A revival of interest in the thought of Theodore of Mopsuestia has been one of the notable developments in recent study of the history of Christian thought. *Manhood and Christ* represents an attempt to indicate some of the sources of Theodore's distinctive doctrine of the Person of Christ by examining its basis in his philosophical and theological doctrine of man. At the same time, it sets Theodore's teaching against the background of the major fourth-century currents of philosophical thought and of the Apollinarian christology which represents the historical antithesis to the views of Theodore and other members of the Antiochene School.

MANHOOD AND CHRIST

A Study in the Christology of
Theodore of Mopsuestia

BY

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ASSISTANT PROFESSOR OF CHURCH HISTORY
AND HISTORICAL THEOLOGY IN THE
PHILADELPHIA DIVINITY SCHOOL

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JOHANNI CLAIBORNE DAVIS

MAGISTRO DISCIPULUS

AMICO AMICUS

HOC OPUSCULUM

GRATO ANIMO

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AUCTOR

PREFACE

THE present work is essentially an attempt to uncover some of the roots of the classical Antiochene christology; it is, therefore, at the same time an attempt to suggest, by way of illustration, that a view of the Person of Christ is not formulated and cannot be discussed simply in terms of formally christological considerations. To understand and to criticize a christology is to understand and criticize a total theological outlook, a total intellectual framework for portraying the relation of man to God. And what has been essayed here is a partial reconstruction of the outlook which produced the Antiochene christology in its most characteristic form: the form which it assumed in the thought of Theodore of Mopsuestia.

The research upon which this book is based was undertaken at the General Theological Seminary in New York City, and completed at Oxford University, where its results were embodied in a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. The project was made possible initially through the generosity of the Rhodes Trustees; and their assistance was materially supplemented by the kindness of the Vicar and Congregation of the University Church of St. Mary the Virgin, and by the hospitality of the President and Fellows of St. John's College.

The sole justification of prefaces lies in the opportunity they afford for an author to discharge in words debts which would otherwise go unacknowledged as well as unpaid. I must therefore seize this occasion to express my gratitude to those who have encouraged, watched over, and contributed to this project: to the Reverend Professor K. J. Woollcombe, formerly Fellow of St. John's College, without whose 'long continuance of nursing care and protection' it would never have been begun or finished; to the Reverend Professor W. Norman Pittenger, whose keen interest and gracious wisdom immeasurably assisted the work; to my former colleague, the Reverend Doctor L. G. Patterson, for many long and invaluable conversations; and to the Reverend Professor Henry Chadwick, whose criticisms and encouragement have contributed much to the final form of the

work. Of course I must add that these men are not to be held responsible for the defects and limitations of the book; but they are mostly responsible for whatever may be right in it.

Finally, I must add a word of thanks to my colleagues on the Faculty of the Divinity School in Philadelphia, as well as to the students there during the past three years; for they have suffered with this book far more than has the author.

R. A. NORRIS, Jr.

The Divinity School
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INTRODUCTION

THE christology of Theodore of Mopsuestia, which was something of a *cause célèbre* in the fifth and sixth centuries, has recently become the subject of renewed discussion and controversy. The immediate reason for this fresh interest in Theodore among theologians and historians has been the recovery of large portions of his work which had previously been thought lost.[1] These new discoveries have evoked a whole series of scholarly studies, which in their turn have produced a growing interest in the question of Theodore's christological orthodoxy, as well as a growing recognition of the historical and doctrinal significance of his thought.

There can be no doubt that Theodore is a figure of singular importance in the history of Christian doctrine. It was he who first developed and systematized the theological outlook of the so-called 'Antiochene School', whose protracted conflict with Alexandrian thinkers furnishes much of the matter of fourth- and fifth-century church history. For the later Antiochenes and their opponents alike, Theodore was the Antiochene teacher *par excellence*. In his exegetical writings he employed and defended the literalistic, anti-allegorical method of scriptural interpretation which was favoured in Antiochene circles. In his dogmatic writings he propounded the undoubted original of the Nestorian christology, with its thoroughgoing emphasis on the fullness of Christ's humanity and the duality of his 'natures'. Theodore's successors, from Nestorius on, may have altered the pattern of his thought as they attempted to restate and defend its central principles; but there could be no question that his were the writings in which the Antiochene point of view was first shaped into a coherent form, and in which its characteristic traits were most fully and clearly manifested.

Theodore's reputation as 'the Nestorius before Nestorius' has

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[1] Among these are Theodore's Catechetical Lectures and his commentary on the Fourth Gospel in Syrian versions, as well as extensive fragments in Greek and Latin of his commentaries on the Psalms, on Genesis, and on the Fourth Gospel. For details of editions and translations, see the appended Bibliography.

made it quite inevitable that the centre of interest for students of his thought should be his teaching about the Person of Christ. It was this teaching which occasioned his condemnation by the Council of Constantinople nearly a century and a quarter after his death; and it is the question of the justice of the Council's decision which has most engaged the interest of modern interpreters of Theodore. Moreover, just because the substantial orthodoxy of Theodore's christology went largely unquestioned during his lifetime, the historian may reasonably hope to discover in his writings a less self-conscious, and therefore a more ingenuous, Antiochene point of view than that, say, of Nestorius' *Bazaar of Heracleides.* From Theodore one may hope to recover both the classical form and the original context of one of the two principal eastern traditions in patristic teaching about the Person of Christ.

But an inquiry into Theodore's christology may take one of several different courses, according as the intent of the inquiry is differently defined. For example, it is possible to direct attention to the popular question of Theodore's orthodoxy. Does he in fact, by the standards of the Chalcedonian Definition, formulate the doctrine of the Incarnation satisfactorily? And this question itself can be posed in two distinct forms. It is of interest to determine whether the christological terminology which Theodore employs is formally orthodox. But it is of equal interest to ascertain whether the language he uses, be it formally orthodox or not, is in fact intended to express the teaching about the Person of Christ which the Church came generally to accept. It is to these questions that F. A. Sullivan has addressed himself in his recent monograph, *The Christology of Theodore of Mopsuestia.*[1]

There is, however, an alternative way of approaching the problem of Theodore's christology: one which may, from the point of view of the historian of doctrine, prove in some respects the more fruitful. For Theodore's christology coheres with, and is determined by, his outlook on other, broader, theological and philosophical issues of his day. Theodore was, to be sure, no philosopher. He belongs, if anywhere, in the class of what moderns have learned to call 'biblical theologians'. But it is seldom if ever that the biblical theologian can succeed in shaking

[1] Rome, 1956.

himself quite free from the intellectual life of his own time and place, with its own characteristic problems and presuppositions; and we may well suspect that Theodore can hardly have escaped the influence, positive and negative, of the diffused popular Platonism which was the 'philosophy' of his day and the customary vehicle of the biblical theology of his time. In what specific ways, then, is Theodore's distinctive christology related to the secular philosophy which prevailed in the fourth and fifth centuries? To what extent is his christology shaped, consciously or unconsciously, by the philosophical thought-patterns of his age? These questions assume an even greater significance when we recollect that much recent scholarship has been at pains to call attention to the organic relationship between Theodore's christology and his doctrine of man.[1] If this emphasis is correct, then Theodore's understanding of Christ cannot be grasped or appreciated apart from a prior analysis of the anthropology which is its setting; and such an analysis must necessarily concern itself with the philosophical as well as the biblical foundations of his doctrine of man. An adequate comprehension of Theodore's christology presupposes at least that it be expounded against the background of fourth-century treatment of the problem of man.

There are two obvious advantages to be looked for in such an approach to the question of Theodore's christology. For one thing, it permits an historical, as opposed to a merely dogmatic, estimate of Theodore's position, by bringing his thought into an explicit relationship with the predominant intellectual currents of his time. At the same time, it serves to set his christology in the perspective of his system as a whole, and thus permits an estimate of its significance as the expression of a unified theological and philosophical point of view.

In following such a programme as this, we shall be interested in two closely connected but by no means identical questions: that of the philosophical bases of Theodore's christological outlook, and that of the relationship between his teaching about the Incarnation and his understanding of the problem of man. Obviously, anyone who opens the second of these questions must interest himself in the first as well. It would scarcely be possible to discuss Theodore's doctrine of man without at the

[1] See below, Appendix II.

same time pursuing its philosophical affinities; and in this sense to relate Theodore's christology with his anthropology is necessarily to inquire into certain of the philosophical grounds of his view of the Incarnation. On the other hand, it is equally obvious that the first of these questions has a greater scope than the second. In seeking the philosophical connexions of Theodore's doctrine of Christ, one might, for example, proceed by way of his doctrine, not of man, but of God: the one course would be as legitimate as the other. Here, however, we shall concern ourselves simply with Theodore's anthropology. The problem of man, his nature and his destiny, will provide the middle term by means of which we shall hope to exhibit Theodore's christology in its connexion with the broader philosophical bases of his thought.

To accomplish this end, we shall necessarily take up much of our time, not with treating of Theodore directly, but with an inquiry into the historical context of his thought. Our attention must be directed first to the general principles of philosophical anthropology as they were understood by Christians and pagans alike in the fourth and fifth centuries. Then we shall discuss in more detail certain specific philosophical doctrines or problems which had a special bearing on patristic treatments of Christ and of human nature. The question must next arise of how these doctrines or problems became ingredients in Christian interpretations of the Person of Christ; and in order to provide a partial answer to this question, and one which will furnish something of a 'control' for our later discussion of Theodore, we shall devote a further section to consideration of the relationship between christology and philosophical anthropology in the teaching of Apollinaris of Laodicea. Apollinaris' point of view may be expected to provide both a specimen of the way in which, in the fourth century, these two dogmatic themes were interrelated, and at the same time a useful contrast with the specific position of Theodore.

With the background thus provided, we shall be able to raise the question of Theodore's treatment of the themes and problems which were occupying the minds of his contemporaries. His doctrine of man, formulated as it is in terms of his own understanding of the Christian Scriptures, can be examined in its relation with the philosophical outlook which it presupposes

and criticizes. Theodore gives some account of the Fall of Adam and its consequences; and he dwells at length on his characteristic doctrine of the 'two ages'. But how are his discussions of these doctrines related to his analysis of the constitution of man, or to his conception of the ontological relation between the soul and its divine Source? What is the *differentia* of his ethical and religious analysis of the human situation? The answers to these queries will in themselves indicate something of the extent to which the governing ideas of Theodore's theology were products of his involvement in the problems of contemporary philosophical anthropology; and by the same token they will provide some clue as to the genesis of his interpretation of the Person of Christ.

For this is the final question with which we must deal: that of the sense in which Theodore's christology, viewed as an alternative to an Apollinarian type of christology, can be understood as the product of a particular view of human nature and of the human situation. The significance and the positive meaning of a christological formula can only be estimated properly when the motives and premises which gave rise to it are taken into account, and when these are understood in the historical context in which they operated. The 'point' of Theodore's christology, therefore, must be presumed to lie in the job which it was intended to do: in the fundamental notion of man and his destiny to which it was intended to give expression. It will be our task, accordingly, to restate the fundamental elements of Theodore's christology and to exhibit these in their direct or indirect relation to the themes of his anthropology, itself understood against the background of fourth-century speculation about the nature of man, both secular and Christian.

In a sense, then, we are embarking upon a twofold enterprise. In the first instance, our interest is centred upon the specific problem of the sources of a typically 'Antiochene' christology of the fourth and early fifth centuries. But secondarily, in pursuit of this goal, we shall be tracing out an illustrative segment of the history of the relation between Christian theology and secular thought. And it may be that in this process we shall find the basis for a constructive estimate of Theodore's accomplishment as an expositor of the Church's traditional valuation of Christ.

Part I

THE PHILOSOPHICAL PROBLEM OF MAN IN THE FOURTH AND FIFTH CENTURIES

1

Philosophy in the Late Roman Empire

To discuss the philosophical problem of man as that was conceived in the fourth and early fifth centuries means, in practice, to investigate the teaching of late Platonism on the human soul, its origin, its destiny, and its relation to the body which it animates. By the time of the Council of Nicaea, the multiplicity of schools and sects which had characterized Hellenistic philosophy was a thing of the past. Its place had been taken by a revived, eclectic Platonism which became, in one or another of its forms, *the* philosophy of the late Roman Empire. Within this movement as a whole, historians of philosophy distinguish several periods or stages of development. It is customary to separate the earlier 'Middle Platonism' (itself by no means a perfectly uniform body of doctrine) of such authors as Albinus, Numenius, and Plutarch from the 'Neo-Platonism' of Plotinus and his followers. Further, there is a difference both of spirit and of doctrine between the 'classical' Neo-Platonism of Plotinus (and in part perhaps of Porphyry), and that of such later writers as Iamblichus, Syrianus, and Proclus. The latter, in a manner which might aptly be styled scholastic, developed and systematized the Plotinian metaphysic in order to provide a theoretical foundation for a self-conscious revival of pagan religion in the face of the growing threat of Christianity. Yet however immense the gap may be between an Albinus and a Proclus, there remains a fundamental unity of outlook which characterizes the whole sweep of late imperial Platonism. This unity may be detected not only in a common devotion to Plato, and in a common set of general philosophical presuppositions, but also in a number of sets of what may be termed common doctrinal themes, *loci communes* of a philosophical tradition. In investigating the philosophical problem of man in the prevailingly Neo-Platonic fourth century, we shall in effect be treating of one such set of themes and questions:

that one whose central concern is the issue of the soul—its nature, its connexion with the visible world, and its ultimate destiny.

Before proceeding to this discussion, however, it will be as well to say something of the relation of Neo-Platonic thought to the doctrine of other ancient philosophical schools, and in particular of its relation to that of the Stoics and Peripatetics. In what form did the teaching of Aristotle and the Stoics in fact survive in the fourth and fifth centuries of the Christian era? To what extent were they distinguishable elements in the intellectual milieu of Christian authors of the time? A great deal has been written of the 'Aristotelianism' of Theodore of Mopsuestia and the Antio-chenes generally;[1] and the same is true in the case of Apollinaris of Laodicea, whose thought has been remarked to have certain affinities with Stoicism as well. For our purposes, therefore, it is important to have some notion of the extent to which, and the spirit in which, Aristotle and the Stoics were read and studied in the fourth century of the Christian era, if only because by this means we may come to a preliminary conclusion as to the likeli-hood that a theological 'Aristotelianism', in the usual sense of the term, should have flourished during this period.

Aristotle and the Late Platonists

The Platonism of the second and following centuries was, we have said, an essentially eclectic philosophy which, while looking to the writings of Plato for its primary inspiration, nevertheless drew upon other sources for its interpretation and systematiza-tion of the Master's thought. It is not in the least surprising, therefore, to find that the teaching of Aristotle, partially mediated through his later commentators and followers, is a significant in-fluence upon late Platonism in all stages of its development. From before the time of Albinus, Aristotle's syllogistic logic was one of the elements in the Platonic school-tradition;[2] and by the end of Porphyry's career, this logic was well on its way to becoming the unique means of initiation into the study of philosophy.[3] The

[1] See below, Appendix II.
[2] Cf. R. E. Witt, *Albinus and the History of Middle Platonism* (Cambridge, 1937), pp. 64 f.
[3] For Porphyry's interest in the logical works of Aristotle cf. Zeller, *Philosophie der Griechen*, 3rd ed., iii. 2, pp. 640 and 644. Porphyry's *Eisagoge*, treating of the Aristotelian doctrine of the predicables, became the introductory logical textbook

Peripatetic doctrine of the categories also appears to have been accepted by certain authors within the stream of late Platonism; although others, and notably Plotinus himself, explicitly re-jected it.[1] Of more significance, perhaps, is the contribution to Middle- and Neo-Platonic thought made by the Aristotelian conception of a transcendent supreme God, defined as self-thinking Intellect, who acts as the unmoved Source of cosmic motion. This conception, conflated with the idea, derived from Plato's *Timaeus*, of a creator-God, lies behind the theology of such writers as Albinus and Maximus of Tyre, and reappears, no doubt much altered, in the Second Hypostasis of the Plotinian metaphysic.[2] Furthermore, such a thinker as Plotinus can adopt Aristotelian theses in points of detail, as in his careful distinction between ἀνάμνησις and μνήμη.[3]

As these examples will serve to suggest, Aristotle remained a living influence on the thought of late Platonic philosophers; and it is therefore not surprising to observe that Neo-Platonic writers, beginning with Porphyry, not only read Aristotle, but also produced a whole series of commentaries on his works. Plotinus himself, in the *Enneads*, can often be found discussing some problem raised by the teaching of Aristotle,[4] or alluding to the Peripatetic position on the question under his consideration. This familiarity with Aristotle, and constant reference to his views, evinces an attitude which was, in later generations, to produce the commentaries not only of Porphyry, but of Themis-tius and the Alexandrian Neo-Platonic School generally. In the first instance, no doubt, it is always the Aristotelian logic which is at the centre of attention; but Aristotle's metaphysics, his physics, and his psychology were known and studied as well.

Behind this Neo-Platonic interest in Aristotle lies, of course, a view of the relationship between the systems of Plato and Aristotle. Themistius, for example, a 'Peripatetic', is at great pains to point out the fundamental agreement between the two

for later Oriental, Byzantine, and Western philosophy. Cf. Ueberweg–Praechter, *Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie* (Berlin, 1926), i, p. 610.

[1] Cf. R. E. Witt, op. cit., p. 118; *Enneads* vi. 1. 1 ff.; and Ueberweg–Praechter, p. 530.
[2] Cf. R. E. Witt, op. cit., pp. 125 ff.; A. H. Armstrong, *The Architecture of the Intelligible Universe in the System of Plotinus* (Cambridge, 1940), p. 11.
[3] *Enneads* iv. 3. 25.
[4] Plotinus' discussion, already alluded to of the Aristotelian doctrine of the Categories, supplies one instance of this.

teachers. He refers to 'the divine Plato',[1] and hastens in one place
to deny that an apparent attack of Aristotle on Plato is really
intended as such at all: it is rather, he says, an attack on the
views of Timaeus, Socrates' interlocutor.[2] In this attitude, Themis-
tius is typical of many philosophers of the Platonic revival, who
attempted consciously to reconcile the teaching of Aristotle with
that of Plato.[3] They were by no means unaware of differences
between the two masters; nor were they, as we shall have reason
to see, incapable of setting aside an Aristotelian view when it
entered too obviously into conflict with a Platonic text. By and
large, however, they were committed to the position that Aristotle
and Plato were in fundamental accord, and it was this presupposi-
tion which encouraged them to assume that the Aristotelian logic
was in fact contained or implied in the system of Plato, and that
the teaching of Aristotle on other than logical questions might
reasonably be adjusted to, or conflated with, the views of Plato
as those were currently understood. As a consequence of this
attitude, Neo-Platonic philosophy, especially after the time of
Porphyry, was in fact the transmitting agent for Aristotelian
thought; but in its own use and understanding of Aristotle, the
Stagirite appears rather as a contributor to the ongoing stream of
Platonism, than as an independent master in his own right: he is,
that is to say, an Aristotle whose thought is understood in a con-
text of Neo-Platonic presuppositions.

It is this fact, moreover, which must be kept in mind when
notice is taken of the interest of fifth-century Syrian–Nestorian
translators in the works of Aristotle. Attention is often drawn to
the report of Ebedjesu[4] to the effect that 'Ibas, Kumi and Probas
rendered the books of the Interpreter [i.e. Theodore] and the
writings of Aristotle out of the Greek into Syriac'. This simul-
taneous Nestorian interest in Theodore and Aristotle has been
thought to lend credit to the view that the Antiochene school
generally was 'Aristotelianizing' in its tendency. Of course, a final
verdict on this judgement must await examination of the thought
of individual Antiochene authors. Nevertheless, the association
of the names of Theodore and Aristotle need mean, in itself,

[1] *Paraphrasis in De anima* (ed. Heinze), p. 4, l. 15.
[2] Ibid., p. 19, l. 23.
[3] Cf. Armstrong, op. cit., p. 7; W. Jaeger, *Nemesios von Emesa* (Berlin, 1914),
p. 60.
[4] *Apud* Assemani, *Bibliotheca Orientalis*, iii. 1, p. 85.

no more than that these translators were, besides being disciples
of Theodore, faithful pupils of the Neo-Platonic tradition which
had begun to use the logical writings of Aristotle as the introduc-
tory textbooks for philosophical study. This conclusion is, if any-
thing, confirmed by the fact that the same Probas whom Ebedjesu
names as a translator of Aristotle was also the author of a com-
mentary on Porphyry's *Eisagoge*:[1] a commentary which, according
to Baumstark, betrays the influence of Syrianus, head of the
Neo-Platonic School at Athens after 435.[2] We may suspect, there-
fore, both that Edessene interest in Aristotle was centred primarily
in his works on logic, and that the context within which this
interest was engendered was that of traditional Neo-Platonic
school-philosophy, which had not at this period, even in Alexandria,
become the more thoroughly Aristotelianized philosophy of the
later Christian Monophysites. In any case, in interpreting such
evidence as that of Ebedjesu, it is necessary to recall that interest
in Aristotle in the fourth and early fifth centuries was itself
a phenomenon within the circle of an historically eclectic Neo-
Platonism, and, consequently, to eschew any tendency to isolate
the 'Aristotelianism' of the period from the Neo-Platonic stream
in which it was transmitted. Especially, for present purposes,
should this principle be kept in mind when the question of Theo-
dore of Mopsuestia's alleged 'Aristotelianism' is raised.

Stoicism in Fourth-century Philosophy

Stoicism, in its relation with late Platonism, is in a case some-
what different from that of the doctrine of Aristotle. To be sure,
just as there can be no doubt of the influence of Plato's thought on
such representatives of the Middle and Late Stoa as Posidonius
and Marcus Aurelius, so there is no question that Stoicism was
one of the ingredients in the highly diversified movement called
Middle Platonism. Antiochus of Ascalon, whose revolt against
the scepticism of the Academy marks a beginning of the Platonic
revival, was himself apparently more of a Stoic than a strict
Platonist, and was inclined to regard Zeno, the founder of the
Stoa, as a Platonic reformer.[3] Stoicizing tendencies have been

[1] For the text, cf. A. Baumstark, *Aristoteles bei den Syrern* (Leipzig, 1900), pp.
148 ff.   [2] Ibid., p. 142.
[3] Cf. Ueberweg–Praechter, i, p. 470; and Armstrong, *Introduction to Ancient
Philosophy* (London, 1957), p. 146.

noted in such writers as Gaius,[1] Atticus,[2] and even Plutarch.[3] R. E. Witt traces the presence of Stoic themes in Albinus' treatment of the divisions of philosophy, as well as in his discussions of epistemology, logic, and ethics.[4]

But where Plotinus and his followers are concerned, the influence of the Stoa is not so easy to detect. A glance at the system of Plotinus would be sufficient to reveal the innumerable points on which he differs radically from the classical Stoic teachers. His doctrine of divine transcendence; his insistence upon the immateriality of the soul; his assertion, after the Aristotelian and Middle Platonic manner, of the eternity of the cosmos; the otherworldly character of his ethic—all of these positions are diametrically contrary to the teaching of the Porch. On the other hand, Porphyry himself, who notes Plotinus' indebtedness to Aristotle, calls attention also to the presence of Stoic elements in his master's thought.[5] Among modern writers, W. Jaeger has argued at length for the indebtedness of Neo-Platonism to the vitalistic cosmological monism of Posidonius. Plotinus will have nothing to do with the strict Stoic conception of Fate or Necessity. Nevertheless, his qualified adoption of the doctrine of universal sympathy, and his correlative portrayal of the cosmos as an ensouled organic whole, point plainly to a relationship between his cosmology and the Stoic monism which achieved its most systematic statement in the teaching of Posidonius—himself apparently indebted to the *Timaeus* of Plato. In this sense, according to Jaeger, Posidonius may be called 'the true father of Neo-Platonism'.[6]

However this may be, it requires to be said that the tradition of Stoic teaching did not survive within Neo-Platonism in the same sense as did that of Aristotle. The views of the Stoic philosophers may have been influential by reason of the diffusion of Stoic thought within the world of the early Empire; but they were not a living force within the Neo-Platonic tradition. Neo-Platonic interest in Aristotle expressed itself in a careful attention to his works, which in turn resulted in an ultimate transformation in the

[1] Ueberweg–Praechter, i, p. 541.
[2] Ibid., pp. 549 f. And for Atticus' anti-Peripatetic polemic, cf. H. Koch, *Pronoia und Paideusis* (Berlin, 1932), pp. 269 ff.
[3] Ueberweg–Praechter, i, p. 539 f.
[4] Op. cit., pp. 10 ff.   [5] *De vita Plotini* 14 (ed. Bréhier, p. 15).
[6] W. Jaeger, *Nemesios von Emesa*, p. 120. Cf. Zeller, op. cit. iii. 2, p. 427.

shape of Neo-Platonic thought itself, especially within the Alexandrian School in its final period. The original writings of the Stoic philosophers, on the contrary, were neglected if not forgotten: and the presence of Stoic themes within Neo-Platonism was rather an after-effect of their former currency in the Hellenistic world and that of the early Empire.

Furthermore, it should be remarked that the survival of Stoic ideas in the period of the fourth and fifth centuries is, in certain respects, more prominently marked in the thought of some Christian authors, than in that of Neo-Platonic philosophers generally: as we shall have particular reason to note in the case of Apollinaris of Laodicea. Spanneut has pointed out that the earliest fathers of the church, including a thinker as influential as Clement of Alexandria, were imbued with the themes of Stoic cosmology and psychology;[1] and it may be supposed that within the tradition of Christian theological writing, certain of these themes would be handed on and used even after the time when a form of Platonism had become the dominant secular philosophical influence.

While, then, both Stoicism and Aristotelianism were, in differing ways, elements in the philosophical milieu of the fourth and early fifth centuries, it remains the case that such elements were subordinated to the predominant Platonism of the time, which was indeed their historic vehicle. Consequently, it is to the philosophy of late Platonism itself that we must turn to define the shape of the problem of man as that was conceived in the era of the great christological debates. Needless to say, we shall not be interested primarily in the system of any one author, though the figure of Plotinus must necessarily loom large in any discussion of Neo-Platonic philosophy. Nor, for that matter, shall we attempt to assess or define the original genius of any of the writers to whose work we must refer. On the contrary, it is to the commonplaces of this philosophy, as it treats of anthropological problems, that we shall want to attend most closely, in order to acquire some picture of the *problématique* of the doctrine of man in the diffused and somewhat diversified philosophical tradition which lies in the background of the thought of Theodore of Mopsuestia. And first of all, we shall want to sketch the outlines of the metaphysical background against which this doctrine of man in its detail is to be understood.

[1] This is the burden of Fr. Spanneut's recent work, *Le Stoïcisme des Pères de l'Église* (Paris, 1957).

2

Central Metaphysical Themes
in Late Platonism

THE anthropology, or better, perhaps, the psychology, of Neo-Platonic authors is to a large extent determined and governed by certain more general philosophical themes and prepossessions; and a discussion of the former necessarily presupposes some grasp of the latter. Moreover, it is the metaphysic implicit in Neo-Platonic psychology, rather than the formulas of that psychology itself, which ultimately defines the difference between the outlook of the fourth- or fifth-century philosopher and that of the Christian theologian who was his contemporary. For both of these reasons, it is incumbent upon us here to call attention to certain of the fundamental metaphysical positions and concerns which characterized Neo-Platonic thought generally, and also to indicate some of the basic questions which, at this level, were at issue between Christian thinkers and their pagan contemporaries. For in the last resort, it is only in this way that one can understand Neo-Platonic psychology in its intellectual setting, or for that matter understand the ambiguous relationship which existed between the Christian theology of the time and the pagan philosophy which it necessarily employed as a tool.

Dualism in the Platonic Tradition

The Neo-Platonic doctrine of the soul is formulated against the background of the classical Platonic contrast between intelligible and sensible reality: and our first task must therefore be to explore the terms of this dualism, which, though strongly qualified by Plotinus, remained fundamental both for him and for his followers.

In the *Timaeus*, a virtual textbook for the philosophy of the imperial age, Plato lays down as the presupposition of his argument a distinction between the realm of Being (τὸ ὄν) and that of Becoming (τὸ γιγνόμενον).[1] His subsequent explanation of this distinction makes it plain that it rests ultimately upon an epistemological basis. 'Being' is that which is 'always the same', and which, therefore, is the object of knowledge in the true sense: νοήσει μετὰ λόγου περιληπτόν. 'Becoming', on the other hand, is that which is perceived by sense: the realm of change and flux, concerning which only probable opinion is possible. Moreover, Plato makes it clear at the next step in his argument that the distinction between Being and Becoming corresponds to that between corporeal and incorporeal. From the fact that the cosmos is visible, tangible, and material, it is possible to infer that it belongs in the category of things which have 'come to be'.[2] In yet another passage in the *Timaeus*, he suggests that the two terms of this dualism may be opposed as 'divisible' and 'indivisible' existence.[3]

This terminology, which Plato employs to contrast the realm of eternal, self-identical Forms with that of changing, perishable substance, remains fundamental for every area of later Platonic speculation. From one point of view, it is the difference between mutability and changelessness which is in question, and therefore by derivation the difference between time and eternity.[4] From another point of view, the same contrast can be considered as holding between the sensible and the intelligible, the visible and the invisible, the corporeal and the incorporeal. By the same token, the lower realm is understood as encompassing all that is extended, whether in time or in space, and hence all that is composite or capable of being analysed into parts. And since, inevitably, whatever is in this sense σύνθετος must, at the same time, be susceptible of dissolution, it follows that the order of sensible existence is coextensive with that of the perishable and mortal. By contrast, the intelligible world is neither in space nor in time: it is indivisible, and consequently immortal and imperishable. Correlated with the terms of this dualism are the notions of 'passion' (πάθος) and 'impassibility' (ἀπάθεια); for it is only the mutable and temporal which is subject to alteration or modification of nature: intelligible reality, Being, since it is eternally self-identical and changeless, is at the same time purely active in its nature, and thus ἀπαθές. Finally, this same contrast

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[1] *Timaeus* 27 d 5–28 a 4.   [2] Ibid. 28 b 8.
[3] Ibid. 35 a 1 ff.   [4] Cf. *Enneads* iii. 7. 4.

may be expressed in terms of the differentiation between the generate and the ingenerate,[1] in at least one, if not both, of its common acceptations. It is in these terms, for example, that Proclus defines the difference between 'divisible' and 'indivisible' existence: '. . . of the things that exist, some are intelligible and ingenerate, others are perceptible and generate.'[2]

In Plato's use, as we have indicated, these contrasting sets of epithets were employed to characterize the difference between the visible world of sense on the one hand, and the order of intelligibles on the other. In the Neo-Platonic scheme, the same *fundamentum divisionis* is employed; but the order of intelligibles, the Forms, appears under the guise of νοῦς (Intellect), conceived, after the Aristotelian manner,[3] as the identity of Thinker and Thought,[4] and subordinated in the order of being to the transcendent One. Thus when such an author as Chalcidius addresses himself to the Platonic distinction between Being and Becoming, or between indivisible and divisible substance, it is always with the understanding that by 'substantia individua', Plato means

[1] The words γενητός and ἀγένητος bear several shades of meaning in the later Greek philosophical tradition. Albinus employs ἀγένητος as a correlate of ἀφθάρτος (*Epit.* x. 8, xii. 1) and ἀνώλεθρος (xxv. 4). The soul, he points out, as the self-moving source of cosmic motion, is necessarily both unbegotten and imperishable (cf. *Phaedrus* 245 d). Here ἀγένητος seems clearly to suggest that the soul has no temporal beginning of its existence, as it will have no end. On the other hand, Albinus explains (xiv. 3) that to describe the cosmos as γενητός is not to say that it has a beginning in time. Rather, it entails two assertions: (1) that the visible world is ἀεὶ ἐν γενέσει—that its existence is a perpetual process of change and decay; and (2) that the cause of its ὑπόστασις lies outside itself. Thus 'generatedness' implies primarily *mutability* and *ontological dependence*. (Cf. Numenius, who explains (*apud* Euseb. *Praep. Ev.* xi. 9. 10) that ἀγέννητον is opposed to τρεπόμενον and thus suggests at once imperishability and unalterability.) Accordingly, Porphyry (*Sent.* xiv) distinguishes two senses of γεννητός: entities may be (1) γεννητὰ . . . ὡς αἰτίου ἠρτημένα, or (2) γεννητὰ . . . ὡς σύνθετα (in which case they are also φθαρτά and, presumably, τρεπτά). The word may bear either one of these two meanings separately, or both simultaneously. In neither case is the connotation of a beginning in time necessarily present. Cf. Proclus, *In Tim.* ii. 4. 17 ff. (Diehl).

[2] *In Tim.* ii. 402 (Diehl).

[3] Cf. Aristotle, *De anima* 430ᵃ4, 14 for the identification of νοοῦν and νοούμενον in the active intellect. Later commentators of the Peripatetic School bring this discussion into conjunction with Aristotle's description of the Prime Mover in the *Metaphysics*, and identify active intellect as the First Cause. Cf. Alexander Aphr. *In De anima* 139ᵛ9–23.

[4] The beginnings of this view are, of course, to be found in the Middle Platonic conception of the Forms or Ideas as the content of the divine Intellect. Cf. Albinus, *Epit.* ix. 1. With this one may compare and contrast Plotinus' observation that thinker and thought are one (*Enn.* ii. 9. 1, cf. ii. 9. 6), and his identification of Intellect, the Ideas, and true Being (*Enn.* v. 9. 6 ff., cf. v. 1. 4).

nothing more or less than 'mens intellectusque', which, in turn, is to be identified with the 'intelligibilia'.[1] From one point of view, therefore, the fundamental problem of Neo-Platonic psychology is to locate the soul metaphysically by defining its relation on the one hand to the visible world which it inhabits, and, on the other hand, to the intelligible world, the intellectual substance, with which it is naturally affiliated.

Nor is this a problem of merely theoretical interest. For within the Platonic scheme of things the distinction between sensible and intelligible being is pre-eminently a matter of practical concern. Not only does it contain an implicit judgement of value, and thus in effect supplies the basis for a definition of the human good; it also records the philosopher's apprehension of the ambivalence of human nature: his recognition that the soul is a denizen of two worlds at once, and these worlds not altogether of a piece. Like the Socrates of the *Phaedo*, the Neo-Platonic philosopher senses that when the human soul acts in and for itself, without the intervention of body, it is drawn immediately to the realm of that which is 'pure and eternal and immortal and self-identical'.[2] Consequently, he sees in the soul's association with the sensible world and with its individual body the ultimate source or occasion of those passions and impulses which serve to distract the soul from the contemplative life which is its proper manner of existence. Hence he can only agree when Socrates concludes that the relationship between the soul and the intelligible world is one of συγγένεια.[3] Since the soul spontaneously aspires to the vision of Being, it follows that by its original and native constitution it must 'belong' to the sphere of incorporeal Forms, and must itself be of an intelligible nature. By contrast, then, its association with body can only be conceived as in some sense unnatural.

Yet the fact of this association is given and must be explained. Moreover, its implications must be reconciled with the equally basic datum of the soul's intelligible nature. Nor is it sufficient, following the logic of a dualistic outlook, merely to explain that the soul's association with the sensible world is the result of a fall from its original state, or that it is a probationary device by which the universal Providence designs to test and educate the soul. For such explanations themselves necessarily imply something about the nature of the soul which makes it difficult to assert

[1] *In Tim.* xxvii.   [2] *Phaedo* 79 d.   [3] Ibid. 81 a.

without qualification that it is of a purely intelligible nature. The dualistic logic requires that the soul be regarded as a stranger in the world of sense; but the fact of the soul's present situation demands that this judgement be somewhat modified. The soul, despite its intelligible and divine nature, cannot be wholly strange to the material world of becoming in which it is set.[1]

Neo-Platonic Monism

There is, then, a tendency within Platonic thought itself to modify or qualify the dualism which informs it; and nowhere is this tendency more plain than in the systems of Plotinus and his followers. The Neo-Platonists retain the terms of the classical dualism, but only within the framework of an over-arching monism.

The most obvious contrast between the system of Plotinus and that of his Middle Platonic predecessors, or that of Plato himself, is to be found in the former's rejection of the hypothesis of a plurality of First Principles, and his derivation of all existence from a single Principle, the transcendent One. Matter itself is not, of course, derived from the One; but neither does it exist as a second principle alongside Unity. Plotinus continues to speak of 'matter', but he reconciles this language with his monistic outlook by denying that matter is 'reality' in any significant sense. Rather, it is to be characterized as the privation of being: it is the darkness which marks the limit beyond which light does not pierce.[2] As a consequence, the Plotinian system appears, at least formally,[3] as a strict monism, and can be understood as a reaction against the thorough-going dualism of the Middle Platonists and the Gnostics.

[1] This view is perhaps best illustrated from the *Timaeus* itself, whose outlook is somewhat different from that of the *Phaedo* with its Orphic-Pythagorean overtones. In the *Timaeus* Plato treats the soul primarily as a cosmological principle, whose importance lies in the fact that it serves as a mediator between the motionless sphere of self-identical forms, and the ever-changing order of material Necessity. The dualism of intelligible and sensible, of Being and Becoming, of course persists. But the nature of the soul is defined as 'mixed'. Since its function is to realize within the universe of change a rational order that reflects the perfection of the Forms, it is described as participating in both Being and Becoming (35 a).

[2] Cf. *Enn.* iii. 6. 7, ii. 4. 16.

[3] Some such qualification as this is clearly required since, despite the monistic character of Plotinus' system in its general outlines, it remains the case that the dualism of Matter and Spirit persists as a thematic element in the whole Plotinian metaphysic, emerging most obviously in its treatment of psychological and ethical problems.

Accompanying this monism, moreover, is a correlative strain of optimism in Plotinus' treatment of the visible world of sense and motion, which, at however far a remove, is nevertheless a product of the eternal procession of being from the One. In his treatise against the Gnostics, Plotinus is found chiding his opponents for their contempt for the created world, as well as for the fact that they find the soul's association with the body a ground of reproach.[1] He recognizes the ontological and axiological inferiority of the visible world to the invisible, but insists that it is not a matter for blame that each sort of being can only achieve perfection after its kind.[2] On the contrary, the visible universe is itself the end-product of the downward procession of being from the One, and as such it is a revelation of the higher Reality which it reflects. In adopting this position, which is a logical consequence of his monistic outlook, Plotinus finds himself at one with the tradition of cosmic religion in Stoicism, and still earlier in the *Timaeus* of Plato.

This attitude inevitably has its effect on a doctrine of the soul: particularly so in view of the fact that soul in Neo-Platonic, as in Platonic and Stoic, thought, is conceived in the first instance as the immanent source of order within the visible cosmos. If the dualistic strain in Platonism proceeds on the assumption of a fundamental opposition between soul and its material container, the optimistic and monistic strain assumes, on the contrary, that embodiment is the natural and inevitable condition of the soul, and one to which, therefore, it is naturally adapted. Just as there is no suggestion in the *Timaeus* that the World Soul's embodied state is a matter for regret, or a situation which will, in the end, be remedied;[3] so for Plotinus there is evidently no reason to suppose either that embodiment as such is necessarily an evil, or that soul in fact ever exists apart from a relation to body. Clearly, it is a serious mistake to suppose that the Platonism which was known to the Christian Fathers of the fourth century, and by which they themselves were, to one degree or another,

[1] Cf. *Enn.* ii. 9. 5 f.   [2] *Enn.* ii. 9. 13.

[3] The same does not hold true, for Plato, of individual souls, possessed as they are of inferior bodies. Their embodiment is not an evil in itself; but it is a state of trial (*Timaeus* 41 e–42 d). If they endure the temptations of earthly life uncorrupted, they may return to the heavenly sphere of the World-Soul itself, there to enjoy the vision of Reality in their conformation to the motion of the Cosmic Intellect.

influenced, was a system merely dualistic in its outlook, and therefore a system whose influence can be estimated simply by observing the extent to which a given writer shows a tendency to propound a strong dualism of soul and body.

The Metaphysical Problem of the Soul in Neo-Platonism

Observation of these two contrary trends in later Platonism supplies a key for understanding the problem of philosophical psychology as it presented itself to fourth-century thinkers. Their psychology appears, in fact, to be the product of two tensions, each of which is implicit in the fundamental tension between monism and an idealistic dualism.

For one thing, as far as the Neo-Platonist is concerned, the soul is necessarily conceived in a double perspective, as affiliated on the one hand with Being, and on the other with Becoming. The soul is defined as a 'mean' between the two orders of existence, corporeal and incorporeal, divisible and indivisible.[1] Consequently, its nature and activities have to be defined with reference both to its character as part of the intelligible order, and to its natural functions as the source of life within the material world. Iamblichus notes the radical divergence from Stoic principle which is implied in what he calls the 'double life' of the soul. The Stoics, he points out, held that the soul has only one life, that which belongs to it as it is related to the body. In the Platonic tradition, however, as well as in the teachings of Pythagoras, the soul has a mode of existence proper to its own nature, which it enjoys quite apart from any association with body.[2] It exists and acts, in fact, on two levels, one of which is native to it, the other of which is accidental, but at the same time proper and inevitable. The soul's nature, therefore, is essentially ambivalent: yet, for the Neo-Platonist, the primary truth of the soul's intelligible nature

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[1] For this doctrine, cf. Porphyry, *Sent.* v: ἡ μὲν ψυχὴ τῆς ἀμερίστου καὶ περὶ τὰ σώματα μεριστῆς οὐσίας μέσον τι, ὁ δὲ νοῦς ἀμερίστος οὐσία μόνον, τὰ δὲ σώματα μερίστα μόνον. . . . The source of this notion is, of course, the *Timaeus* itself (35 a), where the soul is defined as τῆς ἀμερίστου καὶ ἀεὶ κατὰ ταὐτὰ ἐχούσης οὐσίας καὶ τῆς αὖ περὶ τὰ σώματα γιγνομένης μεριστῆς τρίτον ἐξ ἀμφοῖν. Cf. Proclus, *In Tim.* ii. 402 (Diehl). Plotinus (*Enn.* iv. 1. 1) cites the above passage from the *Timaeus*, and explains that soul, while indivisible in its essential nature, is susceptible of a certain kind of divisibility by reason of its entry into body. Thus (iv. 2. 1) it stands between Intellect (the indivisible) and Body (the divisible).

[2] *De anima*, in Stobaeus, *Ecl.* i, p. 368, 1 ff. (Wachsmuth). Cf. *De mysteriis* iii. 3 (Parthey).

makes it difficult for him to accept this ambivalence quite wholeheartedly. Though it be true, as a monistic theodicy demands, that the soul has a natural and rightful place in the world of sense, it remains that, at a deeper level, it is essentially a stranger there, and that its blessedness consists ultimately in its dissociation, however conceived, from the realm of Becoming. The soul may be possessed of a 'double life': but, for the Neoplatonist, in the final analysis, only one of these 'lives' is truly its own. One may well expect, therefore, to find the tension between monism and dualism reflected in his treatment of the nature of the soul.

The same tension, moreover, may be observed in the ambiguity of the Neo-Platonic attitude towards the material world in which the soul is immersed. On the one hand, as we have seen, such a writer as Plotinus can deny that the visible, temporal world of extension is evil in itself.[1] Nevertheless, it is in the fact that the soul is merged with a material body that he sees the cause of its defection from the Good,[2] and he can state quite plainly: 'If . . . body is the cause of evil, then . . . it is matter which is the cause of evil.'[3] Again, Porphyry is quite emphatic in his assertion that it is not 'the flesh', nor anything external to the soul, but the soul itself, which is the cause of its evils;[4] but at the same time, it is body which distracts and misleads the soul, which supplies at once the occasion and the content of evil inclinations.[5] And the uncertain attitude of these two philosophers is not untypical of the late Platonic outlook generally. From the point of view of ontology or theodicy, matter appears as a neutral factor, and body as the lowest work of a benign Providence; but where questions of ethics or of the nature of the soul's blessedness are at stake, the dualistic outlook reasserts itself, and the fundamental contrariety of Matter and Spirit is, as it were, rediscovered.

The problem of rational psychology, then, becomes for the Neo-Platonic thinker that of reconciling two divergent attitudes, each of which he adopts with genuine seriousness. This reconciliation is attempted through a careful analysis of soul's relationship with body on the one hand, and Intellect on the other, and it

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[1] See above, p. 15.   [2] *Enn.* i. 8. 4.   [3] Ibid. i. 8. 8.

[4] *Ad Marcellam* 12. 29. On the literary character of the *Ad Marcellam*, which appears to be largely a catena of traditional philosophical and ethical maxims, see H. Chadwick, *The Sentences of Sextus* (Cambridge, 1959), pp. 143 f. The letter is here cited as reflecting Porphyry's views, if not always as reproducing his own language.

[5] Cf. *Ad Marcellam* 10.

takes the form, essentially, of a justification of the view that the soul is a median substance, whose ultimate origin and destiny is discovered in its affiliation with the Intelligible, but which at the same time possesses a natural place and function with the material world.

Christianity and Neo-Platonic Thought

Neither the dualism nor the monism of the Neo-Platonic outlook was, as such, wholly reconcilable with Christian teaching. On the one hand, the doctrines of the Resurrection and of the Incarnation obviously forbade any such uncompromising opposition between Spirit and Matter as the Platonic tradition generally presupposed. The Christian understanding of 'salvation' included the notion of a redemption of the body, and this conception, with all its ramifications, was wholly foreign to the Neo-Platonic outlook.[1] And needless to say, Christianity brought in its wake a marked tendency to reject any doctrine which sought to define evil simply in terms of materiality. On the other hand, the universe of Christian theology was not a continuous, organic whole as was that of Neo-Platonic philosophy. Christianity confronted the emanationist monism of Plotinus with a doctrine of creation out of nothing, an assertion of the absolute ontological discontinuity between creature and Creator; and this view inevitably entailed (among other things) some modification of the Greek idea that the soul is by natural right a member of the divine order.

But despite these elementary and fundamental divergences, which, with all their implications, could not go unremarked on either side, Christian theology of the fourth and fifth centuries owed to Middle Platonic and Neo-Platonic thought much of the conceptual structure in terms of which it interpreted the Church's gospel. And its wholly natural use of late Platonic thought-forms meant that the presuppositions of this philosophical outlook, as well as the intellectual problems which they generated, became, whether in a disguised or an explicit fashion, part of the framework of Christian theological discussion.

Thus, for example, the Christian thinker, while he tended to reject any equation of matter with evil, nevertheless found a useful instrument in the fundamental Platonic distinction between

[1] Cf. *Enn.* iii. 6. 6 *ad fin.*

intelligible and corporeal substance. In one of its forms, this distinction assisted in clarifying the doctrine of creation, which could very conveniently be expounded in terms of the difference between generate and ingenerate existence. In another form, as employed anthropologically of the opposition between body and soul, it seemed to correspond nicely with the Pauline distinction between 'flesh' and 'spirit'. And of course, taken jointly, these two applications of a fundamental Platonic theme pointed to an obvious rational interpretation of the biblical doctrine of man 'in the image of God'. The fact that the same sets of terms were used to explain the contrast between Creator and creature on the one hand, and 'spirit' and 'flesh' (soul and body) on the other, made it quite natural to suppose that God and the soul were somehow of the same 'kind'. Though certainly a creature, the soul was nevertheless 'more divine' by reason of its intelligible nature than creatures whose substance was merely material or visible. Thus the doctrine of the image often appears as a Christian restatement of the Platonic conception of the continuity of the soul with its divine Source: and such a formulation influenced both the Church's picture of 'salvation' and its view of how that state is to be achieved.

Yet Christian writers were inevitably uncomfortable with such notions as these. The idea of the soul's divinity, even in its Platonist form, is ultimately inconsistent with the doctrine of creation, just as a soul-body dualism is inconsistent with the spirit of the biblical ethic: and these inconsistencies, even if their source and nature were not clearly and explicitly recognized, were nevertheless felt by Christian theologians. In consequence, no patristic thinker of this period is willing to pursue the logic of the philosophical tradition which he had inherited to its normal conclusion. As an interpretative tool, he employs a conceptual framework which, in the event, he cannot regard as satisfactory: his thought is governed by a set of presuppositions whose natural consequences he is forever pressed to modify. Yet these philosophical presuppositions remain as the structure of his rational faith, and inform his understanding of the Gospel at every point.

It is in this way that the problems and presuppositions of late Platonic metaphysics and psychology became the problems of the Christian theologian. In the process, as we have indicated, they were transposed into a new context, and modified by their

juxtaposition with biblical themes. Nevertheless, the peculiar logic of the philosopher's psychology, which we shall now explore in more detail, may be seen to be part and parcel of the theologian's thought-world. How truly this is the case will become abundantly clear when we come to consider the case of Apollinaris of Laodicea; and it remains true, though to a significantly lesser degree, in the case of Theodore of Mopsuestia himself.

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The Nature of the Soul

I**T** is the initial commonplace of all Greek anthropology that man, as a living being ($\zeta\hat{\omega}o\nu$), is a composite, being made up of two parts, a body and a soul. To use the word 'man' is in the first instance to designate just such a compound substance: an embodied soul. This axiom is set down explicitly by Plato;[1] and it is the truism which the fifth-century Christian philosopher, Nemesius of Emesa, propounds in the opening paragraph of his *De natura hominis*. What is more significant, however, for our purposes, is the equally pervasive conviction that man's true self, his 'ego', is the soul itself, the rational member of this partnership. It is the soul which constitutes a man's moral and personal identity. Socrates' hope of immortality is premissed tacitly on this postulate, which assures him that the survival of his soul after death means his own personal survival. Plotinus states the matter explicitly: it is the soul which is the man.[2] The body, he writes, is not strange to the soul, but the soul nevertheless constitutes in itself and independently of the body the real human person.[3] Consequently, for the Neo-Platonist, anthropology means psychology. To reflect on the problem of man, his nature and his destiny, is inevitably to turn one's attention to the soul, in its relationship at once with the body, and with the incorporeal world of which it is a natural member. The initial question, then, of philosophical anthropology is that of the nature of the soul.

The Substantial Nature of the Soul

The first concern of Neo-Platonic psychology is to assert the soul's independence of the body. This principle was epitomized in the description of the soul as a 'substance', something capable of existence in its own right, and was maintained against two

[1] Cf. *Phaedo*, 70 a, 76 c, 95 c; and Plotinus, *Enn.* i. 1. 3, iv. 7. 1.
[2] *Enn.* iv. 7. 1 *ad fin.*; cf. i. 1. 10. Also Porphyry, *Ad Marc.* 8.
[3] *Enn.* iv. 4. 18.

recognized views: the notion, on the one hand, that the soul is a harmony of bodily members or elements, and, on the other, the opinion attributed to Aristotle that the soul is the 'form' (i.e. the abstract specific nature) of an organic body. The former of these views, however, does not seem to have been in any sense a live option. It was known largely through the doxographic tradition of the schools, and there is no indication that it was seriously maintained by any philosopher of the imperial period.[1]

Of more significance is the polemic against Aristotle, who is invariably classified by Neo-Platonic writers as among those who make of the soul something purely relative to the body with which it is associated. It has been argued that this polemic is unjustified: that, in fact, Aristotle, in describing the soul as εἶδος and ἐντελεχεία, was far from intending to deny its substantial nature.[2] And indeed he was explicit in his description of the soul as a substance (οὐσία).[3] But this is not precisely the point. The Neo-Platonic objection is, in the last resort, directed against the genuinely Aristotelian view that the soul is inseparable from its body: the view, that is to say, that as a substance the soul is not independent. Aristotle himself writes: οὐκ ἐστιν ἡ ψυχὴ χωριστὴ τοῦ σώματος;[4] and Alexander of Aphrodisias notes, in the same spirit, that the soul is not οὐσία τις αὐτὴ καθ' αὑτήν.[5] Themistius, the fourth-century Neo-Platonic commentator on Aristotle, also denies that soul and body are separable, but eagerly reiterates Aristotle's opinion that νοῦς, as a part of the soul whose native functions have no essential relation with body, may be described

[1] Nemesius attributes this view to Dicaearchus (*PG*, xl. 537A), and, when he comes to deal with it, alludes to *Phaedo* 92 a–94 e, where Socrates controverts the suggestion of Simmias that the soul is a harmony of the body. Plotinus attributes this opinion to the Pythagoreans (*Enn.* iv. 7. 8; cf. iv. 2. 1), and he too, in rejecting it, refers to the argument of Socrates in the *Phaedo*. It should be noted that Nemesius (*PG*, xl. 553B–556A) seems to attribute some such view as this to Galen, whom he reports (without any great confidence) as tending to think of the soul as a κρᾶσις. But this is evidently not Galen's strict opinion. Cf. Domanski, *Die Psychologie des Nemesius (Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelalters*, iii. 1), p. 9, n. 1. Iamblichus, *De an.*, in Stob. *Ecl.* i. 363, 21 ff. (Wachsmuth) records the existence of a similar view which he associates with the Aristotelian doctrine that the soul is a 'quality', and which Festugière (*Hermès Trismégiste*, vol. iii, *Les Doctrines de l'Âme* (Paris, 1953), p. 179, n. 2) supposes to have originated with Galen. Festugière cites Proclus *In Tim.* iii, p. 349, who attributes to Galen the view that 'The powers of the soul are consequent upon the temperaments of the body'. This statement, however, does not in fact concern the question of the nature of the soul.

[2] So Domanski, op. cit., p. 2, n. 1 *ad fin.*   [3] *De anima*, 412ᵃ21, 27.
[4] *De anima*, 413ᵃ4.   [5] *In De an.* 125ʳ7 f. Cf. 126ʳ1 ff.

as 'separable'.[1] Plotinus takes issue with the opinion that the soul is an ἀχώριστος ἐντελεχεία;[2] and Nemesius similarly is troubled by the Aristotelian notion that the soul does not exist of itself.[3] Chalcidius sums up what was in fact a common view:

. . . non enim specialem essentiam fore animam, quam adpellat Aristoteles entelechiam: haec quippe forma est corporibus accidens . . . et est imago speciei purae a corpore et intellegibilis . . . hoc quippe formabile fit et corrumpitur corporibus solutis, anima vero omni est corpore antiquior habens olim et ante conjugationem corporis substantiam propriam.[4]

As we shall see, the Neo-Platonists were, by and large, willing to use Aristotelian language to the extent of affirming that the soul confers a form on body; but to characterize the soul as in itself the form of a body was to endanger both its pre-existence and its immortality.

The Soul's Immateriality

As the soul is independent of body, so it must, at the same time, be itself of an incorporeal nature. In this connexion, Neo-Platonic polemic is directed against the Stoic doctrine that the soul is πνεῦμα, a fiery material breath which permeates the body totally, and is the source of life and seat of reason within the human organism, as well as the power which causes the body to cohere as a unity. The Neo-Platonic schools did not dispense altogether with the notion of πνεῦμα.[5] But there could be no question, for the

[1] *Paraphrasis in De Anima* (ed. Heinze), 43. 21 ff. Themistius differs from Alexander in maintaining that active intellect is a part of the individual soul, and not to be confused with the First Cause (see above, p. 12, n. 3). He argues (*Paraphrasis* 106. 29 ff.) that Aristotle's active intellect is to be identified with that part of the individual soul which Plato had described as immortal.

[2] *Enn.* iv. 7. 8 (5).   [3] *PG*, xl. 560B et seq.
[4] *In Tim.* ccxxv.

[5] Iamblichus (*De an.*, in Stob. *Ecl.* i. 363. 21 ff. (Wachsmuth)) explains that a number of authorities have proposed the view that the soul, at least in its embodied state, is associated with a pneumatic 'vehicle', which is assigned certain inferior vital functions, and which at once serves to connect the rational soul with its body, and at the same time encloses and protects it. The sources of this doctrine (for which see E. R. Dodds, 'The Astral Body in Neoplatonism', in *Proclus: The Elements of Theology* (Oxford, 1933), pp. 313 ff.) are not directly in Stoicism, but are to be sought in Galen's conception of πνεῦμα ψυχικόν, which has both Stoic and Aristotelian roots. Aristotle had spoken of πνεῦμα as the 'first instrument' of the soul, and Galen applies this description to the πνεῦμα ψυχικόν, which he distinguishes from the πνεῦμα ζωτικόν, and to which he assigns functions relating to sensation and motion. Cf. the discussion of Verbeke, *L'Évolution de la doctrine du pneuma* (Paris and

Neo-Platonist, of identifying the rational soul with a material substance. Plotinus gives great prominence to a series of arguments tending to show that no corporeal nature could in fact perform the functions which pertain to the soul.[1] Only an immaterial principle, he argues, can be the source of life and of order in the world. Further, it is only an incorporeal agent which can operate independently of the qualities and characteristics which confine the scope of the operations of any bodily substance. Moreover, the soul must be wholly and indivisibly present to each of the separable parts of the body which it animates: and this capacity is predicable only of an immaterial entity. Plotinus lays great stress also on the consideration that no bodily substance is possessed of the internal unity which is presupposed in any subject of sensation. And finally, he insists most characteristically that intellectual knowledge can occur only when the soul's apprehension is totally divorced from material conditions; and this state of affairs can obtain only in the case of an immaterial being. This last argument is reinforced by the observation that, since the object of intellectual knowledge is incorporeal, the subject which knows must be incorporeal as well: an application, this, of the principle that 'like knows like'.

A more common type of argument in use among Neo-Platonic writers addressed itself to the Stoic account of the manner in

Louvain, 1945), pp. 207 ff. It is in Galen, too, that the πνεῦμα is first characterized as the ὄχημα of the incorporeal soul (*De plac. Hipp. et Plat.*, pp. 643 ff. (Müller), cited by Dodds, op. cit., p. 316): a description which became traditional in Neo-Platonic circles. In the Neo-Platonic view, the 'spirit' in question was a celestial substance, a 'spiritualized' matter which was not so gross as that which is found in terrestrial bodies, and which, therefore, was a more suitable and docile instrument of the soul. Plotinus denies (*Enn.* iv. 7. 7) that functions of sensation may be assigned to material 'spirit'. Nevertheless, he speaks of πνεῦμα as the vehicle on which the soul is set (*Enn.* iii. 6. 5), and seems to suggest that this pneumatic body is the first to be assumed by the soul as it leaves its celestial home (iv. 3. 15). Nemesius, as is consonant with his use of Galen, accepts the view that πνεῦμα is the soul's intermediary in perception (*PG*, xl. 633B); and in this he seems to be in agreement with Porphyry (*apud* Augustine, *De civ. Dei* x. 9, cf. *Sent.* xxix), who speaks of a *pars spiritalis* of the soul, 'qua corporalium rerum capiuntur imagines'. Porphyry also seems to have held (in contrast with Iamblichus later, cf. *De an.*, in Stob. *Ecl.* i. 363, 21 ff. (Wachsmuth)) that the soul's spiritual sheath belongs to it only during the time of its descent into the material world, and perishes together with the irrational part when the soul returns to its native state. Cf. the discussion of Verbeke, op. cit., pp. 367 f. The tendency to identify 'spirit' with 'intellect' is no part of the Neo-Platonic tradition.

[1] For these arguments cf. *Enn.* iv. 7. 3–8. They are summed up at length by Verbeke, op. cit., pp. 353 ff.

which body and soul are joined. Nemesius cites,[1] as from Chrysippus, a Stoic argument to the effect that an incorporeal substance could not stand in any relation, positive or negative, to a body, and that therefore, since the soul unquestionably is embodied, it must be corporeal in nature. Nemesius' refutation takes the form of a dilemma. Either, he says, the body is not animate throughout, or else the soul is incorporeal. The pivot of his position is found in the allegation, propounded, as we have seen, by Plotinus, that the body's animation requires its total interpenetration by soul. For if the soul is corporeal, such interpenetration is of course impossible, save on the inadmissible hypothesis that two bodies may occupy exactly the same space at the same time. Nemesius' polemic is thus based on a criticism of the Stoic doctrine of κρᾶσις δι' ὅλων[2] as a possible account of the union of body and soul.[3] And the conclusion at which it arrives is exactly the one which Plotinus desiderates. The soul is an immaterial entity: that is to say, its existence is outside space altogether, since it is indivisible, imperceptible, and capable of simultaneous and total presence to any number of parts of a divisible corporeal substance.

[1] *PG*, xl. 549AB.

[2] For a discussion of this doctrine see below, pp. 68 ff.

[3] Nemesius is evidently reproducing here the final and crucial step in a traditional anti-Stoic polemic. A fuller form of the argument appears in Chalcidius' commentary on the *Timaeus*, cap. ccxxii. Chalcidius enumerates three possible ways in which two corporeal substances may combine: *adplicatio*, *permixtio*, and *concretio*. He then rejects each in turn as a conceivable explanation of the union of body and soul. Thus *adplicatio* fails because it will not account for the fact that the *totum animal* (i.e. soul and body) is alive. *Permixtio*, which describes the process by which fine particles of two substances are mingled in juxtaposition, fails also— because, as Chalcidius says, the soul is *unum aliquid*, indivisible, and cannot therefore be split up into parts of any kind. *Concretio*, the third possibility, is set aside as a possible account of the matter on precisely the ground which Nemesius alleges in his discussion. Chalcidius argues, that is to say, that the same space cannot hold double its own capacity. Nemesius (loc. cit.) seems to refer to the earlier steps of the argument allusively when he observes that in the case of any mode of combination alternative to the one he discusses, the body would not be wholly ἔμψυχον. Priscianus Lydus, at a later date, reproduces the same argument, in almost the same form it assumes in Chalcidius: cf. *Solutiones ad Chosroem* (ed. Bywater), p. 44, 15 ff. 'Anima enim a se animato animali aut apponitur aut miscetur aut concreta est. Sed si quidem quasi tangens apponitur, non fortassis esset animal totum animatum. . . . Si autem miscetur, non iam unum erit anima, sed quiddam divisorum et partitorum: unum autem esse oportet animam: non igitur miscetur. Si vero concreta est, corpus totum per corpus totum pertransivit: impossibile autem hoc; duo enim in eodem corpora erunt. Itaque neque apponitur neque miscetur neque concreta est: et necessario neque corpus est.'

The Soul's Immortality

The soul is, then, to be defined in the first instance in terms of its incorporeality and its separability from body. Formally considered, these two properties are wholly negative in character. Nevertheless, in the context of Neo-Platonic thought they contained a wealth of positive connotation. Implicit in this definition of the soul's nature is a judgement asserting its affiliation with the order of intelligible existence; and this judgement, in turn, does no more than set forth what appeared to be an inescapable inference from the soul's capacity for contemplative intellectual activity. To acknowledge this capacity is necessarily to affirm the soul's affinity with the realm of intelligible existence; and, as we have seen, such an affinity is only explicable if the soul's nature is such as to mark it a birthright member of the immortal sphere to which it spontaneously aspires. *Operatio sequitur esse*. As an immaterial substance, therefore, independent of body, the soul is a member of the divine order, and must share in some measure the properties which belong to all natives of that world.

The first and most obvious of these properties is *immortality*: or better, perhaps, *eternity*, since the Neo-Platonic doctrine of the soul's immortality contains rather more than simply the assertion that the soul survives the death of the body. Here we must note both what the full content of the doctrine was, and also how it was treated by Christian authors of Neo-Platonic bent.

Plotinus devotes an entire essay to the problem of the soul's immortality,[1] of which the greater part is given over to a proof that the soul is incorporeal and substantial. This double thesis established, Plotinus is satisfied that he has found sufficient ground for asserting the soul's imperishability. Being incorporeal, he says, the soul is τῇ θειοτέρᾳ φύσει συγγενὴς . . . καὶ τῇ ἀιδίῳ.[2] This, he insists, must be evident to anyone who will consider the soul in its pure and (therefore) natural state: that is to say, in separation from the material order, and from the passions consequent upon its involvement in that order. As Plotinus sees it, anyone who acknowledges that the soul is an entity self-subsistent and incorporeal must recognize at the same time that it is both an intelligible and an intelligence: and no one who has grasped this

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[1] *Enn.* iv. 7.　　　　　　[2] *Enn.* iv. 7. 10.

fact can fail to admit that the soul is divine and therefore immortal.[1] For Porphyry also, the indestructibility of the soul follows directly, and almost by definition, from its incorporeality.[2]

To affirm the soul's imperishability, however, is at the same time to assert its pre-existence.[3] A substance which belongs to the realm of that which is divine and ingenerate can no more be thought of as having a beginning of its existence than it can be conceived as perishing. The soul's immortality is consequent upon its membership of the eternal order: and if the soul is eternal, then it follows that the terrestrial birth of the individual man does not mark the commencement of his soul's existence. This notion of the soul's pre-existence, however, is not merely an inference from a previously defined doctrine of its eternity. As an assertion about the soul's origin, and therefore about its original nature, this view has, historically, an independent significance of its own. It represents a distinct way of bearing witness to the divine character and celestial origin of the soul—a fact which may explain why the doctrine was only half-heartedly relinquished by certain Christian teachers.

Nemesius of Emesa, for example, adheres to the view that the soul is temporally generate: that it was brought into existence at the beginning by the Creator. No doubt for just this reason he is unwilling to rely on any save biblical evidence for the soul's immortality.[4] He could not afford to be interested in arguments which might suggest, directly or indirectly, that the soul exists everlastingly. Nevertheless, he was prepared to argue that the creation of the soul must have taken place apart from, and prior to, that of the sensible universe. For, he observes, 'Everything whose coming-to-be is in body and in time is corruptible and mortal'.[5] Consequently, in order to safeguard the immortal and

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[1] At this point in his demonstration, Plotinus proceeds to restate certain of the classical Platonic arguments for the immortality of the soul. He argues that life is an inherent property of soul, of which, therefore, it cannot be deprived (iv. 7. 11); that the soul's knowledge by reminiscence of the Forms establishes that it exists eternally (iv. 7. 12); and that, as simple and not composite, the soul is not susceptible of dissolution. To these he adds a 'cosmological' argument: if the soul were not indissoluble, he points out, the universe would long since have ceased to exist (ibid.). Each of these arguments, however, is treated as dependent on the fundamental premiss that the soul, as an immaterial substance, is *ipso facto* a member of the divine order.

[2] *Sent.* xiv.

[3] See, e.g., Iamblichus, *De anima*, in Stob. *Ecl.* i. 363. 16 ff. (Wachsmuth).

[4] *PG*, xl. 589BC.　　　　　　[5] Ibid. 572A.

rational nature of the soul and to assert its natural membership of the eternal order, Nemesius opts for a doctrine of pre-existence, as distinct from creationism[1] or traducianism.[2] For what is at stake, as he sees it, is the soul's συγγένεια with the intelligible world.

Gregory Nyssen had gone still farther in modifying the constellation of ideas associated, in Platonic thought, with the conception of the soul's immortality. But even in his less compromising attitude, there is discernible the influence of the very views he had called in question. Nyssen rejects not only the doctrine that the soul is everlasting, but also the view that the individual soul comes into existence apart from its body.[3] In this latter regard he is apparently motivated primarily by a desire to assert the unity of the human organism as a psycho-physical whole: a biblical emphasis, which he expounds at least partially in terms of Stoic ideas. Nevertheless, the notion of pre-existence persists in Gregory's thought, under the form of his conception of a double creation of man.[4] The order of priority here as between 'man in the image' (the 'fullness' of humanity) and historical man is no doubt, as

[1] *PG*, xl. 572A. The polemic against creationism has Eunomius in view.

[2] Ibid. 576. Nemesius accuses Apollinaris of teaching this doctrine, which, he insists, necessarily implies that the soul is mortal. The view was, of course, bound up with Stoic materialism, and was therefore universally rejected by Platonists. Nevertheless, certain vestiges of it remain in their account of reproduction. They affirm the operation of an inferior vital principle, distinct from the rational soul, in the conception of the living physical frame of a new individual: and this principle, it appears, is what is passed on in procreation. Nemesius describes the parental semen as 'charged with spirit' (701A), his view being, of course, that of Galen. At the same time he quotes approvingly the Stoic Panaetius to the effect that the generative faculty is not part of the soul at all, but is the operation of φύσις (ibid. 669A). Plotinus speaks of a phase of soul (i.e. a life principle) and a 'logos' which inform the single sperm (iv. 7. 5 *ad fin.*), and individuals are brought into existence by the union of the 'logoi' of their parents (v. 7. 2). The nature of these powers is perhaps hinted at when Plotinus speaks of the principle of vegetative life (τὸ φυτικόν) which is immanent in the earth, generative in operation, and pneumatic in nature (iv. 4. 26 f.). Porphyry asserts that the embryo before parturition is possessed of life, but only of the lowest kind of life—a vegetative soul which is distinct from, and serves as instrument for, the rational soul which supervenes at birth (Πρὸς Γαῦρον, 56. 16 ff. (Kalbfleisch)). 'Soul', then, or 'spirit', of an inferior sort, is transmitted in the act of procreation—a quasi-material life-principle assimilated to the Stoic φύσις. To this extent, the traducian theory of the Stoics was retained in Neo-Platonic circles.

[3] *De hom. opif.* 29. 1 (*PG*, xliv. 233D). Cf. *De an. et res.*, *PG*, xlvi. 125C. In the former passage, as in the latter, Nyssa associates this view with a clear traducianist position. For his polemic against the doctrine of pre-existence cf. *De hom. opif.* 28.

[4] For this doctrine cf. *De hom. opif.* 16 *passim* (*PG*, xliv. 177D and following, esp. 185B); *De an. et res.*, *PG*, xlvi. 160C.

Leys observes,[1] logical rather than chronological. The point is, however, that Gregory's conception of 'man in the image', whatever else it may involve, is calculated to emphasize the originally intelligible nature of the rational creature, its affiliation with the non-sensible order and, by this very fact, its affiliation, as an *immortal* creature, with God himself.[2] Here again, quite apart from a strict doctrine of the eternity of the soul and its pre-existence, and within the context of a doctrine of creation, the fundamental theme of the Neo-Platonic doctrine of the soul's ἀφθαρσία is sounded. Essentially, in his highest nature, man is a member of the intelligible world, the world of imperishable substance.

The Problem of the Impassibility of the Soul

A second property which is characteristic of the soul as an incorporeal substance is 'impassibility'. To say of an entity that it is subject to 'passion' meant, in the most general terms, that it is susceptible of modification or alteration as the result of the operation of an alien, external agency.[3] So defined, passibility is the natural property of the world of γένεσις: an attribute co-extensive in the scope of its denotation with corruptibility, mutability, and corporeality. Passion, therefore, means the alienation of a subject from its given nature through its subjection to forces which lie outside its own control. In the case of the soul, the problem of its passibility or impassibility is raised concretely by the existence of emotions or affections—e.g. desire or anger or sorrow—which are directed upon events or objects in the sensible world, and which, at the same time, appear to have the nature of mere reactions to external stimuli.

For the Neo-Platonist there could be no doubt about the existence or passionate nature of such affections, or about the fact that in some sense they bore upon the soul. Indeed, the Neo-Platonic ethic is, at base, an ethic of purification from passion. Consequently, it presumes that the soul, involved as it is in the world of materiality and change, is subject to the buffets and temptations which result from its animation of a corruptible

[1] *L'Image de Dieu chez Saint Grégoire de Nysse* (Paris: de Brouwer, 1951), p. 49.

[2] Cf. *De hom. opif.* 16. 9 (*PG*, xliv. 181BC); *Orat. catech.* 5 (ibid. xlv. 21D). In this latter passage Gregory argues that, in order for man to be drawn towards the enjoyment of the Divine, it was necessary for something συγγενὲς πρὸς τὸ θεῖον to be mingled with his nature; and this, he later avers, is precisely τὸ ἀθάνατον.

[3] Cf. Nemesius, *De hom. nat.*, *PG*, xl. 673B: πάθος ἐστι κίνησις ἐν ἑτέρῳ ἐξ ἑτέρου.

body, and is thus in some sense alienated from its true nature. At the same time, however, Neo-Platonic thinkers found themselves unable to admit that the soul is the proper subject of passion, for that would have been to question yet another presupposition of their ethic: namely, the assumption that the soul's final blessedness, the impassive contemplation of the Good, is the realization of its given nature as an intellectual substance. In the last analysis, therefore, they are committed to a paradox: that the soul must be purified of passion because, ultimately, it is by nature impassible.

The Neo-Platonic doctrine of ἀπάθεια, therefore, is misunderstood unless it is seen as an attempt to resolve this paradox into a statement which approaches some kind of intellectual consistency. The matter is further complicated by the consideration that a monistic or optimistic world-view cannot conceive of embodiment and its natural consequences as evil in themselves: which tended to mean, for the strict Neo-Platonist, that affliction with passion need not inevitably result from the soul's association with a body, and, for his Christian contemporary, that passion itself might require to have a less negative valuation set on it. We may expect *a priori*, therefore, to find that the notion of the soul's impassibility is worked out in a number of differing ways.

Plotinus is quite clear about the fact that the soul cannot be the seat of passion, even in its lower phase.[1] He agrees with Aristotle that the soul's incorporeal nature entails its exemption from passion: it cannot be subject to the affections characteristic of a corporeal substance. Moreover, 'If (the soul) is an unextended substance, and one to which incorruptibility must belong, we must beware of ascribing . . . passions to it, lest inadvertently we concede also that it is corruptible'.[2] Negatively, then, the soul's impassibility denotes its natural inability to be affected by the sorts of alterations which take place in the sensible world. More positively, however, it connotes the soul's self-sufficiency (αὐτάρ-κεια),[3] its independence of external conditions, and, above all, the fact that, being immortal and incorruptible, 'it gives of itself to what is other than itself, but receives nothing . . . from outside'.[4] The fact that the soul is impassible thus suggests, not

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[1] Thus he describes (*Enn.* iii. 6. 1) the seat of anger and desire as τὸ λεγόμενον παθητικόν.   [2] Ibid., *ad fin.*   [3] *Enn.* i. 1. 2 *ad fin.*
[4] Ibid. Plotinus qualifies this statement by noting that the soul 'receives' from beings which are above it on the ontological ladder.

merely that it is incorporeal and imperishable, but also that, in its relations with the world of which it is a part, it always, as it were, retains the initiative, because it acts in accord with its own nature as an intellectual substance. In this sense, to assert the soul's impassibility is to assert its moral indefectibility.

Passion, therefore, must be attributed not to the soul, but to the animate physical frame—τὸ συναμφότερον.[1] Passions belong to the body as modified by contact with the soul. The soul participates in passion only in so far as it is capable of entertaining ἡ τοῦ προσδοκωμένου κακοῦ εἰκών as the result of a 'disturbance' produced in the organism;[2] and it is no doubt in this sense that the soul may be said to possess a 'sympathy' with its body:[3] that is, in so far as it takes cognizance of troubles and pleasures which belong, not to itself, but to the animate organism. It is, at any rate, this concern with the affairs of the body which, in Plotinus' view, is the 'passion' of which the soul requires to be purified. In this way, he seeks at once to resolve the paradox of the involvement of a rational substance in passion, and to indicate how it may be true that subjection to passion, in the sense defined, is not an inevitable result of embodiment as such.

Plotinus' successors felt more strongly than he the difficulties of maintaining, without qualification, the impassibility of the rational soul. Porphyry, perhaps, comes closest to reproducing Plotinus' position;[4] but in the developed system of Proclus there is an observable alteration of emphasis which reflects the change which had taken place in the attitude of Neo-Platonic thinkers. Proclus, of course, lays down the principle that passion pertains to bodies,

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[1] *Enn.* i. 1. 6 f.   [2] *Enn.* iii. 6. 5.
[3] Cf. *Enn.* vi. 4. 3. Elsewhere, however, Plotinus seems to question whether it is legitimate to speak of the soul's 'sympathy' with its body. Cf. *Enn.* i. 1. 5.
[4] Porphyry lays it down (*Sent.* xxi) that the subject of passion and the subject of corruption are the same; and since anything which is incorporeal is incorruptible, it must at the same time be impassible. Passion can only be predicated of what is composite—in the case of man, of his animate physical nature, τὸ συναμφότερον (ibid., cf. Iamblichus, *De an.*, in Stob. *Ecl.* i. 371. 1 ff. (Wachsmuth)). What are called the 'passions' of the soul are in fact ἐνέργειαι, not affections accompanied by change (*Sent.* xviii; cf. *Enn.* iii. 6. 1; i. 1. 2 *ad fin.*; i. 8. 5). Thus the soul in its own nature is impassible. Nevertheless, Porphyry affirms (*Sent.* xxxii) that the soul enters into συμπάθεια with its body as the result of the union which takes place between them, though at the same time he makes it clear that it is just this 'sympathy' of which the soul must purify itself. The doctrine of 'sympathy' is evidently taken as a convenient means of asserting the soul's involvement in bodily affairs, while safeguarding the axiom of its impassibility.

and action to incorporeals; but he adds, significantly, πάσχει δὲ καὶ τὸ ἀσώματον διὰ τὴν πρὸς τὸ σῶμα κοινωνίαν.[1] In so far as the soul becomes divisible through its association with a composite body, it may be said to 'participate in' passion.[2] And this formula seems to reflect a conscious qualification of Plotinus' position. Proclus indeed takes issue with 'Plotinus and Theodore', ἀπαθές τι φυλάττοντας ἐν ἡμῖν καὶ ἀεὶ νοοῦν.[3] In Proclus' view, the soul which has entered into the sphere of Becoming has, as a consequence of its state, ceased to be simply impassible, although it may at any time regain its ἀπάθεια.[4] The point of this departure from the Plotinian view lies in Proclus' conviction that if (as Plotinus himself had maintained) the soul's absorption in the affairs of the space-time universe is voluntary,[5] this fact is incompatible with its remaining wholly unaffected in its own nature. As it turns out, however, Proclus' view of what the soul's passibility consists in is not dissimilar to that of Plotinus. The soul is passible, Proclus writes, in the sense that it 'sympathizes' with the image of itself which it sees projected and 'tossed about in the stream of becoming'.[6] In itself, therefore, even on this view, the soul remains impassible.[7] Proclus, then, while he differs from Plotinus in desiring to predicate ignorance and error of the soul, nevertheless chooses to differ in such a way as to safeguard the principle that an incorporeal substance, while it may somehow participate in passion, continues impassible in its essential nature.

Nemesius' outlook on this question is difficult to assess, but not evidently unorthodox in the end. He insists that the passions are necessary components of man's life as an embodied soul;[8] but at the same time, he is clear that they have no place in the essentially intellectual life of the soul itself.[9] Is the soul, then, impassible?

[1] *Elements of Theology*, Prop. 80 (Dodds).

[2] Ibid.

[3] *In Tim.* iii. 333. 29 ff. (Diehl).

[4] *In Tim.* i. 362. 21 f. (Diehl).

[5] Cf. also *Ad Marc.* 12. 29. This is not necessarily to say that, on this view, the soul's embodiment itself is truly voluntary: but merely that its focusing of its whole attention on the material world is a free act.

[6] *In Tim.* iii. 330. 18 ff. (Diehl); and cf. ibid. 324. 28.

[7] Cf. ibid., of the soul: αὐτὴ μὲν ἀπαθής ἐστιν, οἴεται δὲ πάσχειν, ἑαυτὴν ἀγνοοῦσα καὶ εἴδωλον αὐτῆς ἑαυτῇ εἶναι νομίζουσα.

[8] *De nat. hom.*, *PG*, xl. 673A: συστατικὰ τῆς ζῳώδους οὐσίας.

[9] Nemesius, following a Neo-Platonic position (cf. Porphyry, *Sent.* xxxii), admits a twofold moral standard. There is first the ideal represented by ὁ σπουδαῖος, who is μετριοπαθής (*PG*, xl. 688A). This is the man who by reason rules the irrational part

In the one context in the *De natura hominis* where this question arises explicitly, Nemesius gives no clear answer,[1] and his hesitation suggests that he is in doubt as to which alternative is correct, or that (not unlike Proclus later) he prefers to have it both ways. Elsewhere, he asserts that the soul, as γενητός, is necessarily mutable,[2] and indeed calls attention to the soul's συμπάθεια with its body as evidence of the intimacy of their union.[3] Here the Christian doctrine of man as a unified psycho-physical organism is to the fore, though Nemesius' language remains Neo-Platonic. These expressions, however, are not decisive as showing that Nemesius was willing to dispense with the doctrine of the soul's impassibility;[4] and other evidences suggest that he was

of the soul and who does not inordinately indulge the pleasures of the body, but maintains the Aristotelian 'mean'. It is with this ideal in mind that Nemesius writes of the virtues: ἐν μεσότητι . . . αὗται τῶν παθῶν εἰσιν (ibid. 729B). But transcending this standard is the ultimate ideal—that of ὁ θεωρητικός, the man who has achieved ἀπάθεια (ibid. 681A, cf. 688A). Such a man cultivates the peculiar pleasures of the soul, which have their source in science, intellect, and thought, and which, therefore, are in no sense passions, being unalloyed with any material element (cf. *Enn.* i. 1. 2 *ad fin.*, i. 8. 15). In thus cleaving to God, the contemplative attains a pure activity (ἐνέργεια) which is free from all motion and change: he becomes, in fact, immutable (ibid. 777A). There can be no doubt that, in Nemesius' eyes, 'impassibility' is characteristic of the soul in its ideal state: that it is the destiny of the soul.

[1] *PG*, xl. 548A. Nemesius quotes an argument of the Stoic Cleanthes, who maintains that since an incorporeal substance cannot 'suffer together with' (συμπάσχειν) a body, and since the soul is clearly affected by the states of its body, the soul must itself be corporeal in nature. To this, Nemesius replies by questioning both premisses in turn. First, he suggests that there are some incorporeals which in fact do suffer together with bodies (ibid.), instancing the qualities of a body (ibid. 549A), and pointing out that it is not inconceivable that the soul should be a similar exception to the general rule. He does not press this point further, however, but turns to Cleanthes' second premiss. 'Most learned authors', he says (ibid.), deny that the soul is affected by what happens to its body, and insist that it is the body, as modified by its union with the soul, which is the subject of passion. This, of course, is the classical Neo-Platonic view. While, however, the suggestion is that this is the position which Nemesius himself adopts, he does not indicate this clearly. The conjunction of his two criticisms of Cleanthes hints at an outlook similar to that adopted later by Proclus.

[2] Ibid. 776A. Γενητός here is to be taken in the peculiarly Christian sense of 'created', with its customary connotations of mutability and involvement in Becoming.

[3] Ibid. 549A.

[4] The notion of *sympathy*, as we have seen, was not repudiated in Neo-Platonic circles. With Nemesius' remark, designed to assert the 'unconfused union' of soul and body, cf. Priscianus, *Solutiones*, 52. 13 ff. (Bywater): 'Quia enim unitur, *compassibilitas* declarat: quia vero non concorrumpitur, ostendit segregatio facta per somnos.'

sympathetic with the Neo-Platonic view. Not only does he accept ἀπάθεια as the soul's ideal (and in this sense natural) state, but he also, significantly, characterizes the passions of the soul as ἐνέρ-γειαι,[1] and insists that perception does not involve an alteration of the soul, but rather the soul's 'judgement' of an instance of corporeal ἀλλοίωσις.[2] Most significant of all, perhaps, is his charge against the Manichaeans that they make the soul out to be corporeal, and thus subject it to passions,[3] the implication of his accusation being that he himself holds the contrary of both assertions. In sum, Nemesius' position in this regard seems to be no more than usually ambiguous. For him, as for other Neo-Platonic thinkers, the incorporeality and intellectuality of the soul connote its impassibility; but, like them, he feels himself bound to recognize both that the soul requires in some sense to be purified of passion, and that, in a world governed by Providence, the passions of the body cannot be, in themselves, unqualifiedly evil. This last consideration is, in his case, reinforced by his Christian understanding that the soul is a creature, and that it is bound together with its body by the good Creator himself. In the last analysis, Nemesius' position provides an admirable illustration of the tensions and ambiguities involved in the Neo-Platonic treatment of the problem of the soul's nature.[4]

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[1] *PG*, xl. 673B.   [2] Ibid. 636AB.   [3] Ibid. 577B.

[4] The position of Gregory Nyssen seems to provide yet another illustration of the same outlook. Gregory insists upon the incorporeality of the soul, and recognizes, accordingly, that passion is foreign to its essential nature. This is the significance, in the first instance, of his well-known exegesis of the 'coats of skin': they represent, for him, the passionate and mortal animal nature which, in man, is superadded to the nature of a rational substance (cf. *Orat. Cat.* 8, *PG*, xlv. 33; *De an. et res.*, *PG*, xlvi. 148BC, 52AB; and *De hom. opif.* 18 *passim*). For very good reasons, however, Gregory is of two minds about the significance of man's involvement in the space-time order and his consequent subjection to passion. The fact emerges in several ways. Thus, as Daniélou (*Platonisme et théologie mystique* (Paris, 1944), pp. 71 ff.; cf. the observations of Gaith, *La Conception de la liberté chez Saint Grégoire de Nysse* (Paris, 1953), p. 60, n. 2) has pointed out, he uses 'passion' in two senses—according as he regards it as a natural part of man's God-given constitution, or as the perversion of this nature, i.e. vice. Cf. *Contra Eun.* vi. 3 (*PG*, xlv. 721CD). Again, he is not clear as to whether the rational creature's involvement in material, animal nature is the cause of sin, or the result of sin (cf. the discussion of von Balthasar, *Présence et pensée* (Paris, 1942), p. 47): a not un-Plotinian dilemma. The former alternative is attractive because it provides an explanation of sin which does not compromise (in one sense) the native intellectuality of the soul; but difficult, obviously, because it contravenes the view that sin has its roots only in the creaturely will—a view which is the axiomatic basis of all theodicy. The second alternative is useful as providing some foundation for a theodicy; but fails, for just this reason, to explain how it was

Soul and Intellect

The same sort of ambiguity which emerges from the point of view of the soul's relation to the material world, in this discussion of its impassibility, appears also, from another point of view, in the Neo-Platonic treatment of the soul's intellectuality. The soul's intellectual nature is, as we have indicated, the basic datum for the structure of Platonic psychology. The soul's incorporeality, its independence of body, its immortality and impassibility—all these attributes set forth what must be true of the soul if its capacity for contemplative vision of the Real is to be explained. Consequently there is no more important question for Neo-Platonic psychology than that of the relationship between ψυχή and νοῦς.

Strictly speaking, νοῦς was identified with the intelligible order itself, and regarded as a transcendent hypostasis immediately derived from the superessential Unity. At the level of metaphysics Intellect was carefully distinguished from Soul as a superior phase within the sphere of incorporeal existence. None the less, in earlier Platonic and Aristotelian thought, νοῦς had been employed in the first instance to denote the rational activity or faculty or 'part' of the soul itself; and this psychological use of the term, as well as the persistent conviction of the soul's kinship and continuity with the divine world in which it took its origin, demanded that the question of the soul's participation in νοῦς be raised, and the nature of this participation defined. In Christian Neo-Platonic circles, of course, the question took, of necessity, a slightly different form. The doctrine of creation effectively dispensed with the elaborate metaphysical superstructure of the Neo-Platonic cosmos, with its graded scale of derivative divine hypostases, and its implied doctrine of a purely 'natural' continuity between soul and supreme Divinity. This did not mean, however, that the Neo-Platonic habit of thought simply disappeared in Christian circles. Rather, the question of the soul's participation in divine Intellect was raised in a new context: that of the doctrine of the image of God in the embodied rational creature, whose interpretation was undoubtedly assisted and influenced by philosophical speculations as to the relation between the soul and the transcendent νοῦς.

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possible for an impassible rational nature to go wrong. Nyssen's position, in this regard at any rate, reflects, in its very difficulties and apparent confusions, the logic of late Platonic speculation on the impassibility of the soul.

There is no need to emphasize the fact that among Neo-Platonists generally it was usual, not so much to assert, as to assume, the noetic nature of the soul. Plotinus can describe the unembodied soul simply as 'an intellect'.[1] The characterization of soul as νοερός is virtually a truism. Iamblichus speaks of 'that of the soul which is accompanied by intellect';[2] and Themistius, the commentator on Aristotle, identifies the highest part of the soul as νοῦς.[3] Proclus asserts the intellectual nature of the soul and its participation in the divine νοῦς.[4] Nemesius uses precisely similar language.[5] Gregory Nyssen describes the higher part of man's nature as 'divine and rational and intelligent',[6] and denies that anything which is not νεορός and λογικός is strictly to be called 'soul'.[7]

What such language affirms is the soul's capacity for contemplative knowledge of the intelligible world, and, indeed, in some sense, of the divine Nature itself. But of course, such knowledge, in human experience, remains a rare and spasmodic phenomenon, and never appears as an enduring state.[8] Consequently, the philosopher must find a way of asserting, first identity, then difference, as between soul and Intellect. Intellect may be participated by soul, but at the same time it remains transcendent over it: as is attested by the fact that soul, even when not perversely wrapped up in the affairs of sense, reveals its rational nature, not so much in the timeless vision of the intelligible, as in discursive reasoning, the very articulation of whose structure reflects the 'divisibility' of the space-time world. The soul's intellectuality, therefore, must be explained in such a way as to account for its involvement in the distractions of the corporeal universe: whether such involvement be regarded as the cause, the occasion, or the result of the soul's sin.

Plotinus accordingly distinguishes two senses of the word νοῦς: its use as denoting a part or aspect of the soul's proper nature, and its (primary) use as denoting an hypostasis transcendent of soul.

The activity of intelligence thus belongs to us because the soul is intelligent (νοερός) and because the activity of intelligence is the

[1] *Enn.* iv. 7. 10.　　　[2] *De an.*, in Stob. *Ecl.* i. 365. 25 (Wachsmuth).
[3] *Paraphrasis in De anima*, 106. 29 ff. (Heinze).
[4] *In Tim.* ii. 402 f. (Diehl); *Elements*, Prop. 129.
[5] *De hom. nat.*, *PG*, xl. 504A, 600A *ad fin.*
[6] *PG*, xliv. 181C.　　　[7] Ibid. 176D–177A.　　　[8] *Enn.* iv. 8. 1.

highest form of life. It occurs both when the soul conceives intelligibles, and when Intellect acts upon us: for Intellect is both a part of us, and that towards which we raise ourselves.[1]

The soul's intellectual nature is proper to it, but proper to it as a participation in a superior existence. In this sense, to speak of the soul's essential intellectuality is to assert that it is of the soul's nature to transcend its own distinctive nature and to identify itself with the higher nature from which it is derived. This is at least part of the sense of Plotinus' doctrine of 'reversion' (ἐπιστροφή), according to which διάνοια, the soul's characteristic activity, passes in the uppermost reaches of its existence into νόησις as the soul discovers its original self in its divine Source.[2] Regarded simply in itself, and in its ordinary operations, the soul is of a different kind from νοῦς. It is distinguished from Intellect as αὐτοκίνητος from ἀκίνητος:[3] and whereas Intellect is above time, subsisting in a changeless eternity, the soul exists in time and its knowledge is successive in character.[4] Gregory Nyssen employs similar categories to distinguish the divine Intellect from its human counterpart: the one is uncreated (ἄκτιστος) and immutable; the other, created and mutable, involved in time and change.[5] Nevertheless, for all these writers, there is that of man's psychic self which participates in the transcendent Intellect and is its image; and it is at the point at which the soul thus exceeds itself that its truest character is realized.

The full sense of this position emerges in the conception of the soul as a 'mean' substance, which was developed out of Plato's hints in the *Timaeus*.[6] However, later Platonic writers tended to diverge from Plotinus himself in their understanding of this doctrine. Plotinus had maintained that there is always a phase of soul which is at one with the universal νοῦς[7] (though never simply identical with it),[8] even though this phase may not be, at any given point in the soul's biography, the ruling phase: i.e. that with which, as it were, the psychological 'self' is identified. In his

[1] *Enn.* i. 1. 13, cf. iv. 4. 2.
[2] Cf., e.g., Plotinus' discussion in *Enn.* v. 3. 6, 8f.
[3] Proclus, *Elements*, Prop. 20 (Dodds).
[4] *Enn.* iii. 7. 11 (but cf. iii. 7. 12); Porphyry, *Sent.* xliv.
[5] *PG*, xliv. 184C.
[6] See above, p. 16, and n. 1.
[7] Cf., e.g., *Enn.* ii. 9. 2, iv. 3. 12, iv. 8. 3 f., ii. 9. 2, iv. 8. 8.
[8] *Enn.* iv. 4. 2.

view, the soul was a 'mean' in the sense that it was a sort of cosmic ladder which spanned the metaphysical gap between Intellect and Body. It existed on several ontological levels at once, even though, at any given time, the conscious self might be unaware of the reality of one or another of the phases of its existence. Iamblichus, however, and those who followed him, found difficulty in this insistence on the essential indefectibility of the soul,[1] feeling that the soul's involvement in the corporeal world is not a neutral datum, but implies the soul's voluntary defection from its original high estate, and thus its alienation from *voῦs*. Hence, on Iamblichus' view, the doctrine of the soul as a 'mean' substance is to be understood as asserting that it is 'another substance'[2] from Intellect, having its own distinctive properties, and thus capable of falling away from its communion with the higher hypostasis. Such alienation, of course, is never complete:[3] else the soul would cease to be itself. It remains both possible and necessary to speak of the soul's affiliation with *voῦs*, of its impassible and intellectual nature. But given the reality of sin, it is also necessary to recognize its capacity for irrational activity, for passion, and even, in some sense, for corruption.[4] The contrast between Plotinus' outlook and the more pessimistic view of Iamblichus provides an exact illustration of the tension of attitudes which is involved in the Neo-Platonic metaphysic—a tension which, it might be added, can be perceived, in differing forms, within the thought of each of these authors, as well as in the opposition between them.

Again, a similar tension can be noticed in the teaching of such a Christian Platonist as Gregory Nyssen. As we have seen, Nyssen affirms the intellectual nature of the soul, and sees its possession of intellect as a participation in the divine Nature itself, the infinite transcendent *voῦs*.[5] No more than the Neo-Platonic philosopher, however, is Nyssen willing to assert a simple identity as between soul and Intellect. For one thing, like Iamblichus, he is bound to take the soul's capacity for sin quite seriously.

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[1] Festugière (*Les Doctrines de l'âme*, pp. 252 ff.) has collected a number of passages from Simplicius and Proclus which tend to show that this was the true point of Iamblichus' charge that Plotinus had asserted the identity of soul and Intellect.

[2] *De anima*, in Stob. *Ecl.* i. 365. 23 ff. (Wachsmuth).

[3] Cf. Simplicius, *In Ar. De an.* 240. 33 ff. (Hayduck), cited by Festugière, op. cit., p. 253.   [4] Simplicius, ibid. 89. 22 f. Cf. Festugière, op. cit., p. 254.

[5] Cf. *De hom. op.* 16 (*PG*, xliv. 185CD), 2 (133B), 5 (137C), and 11 (156B).

In this case, moreover, this unwillingness is encouraged by the exigencies of the doctrine of creation. As a creature the soul is always mutable,[1] and therefore despite its participation in divine Intellect, always involved in Becoming. Even as purified of passion, the soul is never simply at one with uncreated Mind: its life is an eternal progress into the mystery of infinite Being. For the soul blessedness is, with Nyssen as with Plotinus, a state of perpetual self-transcendence. Yet the participation in the Divine which this possibility of self-transcendence implies cannot be rightly understood save as an essential given attribute of the soul itself.[2] In Nyssen, then, as in late Platonism generally, the ambiguity of the soul's relation to body is paralleled by a correlative ambiguity in its relation to divine Intellect. And this, of course, is to say no more than that, in the context of a set of clearly biblical presuppositions, Nyssen remains true to the logic of late Platonic speculation about the nature of the soul.

Conclusion

For the Neo-Platonist the soul is an ontological Janus, forever turned towards the world of sense, yet—and no doubt more fundamentally—forever aspiring to the sphere of Intellect. It is to account for this experienced truth of the soul's nature that the philosopher develops his theory of the 'mixed' substance of the soul. The soul is by nature immaterial, intellectual, and impassible. Its home is in the incorporeal world of intelligible substance. In fact, however, it is involved with the corporeal world; and although this involvement in materiality is the source of the soul's affliction with passion and its alienation from the Divine, it is, at the same time, an expression of its natural destiny. The soul lives and belongs in two worlds. The Neo-Platonist then, can quite properly speak of the 'divinity' of the soul, but only in a carefully qualified sense. Stoics might have argued that the human soul is a veritable portion of the divine Spirit which animates the cosmos. But for the Platonist, there can be no question of a simple identity of soul-substance with that of transcendent Intellect.[3] The divinity of the soul consists rather in its

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[1] *De hom. op.* 16 (*PG*, xliv. 184CD).

[2] Cf. Ladner, 'The Philosophical Anthropology of Saint Gregory of Nyssa', *Dumbarton Oaks Papers*, no. 12, pp. 63 f.

[3] Contrast the statement of Gaith, *La Conception de la liberté*, p. 35, which seems to be based on a misapprehension of the meaning of 'emanation' in a Plotinian system.

status as an inferior member of the immaterial order, and in its 'participation' in the life of Intellect: that is to say, in its native capacity for self-transcendence through contemplation, as well as in its active possession of discursive reason.

Furthermore, this view of the soul, while obviously premised on the classical dualism of intelligible and sensible, is, as we have already indicated, incomprehensible apart from the monistic optimism which also characterizes the Neo-Platonic outlook. It is the optimistic element which introduces a note of uncertainty and inconsistency into the philosopher's evaluation of the soul's embodied condition: which presses him ever and again to insist, in opposition to the whole spirit of his ethic, that embodiment of itself is no evil. Like Christian thinkers, the Platonist was bound, if only for the sake of a rational theodicy, to qualify the dualism which otherwise governed his thought. And this motive unquestionably contributes significantly to his insistence on the 'mixed' nature of the soul: his view that, even as a member of the intelligible order, the soul is constitutionally 'made' for embodiment.

Now, it is impossible not to remark—what is often obscured in discussions which are concerned primarily to emphasize the inconsistencies between Neo-Platonism and a Christian world-view —that this account of the nature of the soul as a 'mixed' substance was one calculated, with all its tensions and ambiguities, to make a great deal of sense to Christian thinkers. It affirms the soul's affiliation with the Divine without asserting a simple identity of substance between them. The dualism on which it is based supplies a rational explanation of man's experience of moral conflict; and yet it is a dualism qualified by a sense that corporeal existence has a positive purpose in the providential scheme of things. It cannot be surprising, then, that in the speculations of Christian thinkers of this era, the logic, if not the exact substance, of Neo-Platonic psychology should frequently be reproduced.

The significance of this relationship for our purposes will become plainer as we turn now to review certain specific philosophical problems which had historically a special bearing on christology and theological anthropology. The questions of the soul's freedom, its unity, and its relation with the body which it animates can serve as individual illustrations of the general

psychological theory which we have attempted to delineate here. At the same time, consideration of these questions will lead directly into our discussion of the bearing of philosophical anthropology on the christological views of Apollinaris and Theodore of Mopsuestia.

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The Freedom of the Soul

CLOSELY involved in any discussion of the nature of the soul is the question of its moral freedom—a question which in the Hellenistic and Roman worlds was rendered the more crucial by reason of the prevalence of explicitly fatalistic and deterministic currents of thought. The doctrine that all cosmic events, including the actions of men, find their explanation in the immutable decrees of Fate was well known and widely believed throughout this period, both in its Stoic form and in the form which it had assumed in circles where the practice of astrology was current. As against any such dogma, Christians, Platonists, and Peripatetics alike were instant to protest in defence of the view that the soul, as an intelligent substance, is possessed of a genuine power of initiative and that its activities cannot be regarded as products of forces lying outside itself. It will be our task here, not to review the sources and growth of anti-fatalistic polemic,[1] but to indicate in a general way how thinkers in the late Platonic tradition developed and conceived the doctrine of the self-determination of the rational agent. It is against the background of this discussion that we can best comprehend the distinctive elements in Theodore of Mopsuestia's treatment of the theme of human freedom.

Issues at Stake in the Question of the Soul's Freedom

The form of anti-fatalistic polemic in late Platonic philosophy was governed by two primary concerns, both of which Plotinus expresses in a single sentence:

It is necessary that each individual preserve his identity, that our deeds and thoughts be our own, that each man's deeds, be they good

or evil, find their source in himself, but that the production of evil acts be not attributed to the Whole.[1]

It may well be that for Plotinus the last-mentioned consideration is the governing one. The doctrine of the astrologers, which is directly under discussion in the passage from which this citation is drawn, destroys the foundations of theodicy; and Plotinus the monist is as firmly committed to the doctrine of a beneficent Providence as Plotinus the dualist is to a distrust of the material cosmos. But if Providence is to be exculpated from responsibility for contingent evils, there must be an independent source of evil in the activity of particular rational beings. Human souls, therefore, are to be regarded as distinct selves, possessed of an identity and an initiative of their own, and capable of exercising a power of choice. We shall see reason to believe that Plotinus' explanation of the freedom of man does not in fact altogether fulfil the promise of this early statement of principle. Nevertheless, his intention is clear, whether or not he contrives to carry it out completely. He means to affirm the freedom and responsibility of the individual agent within the world-system, as the foundation of a rational theodicy.[2]

This insistence upon the moral responsibility of man had previously been pressed for its own sake by the Peripatetic Alexander of Aphrodisias, who took pains to point out that, on the view of the Stoic fatalism he was criticizing, there could be no ground for praise or blame in human affairs. In depriving man of effective choice, the Stoics had deprived him also of the authorship of his own deeds.[3] Writing from a Christian point of view, Nemesius of Emesa rehearses these charges of Alexander's in the opening sentences of his chapter Περὶ εἱμαρμένης;[4] and together with them the allegation that the doctrine of an all-controlling Destiny must inevitably impute the most monstrous evils to God himself.[5] Nemesius is conscious of the same two questions as was Plotinus in this connexion: the problem of theodicy, and the problem of man's responsibility for his deeds. These are the two closely related issues which are at stake when the matter of the soul's

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[1] This question is dealt with at length by D. Amand, *Fatalisme et liberté dans l'antiquité grecque* (Louvain, 1945). Amand is interested in reconstructing and tracing the influence of Carneades' polemic against the Stoic fatalism of Chrysippus.

[1] *Enn.* iii. 1. 4 *ad fin.* Cf. iii. 2. 10 *ad fin.*; iii. 3. 3, iii. 3. 4.
[2] See P. Henry, 'Le problème de la liberté chez Plotin', in *Revue Néoscolastique,* xxxiii (1931), esp. pp. 55 and 60.
[3] *De fato,* xx.
[4] *De nat. hom.* xxxv (*PG,* xl. 741B).
[5] *PG,* xl. 744A; cf. 756B, 764A.

freedom is under discussion. How were they treated by Neo-Platonic and Christian Neo-Platonic thinkers?

The Plotinian Conception of Freedom

In a late essay,[1] Plotinus embarks upon a discussion of the meaning of the expression τὸ ἐφ' ἡμῖν ('that which is in our power'), and on an inquiry into the question whether, or to what extent, the freedom it denotes in fact belongs to human nature. His conclusions here can serve as a guide to the Neo-Platonic conception of the freedom of man.

The reasons, Plotinus says, why men doubt whether or not they possess a true power of initiative is that they frequently feel themselves to be mastered by external forces. Such subjection to alien influence is the precise contrary of τὸ ἐφ' ἡμῖν, which may, therefore, be defined as that which men do when freed from the compulsion of causes lying outside their own counsel: ὅ . . . πράξαιμεν ἂν βουληθέντες οὐδενὸς ἐναντιουμένου ταῖς βουλήσεσιν.[2] As against the Stoics, then, Plotinus chooses to affirm that the soul of man is in some sense an independent cause within the cosmic system: ψυχὴν δὲ δεῖ ἀρχὴν οὖσαν ἄλλην ἐπεισφέροντας εἰς τὰ ὄντα, οὐ μόνον τὴν τοῦ πάντος, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν ἑκάστου μετὰ ταύτης, ὡς ἀρχῆς οὐ σμικρᾶς οὔσης.[3] His conception is, apparently, that inasmuch as the soul in its rational nature is transcendent of the corporeal world, it operates independently of the τυχή which rules within that order.[4]

Plotinus develops this theme by proceeding to a consideration of the seat of human self-determination within the soul. Obviously, he thinks, actions having their principle in a motion of the faculties of anger or desire are not to be regarded as ἐφ' ἡμῖν. Like the deeds of children and animals, they are the work of impulse aroused and directed by the operation of external forces, and therefore cannot be regarded as genuine products of human initiative. It is to the rational faculty that one must turn to locate the spring of man's freedom: it is in an activity which is governed by rational deliberation (λογισμός) that man finds himself the master of his doings.

But even this definition requires careful qualification if it is to

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[1] *Enn*. vi. 8.   [2] *Enn*. vi. 8. 1.
[3] *Enn*. iii. 1. 8. Cf. Iamblichus, *Protr.* iii (ed. Pistelli, p. 12, ll. 12 ff.).
[4] *Enn*. iii. 1. 8.

stand. Free action is rational action: but not all action of a rational agent proceeds in fact from reason. For one thing, rational deliberation can be the source of activity which is 'in our power' only when it is 'right' (ὀρθός) and not erroneous (πεπλανημένος). Otherwise, it is not true reason which governs the resultant activity. Furthermore, an act is genuinely 'in our power' only when the movement of desire which leads directly to action is originated by reason, and does not govern or precede rational decision. This, of course, is simply to reiterate the principle that the soul ceases to be fully self-determining in so far as human activity happens by way of reaction to casual external circumstance. But for Plotinus an interesting and crucial consequence follows from this principle. As he sees it, deeds (πράξεις) of virtue, as distinct from virtuous dispositions of the soul, are not genuinely 'in our power'. They are essentially responses of the soul to the necessities of an external situation, and thus partake of an element of compulsion. The freedom of the soul is to be sought in a rational activity altogether unhampered by the constraint of conditions external to reason.

For Plotinus, then, human freedom is found simply in rational action. Not only is the intellect the seat of τὸ ἐφ' ἡμῖν. Its unimpeded, spontaneous operation supplies the pattern and norm of free, subjectively determined activity. Consequently, to say that an action is free is not merely to specify something about the manner in which it happens. It is also to specify something about the quality, and, so to speak, the content of the action. By way of summary, Plotinus can write: Ἀναγάγοντες τοίνυν τὸ ἐφ' ἡμῖν εἰς βούλησιν, εἶτα ταύτην ἐν λόγῳ θέμενοι, εἶτα ἐν λόγῳ ὀρθῷ . . . εἰς ἀρχὴν τὸ ἐφ' ἡμῖν καλλίστην ἀνάγοντες τὴν τοῦ νοῦ ἐνέργειαν καὶ τὰς ἐντεῦθεν προτάσεις ἐλευθέρας ὄντως δώσομεν.[1]

It is not difficult to see in what direction this argument tends. Plotinus is committed to the classical Socratic view that no rational agent can be thought to go wrong knowingly or voluntarily: that vice, in fact, if it does not proceed from some obvious compulsion, must stem from error.[2] This, in the last resort, is the

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[1] *Enn*. vi. 8. 3.
[2] Cf. *Enn*. i. 8. 5 *ad fin.*, and *Timaeus* 86 d: κακός . . . ἑκὼν οὐδείς, a maxim in the Socratic tradition. Chalcidius explains the saying (*In Tim.* clxv): 'Dicunt porro non spontanea esse delicta, ideo quod omnis anima particeps divinitatis naturali adpetitu bonum quidem semper expetit, errat tamen aliquando in judicio bonorum et malorum.' The ultimate source of evil in the soul is thus a kind of ignorance

point of his insistence that it is only the action of 'right reason' which is free action. Plotinus considers that the soul, when not distraught and battered by the assaults of passion, wills, and can will, nothing other than the good towards which it is spontaneously driven by the most deeply rooted tendencies of its nature. For this reason he denies to the authors of evil actions the epithet 'self-governing'.[1] In so far as men are transgressors of moral law, they are to be regarded as the servants of desire, slaves of the casual images which come indiscriminately to birth in the imagination. But when they submit to the sway of their true selves, and exercise the initiative which belongs to them as rational substances, they act voluntarily, and in so doing inevitably seek their good, which is the fulfilment of their intellectual nature in the contemplative life.

> . . . when, in its intentional movement, the soul has as its guide the pure and impassible reason (λόγος) which is native to it—this movement only is rightly said to be in our power, and our own work is that which does not proceed from elsewhere, but from within the soul which is pure, the ruling and governing first principle: but not a soul which suffers from the misdirection of ignorance, or one weakened by the force of desires, which, when they come upon the soul, drive and drag it, and no longer permit that actions stem from us, but only passions.[2]

Free actions, then, are native actions of the rational soul. If the soul acts, the man acts freely, both in the sense that what he does depends upon his own initiative, and in the sense that he acts voluntarily, consenting to what he does. Free action may

rather than a fully voluntary choice of the wrong. With this view that of Aristotle stands partly in contrast. Cf. *Nic. Eth.* 1114ª11 : ἄλογον τὸν ἀδικοῦντα μὴ βούλεσθαι ἄδικον εἶναι; ibid. 22 : αἱ τῆς ψυχῆς κακίαι ἑκούσιοί εἰσιν. Nevertheless, the notion that vice is a kind of ignorance persists in Aristotle's thought, as witness his discussion of the doctrine of the 'apparent good', *Nic. Eth.* iii. 4. Plotinus seems torn between his view that only the good is ἐφ' ἡμῖν, and the necessity to assert the individual soul's responsibility for its subjection to passion. See his discussion in *Enn.* vi. 8. 1 *ad fin.* with its perhaps unusual discussion of the distinction between τὸ ἐφ' ἡμῖν and τὸ ἑκούσιον. The more ordinary view of the distinction may be found in Alexander Aphr. *De fato* xiv, xii; Nemesius, *De nat. hom.*, *PG*, xl. 732A; and their source, Aristotle, *Nic. Eth.* 1111ᵇ7. Plotinus evidently proposes to recognize a class of actions which are not truly voluntary (being due to ignorance), but for which the agent may nevertheless be held accountable. Plotinus' view also finds precedent in Aristotle, *Nic. Eth.* 1135ª21 ff., and in the discussion in Plato, *Laws* 860–4. Cf. P. Henry, op. cit., pp. 187 ff.

[1] *Enn.* vi. 8. 3; cf. *Nic. Eth.* iii. 1.   [2] *Enn.* iii. 1. 9.

therefore be described as action 'according to nature' (κατὰ φύσιν),[1] as long as the 'nature' in question is understood to be man's true self, the νοῦς which is the seat of the activity of contemplation.[2] By denying that the soul can truly be said to initiate any action which does not proceed from its intellectual nature, Plotinus arrives at the identification of freedom with virtue and impassibility which is characteristic of the Neo-Platonic outlook generally. The passion which enslaves the soul and limits its freedom is the same force which is the root of vice. Hence only virtue is ἀδέσποτος, truly free, and virtue consists ultimately in a spontaneous contemplative activity of the rational soul unhampered by the distractions of corporeal passion. Conversely, the only genuinely free act is one which accords with nature and therefore with virtue.

Iamblichus at a later date sums this position up admirably in his treatise *Ad Macedonium de fato*:

> The substance of the soul is . . . immaterial, incorporeal, in every respect ungenerate, and indestructible, possessed in its own right of being and life, wholly self-moved. . . . In so far, then, as it is such, it possesses in itself the life which is free (ἀπόλυτον) and self-determining. And inasmuch as it hands itself over to Becoming, and orders itself under the revolution of the universe, to that extent it is led under Fate and is enslaved to the necessities of Nature. On the other hand, inasmuch as it pursues its proper intellectual activity, self-chosen and truly freed from everything, to that extent it carries out its activities voluntarily (ἑκουσίως), and attains the Divine and Good and Intelligible accompanied by Truth.[3]

In this statement we can see reflected both the positive sense of the Neo-Platonic understanding of man's freedom, and its most obvious difficulty. In accordance with the radical dualism of his ethic, the Neo-Platonist seeks the soul's freedom not so much in a capacity for responsible choice between alternatives in action, as in the mind's liberation from the necessities imposed upon it

[1] *Enn.* vi. 8. 2.

[2] Cf. the observation of E. Benz, *Marius Victorinus* (Stuttgart, 1932), pp. 294 ff. : '. . . die wahre Freiheit existiert nur in einem denkenden reinen Intellekt. Der eigentliche freie Akt ist eine energische Zurichtung des Intellekts auf das Gute.'

[3] In Stobaeus, *Ecl.* ii. 8 (ed. Wachsmuth, ii. 173, ll. 5–17). In his identification of Fate with Nature, Iamblichus seems to employ a Peripatetic conception: cf. Alexander Aphr. *De fato* vi. However, he treats Nature as a fully deterministic system, as it was not for Alexander: and 'Nature' has been absorbed into Iamblichus' dualism, being identified with 'Becoming'.

by the 'system' of the visible world. He is willing, in the last re-
sort, to surrender the visible, material cosmos to the reign of
Chance or Fate, as long as it is understood that 'inasmuch as it
pursues its proper intellectual activity' the soul stands above the
sphere of Destiny. The Platonist reply to fatalism lies in the
exemption of the intellectual soul from the categories of Becom-
ing: in the discovery, that is to say, of a higher freedom which the
soul enjoys as it escapes involvement in the concerns of the visible
world. This point of view presupposes the normal Greek con-
ception that freedom means the autonomy of reason. But it is
further conditioned by the characteristically Neo-Platonic empha-
sis on the contemplative, as distinct from the practical, function
of reason, and by the dualism which insists that contemplative
reason be wholly dissociated from material conditions. The conse-
quence of this outlook is seen in Plotinus' doubts as to whether
'deeds' of virtue can be regarded as authentic acts of the autono-
mous reason. As he sees it, the practical reason, exercising an
ordinary 'freedom of choice' within the visible world, is after all
a form of involvement in the sphere of Becoming, and a mode of
response to the demands of external agents or situations. As such,
it lacks genuine autonomy: but even more, it fails to conform to
the dynamic of the contemplative life. At best, then, it possesses
an inferior kind of freedom: man's ultimate liberty is found only
as, in contemplation, he transcends the world in which the practi-
cal reason is concerned.

But the problem of man's 'freedom of choice' cannot be avoided,
even by the Neo-Platonist who seeks his liberty in a higher
sphere; and the principal difficulty of the Platonist analysis of
human freedom lies just in its inability to deal adequately with
this problem. The difficulty emerges in Iamblichus' statement
that the soul 'hands itself over to becoming' and is thus enslaved.
His language initially suggests that the soul's subjection to alien
forces is somehow its own work: that the soul, freely if foolishly,
chooses to enter the world of Becoming. This suggestion, however,
is obviously not consonant with the view presupposed by his
entire statement, that 'All movement towards the inferior is in-
voluntary'.[1] There is a paradox here, which is part and parcel of
the Neo-Platonic position. As we have seen in the case of Plotinus,
the philosopher wants to maintain the soul's responsibility for its

[1] *Enn.* iv. 8. 5.

vices and distractions: yet he is also committed to the idea that
the reasonable soul cannot willingly or knowingly sin. Plotinus
puts the paradox with a wholly admirable frankness when he
writes, of the soul's descent into body, that it is necessary to assert
at once τὸ ἑκούσιον τῆς καθόδου καὶ τὸ ἀκούσιον.[1] If the soul's
descent is not voluntary, then the evils consequent upon embodi-
ment stand as a cosmic injustice: if it is not involuntary, then one
must suppose that the intellectual soul can freely elect to be false
to its own nature. But neither of these alternatives is ultimately
thinkable; and the philosopher must choose, as Plotinus ap-
parently does, to embrace the horns of his dilemma, the root of
which is twofold: an unwillingness to ascribe the capacity for
self-alienation to an 'impassible' substance; and an equally firm
determination not to admit that such self-alienation, when it
occurs, can have any other cause than the will of the individual.
In so far, then, as man's freedom is a freedom of choice which
involves a capacity freely to choose the worse, Neo-Platonic
thought is unable wholeheartedly to affirm it, or at any rate fully
to come to terms with it.

Nemesius' Discussion of Freedom

Nemesius of Emesa, as a Christian, attaches a genuine impor-
tance to the ordinary morality of the practical reason, and there-
fore to man's freedom of empirical choice, which includes his
freedom to choose wrongly. His discussion of the problem of
freedom, therefore, concentrates on an attempt to give a con-
structive account of the place of the practical reason in a life
whose perfection he conceives, in the Neo-Platonic fashion, as
a purified contemplative activity. To this end he draws freely, as
Plotinus had done, on the teaching of Aristotle; but in the last
resort it is the Neo-Platonic problem with which he must come
to grips, since that problem is implicit in his own thought.

Nemesius' fidelity to Aristotle appears in his unequivocal in-
clusion of passionate action within the area of τὸ ἐφ' ἡμῖν. He
insists that the life of the passions genuinely belongs to the rational
creature, who thus has an ultimate responsibility for the outward
expression and inward control of his emotional impulses.[2] The

[1] *Enn.* iv. 8. 5. See the lengthy discussion in *Enn.* iii. 2. 10, where the problem of
the soul's responsibility for evil is examined.

[2] Contrary to the opinion of Plotinus, Nemesius conceives that the actions of

scope of rational initiative includes virtuous deeds (αἱ πράξεις αἱ κατὰ τὰς ἀρετάς),[1] to which Plotinus, as we have seen, had denied the description ἐφ' ἡμῖν—the virtues in question being exactly those whose nature consists in μετριοπάθεια.[2] Moreover, vicious actions too are included in this category.

Let no one think that inordinate lust or anger are to be reckoned among involuntary offences because they have their effective causes outside the agent. . . . For though they have an external cause, nonetheless their agents perform them in their own persons and by means of their own members. Such behaviour does not fall within the definition of the involuntary, since the agents furnished themselves with the occasion of the [external] cause['s operation], being easily made slaves of their passions on account of lax training.[3]

Nemesius does not differ from Plotinus in his analysis of the elements of the structure of the moral situation, but only in his evaluation of it from the point of view of human responsibility. The difference between virtue and vice, good and evil, is still understood in terms of the conflict between the solicitations of sense on the one hand, and the aspiration of the soul towards the ἀπάθεια of contemplation on the other. Nemesius is quite clear, further, that the passionate faculty is not in itself the subject of responsible action, since passion (by definition) is not self-governing. But he is prepared to insist that passion can be administered by reason, and that, on this ground, the intellectual soul may be held to account for the practical vices or virtues in which its choices are expressed.

What all this means, of course, is that the soul, as Nemesius sees it, is genuinely free to choose between alternative ways of life: free in the critical sense that it may freely elect the worse way by giving itself over to passion, and so failing either to moderate it or to extirpate it. But if this is indeed the case, then it is a fact which,

children and animals may properly be termed 'voluntary', even though they be never rationally deliberate: and this means that behaviour which is essentially passionate may be classified as ἐφ' ἡμῖν (*PG*, xl. 729B). Nemesius regards this truth as essential, since he judges that 'the ethical virtues' themselves κατὰ πάθος γίνονται (ibid.), and yet, as subjects for praise, are voluntary.

[1] Ibid.
[2] It is essential to note this qualification. Nemesius, as has been noted (above, p. 32, n. 9) recognizes two kinds of virtue: and the virtues he has in mind here are not those of the contemplative life, whose proper characteristic is ἀπάθεια, but the virtues of ὁ σπουδαῖος. Cf. *PG*, xl. 512C.
[3] *PG*, xl. 724A.

for the fourth-century philosopher, demands some explanation. Plotinus' attempts to maintain that the rational soul cannot willingly or knowingly choose the worse were merely a way of acknowledging the axiomatic truth that what the soul is must determine what it does. How can action which does not follow from the soul's immaterial and intellectual nature be supposed to express its unconstrained, voluntary working? Plotinus could not see an answer to this question, even though he felt a pressure to state one. What account then does Nemesius give of the soul's capacity for going wrong?

He addresses himself to this question in Chapter XLI of the *De natura hominis*, where he puts the question, Διὰ ποίαν αἰτίαν αὐτεξούσιοι γεγόναμεν. In his terms this question means, What accounts for the soul's ability to choose, to go now this way, now that, as its own decision may determine? He gives the substance of his answer in a few condensed phrases, which we must examine closely:

Straightway, then, we say that self-determination enters in as the accompaniment of the rational faculty, and that change and mutation are the natural properties of generate beings, and especially of those which have come to be out of an underlying matter.[1]

Nemesius' first observation, that τὸ αὐτεξούσιον is a power consequent upon man's rational nature, is one which would have been universally accepted. Interpreted in one sense, it states the substance of Plotinus' position. As Nemesius understands it, however, what is in question is not merely the soul's capacity for initiating subjectively determined activity, but also its capacity to deliberate as to what course is to be followed. Deliberation, however, presupposes a genuine ability to choose between better and worse, and therefore a genuine freedom of choice. This argument, couched in Aristotelian terminology, had been employed by Alexander of Aphrodisias against the Stoics,[2] and what it asserts is the common-sense principle that since men reason about which of two courses they ought to take, freedom of choice is implicit in rationality itself. It is in this sense that Nemesius understands his characterization of man as αὐτεξούσιον . . . ἐπειδὴ καὶ λογικός.[3]

[1] *PG*, xl. 773AB.   [2] Cf. *De fato* xi, xii.   [3] *PG*, xl. 776A.

But this argument does not explain, to put the question as unfairly as possible, how a rational being can freely choose to follow an irrational course. Nemesius, accordingly, has recourse to a second consideration. According to Christian teaching, the human soul is a creature; which is to say that it is γενητός. But this means, on the best philosophical premisses, that the soul is essentially and naturally mutable: variable in its inclination, and hence to some extent unpredictable in its choices. Man, then, is not only equipped with the power of rational self-determination; he is also τρεπτός, capable of being alienated from his true nature. Hence it can make no sense to rebuke the Creator because he did not make man incapable of evil.[1] If God designs to make a creature who is rational, then he designs of necessity to make one who is λογικὸν . . . καὶ περὶ τὰ πρακτὰ στρεφόμενον αὐτεξούσιον;[2] and such a creature must be capable of evil as well as of good. Nemesius' point is not that *any* rational being must be capable of evil (i.e. of self-alienation), but that any *created* rational being must be so. For createdness entails mutability. And, of course, he adds, where the created spirit exists in a material body, and is thus brought into direct association with the sensible world and its manifold temptations, this moral instability is only increased.[3]

Nemesius' solution, then, to the problem of man's freedom of choice takes the form of a suggested modification in the Neo-Platonic doctrine of the nature of the soul. The human soul is indeed of the intellectual kind, and its intellectuality defines in what its true virtue and blessedness consist. Nevertheless, as a creature, characterized by that instability which comes of having been summoned into existence out of nothing, the soul is susceptible of alienation from its rational nature through the very power of initiative which belongs to it in virtue of that nature. Its power of initiative, therefore, is inevitably and essentially manifested in a freedom which involves the possibility of wrong choice. By exercising this freedom in a way consonant with reason, and by thus living the life of practical virtue, the soul can begin to pick its way towards the higher freedom (and higher

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[1] *PG*, xl. 776B. [2] Ibid.
[3] Cf. ibid. 521AB, where Nemesius indicates that the grace of forgiveness after repentance is accorded man by reason of his being brought under the compelling influence of corporeal needs and desires through being an embodied spirit: association with the sensible world is thus a sufficient cause, though not the necessary condition, of sin.

virtue) of the contemplative life. Nemesius does not surrender the Neo-Platonic emphasis on the contemplative nature of reason in its highest form. But he restores an emphasis on the practical reason and the life of active virtue; and in accordance with this he develops an account of the way in which, by reason of the soul's creaturely mutability, reason's essential autonomy expresses itself in a genuine freedom of choice.

Gregory Nyssen and the Problem of Man's Freedom

Some reference at this point to Gregory Nyssen's treatment of the problem of freedom may help both to clarify the point of the position we have been tracing out in the thought of Nemesius, and to reveal the nature of its difference from, and kinship with, the Plotinian conception of the soul's independence.

On the one hand, Gregory affirms with Plotinus that the liberty of man consists essentially in a life conformable with his intellectual nature.[1] Liberty connotes, most basically, freedom from passion, and thus the self-determination of the rational creature.[2] When freedom is understood in these terms, moreover, it follows that 'far from being a free choice, the choice of evil is, essentially, a negation of free choice, for choice is not truly free save on the condition that it realizes our true being through participation in Being'.[3] It is by man's freedom, which derives from his character as an intellectual being, that he is constituted in the image of God; and to alienate itself from its own nature as a creature which shares in the divine perfection cannot be the work of the free human will. 'No one sins voluntarily.'

Whence, then, comes man's choice of the worse? For Gregory, as for Nemesius, this possibility—which is, indeed, a fatal necessity from a certain point of view—is rooted in the essential mutability of man, which stems from his nature as a creature[4] and is correlative with his involvement in the distended world of space and time. Because of man's mutability, his rational autonomy becomes a capacity both for virtue and for vice,[5] and he becomes responsible for his evil deeds and for his subjection to passion.[6] Nevertheless—and this perhaps is the essential point to

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[1] *PG*, xlvi. 101D. [2] *PG*, xliv. 180C.
[3] J. Gaith, *La Conception de la liberté chez saint Grégoire de Nysse*, p. 79.
[4] *PG*, xliv. 184C. [5] *PG*, xlv. 857C.
[6] Thus the Fall of man can be termed 'voluntary': *PG*, xliv. 205A.

be noted—man's capacity to go wrong, his freedom of *choice* in the narrow sense, is not an essential mark of reason as such. Rather is it the consequence of a weakness inherent in his nature as a creature: a weakness which, together with the sin which it empowers, serves for Gregory to explain man's involvement in corporeity. The true nature of reason itself is revealed only in its participation in Divinity, through which it is able to transcend its finite limitations in moving towards the vision of God.

For Gregory, and this holds in the end for Nemesius as well, the appeal to the principle of mutability turns out to be a means of safeguarding the axiom that the natural and spontaneous tendency of reason is towards virtue. Both authors undertake in effect to revise Neo-Platonic teaching without relinquishing Neo-Platonic principle. Both are concerned to reaffirm, as against Neo-Platonic hesitations on the subject, the soul's full responsibility for the virtuous or vicious acts of the human organism, and in this sense to deny that vicious acts are necessarily involuntary. For this reason, at once in their analysis of freedom and in their concern for the practical moral life, Gregory and Nemesius, and the latter quite explicitly, approach a Peripatetic point of view. But just as they retain the Neo-Platonic emphasis on the priority of the contemplative reason, so, in the end, neither is willing to surrender the fundamental notion that the exercise of rational freedom ultimately *is* the life of virtue. Consequently, they can only conceive of voluntary sin as the product of a reason weakened by finitude, and therefore subject to ignorance and to the assaults of passion. Like the Neo-Platonists, they feel compelled to attribute the occurrence of sin to the existence of a state of affairs for which the soul is not responsible. For Plotinus, this state of affairs is the soul's embodied condition. For Nemesius and Nyssen, however, involvement in materiality is only part of the problem. For them, the problem lies really in the fact of the soul's *createdness*— which has the advantage of being a condition *of* the soul, and not merely a condition *to* which it is subjected. No doubt this revision serves its immediate purpose: it helps to explain how a rational agent can initiate vicious actions. Whether or not it reflects a Christian conception of the nature of sin is another question.

Conclusion

The Neo-Platonist's discussion of the problem of freedom is

governed by the dualism which informs his ethic and his psychology. His identification of freedom with impassibility (and therefore with virtue) reveals, no doubt, an indebtedness to earlier Stoic thought. But in his case this doctrine is shaped by the conviction that a reason freed from the chains of passion to be itself is a reason which acts outside of, or without reference to, the conditions of material existence. This dominant dualistic strain is, to be sure, qualified to some degree by the monistic optimism which, as we have seen, is also a part of the Neo-Platonic outlook. This second element in his point of view compels the philosopher to a consideration of man's freedom of choice as the key to the problem of theodicy. But his intellectualism and his dualism combine to make him unable to come fully to terms with the idea of a freedom of choice, since this conception involves both a notion of voluntary sin and the affirmation of a freedom which is effective not above, but within, the 'system' of the visible world.

Christian writers in the Neo-Platonic tradition are in a somewhat different case. Their interest in practical morality (as well as their concern for the abstract questions of theodicy) lead them to seek a solution to the problem of freedom of choice within a framework of Neo-Platonic presuppositions. Without surrendering either the Neo-Platonic emphasis on the priority of the soul's contemplative life, or for that matter the essential intellectualism of the Greek tradition, they find in the doctrine of man's createdness an answer to the question how he can voluntarily go wrong: and this solution provides ground for their affirmation of the full responsibility of man in the concrete moral struggle between reason and the passions of the flesh. In this way, and to this degree, the Christian writers whom we have considered qualify the dualistic outlook which determines the Neo-Platonic view of man's freedom.

But whatever differences there may be between Christian and pagan philosophers on this matter, certain problems and presuppositions are common to them all: and it is these which we must keep in mind for the sake of their possible bearing on our later discussions of Apollinaris and Theodore of Mopsuestia.

There is in the first place the obvious and central conviction that freedom means the autonomy of reason. This principle is so basic an axiom that it would be surprising to find an author of this

period who would know how to question it. Its importance, therefore, lies not in the fact that it was a bone of contention among writers of different schools, but rather in the fact that it serves to define a method of inquiry. We may expect to find that, for any writer of this general era, his comprehension of the nature of man's freedom will be a function of his idea of the characteristic operations of reason. For the Neo-Platonist, as we have seen, the true nature of reason is discovered in the timeless activity of contemplative intellect: and the same holds, with qualifications, of the Christian Platonic authors at whom we have glanced. We must therefore be prepared to ask whether the same outlook is reflected in the teaching of Theodore of Mopsuestia, and how his view on this question affects his comprehension of human freedom.

In the second place there is the constellation of problems which arise out of the Platonic inability to come to terms with the fact of voluntary sin. We have suggested that this limitation stems from a sense of reason's natural affiliation with, and attraction towards, the Good. Two crucial questions must therefore be raised both in the case of Apollinaris and in that of Theodore, if we are to grasp fully the significance of their conception of man's freedom. The first, naturally, is that of their appreciation of the voluntary nature of sin. The second is that of their idea of the place of divine action in the salvation of the reasonable soul: for it should be obvious that, in Christian circles, the Neo-Platonic idea of the natural affiliation of reason with the Good would issue in a quasi-Pelagian optimism about the soul's efforts to achieve the vision of God. Answers to these questions should provide some significant clues to the relation between Neo-Platonic thought and that of Theodore.

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The Problem of the Soul's Parts

IN the christological disputes of the fourth century occasioned by the teaching of Apollinaris of Laodicea, much polemical energy was expended in argument over the analysis of human nature into three parts, body, soul, and spirit, on which the Apollinarian position seemed to depend. Critics of Apollinaris, including Theodore of Mopsuestia, attached great significance to this anthropological theme. Instant to repudiate Apollinaris' conception, they saw in it a veritable root of his heterodoxy. The view in question has, of course, a philosophical source in the Platonic tradition, in the well-known doctrine of the soul's 'parts'; and it is to this philosophical doctrine that we must now turn our attention, in an attempt to discern, not merely its form, but something of its point and purpose.

Sources of the Doctrine of the Soul's Parts

This doctrine is fundamentally the expression of an attempt to deal rationally with the question of the soul's relation to its body and, more generally, to the sensible world as such. It involves an analysis of the soul, not so much in terms of its faculties or operations, as in terms of the varying degrees of its involvement in the concerns of the material universe. The occasion of the doctrine can be discerned in the argument of Plato's *Phaedo*. There the soul is characterized as a divine, intelligent substance, foreign at once to the body in which it finds itself, and to the passions and desires which stem from the body. At the same time, however, it is these passions and desires which, by blinding the soul to its true destiny, bind it to the body and to the sensible world. This account assumes that passion belongs exclusively to the body, and thus derives from the conviction that what is genuinely contrary to the soul's good can have no seat within its nature as originally constituted. The passion which leads the soul astray must have its origin outside the soul, simply because its

impulses are directly contrary to the natural tendencies of the soul itself. But if this is so, then it becomes a problem to understand how it is that the impulses which stem (by hypothesis) from the body can become a true source of temptation for the soul. If they have no *point d'appui* within the soul itself, then it is necessary to suppose that their influence derives from an inexplicable inclination towards the sensible and changing world on the part of a being whose natural affinity is wholly with the intelligible and immutable. The *Phaedo* thus tacitly poses a problem: how to explain the susceptibility of the soul to the evils which evidently afflict it.

Plato's solution takes the form of the classic tripartite analysis of the soul,[1] which in effect recognizes within the soul itself the existence of obstacles to the realization of its higher nature, but which, at the same time, formulates this recognition in such a way as ultimately to maintain the integrity of the intellectual soul. Thus the *Republic* divides the soul into τὸ λογιστικόν, τὸ θυμοειδές, and τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν: the seats, respectively, of reason, emotion, and desire. The same division appears in mythological garb in the *Phaedrus*, where the charioteer corresponds to the rational part (designated as νοῦς),[2] and his two steeds to the inferior parts. This image has the virtue of indicating graphically the relationship which, as Plato saw it, obtains between the three parts of the soul. They are distinct, since each has its own identity and its own proper nature. Yet at the same time they form a 'team', and are therefore mutually interdependent. On this view, accordingly, it becomes possible to suggest how the rational soul is affected by passion or desire without its intellectual nature's being affected in itself.

The evolution of this conception into a tripartite analysis of human nature as consisting of rational soul, irrational soul, and body finds its beginnings in the *Timaeus*. Here two developments are to be noted. (1) In his analysis of human nature, Plato shows a not unnatural tendency to group together the two irrational parts of the soul. The handiwork of inferior divine beings, they are jointly described as mortal, and in this respect contrasted

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[1] This must be carefully distinguished from the later tripartite analysis of *man*, which involves a *bipartite* analysis of soul. Fr. Arnou (Art. 'Platonisme des pères', *Dict. Th. Cath.*, vol. xii, col. 2267) seems to make this confusion when he compares Origen's tripartition of man with Plato's tripartition of soul.

[2] 247 c.

with the intellectual soul by which man is affiliated to the cosmic Reason. From this position it is only one step to a simplifying view which analyses the soul, not into three, but into two, parts: the rational soul and the irrational, the latter of which is subdivided into the functions of emotion and desire. Thus Plato can speak simply of 'the mortal kind of soul',[1] and Aristotle, in the *Nicomachaean Ethics*, canonizes the implied bipartite analysis.[2] (2) In one crucial and well-known passage,[3] Plato describes the constitution of the cosmic animal out of νοῦς, ψυχή, and σῶμα. The intent of his argument is to show that the visible cosmos, if it is to be the best possible, must be endowed with Reason. That is to say, its motion must be rational. But since it is only within soul, the ultimate principle of motion and life, that νοῦς can subsist, a rational universe must be a living Animal. Intellectual activity, on this view, is the purest form of motion or life, and is for that reason indissolubly wedded to soul. In fact, then, Plato in this passage is not directly concerned with an analysis of the human constitution. Nor, for that matter, is it clear that the members of the series intellect–soul–body are meant to correspond severally with the 'parts' of the human constitution: rational soul, mortal soul, and body. Nevertheless, the analogy is an easy one,[4] and the language of this passage no doubt supplied, at a later date, encouragement to the tripartite analysis of human nature.

Later Developments

In Middle Platonism this tripartite scheme, in one form or another, is an accepted axiom of anthropology. Albinus, for example, like Plato, adopts a distinction of 'parts' within the soul as a means of explaining how an intellectual substance can be affected by passion without being, in the strict sense, its subject. His fidelity to Plato leads him to describe the soul as τριμερής.[5] He specifies, however, that this triple division of the soul is κατὰ τὰς δυνάμεις. He evidently prefers to speak of the soul as having *two* parts, the rational and the passible: φύσει δὲ χωρίζεται τὸ

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[1] *Timaeus* 69 e.   [2] Cf. 1102ª26 f.   [3] *Timaeus* 30 b.

[4] It is important, however, to keep in mind the distinction between the application of these terms to the 'parts' of human nature, and their cosmological or metaphysical application in later Platonism, which identifies Intellect with the Intelligible World, Body with the realm of Becoming, and Soul with a mean hypostasis, derived from Intellect yet capable of embodiment. It is, as we have suggested, this second application which defines the primary sense of νοῦς in Neo-Platonic thought.

[5] *Epitome*, xxiv. 1.

παθητικὸν καὶ λογιστικόν, εἴ γε τὸ μὲν περὶ τὰ νοητά, τὸ δὲ περὶ τὰ λυπηρὰ καὶ ἡδέα.[1] Here is the classic basis of the tripartite analysis of the human constitution which is, not altogether unjustly, taken to have been a Platonic dogma. Man is conceived of as a being composed ultimately of three parts: body, irrational soul, and rational soul, the last two of which are said to be at war with each other, even in their unity.[2]

Plutarch too adopts a tripartite division of human nature, and, unlike Albinus, explicitly identifies the parts as νοῦς, ψυχή, and σῶμα:

> The majority of men judge correctly that man is a composite, but consider incorrectly that he is made up of only two parts. For they think that the intellect is somehow a part of soul: but in this way they err no less than those who suppose that the soul is a part of the body. For intellect is better and more divine than soul, to the same degree in which soul is better and more divine than body.[3]

This contrast between intellect and soul, it should be noted, is a contrast between two distinct substantial elements in human nature, and not one between the soul and its highest faculty, or between the soul and a transcendent divine Intellect. In this scheme it is the intellect which is the individual man's true self.[4] His soul, on the other hand, is a mean substance: μικτὸν . . . καὶ μέσον.[5] It is not simply the seat of irrational impulse. As the source of motion and life—κίνησις αὐτοκίνητος[6]—it is capable of rational activity. Taken simply apart from νοῦς, however, it is 'irrational'.[7] Thus 'soul', on this view, is assimilated, in a greater or less degree, to what Plato and his later followers would have called 'irrational soul'.

Views of a similar, if not identical, nature were widely diffused during the first centuries of the Christian era, and may be discovered in the writings of thinkers of differing backgrounds. The influence of the Platonic conception may be detected, for example, in the anthropology of such a late Stoic as the Emperor Marcus Aurelius, who analyses human nature into three parts, the highest of which he terms, on occasion, νοῦς: σαρκία ἐστιν καὶ πνευμάτιον

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[1] *Epitome*, xxiv. 1, and cf. xxv. 5, where the mortality of the irrational soul is affirmed.

[2] *Epitome*, xxiv. 2.   [3] *De fac. in orbe lunae* 28 (943A).

[4] Ibid. 30 (945A).   [5] Ibid. 945D.

[6] *De animae procr.* 3 (1013C).   [7] Cf. ibid. 5, and *Platonicae quaest.* 4.

καὶ τὸ ἡγεμονικόν,[1] or alternatively, σωμάτιον, πνευμάτιον, νοῦς.[2] A similar analysis is to be found in the Hermetic literature, as well as in the thought of Philo of Alexandria.[3] Such a Christian writer as Clement of Alexandria also employs a trichotomous analysis on occasion, though not, apparently, to the exclusion of a bipartite formula.[4] The usefulness of the Platonic formula lies in the fact that it explains, by means of a psychological analysis, the fundamental ambiguity of the soul's nature, without at the same time endangering the dogma of its affiliation, *qua* rational, with the divine sphere. As such, the formula represents, in effect, the introduction into the nature of the soul itself of the dualistic distinction between the realms of Being and Becoming. By the same token, the simultaneous retention of the bipartite formula reflects a conviction of the underlying unity of the psychic life which, at another level, is analysed into a rational and an irrational part. In Middle Platonism, it seems apparent, the dualistic theme is dominant; but in developed Neo-Platonism, as in Christian thought generally, the situation is somewhat different.

The Neo-Platonic Doctrine

The partition of human nature into three distinct substances is attacked by Nemesius in the opening sentences of the *De natura hominis*. Nemesius knows and objects to it in a form somewhat similar to that proposed by Plutarch. He inveighs against those who distinguish νοῦς and ψυχή as 'one thing' and 'another', and who deny that soul, of its own nature, is intellectual. As proponents of the point of view he attacks, Nemesius names Plotinus, Apollinaris, and unspecified 'others'.

Nemesius' own view is not difficult to reconstruct. He does not

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[1] *Meditations*, ii. 2.

[2] Ibid. xii. 3. Cf. Verbeke, *L'Évolution de la doctrine du pneuma*, p. 160: 'Il n'est pas douteux que cette trichotomie a été influencée par le platonisme, de sorte que le pneumation de Marc-Aurèle répond à la partie irrationnelle de l'âme humaine, tandis que le νοῦς ou ἡγεμονικόν coincide avec la partie rationnelle.' Verbeke (ibid., p. 169) detects Platonic influence also in Marcus Aurelius' limitation of the divinity of the soul to its highest part. It should be pointed out, however, that he conceives the soul's divinity in Stoic rather than Platonic terms: cf. *Meditations* ii. 4, v. 27.

[3] Cf. *De op. mund.* 23; *Quis rer. div.* 13. 16.

[4] On Clement's language see Verbeke, op. cit., pp. 435 f. It appears that Clement used πνεῦμα in a double sense—of the superior part of the soul, distinguished from ψυχή, and of 'notre principe vital sans détermination de parties'.

neglect the dualistic theme typical of the Platonic tradition. He distinguishes two 'parts' in the soul, a rational and an irrational.[1] He further makes it clear that this distinction has important ethical connotations. The good for man consists in his governing his life according to reason; and this in itself means that he must turn away from the irrational life which he shares with brute beasts.[2] Man's moral struggle, therefore, is to be defined in terms of the conflict which subsists between the two 'parts' of his psychic nature. On the other hand, Nemesius (unlike, say, Albinus) feels bound to insist upon the unity of the soul. Rational and irrational are, for him, aspects, faculties, or parts of a single life.[3] In consequence, it becomes necessary for him to deny that νοῦς and ψυχή are different 'substances'. Intellect is rather the rational part or faculty of the soul itself. And we may take it that the position which Nemesius adopts is not untypical of what had, by his time, become normative Christian teaching.[4]

What is Plotinus' position with regard to the 'parts' of the soul? Is Nemesius' attack just or well informed? Plotinus rejects, of course, the Stoic division of the soul into 'parts' which, as he describes them, are χωρὶς ἀλλήλων.[5] He insists that, while soul is present to all the articulated members of a divisible body, it is nevertheless present to each part as a whole, and thus retains its primordial unity.[6] On the other hand, he employs the terminology of Plato's tripartite analysis of soul,[7] although, like Albinus,

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[1] *PG*, xl. 669B–672A.   [2] Ibid. 512C.

[3] Ibid. 672A. Nemesius, it should be noted, is consciously following the analysis of Aristotle here.

[4] Gregory Nyssen, again, propounds a view which, in its eclectic essentials, is similar to that of Nemesius. In the *De hominis opificio* he distinguishes three 'kinds' of soul which belong to man, following the Aristotelian analysis, and relates them to the Pauline trichotomy of body, soul, and spirit (*PG*, xliv. 145B ff.), insisting at the same time on the essential unity of the soul (ibid. 148B, 176AB). Elsewhere he can employ the Platonic trichotomy of soul (ibid. 237B). In the *Antirrheticus*, contending with Apollinaris, he expounds a view of the relation between νοῦς and ψυχή which is similar to Nemesius': intellect is an essential endowment of human—i.e. rational —soul. See the discussion of G. Ladner, 'The Philosophical Anthropology of Saint Gregory of Nyssa', in *Dumbarton Oaks Papers*, no. 12, pp. 70 f., and esp. p. 71, n. 43: 'It would then not be quite correct to say that Gregory of Nyssa is altogether opposed to anthropological or even to psychological trichotomism. He opposes only that version of it that, following Apollinaris of Laodicea, holds it possible to separate the rational from the irrational part of the soul . . . and to dissolve the unity between mind, soul, and body.'

[5] *Enn*. iv. 2. 2.

[6] Cf. *Enn*. iv. 2. 1 *ad fin*.   *Enn*. iii. 6. 2.

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he tends to reduce the number of divisions to two: τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν and τὸ θυμοειδές are faculties of τὸ ἄλογον τῆς ψυχῆς,[1] or, alternatively, of τὸ λεγόμενον παθητικόν.[2] To this extent, then, Plotinus is at one with the Middle Platonists. He observes, moreover, that the irrational or 'divisible' soul stands apart from the nobler part of the soul inasmuch as it has entered into the realm of sense and distension.[3]

In Plotinus' case, however, this doctrine of the two 'parts' of the soul is subject to severe qualification. He sets aside, as we have seen, the view that any phase of the soul's existence, even the lowest, is genuinely subject to passion.[4] Passion is seated ultimately in the conjunction of body and a 'vestige' (ἴχνος) of the soul,[5] the trace of life which, in the presence of soul, is imprinted in matter. Consequently, the lower part of the soul is not regarded by Plotinus as mortal. Of its own nature, it belongs to the intellectual order.[6] Plotinus' conception of its relation to the rational soul appears to be governed by his favourite metaphor of light. The irrational part corresponds to a ray or emanation from the source of light, which is the intellectual soul itself.[7] The lower phase of the soul is thus distinct from the higher while the soul is immersed in body: but it is neither separated from it nor independent of it. And when the 'separated soul', soul in its higher phase, turns away from body, the 'illumination' by which it confers life upon body returns to its source, with which it is ultimately at one.[8] Plotinus thus agrees with Albinus only in so far as he denies the immortality of the irrational part *qua* irrational. In the end he proposes to dispense with the notion of self-subsistent 'parts' of the soul: a view which would contravene the axiom of the indivisibility of intelligible substance.

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[1] *Enn*. iv. 4. 28 *ad fin*.

[2] *Enn*. iii. 6. 4, cf. iii. 6. 1.

[3] *Enn*. iv. 2. 19 *ad fin*. Plotinus tends to conceive of two phases in the inferior stage of the soul's existence: the lower of these is φύσις, the higher, ἄλογος (ψυχή) (*Enn*. iv. 9. 3), or φαντασία (iv. 4. 13).

[4] *Enn*. iii. 6. 4.

[5] *Enn*. iv. 4. 18, 20, 28 *ad fin*.

[6] *Enn*. i. 1. 2.

[7] Cf. *Enn*. iii. 4. 2 *ad fin*. i. 1. 7, 8.

[8] *Enn*. i. 1. 10, cf. iv. 4. 29 *ad fin*. Cf. Iamblichus, *De anim.*, in Stob., *Ecl.* i. 374. 21 ff. (Wachsmuth), who includes Plotinus (and Porphyry) among those who reduce 'the kinds and the parts of life into one system and one ἰδέαν'. Festugière observes (*Les Doctrines de l'âme*, p. 207, n. 4): '. . . je pense que les parties de la vie ici en question . . . sont . . . le παθητικόν et le λογιστικόν.'

While, therefore, Neo-Platonic writers speak freely of the soul's two 'parts',[1] they are at the same time swift to qualify the implied dualism. Longinus is quoted as maintaining that the soul is ἀμερής, but at the same time, as embodied, πολυμερής.[2] Porphyry seems to follow Plotinus in adopting an 'economic' doctrine of the soul's parts. In eclectic style he sets out to interpret Plato's notion of the soul's 'parts' in terms of an Aristotelian faculty-psychology, a project of which one sees a completed form in the views of Nemesius. 'How', Porphyry asks, 'is the soul at once without parts and tripartite?'[3] He rejects outright the notion that the soul has quantitative parts, but quotes with approval the suggestion of Nicolaus that the soul's parts should be likened to the 'parts' of philosophy, or of an art, and that they should be understood as 'faculties' (δυνάμεις) of the living creature, which as the result of its possession of soul becomes capable of species of activity which are differentiated in the animate organism, but in the soul itself are aspects of a single life.[4] Thus Porphyry concludes that the soul's 'parts' ψυχῇ ἀμερίστῳ οὔσῃ ἐν τῇ σπορᾷ παρυφίσταται.[5] In this way he seeks at once to maintain Plato's distinction between a higher and an inferior soul, and to assert the unity and indivisibility of the soul in its essential nature.

Conclusion

In the last resort, there is no question for most Neo-Platonic writers of a tripartition of human nature in the crude sense intended by Nemesius in his accusation against Plotinus. The accusation probably stems from a tendency to confuse the distinction which is drawn between (rational) soul and the transcendent

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[1] The persistence of this conception is nowhere plainer than in Neo-Platonic discussions of the question whether the 'irrational soul' is or is not mortal. The Neo-Platonic tendency is plainly to assert its immortality—a fact which in itself testifies to their sense of the unity of the soul. But fidelity to the text of the *Timaeus* makes this position difficult to maintain. Proclus (*In Tim.* iii. 234 ff. (Diehl)) thus reports that Iamblichus holds to the immortality both of the irrational soul and of the pneumatic ὄχημα (cf. *De anim.*, in Stob. *Ecl.* i. 384. 20 ff. (Wachsmuth)); but he himself feels compelled to adopt a compromise position, holding that 'the highest parts' (τὰς . . . ἀκρότητας) of the irrational soul are immortal, whereas the divisible soul perishes (loc. cit., 236. 31 ff.).

[2] Cited by Porphyry, in Stob. *Ecl.* i. 351. 14 ff. (Wachsmuth).

[3] Porphyry distinguishes the doctrine that the soul has 'parts' from the view (which he attributes to Numenius) that there are in man 'two souls'. Ibid. 351. 24 ff.

[4] Ibid. 353. 1 f.　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　[5] Ibid. 353. 12 ff.

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divine Intellect, with that which is drawn between reason as a part or faculty of the human soul and τὸ ἄλογον τῆς ψυχῆς.[1] In the former case there may indeed be a question of two different 'things'; in the latter case, what is contemplated is substantially the difference which Nemesius himself defines between rational and irrational soul. Used in this sense, νοῦς is a synonym for λογικὴ ψυχὴ,[2] and may be characterized as one of the 'higher faculties' of the soul.[3] At the same time, however, because it denotes the participated presence within the soul of a higher kind of existence, νοῦς may be singled out and even contrasted with the soul to which it belongs.[4]

It follows, then, that 'bipartite' and 'tripartite' language are not necessarily mutually inconsistent, since the latter does not, for the Neo-Platonist, appear to intend a denial of what the former seeks to assert, the essential unity of the soul. Nevertheless, there are two facts which, for the Neo-Platonist, demand the assumption of an internal articulation within the soul. First is the fact that, *qua* rational, the soul overreaches itself to share in the nature of an hypostasis superior to itself. Herein resides its divinity and impassibility, and herein too consists the possibility of a language which contrasts soul and intellect as though the latter were a 'part' of human nature.[5] Second, the soul as embodied undertakes certain functions of a biological and sensitive nature. These are, in the last resort, functions of the soul as rational. Nevertheless, since they bring it into contact with the sensible world, they are also essentially foreign to its rational

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[1] This confusion surely lies behind the suggestion of W. Jaeger (*Nemesios von Emesa*, p. 5, n. 2) that Apollinaris' anthropological treatment of νοῦς and ψυχή is to be compared with Plotinus' distinction between these terms 'als zwei Substanzen'. He refers to *Enn.* i. 3. 5, iv. 4. 2, iv. 8. 1 (?), as affording parallels to Apollinaris' view. But what seems to be in question in each case is not the relationship between soul and intellect as parts of human nature, but that between soul and the cosmic Intellect in which the soul, as rational, participates. Cf. above, pp. 35 ff. A better case might have been made out from *Enn.* vi. 8. 5.

[2] Cf. Proclus, *In Tim.* iii. 234. 10–13 (Diehl).

[3] e.g. Iamblichus, *De an.*, in Stob. *Ecl.* i. 317. 21 (Wachsmuth).

[4] Cf. Iamblichus, *De mysteriis* (Parthey), p. 81, where classic tripartite language is explicitly employed, and ibid. 21 ff. where it is explained that 'the soul participates in divisible Intellect'. The two forms of expression appear to represent a single conception in different aspects.

[5] At this point it is necessary to keep in mind Plotinus' treatment of the relation between soul and intellect. See above, pp. 36 f. Strictly speaking, intellect cannot be a 'part' of soul at all. Rather, the soul in 'reverting' to its Source identifies with intellect in its highest reaches.

nature: and this fact in its turn suggests a distinction—but now a distinction between rational soul and its irrational phase. Thus from two points of view, that of the rational soul's relation with νοῦς, and that of its relation with body, an analysis of the soul into parts or phases seems required. Yet the Neo-Platonist, like his Christian contemporary, would insist ultimately that it is the soul as a unity which is at once the source of animal life and sensitivity and the seat of those operations which proclaim its participation in Intellect. The same considerations which serve to shape the doctrine of soul as a mean substance serve also to dictate a somewhat equivocal attitude on the question of its parts: again, it is the problem of the conflict between monistic and dualistic tendencies within the same system of thought.

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The Union of Body and Soul

THERE remains a final theme or problem in late Platonic anthropology which we must explore here: that of the mode in which the soul is united to its body. For here again we confront a philosophical issue which prima facie has a direct bearing on the christological discussions of the fourth and fifth centuries. Apollinaris, Gregory Nyssen, Theodore, and Nemesius—all in one way or another employ the analogy of soul-body union to explain the union of divinity and humanity in Christ. Our task here, therefore, must be to explore some of the differing ways in which philosophers treated of this problem, expecting to find that our conclusions will bear fruit when we come to discuss the christologies of Apollinaris and Theodore.

In the Platonic tradition it is the soul alone which constitutes the person. In spite of this tradition, however, Neo-Platonic writers understood the soul as a substance whose very nature it is to be embodied, as the mediator between the sensible world and the world of pure Spirit. Since, however, they retained at the same time that essential dualism which defines soul and body as contraries, the question of the manner of this union was a serious and difficult problem. How was it possible to conceive a genuine union of soul and body in which the incorporeal and impassible nature of the soul is neither denied nor compromised?

Background of Neo-Platonic Speculation

In the philosophical tradition upon which Neo-Platonism drew, there were current several alternative accounts of the manner in which body and soul are united. (1) Plato himself did not treat this question systematically. Nevertheless, he made use of certain figures which, in later times, were accepted as models for the union of soul and body. He likens the soul to the 'steersman' of a ship,[1] or to a 'charioteer' driving and directing his equipage.[2]

[1] *Critias* 109 c; *Phaedrus* 247 c.   [2] *Phaedrus* 246 a.

In the *Timaeus* he speaks of the body as the soul's 'vehicle' (ὄχημα),[1] and, in another figure, describes the 'interweaving' of the World-Soul and its body.[2] (2) Aristotle, in contrast with Plato, gives what is intended as a systematic account of the body–soul union. He likens it to the relationship between form and matter, describing the soul as the form of an organic body. On this view, as we have seen, soul and body were to be taken as interdependent substantial principles which together constitute a single living entity, with the consequence, drawn out by later Aristotelian commentators, that the soul's independence and immortality are denied. (3) Finally, there was the Stoic view of the body–soul union as a mixture of two corporeal substances—a mixture of the distinctive sort which was called κρᾶσις δι' ὅλων. Like Aristotle, the Stoics conceived the relationship between soul and body in terms of the interaction between an active or formal principle, and a passive or 'material' principle. In their case, however, both elements were assumed to be material substances, and the doctrine of κρᾶσις δι' ὅλων was employed as a means of asserting the most intimate sort of union between these elements, without at the same time endangering their distinction one from the other. Since this view was influential in the formation of later teaching, we shall examine it more closely.

The Doctrine of Mixture

Aristotle had set forth a doctrine of κρᾶσις as a part of his discussion of the relationship between agent and patient in the processes of change and growth. He enumerated two principal sorts of mixture-relation. First he spoke of σύνθεσις: a mixture formed by the juxtaposition of very small parts of its constituent elements.[3] He instances, as an example of this phenomenon, the mingling together of grains of barley and wheat.[4] Characteristic of σύνθεσις is the fact that it is an inert mixture. Since its elements do not react upon each other, they retain their distinctive properties intact. Κρᾶσις (or μίξις: Aristotle uses the terms interchangeably)[5] is an altogether different matter. It occurs when two conditions are fulfilled. The two substances in question must be of a sort to interact reciprocally (i.e. both to cause change and to undergo it as the result of being brought into contact with each other).

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[1] *Timaeus* 69 c.   [2] Ibid. 36 e.   [3] *De gen. et corr.* 327ᵇ34 ff.
[4] Ibid. 328ᵃ2 f.   [5] Ibid. 328ᵃ8.

Furthermore, each of them must possess approximately the same capacity for altering its contrary as for being altered by it.[1] The result of the mixture of two such elements is a *tertium quid*: a **compound** in which the distinctive properties of the ingredients remain potentially (with the consequence that the compound can be analysed into its original elements), but in which they are actually superseded by the properties of an intermediate substance.[2] Aristotle denies that any degree of σύνθεσις can be described as κρᾶσις. In the case of the latter, he argues, the coalescence of the elements must be complete, so that the resultant substance is of 'a uniform texture'.[3] A special kind of κρᾶσις occurs when it happens that one of the two constituents of the mixture dominates or prevails over the other. In such cases, the relation between the stronger and the weaker elements is analogous to that between form and matter, and one element is in effect transmuted into the other. As an example of this sort of mixture, Aristotle cites the effect of placing a drop of wine in 'ten thousand gallons of water'—an illustration which the Stoics were to use later to another purpose.

Clearly neither of these sorts of mixture, neither σύνθεσις nor κρᾶσις, could satisfy the Stoic need for a description of the manner in which soul and body are united. Because σύνθεσις is a matter merely of the external juxtaposition of the parts of two aggregates, it cannot serve as a principle to explain the animation of body by soul. As for the Aristotelian doctrine of κρᾶσις, to apply it to the problem of body-soul union would be to suggest that the soul (πνεῦμα) undergoes substantial alteration in the process of union, and thus loses its identity as the substance which pre-eminently possesses, and can confer, life.

The Stoics, in any case, took issue with Aristotle, and distinguished two kinds of mixture where he had allowed (apart from σύνθεσις)[4] only one. They spoke first of σύγχυσις: a mixture in which both ingredients are altered, and which (unlike the Aristotelian κρᾶσις) cannot be resolved again into its elements.[5] Next, they spoke of κρᾶσις δι' ὅλων: a mutual and total interpenetration of two material substances, in which each retained

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[1] Ibid. 328ᵃ19 ff.   [2] Ibid. 327ᵇ25 ff.   [3] Ibid. 328ᵃ4 f.
[4] Παράθεσις ('juxtaposition') was the name which the Stoics applied to this sort of mixture. Cf. Alexander Aphr. *De mixtione*, 216. 17 (Bruns).
[5] Alexander Aphr. *De mixt.* 216. 22; cf. 220. 29 ff. (Bruns).

all of its characteristic properties unaltered, so that even in their intimate union the two substances remain distinct.[1] In view of their thoroughgoing materialism, it was at once natural and necessary that the Stoics conceive the union of soul and body on the analogy of this sort of physical mixture.[2] Employing this model, they were enabled at once to assert the most intimate union of the pneumatic soul and its body, and at the same time to deny that either of the elements in this union is corrupted in its essential nature. Soul acts upon body, and responds to states of the body, but without therefore ceasing to be itself, or to function as the active, determinant principle within the composite of human nature.

Neo-Platonic Speculation on the Union of Body and Soul

Plotinus, in his discussion of the relation of soul and body, subjects this doctrine of κρᾶσις δι' ὅλων to a searching criticism in terms of the Aristotelian doctrine of κρᾶσις. In his treatise on the soul he maintains that the coalescence of two material substances can only take place when each of them surrenders its own distinctive properties.[3] His conclusion, however, should be carefully noted: '. . . it is not possible for a body to traverse anything as a whole through a whole: but this is what the soul does. . . .'[4] Plotinus suggests, then, that he wishes to conceive the relation between soul and body on the analogy of the Stoic conception of κρᾶσις δι' ὅλων, while at the same time he wishes to deny that this doctrine is applicable as an analysis of the relation between two corporeal substances. He values the notion of κρᾶσις δι' ὅλων both because it asserts the total interpenetration of body by soul and thus genuinely accounts for the animation of the body, and because it seeks to maintain a distinction between soul and body, and thus to safeguard the integrity of the soul. Nevertheless, he differs profoundly from the Stoics in that his thought is governed by the axiom of the incorporeality of the soul.

In one of his last essays, inquiring into the question whether the soul is the subject of passion, Plotinus affirms that, until liberated by the practice of philosophy, the soul is in some fashion mixed with its body: ἐμέμικτο.[5] The question is, How does this mixture

[1] Alexander Aphr. *De mixt.* 216. 28 ff. (Bruns).
[2] Alexander Aphr. *De mixt.* 217. 18 ff. (Bruns).
[3] Ibid., *ad fin.*
[3] *Enn.* iv. 7. 8 (2).
[5] *Enn.* i. 1. 3.

take place? He sets aside the Aristotelian doctrine of κρᾶσις as a possible account of the matter on the obvious ground that it would suggest a mutual alteration of soul and body, and thus fail to provide for the soul's impassibility.[1] Plotinus turns, therefore, to the language of the *Timaeus*, and raises the possibility that body and soul are 'interwoven'.[2] This proposal, he thinks, seems to allow for the impassibility of the soul, since things which are interwoven need not be ὁμοιοπαθῆ. As an illustration of this sort of conjunction, Plotinus refers to the relationship of light to its medium: one of the classical Stoic examples of κρᾶσις δι' ὅλων.[3] Plotinus evidently proposes to understand Plato's language in the light of the Stoic doctrine of κρᾶσις; and this fact is further made plain by a parallel passage of earlier date.[4] Here Plotinus again employs the analogy of the presence of light in air as a means of elucidating the relationship of soul and body. Light, he says, is present to air δι' ὅλου, yet it is not 'mixed' with it: οὐδένι μίγνυται.[5] Moreover, it is correctly said that the air is in the light rather than that the light is in the air; and this provides a further analogy to the relationship of soul and body, since, while the body is totally penetrated by the soul, soul is not totally penetrated by body. In its highest phase, it remains transcendent of body. In this connexion, Plotinus alludes again to the passage in the *Timaeus* which describes the 'interweaving' of soul and body—an interweaving which, according to Plato, takes place in such a manner that soul is said to contain body, but not body to contain soul.

In both of these passages, then, Plotinus holds the same set of ideas in association. At the base of his conception lies the language

[1] *Enn.* i 1. 4. As altered, he argues, soul could scarcely be the subject, much less the source, of sensation. He goes on to observe that μίξις of soul and body may not even be possible, since they appear to be entities that cannot interact reciprocally like (citing Aristotle, *De gen. et corr.* 323ᵇ25, cf. 327ᵇ17 ff.) 'whiteness' and 'line'. In this particular passage Plotinus is evidently using μίξις to denote specifically what Aristotle meant by κρᾶσις.
[2] *Enn.* i. 1. 4; cf. *Timaeus* 36 e.
[3] Cf. Alexander Aphr. *De mixt.* 218. 8 f. (Bruns): καὶ τὸ φῶς δὲ τῷ ἀέρι ὁ Χρυσίππος κιρνᾶσθαι λέγει. Alexander himself regards the mixture of light and air as an instance of that sort of κρᾶσις in which one element 'dominates' another, being united to it as form is to matter, and inseparable from it as form is from its matter. Cf. ibid. 222. That Plotinus does not accept this Peripatetic view is evident from *Enn.* iv. 5. 6, where he argues at great length that light is not a modification of air, but an independent substance.
[4] *Enn.* iv. 3. 22.
[5] Ibid. Here again, Plotinus is clearly referring, when he speaks of μίξις, to κρᾶσις in the strict Aristotelian sense.

of the *Timaeus*: soul and body are woven together, but in such a way that the soul is container and not contained. This doctrine Plotinus interprets in the light of the Stoic doctrine of κρᾶσις δι' ὅλων, by means of the common image of the penetration of ἀήρ by φῶς: an image which, in its turn, is recast in view of the Platonic emphasis on the fact that soul, as including body, must also transcend it.

It is this same image which governs Plotinus' use of the idea that the soul is the 'form' of its body. Although he rejects the Peripatetic conception that soul is to be defined as a 'form' or ἐντελέχεια, on the ground that it calls in question the soul's independent substantiality, he nevertheless considers that the soul may be described as a formal principle, inasmuch as it is the separate, active substance which begets form within body.[1] And just as he envisages the 'interweaving' of soul and body in terms of the penetration of air by light, so he conceives the soul's form-producing activity in terms of the 'illumination' of body by soul.[2] The soul is present to the body because it emits from itself a light which penetrates body, vivifies it, and thus gives rise to the living organism which belongs to the soul in question.[3] The rational soul itself, however, remains apart from body, and as the source of light, is modally distinct also both from the ray by which it illuminates body, and from the reflection of itself which it produces within the corporeal realm.

It must, however, be re-emphasized that Plotinus' thought in this connexion is governed by his conviction of the incorporeal, and hence non-spatial, nature of the soul. From his point of view, the mixture of light and air is not an instance of the sort of relationship which obtains between soul and body. Rather, it is an analogy which is profitable just in so far as it leads the mind to perceive certain abstract truths about the relationship of the soul to its body: its transcendence of body, and the fact that, while 'present to' body, it is not essentially relative to body. If, therefore, he seizes upon the notion of κρᾶσις δι' ὅλων, it is only because, however false in its customary psychological application, this conception serves to suggest in part the sort of situation which obtains when an incorporeal entity such as the soul enters into association with, and animates, a body.

In the last resort, therefore, Plotinus chooses to define the mode

[1] *Enn.* iv. 3. 20 *ad fin.*   [2] Ibid. i. 1. 7.   [3] Ibid. iv. 3. 23.

of the soul's presence to body in terms suited to its incorporeal nature. He adumbrates the idea of an *intentional* presence: a presence brought about by the soul's focusing, to one degree or another, its attention on the body which it animates. Thus the soul's descent is explained as its becoming 'absorbed in the partial' (πρὸς μέρος βλέπειν):[1] as a bending of its consciousness upon the particular as opposed to the universal. Similarly, Plotinus observes that the difference between the World-Soul and individual souls in their relation to body is constituted by the fact that the individual souls are governed by a νεῦσις towards the inferior,[2] or by an ἐπιστροφή towards the body which has need of their attention.[3] Moreover, it is precisely this νεῦσις, this inclination which is in fact a concentration of attention on the corporeal, that Plotinus explains as ἔλλαμψις πρὸς τὸ κάτω: the illumination by which the soul penetrates and animates the body.[4]

The same conception is substantially present in Porphyry. Like Plotinus, he insists that the soul is not contained in its body, but contains it,[5] and further that in the case of τὰ καθ' αὐτὰ ἀσώματα, οὐ τοπικῶς παρόντα τοῖς σώμασι . . . τῇ σχέσει πάρεστιν αὐτοῖς.[6] That is to say, the soul is present to its body by reason of a relation or attitude, an ἐπιστροφὴ πρὸς τὰ πάθη,[7] as he terms it in another connexion. Moreover, the soul's freedom from the body is constituted precisely by the turning of its attention from the sensible to the intelligible and not, certainly, by any local movement. While, then, the Neo-Platonic philosopher is willing to employ carefully defined and qualified physical analogies for the union of soul and body, he interprets these always in terms of the sort of relationship which an incorporeal, rational substance is alone capable of sustaining: relationships, that is to say, in the order of consciousness and voluntary accord.

Nemesius' Treatment of the Body-Soul Union

As a Christian Neo-Platonist, Nemesius follows Porphyry in adopting the terminology of σχέσις to explain the mode of the soul's presence to body, with which he associates Plotinus' term, νεῦσις: 'The soul is bound to the body by relation, or by an inclination or disposition towards it, just as we say that a lover is

[1] *Enn.* iv. 8. 4.   [2] Ibid. iv. 8. 2.   [3] Ibid. iv. 3. 4.
[4] Ibid. i. 1. 2.   [5] *Sent.* xxviii.
[6] Ibid. iii.   [7] *Sent.* vii.

bound to his beloved . . .'.[1] And again, of course, it is the soul's incorporeal nature which demands the use of such language. Nemesius points out that the soul can only be said to be 'in a place' in the sense that its activity may have a reference to, be directed upon, some spatial substance or event.[2] Thus he writes, in a summary passage:

The soul is incorporeal, and yet it has established its presence in every part of the body, just as much as if it were a partner to a union involving the sacrifice of its own proper nature [i.e. just as if the union took place by κρᾶσις in the Aristotelian sense]. Nevertheless, it remains uncorrupted by body, just as if it were something quite distinct from it. Thus, on the one hand, soul preserves its own independent unity of being, and, on the other, it modifies whatever it indwells, in accordance with its own life, while itself suffering no reciprocal change. For as the presence of the sun transforms the air into light, making the air luminous by uniting light with air, at once maintaining them distinct and melting them together, so likewise the soul is united to the body and yet remains distinct from it.[3]

Moreover, Nemesius continues, it is the soul which contains the body, and not the body which contains the soul.

The way is prepared for this general statement, which may be taken as an amalgam of Neo-Platonic teaching on the subject, by a discussion of the various modes in which the union might be conceived to take place: a discussion which is paralleled, and often elucidated, by a much later account of the matter given by Priscianus Lydus, who evidently shares with Nemesius a common source.[4] Nemesius begins by setting aside three alternative possibilities. He notes that 'All things which come together εἰς μίας οὐσίας ὑπόστασιν are united in all respects': but at the same time, they are altered, since ἐνωθέντα ἄλλο τι γέγονε.[5] By ἕνωσις here is plainly meant the Aristotelian κρᾶσις, which is rejected on the usual ground that it fails to explain how body and soul can be

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[1] *PG*, xl. 600B.   [2] Ibid. 601A.   [3] *PG*, xl. 597B.

[4] Cf. *Solutiones ad Chosroem*, pp. 50–52 (Bywater). The common source is probably Porphyry's *Summixtae Quaestiones*. Cf. H. Krause, *Studia Neoplatonica*, Leipzig, 1902.

[5] *PG*, xl. 592A. Cf. Priscianus, *Sol.*, pp. 50 f. (Bywater): 'videmus enim omnem essentiam acceptam in unius cuiusdam substantiam . . ., si prius ab alio transmutata et corrupta, sic committitur in unius substantiam. Non enim inest intelligere et simul salvatam incorruptam et ad substantiam alicuius unius commissam. Si enim corrupta sint unita, unam perficiunt substantiam.'

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united while the soul remains 'incorporeal . . . and substantial'.[1] Παράθεσις (the Aristotelian σύνθεσις) Nemesius similarly passes by. Mere juxtaposition cannot account for the animation of the body. Finally, Nemesius turns to κρᾶσις in the Stoic sense, which he illustrates by the example of wine mixed with water. He asserts that in fact the constituents of such a mixture are not preserved pure, even though it may be analysed; for in the resultant neither constituent can be distinguished from its contrary. Nevertheless, he argues, this sort of κρᾶσις is in fact simply another case of παράθεσις, an instance of mixture by juxtaposition, which fails for just that reason to afford a model for the soul-body union.[2]

Nemesius therefore turns to a fourth explanation of the union of soul and body: one propounded, he says, by Ammonius, the teacher of Plotinus. On this view, it is in the nature of intelligibles to be capable of union with other substances in such a way that (a) their union is as genuine as it would be if it were a κρᾶσις in the Aristotelian sense; and (b) they are essentially altered in this union as little as they would be if it were a case of mere παράθεσις.[3] Nemesius goes on to argue that in any case intelligible substances are not susceptible of alteration; and that, if the soul as source of life were altered or corrupted by reason of its union with body, it would cease to supply life to the body.[4] The outcome of this argument, therefore, is the position which Nemesius outlines in the passage cited at length above. The soul in its relation to body is compared to light in its relation to air: penetrating it totally, transforming its character, the while remaining distinct from it and unaffected by it.[5] The soul dominates and contains the body: it is, in fact, the active, governing element in the human composite, conferring life, but receiving from the body nothing in return.

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[1] *PG*, xl. 592A. Cf. Wolfson, *The Philosophy of the Church Fathers*, i, pp. 400f.

[2] For the conjunction of these two criticisms of the Stoic theory cf. *Enn.* ii. 7. 1.

[3] *PG*, xl. 593B. Cf. Priscianus, *Sol.* 51. 9 ff. (Bywater): 'Tale igitur mirabile in anima, quomodo id ipsum et miscetur alteri, sicut ea quae sunt concorrupta, et manet sui salvans essentiam, sicut ea quae sunt apposita.'

[4] *PG*, xl. 596A. For parallels to this argument cf. *Enn.* iv. 7. 2, and Porphyry, *Sent.* xxxix.

[5] Cf. Priscianus, *Sol.*, p. 51. 30 ff. (Bywater): 'Incorporales enim essentiae corporibus uniuntur et manent inconfusae, unumque cum alio factae et per se ipsos unum salvatae; et tamen convertunt illa in quibuscumque fiunt in operationem quae secundum eas est: lux vero unitur aeri, sicut ea quae sunt concorrupta, et inconfusa manet ad eum.'

In his discussion of this passage, H. A. Wolfson argues that Nemesius (and, by implication, those who held views similar to Nemesius') has in fact chosen to model the soul-body relation after the example of the Aristotelian notion of mixture (or union) by 'predominance'.[1] Several considerations seem to support this view. Negatively, of course, there is the fact that Nemesius seems to eliminate every alternative save this as a possible model. More positively, there is his insistence upon the soul's 'domination' of body, and on the fact that the soul alters the nature of body by rendering it animate without itself being changed. Further, Wolfson points out that a passage cited by Nemesius from Porphyry[2] employs language suggestive of a conception of the soul as the ἐντελέχεια of its body—i.e. as related to it after the fashion of form to matter. Moreover, as Wolfson points out, Alexander of Aphrodisias, contending against the Stoic doctrine of mixture, cites the union of light and air as a case of just this sort of mixture.[3]

Despite this evidence, however, Wolfson's interpretation of Nemesius seems to require qualification. In the first place, union by 'predominance', as expounded by Alexander of Aphrodisias, involves one characteristic which renders it totally unsuitable as a model for the Neo-Platonic doctrine of body-soul union. It entails the view that the formal element in such a mixture be 'inseparable' (ἀχώριστος). In a passage continuous with one cited by Wolfson, Alexander makes this fact quite clear:

'Habit' (ἕξις) is not something separable from that which possesses it, as though it were able to exist on its own; nor may the 'nature' of plants ever subsist apart from the plants. And how is it possible to conceive light apart from the transparent bodies? Nor, for that matter, is the soul of such a nature . . ., since it is not possible for an enmattered form to exist apart from matter and body.[4]

These are all instances of union by 'predominance', as Alexander understands it; and it seems, as Wolfson declares, to reduce to a special case of the form-matter relationship. But this fact alone indicates that Nemesius, and other Neo-Platonists, who were concerned above all to deny that the soul is an 'inseparable form' (εἶδος ἀχώριστος), would be the last to specify this sort of 'mixture'

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[1] For this discussion see *The Philosophy of the Church Fathers* (Cambridge, Mass., The Harvard University Press, 1956), pp. 405 f. See also above, pp. 68 ff.
[2] *PG*, xl. 604A.
[3] See above, p. 71, n. 3.   [4] *De mixt.* 222. 31 ff. (Bruns).

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as the type of the body-soul union. Moreover, a second glance at Neo-Platonic use of the 'light' metaphor serves to confirm this impression. Nemesius likens the soul, not merely to the light which, as it were, informs and penetrates the air, but also, at the same time, to the transcendent source of light, the sun.[1] Priscianus similarly figures the transcendence and separateness of the soul, likening it to a lamp: 'In his enim quae illuminant, utpote lucerna posita, solummodo lux aera quodammodo afficit, ipse vero ignis in candelabro tenetur.'[2] This is the sense in which Plotinus himself understood the analogy of the mixture of light and air. It is intended to assert, not merely the dominance of light in the mixture, as the active, formal element, but also the radical independence of the source of light—i.e. of the soul in its highest phase. Neo-Platonic writers, in fact, understand this metaphor in a sense precisely contrary to that in which it was propounded by Alexander.

Conclusion

In view of these considerations, it seems dangerous to attempt, with Wolfson, to assimilate the Neo-Platonic doctrine of the union of soul and body to any single one of the classical kinds of 'mixture'—and certainly not to the Aristotelian 'mixture by predominance'. The evidence we have examined, and the Neo-Platonic tendency to explain the union of soul and body in quasi-voluntaristic, non-physical terms, should suggest that in the end their position, while indebted to earlier speculation, represents something of a new departure just because of their deliberate and reiterated insistence upon the incorporeality and independence of the soul. They liken the body-soul union to a κρᾶσις in the Aristotelian sense, by reason of the intimacy and completeness of the union. On the other hand, they liken it to a case of παράθεσις, because in it the constituents are σωζόμενα, ἀδιάφθαρτα. As we have seen, the Stoics attempted a somewhat similar account of the matter with their doctrine of κρᾶσις δι' ὅλων; and the Neo-Platonists gladly use the Stoic terminology of total penetration in their description of the body-soul union. In the final analysis, however, their position is far from being a mere restatement of Stoic views. On the contrary, they insist that a union of this curious and exceptional sort can only take place

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[1] *PG*, xl. 597B.   [2] *Sol.*, p. 51. 20 ff. (Bywater).

when at least one of the elements is an incorporeal. Moreover, they deny the essential divisibility of the soul, which seems to be premissed in the Stoic account. In the end, as Priscianus observes, the mode in which body and soul are united is 'ineffabilis . . . recipitur secundum solam intellegentiam'.[1]

The uniqueness of this relationship is constituted by the fact that in the case of soul and body an incorporeal nature is truly united to a corporeal substance, without in any way being limited or corrupted by its association. The soul is in one sense united with its body; for it is only this affirmation which can account either for the animation of the body, or for the distractedness and trouble of the soul. Yet at the same time the soul is independent of the body and transcendent of it; for only so can the soul's incorporeal and intellectual nature be safeguarded. Here again, in the doctrine of the union of soul and body, is an illustration of the Neo-Platonic habit of taking refuge in paradox in order to reconcile a sense of the soul's exalted origin and destiny with the facts of its terrestrial condition. It is the pattern of systematic ambiguity which we detected in the Neo-Platonist's treatment of the problem of the soul's nature which emerges here as, in different ways, it emerges also in his treatment of the questions of man's freedom and of the 'parts' of the soul. And it is this general pattern—its presuppositions and the specific doctrines with which it tends to be associated—which must be kept in mind as we move on first to Apollinaris and then to Theodore of Mopsuestia himself.

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[1] *Sol.*, p. 52. 8 f. (Bywater). Cf. Porphyry, *Sent.* xxxv.

Part II

ANTHROPOLOGICAL ISSUES IN THE CHRISTOLOGY OF APOLLINARIS OF LAODICEA

7

The Unity of Apollinaris' Teaching

IN the first part we examined the shape of the philosophical anthropology which lay in the background of fourth- and fifth-century Christian thought, and noted, in certain particular instances, how the logic of Neo-Platonic speculation became an ingredient in the anthropology of Christian thinkers who could only partially, or in a qualified sense, accept the results of this speculation. We turn now to consider the question how the problems or specific doctrines involved in this picture of man and his nature may have influenced the christological teaching of Apollinaris of Laodicea. To what extent, and in what ways, do anthropological issues enter into his thought about the Person of Christ? More particularly, to what extent is he indebted to secular philosophical modes of thought about the nature of man, and in what ways does his indebtedness reveal itself in his christological formula?

Such an inquiry has, of course, a value in its own right. It may cast light on some of the motives which governed the shaping of the patristic doctrine of the Person of Christ. It may, further, serve to define more closely the ways in which the problems and doctrines of secular philosophy constituted issues in the Church's continuing discussion of her own teaching. For our purposes, however, this inquiry has a purely ulterior value, inasmuch as it may provide a background against which to set the results of an investigation into the relationship between Theodore of Mopsuestia's doctrine of man and his christology—and thus assist in arriving at an estimate of the significance of his teaching within a history of patristic thought.

Needless to say, the Apollinarian controversy does not by any means constitute the sole element in the Christian background of Theodore's teaching which is relevant for these purposes. One might equally well pursue a similar inquiry in connexion with the christology of the Cappadocian Fathers, say, or of Diodore of

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Tarsus, Theodore's teacher. It has, however, seemed necessary to focus attention on one christological discussion which may usefully serve to illustrate the bearing of anthropological issues upon a doctrine of the Person of Christ within the context of fourth-century Christian thought. The centrality of the Apollinarian question in the latter part of the fourth century naturally recommends it for this sort of use, as does the fact that the Antiochene tradition in which Theodore stands presents a conscious alternative to a christology of the sort propounded by Apollinaris.

The Problem of the Unity of Apollinaris' Teaching

The first question to be faced by anyone who sets out to investigate the christology of Apollinaris of Laodicea is the vexed one of the unity or consistency of his doctrine; and to seek a solution of this question is to be plunged straightway into the issue of the relation between Apollinaris' doctrine of the Incarnation and his anthropology.

The problem is posed by a well-known passage in the *Ecclesiastical History* of Rufinus.[1] This author asserts that at a late date in his career Apollinaris, who had consistently denied the presence of a human soul in Christ, was forced to adopt a trichotomous anthropology in order to account for texts in the Gospels where Jesus himself is reported to have made reference to his 'soul'. According to this account, Apollinaris taught initially that in Christ the divine Logos took the place of the human soul and was united merely to a human body. Under the pressure of criticism, however, he revised both his anthropological and his christological formulas, in such wise as to be able to say that, while the Logos indeed took the place in Christ of the human intellect, he nevertheless assumed a human (irrational) soul. Rufinus seems thus to lodge against Apollinaris a charge both of inconsistency and of insincerity. He suggests at once that the heresiarch did not propound one single doctrine, but two; yet

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[1] *H.E.* ii. 20 (*PL*, xxi. 526–7). According to this account Apollinaris asserted first that 'solum corpus, non etiam animam a Domino in dispensatione susceptam. In quo cum evidentibus evangelii testimoniis urgeretur (quibus ipse dominus et salvator habere se animam profitetur, et ponere eam quando vult, et iterum assumere eam; quamque turbatam et tristem dicit esse usque ad mortem) vertit se post, et ne ex toto verti vel vinci videretur, ait, eum quidem habuisse animam, sed non ex ea parte quae rationabilis est, sed ex ea solum qua vivificat corpus.'

that, nevertheless, his change of mind was motivated solely by a desire to appear *verbally* orthodox.[1]

The charge of inconsistency, moreover, is borne out, at least superficially, by the evidence of Apollinaris' dogmatic works themselves, as far as they are available. These, as has frequently been observed, seem to divide themselves quite naturally into two categories. There are those in which Apollinaris employs a 'soul-flesh' or 'soul-body' formula to characterize the constitution of man; and those in which, on the contrary, he uses a 'spirit (intellect)-soul-flesh (body)' scheme. In the former class it is customary to count the *De unione* and the *Contra Diodorum*, as well as *Ad Jovianum*, *De fide et incarnatione*, and *Ad Dionysium I*. Most notable in the latter class is, of course, the *Apodeixis*, excerpted by Gregory Nyssen in his *Antirrheticus*, to which may be added the *Anacephalaiosis*, *Kata meros pistis*, *Ad Julianum*, *Tomus synodalis*, and *Ad episcopos diocaesarienses*. In the earlier, 'dichotomous', works, the relation of the Logos to his body is closely modelled on that of the human soul to its body; in the 'trichotomous' works, on the other hand, the Logos is said to take the place of 'spirit' ($\pi\nu\epsilon\hat{\upsilon}\mu\alpha$) or 'intellect' ($\nu o\hat{\upsilon}\varsigma$) in the total human organism. Thus it appears not merely that Apollinaris' anthropological scheme was altered, but that the sense of his christology was altered with it: since it cannot mean the same for the Logos to assume the functions of the whole vital principle in man, and for him to assume the functions merely of the rational 'part' of the human soul. Rufinus' observation, and the evidence of Apollinaris' works themselves, thus inevitably call attention to the fact that Apollinaris' christology is closely related to his conception of human nature: that it is dependent in some sense on his view of the human constitution. But at the same time, they make it necessary to raise the question of the unity of the heresiarch's teaching before it is possible to explore this relationship profitably or in detail.

Lietzmann's Hypothesis

Lietzmann,[2] accepting in part the report of Rufinus, and noting the evidence from the works of Apollinaris which we have

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[1] On this point cf. Epiphanius' report of his conversation with Vitalis, the disciple of Apollinaris, at Antioch: *Panarion* 77. 23.

[2] *Apollinaris von Laodicea und seine Schule* (Tübingen, 1904), pp. 5 f. Cf. Voisin, *L'Apollinarisme* (Louvain, 1901), pp. 52, 77 f.

just summarized, concludes that it is possible to discern two distinct conceptions of the Person of Christ in the heresiarch's writings.

The first causes the Logos, the Second Person of the Trinity, to make his dwelling as soul in the flesh born of Mary, which becomes his garment, in such manner that in the 'one nature of the incarnate Logos', the Logos is the willing and acting subject, the flesh, the passive instrument. Through the exchange of properties, the Deity assumes what is human, the flesh, what is divine: thus the unity of nature is effected together with the redemption of humanity consisting in divinization. So—substantially—runs the doctrine of Apollinaris in its oldest form. The second theory, growing out of his conflict with his adversaries, makes the Logos take only the place of the νοῦς, the higher faculty of the soul, while the flesh and the animal soul were human; the Saviour is 'heavenly man', not by reason of his earthly part, but because the highest element in man—the νοῦς—comes from heaven.[1]

Leitzmann, as Raven has remarked,[2] emphasizes the differences between two christological formulas, and subordinates the change from 'dichotomous' to 'trichotomous' language about the human constitution. It is not clear, however, that this account of Apollinaris' views is wholly accurate in its estimate of the lines along which his thought developed. An emphasis on the passivity of the flesh and the active, governing role of the Logos in the Person of Christ is quite as pronounced, if not more so, in the later 'trichotomous' works as in the earlier group.[3] If there is a change of accent in this regard, it is to be found in the increased attention given in the later writings to the function of the Logos as the sinless rational governor of rebellious human flesh. Moreover, neither the 'one nature' (μία φύσις) formula nor the notion of *communicatio idiomatum* is absent from the later works, although it may certainly be said that they are no longer the direct concern of Apollinaris' argument. By the same token, it appears to be the case that the doctrine of the 'heavenly man', which looms so large in Gregory Nyssen's excerpts from the *Apodeixis*, must be understood, not apart from, but in terms of, the 'one nature'

[1] Loc. cit.
[2] *Apollinarianism* (Cambridge, 1923), p. 175.
[3] For this contrast, see H. de Riedmatten, 'La Christologie d'Apollinaire de Laodicée', in *Studia Patristica*, ii, Berlin, 1957 (*Texte und Untersuchungen*, lxiv), esp. pp. 231 ff.

doctrine and the *communicatio idiomatum*.[1] These evidences at least suggest that Apollinaris' christology—and the doctrine of man with which it is correlated—may be more of a unity than at first sight appears. Is the shift from dichotomous to trichotomous language about the constitution of man less significant than Rufinus makes it out to be?

Evidences of the Unity of Apollinaris' Doctrine

There are several considerations of a general and preliminary sort which might tend to confirm doubts as to the correctness of Rufinus' accusation of inconsistency. For one thing, as we have seen, neither Christian theologians nor pagan philosophers of this period were in the habit of thinking of 'dichotomous' and 'trichotomous' languages as exclusive alternatives.[2] Indeed, the analysis of human nature into two parts, body and soul, visible and invisible, is not characteristic in itself of any particular philosophical or theological outlook. In one form or another, it represents an almost universal way of speaking and thinking about the elements of man's nature, and one which is more popular than technical. Perhaps for this reason, it was not deemed inconsistent to say of man in general that he is composed of body and soul, and then periodically to recollect that the vital principle in man subsists on two levels, or has two parts. Which convention was used would depend to some extent on the writer's immediate purpose. There is, therefore, no *a priori* reason to suppose that Apollinaris' change from bipartite to tripartite language necessarily implies a fundamental alteration in his anthropological scheme. It may reflect, rather, a shift in the immediate purpose and method of his exposition.

Then too, it is noticeable that in his later works Apollinaris has not by any means deserted a dichotomous formula. He defines man as νοῦς ἐν σαρκί,[3] νοῦς ἔνσαρκος.[4] An alternative form of words is found in *Anacephalaiosis* 16: 'Man is a spirit united to flesh.' These two definitions are clearly regarded as equivalents. But further, Apollinaris can assert that Adam was 'a soul . . . together with a body',[5] appealing, as in the case of the

[1] See below, p. 105 and n. 7.   [2] See above, pp. 64 f.
[3] Frag. 72. (All fragments and other works of Apollinaris are cited as edited by Lietzmann, op. cit.)
[4] Frag. 69.   [5] Frag. 26.

first-mentioned formula, to the authority of St. Paul. Apollinaris evidently did not consider these different forms of words as inconsistent either with one another, or with the 'trichotomous' language which he elsewhere adopts in the works from which they are cited. Moreover, Apollinaris seems to supply an account of how, in his mind, these bipartite formulas are to be related with tripartite language about the constitution of man. Having asserted that man is constituted of intellect and flesh, he proceeds to qualify his observation: 'The flesh is not lifeless (ἄψυχος) . . . we say that the bodies of irrational creatures too are possessed of life.'[1] This means to say, in effect, that in the νοῦς-σάρξ scheme, 'flesh' is a term which is capable of analysis, and which contains an allusion to the irrational life-principle as well as to the physical frame itself. The dichotomous formula in fact conceals a tripartite structure. Apollinaris pursues a somewhat different path to the same end when, having explained that Adam was 'a soul . . . together with a body', he points out that in this case 'soul' is to be taken as including 'spirit' within its denotation.[2] This explanation tacitly recognizes that there is a different use of 'soul', according to which it signifies simply the irrational soul; but it insists at the same time, on the basis of Pauline usage, that it is legitimate to describe the constitution of man as consisting in the conjunction of 'body and soul', so long as it is understood that there is a further articulation hidden within this bipartite scheme. It is difficult to resist the impression that these passages contain Apollinaris' own account of the relationship between the 'dichotomous' and 'trichotomous' terminologies. Certainly they suggest that he did not regard the two modes of speech as inconsistent, but saw them rather as alternatives.

Moreover, it is difficult to see what other position he could have taken. It is manifest that Apollinaris takes his anthropology as a restatement of the Pauline doctrine of man. Whatever non-biblical overtones or associations the modern critic may find in his views, he himself seeks the authority for them in the language of the Apostle. It is in the crucial text, 1 Thessalonians v. 23, that Apollinaris finds the basis for the explicit trichotomy of his later works. Nevertheless, he recognizes, as we have seen, that there is Pauline precedent for a simple body-soul anthropology. This being the case, it was inevitable that Apollinaris should accept,

[1] Frag. 22. [2] Frag. 28.

and insist upon, the mutual consistency of these two formulas. Now it is plain enough, from the evidence we have already touched upon, that at the time when Apollinaris wrote the *Apodeixis* he had not repudiated a bipartite anthropological formula. On the contrary, he was prepared to use such a formula freely, with the understanding that it was not to be interpreted in such a way as to render it inconsistent with the view that the human soul itself is in fact 'bipartite'. Did Apollinaris take the same attitude at an earlier date, when his writings as we have them show no trace of an explicit use of a trichotomous formula?

The Evidence of Apollinaris' Traducianism

H. de Riedmatten has sought to supply what is, in effect, an answer to this question by exploring the ramifications of Apollinaris' traducianist doctrine of the origin of the human soul.[1] This doctrine, he points out, is logically presupposed by the argument of the *De unione* 13, where, from the fact that Christ had no human father, Apollinaris infers that his flesh could not have been animated by a human soul.[2] In a well-known fragment of Apollinaris' *Commentary on Ezekiel*, however, this same traducianism is expounded in terms of an explicitly 'trichotomous' anthropology.[3] In this fragment the heresiarch distinguishes carefully between the rational and irrational 'spirits' in man, ascribing to the former a heavenly origin.[4] At the same time, qualifying the dualism implicit in this distinction, he asserts an intimate connexion between the two parts of the human life-principle. The rational spirit—τὸ νοερόν—enters the organism with and within the irrational, and thus, together with the latter, is conveyed *ex traduce*.[5] Emphasizing in this way the unity of the rational and

[1] Art. cit., pp. 215, 230 ff.
[2] The text is supplied by Lietzmann, op. cit., p. 191: 'The ordinary man is animated and lives by the will of the flesh and the will of the father. The spermatic matter which is sent forth bears the life-giving power into the receptive womb. But the holy infant born of the Virgin is constituted by the coming of Spirit and the overshadowing of Power. It is not spermatic matter which effects the divine life, but spiritual and divine Power supplies to the Virgin the divine conception. . . .'
[3] In Mai, *Patrum Novae Bibliothecae*, vii. 2, p. 90. Nemesius too reports that Apollinaris is both a traducianist (*PG*, xl. 576A) and a trichotomist (504AB).
[4] Mai, loc. cit.: τὸ δὲ νοερὸν οὐκ ἀπὸ κόσμου ἀλλ' ἄνωθεν ἅμα τούτῳ [sc. τῷ ζωτικῷ] παραγίνεται, οὐ καλούμενον ἀλλ' ἐκπεμπόμενον. Παρὰ θεῷ γὰρ ἡ νοερὰ οὐσία.
[5] Ibid.: οὐ γὰρ τὸ νοητὸν ἔρχεται, καθ' αὑτό, ἀλλ' ἐν τούτῳ [sc. τῷ κοσμικῷ πνεύματι] καὶ ὡς τοῦτο ὂν οὐχ ὡς ἕτερον. It is on the basis of this passage that one must reject the contention of Raven, op. cit., p. 171, that as a 'Greek' Apollinaris could

carnal spirits, Apollinaris adapts the trichotomy which he employs in the *Ezekiel* Fragment to traducian theory; and he does so in such a way as to make it evident that this trichotomy is altogether consistent with the line of argument which he employs in the 'dichotomous' *De unione*. It is on this basis that de Riedmatten can conclude, not implausibly, that there is no reason to postulate an evolution in Apollinaris' anthropological teaching as such. The doctrine of man presupposed by the several traducian passages, be they early or late, is substantially one.

It appears, then, that it is neither in the 'dichotomy' of the *De unione* and the *Contra Diodorum*, nor in the 'trichotomy' of which Apollinaris makes use in, say, the *Apodeixis*, that one is to seek the key for his system. In focusing attention on these different formulas, and on the contrast between them, Rufinus has in effect obscured the fact that Apollinaris uses both terminologies to express or interpret a relatively self-consistent, unified, anthropological conception, which underlies both forms of speech, and which, at the same time, provides him with a scheme for his christological doctrine.

Apollinaris' Use of the Spirit-Flesh Formula

Such a conception can, I think, be detected in Apollinaris' distinctive use of the Pauline 'spirit-flesh' formula. It is not necessary to emphasize the prominence in St. Paul's writings of the contrast between 'flesh' and 'spirit' in man. Nor should it be necessary to observe that, whatever the true sense of this contrast as the Apostle uses it may be, there are passages in his epistles which are calculated to suggest that the two terms are to be taken as designating 'parts' of human nature.[1] In any case, it is clear that Apollinaris so understood them. 'Flesh', as he sees it, denotes the animal side of man's nature—his physical frame and the irrational life-principle which animates it.[2] This latter 'soul' is the 'cosmic spirit' of the *Ezekiel* fragment, which apparently occupies in Apollinaris' view a place analogous to that both of Porphyry's *pars spiritalis*,[3] and of the Galenic πνεῦμα ζωτικόν.[4]

not have held a traducianist view (of the origin of the irrational soul), unless he had also adopted a trichotomous conception of human nature which allowed a strictly heavenly origin for the rational soul. Apollinaris in fact brings the rational soul within the compass of his traducian scheme.

[1] See, e.g., 1 Cor. v. 5, ii. 11; Gal. v. 16 f.   [2] See above, p. 86, and n. 1.
[3] Cf. p. 23 above, and n. 5.   [4] Cf. above, ibid.

Distinct but not separate from this lower πνεῦμα which is its vehicle, is the highest element in man's constitution—'spirit' in the proper sense. This, we have seen, Apollinaris characterizes as νοερόν; and indeed he interprets it, in his later works, as νοῦς. This is the biblical, Pauline human spirit assimilated at once to the Stoic ἡγεμονικόν,[1] and to the Platonic rational soul. It is not 'cosmic' (κοσμικόν), but heavenly in its origin, and thus, derivatively and after the manner of a creature, divine. In this thoroughly eclectic picture we see a fundamentally biblical terminology assimilated, partly through the medium of Stoic conceptions, to the anthropology of a popular Platonism, with its characteristically dualistic distinction, here carefully muted, between a rational and heavenly and an irrational and earthly 'part' of the soul. So does Apollinaris quite naturally understand the meaning of the Pauline spirit-flesh formula in its application to the nature of man.

It must be remembered also, however, that Paul once or twice uses these terms in prominent christological passages—and in such a way as to indicate, at least for a fourth-century exegete, that they have reference respectively to the Divinity and the humanity of the incarnate Logos. Clearly it is in this light that Apollinaris understands, for example, Paul's characterization of the Second Adam as 'life-giving spirit' (πνεῦμα ζωοποιοῦν).[2] Of equal interest in this connexion is the formula of Romans i. 3 f., τοῦ γενομένου ἐκ σπέρματος Δαβὶδ κατὰ σάρκα, τοῦ ὁρισθέντος υἱοῦ θεοῦ ἐν δυνάμει κατὰ πνεῦμα ἁγιοσύνης. This text is cited in part in *De unione* 9; and it may well be that the discussion of John xvii. 19 (ἁγιάζω ἐμαυτόν) in *De unione* 10–13 supplies an indication of the sense in which Apollinaris would have interpreted the second phrase of the formula from Romans: 'the body [of Christ] lived by the sanctification of Divinity, and not by the provision of a human soul.'[3] But the influence of Paul's language in Romans may also be detected in a characteristic form of expression which recurs throughout Apollinaris' works. Thus in the *Ad Jovianum* Christ is described as θεὸν κατὰ πνεῦμα, υἱὸν δὲ ἀνθρώπου κατὰ σάρκα.[4] Or, in the words of *De unione* 8, Christ is θεῷ ὁμοούσιος κατὰ τὸ πνεῦμα τὸ ἀόρατον, συμπεριλαμβανομένης τῷ ὀνόματι καὶ

[1] See below, pp. 93, 100.
[2] Cf. Frags. 29, 41, and *De unione* 2 (Lietzmann, p. 186).
[3] *De unione* 12.
[4] Lietzmann, p. 250. 6 f. Cf. 251. 14 ff.

τῆς σαρκός. Precisely similar language is found in the later, 'trichotomous' works. The *Apodeixis* has it that the Lord is θεὸς μὲν . . . τῷ πνεύματι τῷ σαρκωθέντι, ἄνθρωπος δὲ τῇ ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ προσληφθείσῃ σαρκί.[1] Again, Apollinaris writes that Christ is not of one substance with God κατὰ τὴν σάρκα . . . ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὸ πνεῦμα τὸ ἡνωμένον τῇ σαρκί.[2]

What account is to be given of this sort of language? Plainly enough, the Pauline πνεῦμα-σάρξ scheme represents, in Apollinaris' eyes, a formula which at once describes the constitution of ordinary human nature and supplies an analysis of the nature of the Logos incarnate. What is more, it applies in the latter case in a sense exactly analogous to that in which it applies in the former. Apollinaris takes it that in St. Paul's christological use of 'spirit' and 'flesh', the terms denote exactly what they signify in an anthropological context: namely, the two constituent principles of a single living being. The spirit-flesh formula supplies, as it were, the abstract form of the constitution of any rational organism. For this reason it is possible, on the one hand, to speak of Christ's πνεῦμα and σάρξ in the same way as one would speak of the 'spirit' or 'flesh' of an ordinary human person. But, on the other hand, it is necessary to specify carefully that Christ's 'spirit' is 'life-giving' or 'divine' rather than merely human. It appears, then, that for Apollinaris the spirit-flesh scheme is an anthropological formula which has a direct christological bearing—which is, in fact, a christological formula as well, and not merely one which may be used to provide a convenient simile for the relationship of Divinity and humanity in Christ.

The πνεῦμα-σάρξ formula is therefore doubly important for an understanding of Apollinaris' thought. Not only does it represent a persistent element in his teaching, an element which is common to both his earlier and later works. It also provides a key to his christological outlook in so far as it defines the point where, for Apollinaris, christological and anthropological languages were seen to meet and coincide. In this fact lies its crucial significance for his system. Here is, if not the source, then at least the most fundamental expression, of Apollinaris' tendency to model the Person of Christ on the example of the human constitution. And since this spirit-flesh scheme recurs regularly in the most diverse of Apollinaris' dogmatic writings, it serves also to call attention to

[1] Frag. 19.   [2] Frag. 41.

the essential unity of his teaching over an extended period of years.

Unity and Development in Apollinaris' Thought

For if our analysis is correct, then the problem of the relationship between 'trichotomous' and 'dichotomous' language in Apollinaris assumes a new aspect. What we are confronted with, it seems, is not two wholly diverse anthropological schemes employed, at different times, to supply an analogy for the union of Divinity and humanity in Christ; but rather with a single scheme which is taken to be at once christological and anthropological in its bearing, and which consistently underlies the differing terminologies by means of which Apollinaris interprets it at various periods in his career. Man and Christ alike are made up of a union of two elements: spirit and flesh. They are unlike, however, in that 'spirit' in the case of Christ denotes divine Spirit, whereas in the case of ordinary man it has reference to created spirit. This is Apollinaris' basic scheme, which may be detected at every stage in the progress of his thinking. The question of the unity of his doctrine therefore resolves into the question why, at various times, he chose to expound the meaning of this scheme in terms of apparently divergent terminologies, which, however, like the spirit-flesh formula itself, are derived in the last resort from the letters of St. Paul.

The answer to this question would seem to lie largely in a consideration of Apollinaris' apparent purpose in the composition of his several works. In the earlier works, what is to the fore is the question of the unity of Christ's Person and the doctrine, as he develops it, of the *communicatio idiomatum*. In this connexion he appeals to the unity of the human person, constituted as it is of visible and invisible parts which remain distinct in their union, to supply an example and an explanation of the sort of unity which obtains equally in the case of the Person of Christ. In the *Contra Diodorum*, for example, it is to this end that he invokes the model of the union of body and soul in man;[1] and similarly, in the *De unione* 5, Apollinaris appeals to the body-soul union as providing a basis for understanding the 'exchange of names' in Christ. In neither of these passages is there question of defining with precision the exact psychic function which the Logos

[1] Frag. 129.

performs with relation to the human flesh which he assumes and on which he confers life. The notion of a replacement of the human soul by the Logos is clearly present in Apollinaris' mind.[1] Nevertheless, the question of exactly *how* this occurs is neither raised nor considered. It is sufficient, for the purposes of Apollinaris' attack on Antiochene dualism, to insist that the union of spirit and flesh, in Christ as in the ordinary man composed of soul and body, results in the formation of a single nature and person. It is in this way, which by no means excludes the later application of the more exact 'trichotomous' analysis of human nature, that Apollinaris' use of the soul-body scheme in his early works is best understood. It represents the most natural, because the most easily comprehended, interpretation of the πνεῦμα-σάρξ scheme as that applies to human nature. It specifies, however, neither more nor less than that man, like the Lord himself, is composed of 'visible' and 'invisible' parts;[2] and it permits an adequate and forceful exposition of the vital unity of these parts in the composite nature.

In the later works, however, Apollinaris centres his attention on slightly different problems. These works reflect, no doubt, the response which he made to various criticisms which had been brought against his views. At the same time they embody a fresh line of argument designed to demonstrate the necessity of some such conclusions as he had reached. Rufinus calls attention merely to the appearance in Apollinaris' teaching of the affirmation that there was in fact a human 'soul' in Christ, in the sense of an irrational soul. There is, however, little if any evidence in Apollinaris' later works to suggest that this affirmation is the point or heart of his argument. What is central in his interest is rather his explicit interpretation of πνεῦμα as νοῦς,[3] and his insistence that the νοῦς of the Redeemer must be sinless, and indeed

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[1] Cf. *De unione* 12 *ad fin.*, 13. Raven is correct—if we set aside the difficult Frag. 2—when he observes that Apollinaris nowhere explicitly says 'that Christ did not assume a human soul' (op. cit., p. 173). Nevertheless it seems fairly plain from these passages that he did, in the *De unione* and the *Contra Diodorum*, conceive a 'parallelism between the soul and the Godhead' (ibid. 172). Raven's mistake is to suppose that Apollinaris never used 'soul' in any sense save that in which it appears in the intellect-soul-body scheme—i.e. in the sense of 'irrational soul'. But we have seen that Apollinaris admits a sense of 'soul' which permits it to include 'spirit' within its denotation (above, p. 86). And this is an admission that he was prepared to use the word in two ways.

[2] Cf. *De fide et incarnatione* 7.

[3] Cf. Frag. 25.

incapable of sin. His interest has shifted, one might say, to the *ethical* aspect of the spirit-flesh scheme, and in the forefront of his mind is the nature of 'spirit' as free, rational substance which is related to flesh as a governing, informing agent. As we shall recall in a later chapter, Apollinaris understands the redemptive work of Christ in terms of the sanctification or vivification (the terms are almost synonymous) of the flesh. And what is characteristic of his later works is an emphasis on the rational nature of 'life-giving spirit'—an emphasis which reflects his concern to interpret the vivification of the flesh in terms which are not merely biological, but plainly moral. It is in this context that the irrational soul of Christ becomes significant in Apollinaris' scheme. It serves, for one thing, to safeguard the impassibility and consequent sinlessness of the divine νοῦς: it is the soul which is spoken of in connexion with passion.[1] But more profoundly than this, it is the irrational soul which explains the 'liveliness' of the flesh in its resistance to the motions of rational spirit.[2] Ultimately, the same ethical interest which determines Apollinaris' interpretation of 'spirit' as 'intellect' renders necessary a careful distinction of intellect from irrational soul.

Conclusion

While, then, it is natural and inevitable to see a development in Apollinaris' thought, it is not necessary to interpret the facts to which Rufinus calls attention in such a way as to suggest that Apollinaris in fact propounded two differing christological doctrines at differing periods in his life. His basic *schema*, anthropological and christological, remains fundamentally the same; and de Riedmatten's discussion of Apollinaris' traducianism lends plausibility to the heresiarch's own apparent insistence that 'dichotomous' and 'trichotomous' formulas must be regarded as complementary alternatives rather than as contraries. What does, however, emerge from a discussion of Rufinus' allegation is a heightened awareness of the two distinct ways in which Apollinaris employed anthropological themes in the exposition of his christology. In his earlier writings he employs anthropological considerations primarily to define the nature of the unity of Christ's Person; and what becomes most prominent as a consequence is the bearing of such considerations on the *form* of his christology. In the later

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[1] See *Kata meros pistis* 30.

[2] Ibid.

writings, however, with their interest in the problems of freedom and of sin, what emerges most strongly is the relevance of a doctrine of man as supplying not so much the form, as the *motive*, for such a christology as Apollinaris proposes. We shall, accordingly, proceed to discuss Apollinaris' position in more detail according to the scheme suggested by this distinction: considering the bearing of anthropological issues first on the *form*, and then on the *motive* of his christology.

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Anthropological Issues Bearing on the Form of Apollinaris' Christology

IN Apollinaris' so-called 'dichotomous' works, we have said, the most prominent theme is that of the unity of Christ's Person. As against the position of the Antiochene Diodore, Apollinaris insisted that the redemption of the world could be wrought only by one in whom Deity and humanity were united in a single, individual Person. 'Any theory which suggested that the historical figure of the Redeemer was that of a good man only united to the divine Son through being the recipient of divine grace and the subject of divine inspiration, he repudiated.'[1] The Antiochenes, Apollinaris writes, teach 'two natures, although John clearly shows that the Lord is one when he says "The Word became flesh", as does Paul when he says "one Lord Jesus Christ, through whom all things." For if he who was born of the holy Virgin is called "one", and he it is "through whom all things came to be", (then) he is one nature.'[2] This language taken simply in itself may be susceptible of perfectly orthodox interpretation. Certainly the sentiment is beyond reproach. But Apollinaris goes on to suggest more exactly how he understands this notion of 'one nature'. '. . . it is not the case that the body is its own nature, and the Deity as incarnate is its own nature; but just as man is one nature, so also is Christ, who came to be in the likeness of men.'[3] The conception here is plain. Christ came 'in the likeness of men'—which is to say that in him spiritual and material principles are present as in the constitution of ordinary men, and that, again as with ordinary men, these principles are so related as to compose a single, organic whole, one nature. They are, in fact, complementary principles, neither of which is 'perfect' in and of itself. For the purposes of his incarnate existence, even the divine

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[1] Prestige, *Fathers and Heretics* (London, 1948), p. 106.
[2] *Ad Dionys* 1, 2.
[3] Ibid.

Word himself can be thought of as 'imperfect' apart from the flesh which he assumes.[1] And the unity of Christ's Person is based on the fact that 'spirit' and 'flesh' as they are seen in the constitution of a rational organism are so adapted one to the other that together they form a single living being, whereas in abstraction from each other they are incomplete. As Apollinaris saw it, then, the only way in which it was possible at once to affirm the unity of the incarnate Person of the Logos and to acknowledge the duality of substantial principles which is implied in the affirmation that the Word became flesh was to conceive the Person of Christ strictly on the model of the human person, assigning to the Logos himself the function of $\pi\nu\epsilon\hat{\upsilon}\mu\alpha$ in the new 'man'.

The Question of Apollinaris' Platonism

What is the view of the human constitution which underlies this christological formula? A. Grillmeier speaks of 'the platonizing conception of "man"'[2] which underlies Apollinaris' christology:

We meet clearly with the notion that what is necessary for the constitution of genuine humanity is not a human soul, and therefore a spiritual substance created from the beginning for a body, but any spirit at all which unites itself to the flesh in a perfect unity.[3]

On this view the plausibility of Apollinaris' christology lies in a distinctively Platonic conception of what is meant by 'man': a conception according to which humanity is constituted by the entrance of any rational, spiritual nature upon an embodied state. The possible bearing of such a view as this on christology is well brought out by J. Liébaert, discussing the views of Cyril of Alexandria.[4] What is involved, he writes, is

the idea that man is, not properly a being composed of a human soul and a human body, but simply a spirit united to a human body, an incarnate spirit. Of a spirit which is united to a human body one can

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[1] See also *De unione* 5, where the constituents of human nature are described as ἀτελεῖς, in a context where the implied analogy with the constituents of Christ's Nature is to the fore.

[2] 'Die theologische und sprachliche Vorbereitung der christologischen Formel von Chalkedon', in *Das Konzil von Chalkedon*, i, p. 105. Cf. Arnou, 'Platonisme des pères', *D. Th. cath.* xii, col. 2322: '. . . l'erreur qui porte son [i.e. Apollinaris'] nom a pour origine la trichotomie platonicienne.'

[3] Op. cit., p. 105.

[4] *La christologie de saint Cyrille avant la quérelle nestorienne*, p. 174.

say that it becomes man: its state corresponds to the definition of man. To become man for a spirit is therefore to be united to human flesh. The Word became man by taking a flesh similar to ours.[1]

H. M. Diepen, who denies that any such view as this is to be attributed to Cyril of Alexandria, nevertheless agrees that it is the position adopted by Apollinaris: 'Man is an incarnate spirit', he says, 'and for this reason God in union with flesh is man.'[2] Diepen goes on to express doubts as to whether such a conception as this is properly to be described as Platonic,[3] and to affirm that, in Apollinaris' case, its basis is to be sought in a somewhat naïve exegesis of St. Paul, who is taken to have recognized, in 1 Cor. v. 43 f., 'two ways of being man'.[4] The view in question, Diepen thinks, is distinctively Apollinarian, and has no roots in the tradition of rational philosophy.

We may agree with Diepen that the notion of a 'manhood' which is constituted by the conjunction of something other than a human soul with flesh is foreign to the thought of Plotinus, as it had been to that of Plato.[5] But then Apollinaris himself, as Diepen seems to recognize, is quite clear about the fact that Christ is not, in the strictest sense, to be called 'man'. Christ comes 'in the likeness of men':[6] he is man only 'according to the flesh'. Apollinaris indeed insists upon a structural similarity between the Person of Christ and the persons of ordinary men. But for him the importance of this similarity lies, not in the fact that it enables him by a curious sort of equivocation to refer to Christ as 'man', but rather in the fact that the spirit-flesh scheme, rigorously applied to the incarnate Nature of the Logos, accounts

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[1] Cf. Prestige, op. cit., p. 110: Apollinaris' 'idea of human nature was that of a material and sentient body directed and controlled by an immaterial and rational consciousness. So long as Christ assumed the sentient body and provided a controlling consciousness, although that consciousness was wholly divine, he thought that all the essential conditions of human existence had been fulfilled.'

[2] *L'Anthropologie de saint Cyrille*, p. 33.

[3] Ibid., and p. 36.

[4] Ibid., p. 34.

[5] The view which Grillmeier and Liébaert characterize as 'Platonic' involves a thoroughly un-Platonic failure to distinguish between 'soul' and higher rational substances, and a consequent failure to appreciate the Platonic insistence both that it is the soul's peculiar destiny to be embodied, and that this destiny belongs to soul alone among rational substances. What is essentially in question here is the understanding of the full implications of the Platonic definition of soul as a mean substance. Cf. above, pp. 15 ff., 36 ff.

[6] Cf. above, p. 95, and n. 3.

at once for the desiderated unity of Christ's Person, and for the divinization of the flesh which is the cornerstone of human salvation. The language, therefore, of such excerpts as Fragment 72[1] or Fragment 89[2] must be interpreted in the light of Apollinaris' assertion, frequently repeated in the *Anacephalaiosis*, that 'Christ . . . is not man'.[3] At best he may be called man ὁμωνύμως :[4] Apollinaris is as well aware as anyone that this is an exceptional, and in part improper, designation of such a nature as he takes Christ's to be. It would, consequently, be unjust to Apollinaris to suppose that his christology is erected upon the foundation of what he himself recognizes to be a wholly unusual use of the term 'man'. It would perhaps be better to say that Apollinaris' careful explanation of the sense in which Christ may be called 'man' is an immediate and necessary consequence of his choice of the spirit-flesh formula as the key for an understanding of the unity of Christ's Person. If the idea that man is 'simply . . . an incarnate spirit' is not a proper characterization of the Platonic conception of human nature, neither is it the view which explains Apollinaris' christological outlook.[5]

Dorner's Hypothesis

This, however, leaves open the question whether Apollinaris' interpretation of the spirit-flesh formula is in fact genuinely Platonic in its tendencies. For it remains to be asked what it is that makes it plausible for Apollinaris to subsume under the single category of πνεῦμα both the human soul and the divine Logos: or, phrasing the matter differently, what sort of conception of the soul is implied by a view which sees the soul as being in some sense of the same kind as the divine Reason. No doubt this is the question which led Dorner to propound as an answer his theory that, for Apollinaris, the Logos was the archetype of manhood come to dwell in the embodied state native to man. Apollinaris, on this interpretation,

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[1] Lietzmann, p. 221 : 'On this account . . . he was man: for man is intellect and flesh according to Paul.'   [2] Ibid., p. 227.
[3] *Anacephalaiosis* 9–14.   [4] Ibid. 16.
[5] The nearest Apollinaris approaches to this view is in the *Tomos synodikos* (Lietzmann, 263) : 'This is what it is for the Logos to become flesh : to be united to flesh in the same way as human spirit. For in our case too [i.e. in the case of ordinary human nature] the man is called flesh.' But the suggestion of the last phrase, that humanity consists simply in the *embodiment* of a spirit, must be qualified by Apollinaris' explicit reference to 'human spirit', as diverse from divine.

viewed the πνεῦμα or the Logos in Christ as the eternal humanity; probably on the ground of his being the archetype of universal humanity. To him the Logos was both God and archetypal man; and that in the sense of his having been eternally destined to become man.[1]

Implicitly or explicitly, this view attributes two conceptions to Apollinaris both of which may rightly be regarded as Platonizing. In the first place, it suggests that he held to a similarity of nature as between the Divine Logos and the human soul—no doubt in respect of their rational properties[2]—which makes it possible to conceive of the latter as an image or reproduction of the former, as an entity possessed of a derivative or participated divinity, just as the Logos, in his divinity, is possessed of the fullness of humanity. Here, it seems, is a Platonic account, no doubt reinterpreted in the light of the doctrine of creation, of the affiliation of rational soul with noumenal, unoriginate existence. What is asserted is not an identity between the two, but a continuity affected by the participation of a derivative nature in its transcendent Source. Secondly, Dorner's hypothesis involves the attribution to Apollinaris of the tacit assumption that what is properly called 'man' is, in the first instance, the spiritual or rational substance itself—the soul, which enters upon an embodied state. It is not so much embodiment, then, which constitutes manhood, as it is the soul itself, in its intellectual nature. And this view too, as we have seen, may aptly be characterized as Platonizing.

Raven, however, subjects Dorner's view to a searching criticism, which is directed against the first of the two conceptions we have delineated. 'In Apollinarius', he writes, 'there is a complete absence of the traditional phrases of the Logos-theology which treat Christ as the Image of God, and men as made after that image.'[3] Moreover, he argues that Apollinaris' sense of the contrast between the corruption of the human soul and the perfection of the divine Son is such as to rule out the possibility that he entertained any such view of the resemblance between human and divine πνεῦμα as Dorner suggests. 'The contrast between God and man as between the sinless and the sinful is fundamental to his position, and is inconsistent with Dorner's hypothesis.'[4] 'The Greek belief that the mind of man and the mind of God are alike

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[1] *History of the Evolution of the Doctrine of the Person of Christ*, i. 2, p. 372.
[2] Cf. Athanasius, *De incarn.* iii. 3 for the form of such a conception as this. And see above, pp. 35 ff.   [3] Op. cit., p. 189.   [4] Op. cit., p. 188.

divine he rejects because in his attitude to sin he is thoroughly Pauline.'[1]

Affiliation of the Created Spirit with the Divine

There are, however, elements in Apollinaris' teaching which make it necessary to qualify Raven's conclusions. As we shall hope to show below, Raven is surely correct in thinking that Apollinaris' description of Christ as 'the heavenly man' is not meant in the sense in which Dorner took it. The expression characterizes, not the Logos himself, taken as the archetype of humanity, but the Logos as incarnate; and the words ἐξ οὐρανοῦ are intended to denote the difference between the 'humanity' of Christ and that of ordinary men. But once this is said, it remains necessary to note the affiliation between the human spirit and the divine Logos which Apollinaris' whole position presupposes. It may indeed be the case that Apollinaris' christology does not rest in the first instance on a notion of the discarnate divine Son as himself the 'eternal humanity'.[2] Nevertheless, both his method and his language presuppose a strict comparability as between the Logos and the rational human soul. This is implied quite plainly in his willingness, spontaneous and unquestioning, to designate them by an identical word: νοῦς or πνεῦμα.[3] In a different sense, it is implied also by his view that the rational soul has a 'heavenly' as opposed to a 'cosmic' origin—a view which is the more significant for the fact that Apollinaris is at pains to maintain it even while he asserts a traducian theory of human generation. We have noticed the presence of this view in the crucial *Ezekiel* Fragment. It seems to be reflected also in the difficult Fragment 107:[4]

The flesh, which is moved altogether from without by the mover and agent (of whatever sort this may be), and which is not in itself a complete living being, has come together into union with its governor, and has been put together with the heavenly governor, being conformed to it in virtue of its own passive nature, and receiving the divine (element), which has been made its own, by reason of (the latter's) active nature. For thus out of mover and moved one living being is constituted—not two, nor out of two complete and self-moving (parts). Whence man is a living being distinct from God, and not God, but the servant of God.

[1] Raven, op. cit., p. 199.
[2] Dorner, loc. cit.
[3] Cf. Frags. 74 and 25.
[4] Lietzmann, p. 232.

In this passage Apollinaris carefully distinguishes man from God; but at the same time, in the Platonic manner, he accords to the rational element in man's constitution a heavenly origin and a 'divine' character. Moreover, it is worth remarking that Raven is perhaps incorrect in his allegation that there is no trace in Apollinaris' writings of the logos-logikos comparison, typical of Athanasius. Apollinaris writes:

Men are of the same substance as the irrational animals in respect of the irrational body, but of a different substance in so far as they are rational (λογικοί). Thus also God, who is of one substance with men according to the flesh, is of a different substance inasmuch as he is Logos and God.[1]

Here again, Apollinaris propounds what is at once a contrast and a comparison between the rational soul and the Logos. He does not minimize the distinction between God and creature; but at the same time, within the framework of this distinction, he alludes to the rationality which belongs to the divine Son as Logos, and in which the creature for his part shares. While, then, no doubt, Apollinaris is quite clear about the meaning of the doctrine of creation, he remains faithful, in his understanding of the nature of the soul, to the peculiar logic of late Platonic speculation. The soul is not 'divine' in the same sense as its transcendent Source. In its own nature it is separate from and inferior to the divine Reason. Nevertheless, as a rational substance, it possesses a natural affiliation and community of nature with the Divine: it is of heavenly origin.

Unity of Soul and Body

The second presupposition, however, of Dorner's hypothesis is open to more serious criticism. Of the Platonic view that 'the soul is the man' there seems almost no trace in Apollinaris' system. Certainly he does not regard the body with which the soul is associated as ultimately foreign to its nature. One evidence of this fact may be seen in his Irenaean insistence on redemption and sanctification of the flesh as a necessary part of human salvation. Apollinaris does not conceive salvation as the soul's escape from a material 'envelope': nor even, for that matter, as an inner turning away from the corporeal frame which it animates. For him, redemption includes the bodily element in man's constitution:

[1] Frag. 126.

and this fact in itself testifies to his grasp, in however curious terms, on the biblical conception of man as a unity of psychic and physical principles. For him, as we have seen, soul and body are two 'natures' which are perfected only in their conjunction; and apart from body, the soul is 'lacking'.[1]

De Riedmatten is at pains to emphasize this strain in Apollinaris' thought in an effort to free him of the charge of 'Platonizing'. He cites a series of exegetical fragments to show that Apollinaris insists that 'the soul is not the man', and that 'God did not at the beginning give to the soul an incorporeal life, but from the start life in a body'.[2] Man is thus a unity of body and soul possessed of a single life:[3] and it is essentially this fact which explains the necessity of the resurrection of the body.[4] Moreover, de Riedmatten maintains, Apollinaris clearly teaches the 'gratuitous nature of the immortality of the soul'.[5] This conclusion, however, seems scarcely justified by the sense of the passage which he cites, since apparently it is not the soul's immortality, but the immortality of the *man* (i.e. of the composite), which is in question. Certainly Apollinaris speaks, as de Riedmatten himself recognizes, of the continued existence of the soul apart from body.[6] What is significant in Apollinaris' teaching in this regard is the conception already alluded to, that the 'separated' soul is inactive, and deprived of those functions of life which belong to it when it is in union with its body.[7]

It may, therefore, be considered doubtful whether it is altogether apt to speak of Apollinaris' 'hylemorphism', or to suggest that his views show a tendency in the direction of Aristotelianism.[8] More appropriate is de Riedmatten's comparison of Apollinaris' position with that of Clement of Alexandria,[9] whose conception of man exhibits strong Stoic influence in certain respects. Clement is at one with Apollinaris in intending to deny that soul and body

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[1] Frag. 138.

[2] Cited by de Riedmatten, art. cit., pp. 224 f. The contrast between this view and that of Origen (ibid., p. 225) and his school is rightly drawn. In the light of de Riedmatten's further comparison of the views of Apollinaris and Clement of Alexandria, it is appropriate to note here the latter's similar denial that the soul was created originally in a disembodied state, and that its embodiment results from a fall of some sort. Cf. *Strom.* iv. 167. 4, iii. 94. 2.

[3] De Riedmatten, art. cit., p. 225 and n. 4.

[4] Ibid., pp. 224 and 225, n. 1.

[5] Ibid., pp. 223 f.   [6] Ibid., p. 225.   [7] Ibid.

[8] Ibid., pp. 227, 232.   [9] Ibid., pp. 230 ff.

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are by nature 'contraries',[1] as the Alexandrian Gnostics were in the habit of teaching. More particularly, however, the two writers agree in combining, or attempting to combine, an emphasis on the heavenly origin of the rational soul with a denial of the strict Platonic doctrine of pre-existence. The result in both cases is the affirmation of that distinctive form of traducianist doctrine to whose presence in the writings of Apollinaris we have already made reference.[2] The rational soul, although it is 'not begotten according to the generation of the seed',[3] is nevertheless conferred in and with the irrational spirit, which is itself begotten *ex traduce*. At least in the case of Clement, it is, in the end, impossible to speak simply and without qualification of his 'traducianism'.[4] Yet, however that may be, the effect and intent of this form of teaching is plain in the case of both Clement and Apollinaris: not only does it emphasize the unity of the rational and irrational parts of the soul—a unity based on the fact that νοῦς is the single ultimate source of life in the organism;[5] it serves also to emphasize the unity and mutual adaptation of soul and body in the constitution of the single organism which is man.

Essential, then, to an understanding of the form of Apollinaris' christology is not only a grasp of his sense of the similarity in kind between human and divine πνεῦμα, but also a comprehension of

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[1] Cf. *Strom.* iv. 163. 3 ff. On body-soul dualism in Apollinaris, see further below, pp. 116 f.

[2] See above, pp. 87 f.

[3] *Strom.* vi. 135. 1 ff. In this passage (cited by de Riedmatten, art. cit., pp. 231 ff.) Clement divides the soul into ten 'parts' (thereby adding two to the customary Stoic enumeration) to correspond with the ten precepts of the Decalogue. This division, however, is plainly less basic to his thought than the division of man into three parts: body, carnal spirit, and rational spirit (the ἡγεμονικόν). The carnal spirit, he says, is the seat of nutritive and sensitive activity: but rational spirit, the seat of the power of choice, is also the seat and source of psychic unity. Cf. also *Strom.* ii. 114. 2.

[4] Cf. H. Karpp, *Probleme altchristlicher Anthropologie* (Gütersloh, 1950), pp. 96 ff. Karpp maintains that Clement's rejection of the notion of inherited sin 'bedeutet . . . eine gewisse Ablehnung des Traduzianismus' (p. 115), while at the same time his dislike for the idea of a 'fall' of the soul leads him to a rejection of the doctrine of pre-existence.

[5] Cf. Verbeke, *La Doctrine du pneuma*, p. 433. 'Comparant la dichotomie psychologique de Clément à celle de Platon, on pourrait . . . dire que l'autonomie des différentes zones vitales est moins grande chez le philosophe Alexandrin.' In this sense of the unity of the soul, Clement (and with him Apollinaris) no doubt stands closer to the outlook of the Neo-Platonist philosophers than to that of Plato; but the manner in which they understand the soul's unity reflects the influence of Stoic conceptions. See above, pp. 62 f.

his view of the unity of man's twofold nature. This unity, Apollinaris writes, is not that which belongs to what is 'simple' (τὸ ἁπλοῦν), but a synthetic unity,[1] which is composed of parts whose mutual relationship is constitutive of their full perfection. Yet in this relationship, by which manhood is defined, the soul or rational spirit remains the senior partner. The flesh itself is essentially passive in nature, and its role is consequently that of submissive obedience to the superior principle which moves and thus vivifies it.[2] Man, like Christ, is in this sense organically one: ἓν ζῷον ἐκ κινουμένου καὶ κινητικοῦ;[3] and his unity consists in the fact that the life which belongs to the soul as mover is the very life by which the recipient flesh is made to live. This point of view and its christological relevance emerge clearly in a sentence which we have already cited from the *De unione* 12 : ἔζησεν τὸ σῶμα θεότητος ἁγιασμῷ καὶ οὐκ ἀνθρωπίνης ψυχῆς κατασκευῇ καὶ ὅλως τὸ ὅλον ἐν συναφείᾳ.[4] The unity of the organism is constituted by the fact that its parts share the common life which has its seat and source in the spirit.[5]

The Unity of Christ's Nature

Thus in the case of Christ, too, the unity of his Person is to be described as 'vital': ἑνότης ζωτική.[6] There is, says Apollinaris, 'one life of the Logos and the flesh' (μίαν ζωὴν τοῦ λόγου καὶ τῆς σαρκός),[7] though of course where Christ is concerned the life which the passive flesh shares is, from its point of view, an ἁγιασμός as well as a mere vivification, since it is the life of one who is the uncreated Son of God. Apollinaris, as we have indicated, carries out the terms of this analogy with great precision. Just as in man the constitutive parts of his nature are by themselves incomplete,[8] so with Christ the incarnate Logos is not a self-contained 'nature' any more than is his body taken in itself. Inasmuch as the Son of God has taken flesh and made it his own, his nature is complete only as it includes the body which he has assumed.[9] Thus there are not two natures, but one, in Christ: φύσεως μιᾶς ἐξ ἑκατέρου μέρους συνισταμένης.[10]

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[1] Frag. 123.   [2] Frag. 107.   [3] Ibid.
[4] Lietzmann, p. 190. Cf. above, p. 89.
[5] A. Grillmeier, op. cit., p. 108.
[6] Frag. 144.   [7] *De fid. et incarn.* 6.   [8] *De unione* 5.
[9] *Ad Dion.* I. 2.
[10] *De unione* 5.

Here, as de Riedmatten has pointed out,[1] is the proper sense of the μία φύσις formula in Apollinaris. The unity which is denoted by this expression is not the simple unity which belongs to the Logos as an indivisible divine substance, but the organic unity proper to a composite human nature in general and, in particular, to the nature of the incarnate divine Son. The one Nature of Christ is 'composite' (σύνθετος) :[2] μία φύσις ἐστιν, ὥστε καὶ ἡ τῆς θεότητος ἀλήθεια μετὰ τοῦ σώματος ἕν ἐστι, καὶ εἰς δύο φύσεις οὐ μερίζεται.[3] And this unity of nature, based upon a unity of life, supplies the ground upon which it is possible to predicate of the whole Christ that which pertains initially and properly to one of the constituents of his Person : κοινωνεῖ γὰρ τὸ ἕτερον τῷ ἑτέρῳ ὀνομασίας κατὰ τὴν μίαν ζωήν.[4] On account of the union, one single name is correctly applied to the composite.[5] This is the theme of the *De unione* as well : and again, the analogy with the case of ordinary human nature is carefully drawn.

The confession is that in him what has been created is in union with the Uncreate, and the Uncreate commingled with what has been created, so that a single nature is constituted out of the several parts, and the Logos supplies to the whole a special (μερικήν) energy together with the divine perfection. The same thing comes to pass in the case of the ordinary man out of two incomplete parts. These make up one complete nature and are revealed by one name, since at one and the same time the whole is called flesh (though by this the soul is not stripped away) and the whole is termed soul (without the body's being removed).[6]

It is the fact of the composite, vital unity of material and spiritual principles which makes the 'exchange of names' possible. Just as, on this basis, the word 'soul' may be used to specify the whole man, so, in the case of Christ, the total nature is rightly described as heavenly and divine; conversely, as 'flesh' may be a designation of the complete human individual, so with Christ manhood is predicated of the complete incarnate Person.[7] This is Apollinaris'

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[1] Art. cit., p. 218. Cf. Raven, op. cit., p. 227.   [2] Frag. 111.
[3] *Ad Dion.* I. 3. Cf. Frag. 149.   [4] *Ad Dion.* I. 10.
[5] Ibid. 9.   [6] *De unione* 5.
[7] Here, surely, is the key to what Apollinaris meant by speaking of Christ as the 'heavenly man'. The expression is not meant to suggest that the very body or flesh of Christ had a heavenly origin, as Nyssen evidently thought; nor is it an exploitation of the notion that the Logos, as divine Intellect, is the eternal, archetypal Man. In itself, the expression precisely illustrates Apollinaris' understanding

explanation of the scriptural datum of a double language about the historic and the risen Christ: an explanation founded on the view that the concrete nature of the incarnate Christ is constituted by an organic union of divine Spirit and human flesh, on the model of twofold human nature.

Apollinaris' Doctrine of Mixture

Apollinaris further works out this spirit-flesh analogy in terms of a doctrine of 'mixture', which, as explaining the mode of body-soul union in man, serves also to account for the union of the Logos with his body in the incarnate Christ. Apollinaris uses several terms to denote this mixture. It is a μίξις,[1] a κρᾶσις[2]—but most often a σύγκρασις. He possibly spoke of σύγκρασις as an equivalent for ἕνωσις,[3] and certainly described the single Nature of Christ as σύγκρατος.[4]

The philosophical associations of Apollinaris' doctrine of mixture are not far to seek. He refers to the analogy of the mixture of two corporeal substances, and makes it clear in this connexion that he accepts the Stoic notion of κρᾶσις δι' ὅλων as offering an acceptable account of such mixture.

The qualities of things which are mixed are mixed and not destroyed, so that certain [portions] stand apart from the ingredients which have been mingled—as, for example, wine from water.[5]

Unlike the Neo-Platonists, Apollinaris accepts the possibility of a mutual interpenetration of material ingredients to form a mixture in which the qualities of the constituents remain uncorrupted. Nonetheless, he asserts, with reference to the special case in which an incorporeal substance is mixed with one which is corporeal, that the mixture is not, from the point of view of the incorporeal element, total. 'There is no mixture with body, nor any mixture of the same sort as that of bodies with bodies, which does not also have that which is unmixed.'[6] This fact, he says, explains how it is that in Christ the divine Energy may, as occasion demands, ἢ ἰδιάζειν ἢ ἐπιμίγνυσθαι.[7] Here Apollinaris approaches a Neo-Platonic outlook, both in admitting the incorporeality of spiritual

of the *communicatio idiomatum*. As Logos united with flesh, Christ may *as a whole* be called 'heavenly', divine; and *as a whole* be called man.

[1] Frag. 10. [2] Frag. 134, Frag. 147.
[3] *De fid. et incarn.* 7. The text here is doubtful.
[4] Frag. 9. [5] Frag. 127.
[6] Frag. 127. [7] Ibid.

substances, and in insisting that such a substance, though mixed with body, nevertheless transcends it and is free in relation to it. In his union and σύγκρασις with a visible body, the divine Logos μένει . . . ἀσύνθετον, καθὸ οὐ συμπεριορίζεται τῷ σώματι.[1] And here, of course, the analogy of the soul-body union is exactly relevant.

If the mixture of soul with body . . . neither makes the soul visible on account of the body nor transforms it into the other properties of the body, such as to be divisible or susceptible of decrease: how much more is God united to a body without suffering change (ἀμεταβλήτως).[2]

There are, of course, limitations upon the use of this analogy. The soul, Apollinaris writes, is συμφυής with its body, whereas the Son of God is not.[3] But this consideration merely strengthens the force of Apollinaris' *a fortiori* argument; and formally, the analogy holds without modification. As the soul is mixed with its body without thereby being altered in its nature, so the Logos is mixed with a body, the while remaining transcendent over it and unchanged by it. The influence of the Neo-Platonic outlook here seems unquestionable.

Apollinaris and Aristotle

Doubt arises, however, when we turn to the problem of the fate of the body in this mixture. In *The Philosophy of the Church Fathers*, Wolfson comes to the following conclusion as to the meaning of Apollinaris' christological formula:

In his insistence upon one nature Apollinaris meant to deny in Jesus not only a rationally animated bodily nature but also an irrationally animated bodily nature, though for different reasons. His denial in Jesus of a rationally animated bodily nature is due to his denial in him of a rational soul; his denial in him of an irrationally animated nature is due to his particular conception of what becomes of the weaker constituent in a union of 'predominance' . . . it is the contention of Apollinaris that the weaker constituent . . . survives only as a property or quality or quantity.[4]

Further, in Apollinaris' view as Wolfson understands it,

. . . the irrationally animated body ceases to be a nature both in the case of man in its union with the rational soul and in the case of Jesus in its union with the Logos, and this because its relation to the rational soul in man and to the Logos in Jesus is like the relation of the passive

[1] Frag. 133. [2] Frag. 134. [3] Ibid.
[4] Op. cit. i, p. 441. Cf. Grillmeier, 'Vorbereitung', p. 107.

to the active or like that of the thing moved to the thing which moves it or like that of the thing vivified to the thing which vivifies it or, in general, like that of what Aristotle calls matter to what he calls form.[1]

It is not, at least at first glance, clear that these two points of view are mutually consistent. The relation of the corporeal to the spiritual principle in Christ could scarcely be *both* that of matter to form *and* that of property or quality to subject. The inconsistency, however, may be only apparent, or in any case it may have been Apollinaris' own. We must, therefore inquire whether Wolfson, with his appeal to the principle of a mixture of 'predominance',[2] gives a correct interpretation of Apollinaris' view. What does the heresiarch say about the character of Christ's corporeal nature?

First of all, it is clear that Apollinaris wants to insist that the body remains body, and is not transformed in its essential character. This follows from his understanding of σύγκρασις as we have outlined it. In any such mixture, both elements remain themselves. Thus, using the analogy of soul-body union, Apollinaris writes, '. . . if the body of man remains in its proper nature, precisely as ensouled, no more in the case of Christ does the mixture alter the body so that it is not a body'.[3] No doubt the body is altered by its union with the Logos; but this alteration, profound though it be, is not such as to affect its essential character as a body. Apollinaris appeals to the well-known iron-fire analogy to illustrate his point:

If the mixture [of fire] with iron, which shows the iron itself to be fire inasmuch as it does the work of fire, does not change its nature, neither is the union of God with the body a transformation of the body, although the body furnishes the divine energies to those who come in contact with it.[4]

Wolfson, however, calls attention to the fact that in these passages Apollinaris does not, in so many words, refer to the 'nature' of Christ's body, or speak of its remaining in the union: 'he seems purposely to avoid describing the irrationally animated body as a "nature" '.[5] Similarly, Wolfson points to a context where Apollinaris denies that the flesh is 'turned into the incorporeal', and asserts in the same breath that it retains 'a property (τὸ

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[1] Op. cit. i, pp. 442 f.   [2] See above, pp. 68 f., 76 f.
[3] Frag. 134.   [4] Frag. 128.
[5] Op. cit., p. 441. Cf. p. 436.

ἴδιον) which is from us'.[1] He concludes, therefore, that Apollinaris held that the body survives in its union with the Son of God only as a 'property'.[2] Against this view, which seems to strain both Apollinaris' language and the power of an *argumentum e silentio*, there is of course the fact that Apollinaris often refers to the body as a φύσις or οὐσία: Wolfson notes several such uses,[3] but considers that 'these terms evidently are not used by him in those passages in their strict technical sense'.[4] He supports this judgement by reference to the evidences we have already summarized, and by a citation of two passages from the *Ad Dionysium I*. Apollinaris is quoted by Wolfson as saying: 'The body is not a proper nature . . . as the divinity is a proper nature in the incarnation': and then, 'The body is not a nature by itself . . . in the one Christ, for it does not live by itself and it cannot be separated from the Logos by whom it is vivified.'[5] In the first of these citations Wolfson appears to have misrendered his source. Apollinaris' words are in fact a denial that either the body *or* the 'Divinity as incarnate' are independent natures.[6] His point is that they are the complementary constituents of one composite nature, as we have argued above. The second citation is quite accurate, but Wolfson has failed to note its immediate sequel: οὔτε ὁ λόγος καθ' ἑαυτὸν εἰς ἰδίαν μερίζεται φύσιν.[7] It is quite plain that Apollinaris chooses to deny in some sense that ἡ ἀνθρωπίνη φύσις—the body—is an independent nature at all: but, by analogy with the human soul, he makes the same judgement about the incarnate Son himself. Neither constituent is a complete nature in itself *within the union*, because the single nature of Christ is the σύνθεσις, the σύγκρασις, of the two. We must suppose, therefore, that Wolfson has misunderstood the motive of Apollinaris' language in failing to see that his denials of a 'nature' to the body of Christ are intended, not to reduce it to the status of a mere qualitative or quantitative modification of the divine Substance, but to accord it the status of a substantial constituent in a single, substantial Nature. In his use of the body-soul analogy, Apollinaris must be taken at his word: the body remains a body, and does not perish. And to this extent there can be no question of union by

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[1] *De fid. et incarn.* 7. Cited by Wolfson, p. 437.
[2] Op. cit., p. 438.
[3] Ibid., *ad fin.* To this list we may add Frag. 149 and *De unione* 8.
[4] Op. cit., p. 441.   [5] Cited ibid., pp. 438 f., as quoted here.
[6] *Ad Dion.* 1. 2.   [7] *Ad Dion.* 1. 8.

'predominance'. As we have seen, Apollinaris' language when he speaks of 'mixture' suggests that he understands the union of the Logos with his flesh in terms of a Stoic doctrine of κρᾶσις interpreted, in the last resort, in a Neo-Platonic sense.

Such a view quite naturally involves the postulate that spirit and flesh are related as an active to a passive principle. The spirit vivifies, leads, and governs the flesh, which is, of its own nature, passive. In itself, however, this rather commonplace conception is certainly not the equivalent of an Aristotelian hylemorphism,[1] to which, indeed, as we have seen, the Stoic and Neo-Platonic accounts of κρᾶσις were intended as alternatives. As a Christian thinker, of course, Apollinaris is swift to insist that in man body and soul are complementary principles in the constitution of a single composite person. Even though the soul is separable from its body, it is deprived of certain natural functions apart from it. None the less, Apollinaris nowhere indicates that he conceives the soul as an εἶδος ἀχώριστος, in the Peripatetic manner. On the contrary, the body is 'something else beside' the soul,[2] and the latter is capable of existing in its own right: a view which, as we have seen, is the axiomatic basis of the late Platonic psychology.[3] Accordingly, in the case of the Incarnation, we have found Apollinaris insisting that the Spirit is not wholly involved in, or dependent upon, the flesh with which it is blended. As a result of the ἕνωσις, the body is modified: it is made to live with a divine life, it is sanctified. By reason of its vital union with the Logos, it may even rightly be called 'uncreate'. Thus the passive body is 'formed' by the higher principle with which it is united; but the latter remains, as for the Neo-Platonists, an informing agent and not, in the Peripatetic sense, a form. The doctrine of κρᾶσις, as Apollinaris understands it, is intended to assert at once the integrity of the constituents of the organic nature, and the relative priority and independence of the spiritual principle *vis-à-vis* its corporeal partner. And to just this extent, his doctrine corresponds with the normal teaching of the Neo-Platonic schools. His, however, is plainly not a self-conscious or thorough-going 'Platonism'. It amounts to little more than acceptance of a commonplace

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[1] Apollinaris' language is in fact much more closely calculated to recall the Stoic distinction between τὸ ποιοῦν and τὸ πάσχον: and his description of soul as αὐτοκίνητος is, of course, a Platonic-Stoic conception, to which the Peripatetics opposed the idea of the soul as ἀκίνητος.

[2] *De unione* 5.

[3] See above, pp. 21 f.

scholastic doctrine as to the nature of the union of soul and body in the individual. Moreover, it misses out a significant element in that doctrine, inasmuch as it neglects the conception of union by 'will' or 'inclination', and places all its emphasis on the metaphor of mixture.

Conclusion

We can see, then, that the Apollinarian christological formula, based as it is upon a philosophical interpretation of the Pauline spirit-flesh scheme, represents in fact a view of the human constitution writ large. The view in question is one which is essentially eclectic. On the one hand, it reflects a Platonic sense of the dignity of spirit in man, both in its conception of the affiliation of the soul with the divine Reason and in the care with which the independence and integrity of the soul in its union with body is safeguarded. On the other hand, Apollinaris' thought is informed by a strong Christian-Stoic emphasis on the unity of body and soul in the human person. The first of these themes operates, for the most part, as a silent presupposition of Apollinaris' christological formula. The second, however, is the explicit basis on which he constructs his account of the unity of Deity and flesh in Christ—the unity which it is the confessed purpose of his argument to defend and uphold. This unity, whether of the ordinary human person or of the Person of Christ, is explained in two related ways. It is a unity of life—a *biological* unity, deriving from the fact that the whole organism lives by the single life of the informing Spirit. At the same time it is a unity which can be accounted for in terms of an essentially Neo-Platonic doctrine of 'mixture', which, as applied to the union of body and spirit, serves to provide a basis on which it is possible both to assert the oneness of Christ's Nature and to guard against confusion of its constituent elements. It is in this sense that the 'form' of Apollinaris' christology may be said to be anthropologically determined.

9

Anthropological Considerations Bearing on the Motive of Apollinaris' Christology

UP to this point we have failed to consider one of the most distinctive elements in Apollinaris' teaching: the answer which he gives in his later works to the question why it is necessary to exclude a human rational faculty from the Person of the Logos incarnate. In his earlier works no such reason is explicitly supplied. The absence of a human soul in Christ appears there merely as a subsidiary consequence of the use of the spirit-flesh model to explain the unity of the Redeemer's Person. In the face of criticism, however, Apollinaris appears to have developed an apologetic for his position: and one based, moreover, on considerations of a predominantly anthropological nature. These considerations, however, are of a slightly different order from those we have hitherto been discussing. It is no longer so much a question of the constitution of man and of the biological or physical relationship between the 'parts' of his nature, as it is a question of man's freedom, of the nature of sin, and of the distinctively moral significance of the spirit-flesh relationship. We may begin our treatment of this apologetic simply by recalling in summary fashion the principal arguments which Apollinaris uses.

Apollinaris' Apologetic Arguments

His initial argument turns, as might be expected, on the question of the unity of the Lord's Person. He phrases it thus:

If . . . every intellect rules itself, being moved naturally by its own will, it is impossible that two (intellects), willing things which are mutually inconsistent, should exist together in one and the same subject (ὑποκειμένῳ).[1]

[1] Frag. 150.

To suppose that there can be two distinct centres of active initiative in Christ is to divide him inevitably into two subjects, and thus to destroy effectively the unity of his Person. '. . . if God is conjoined with a man, as one complete thing to another, then there were two: but the Son of God is one by nature. . . .'[1] For just this reason it is necessary to deny that in Christ the Logos works as it were side by side with a human personality possessed of its own motives and inclinations. Else, Apollinaris thinks, one would arrive at a view of the Incarnation which equated it with a special degree of prophetic inspiration.[2]

But why, as Apollinaris sees it, must the human will inevitably seek ends contrary to those proposed and commanded by the divine νοῦς? Why must it be the case that the two should, with at least intermittent regularity, entertain goals which are mutually inconsistent? In answering this question, Apollinaris carries his argument a step farther.

. . . the divine Intellect is self-moving and perfectly consistent in its motions (ταυτοκίνητος), for it is immutable. Human intellect, however, is indeed self-moving, but not consistent in its motions, for it is mutable.[3]

This, for Apollinaris, explains why it is that 'mutable intellect does not mix with immutable for the constitution of a single subject'.[4] The two would inevitably come into conflict simply by reason of the intrinsic changeability of human purpose.[5] It is important to be quite clear about what Apollinaris is saying here. Raven, discussing this passage, sees in it a reflection of the heresiarch's essential 'Paulinism'. 'Like Athanasius . . ., he has a strong sense of sin; and this supplies him with a further reason for denying His [Christ's] possession of a human mind; for mind if truly human is sinful.'[6] This estimate, however, is misleading. The problem to which Apollinaris points is occasioned by man's mutability—that is to say, by his status as a creature. It may be, as Apollinaris seems to imply, that man's sinfulness is inevitably

[1] Frag. 81.   [2] Cf. Frag. 83.
[3] Frag. 151.   [4] Ibid.
[5] See de Riedmatten, art. cit., p. 212: '. . . la volonté divine est impeccable et immuable, tandis que la volonté humaine étant par nature versatile, le péché ne saurait *a priori* être exclu de ses possibilités.' Apollinaris' argument really goes farther than this. His suggestion is that for a mutable rational creature, sin is in fact not avoidable. On any other ground his argument would not hold.
[6] Op. cit., p. 183.

consequent upon his mutability. But it is not sinfulness as such which creates the difficulty about the reconciliation of the human and divine wills. The contrast between divine holiness and human corruption may be in the heresiarch's mind; but he makes primary reference to the opposition between the mutability of the human mind and the immutability of the uncreated Logos. If, as Raven observes, Apollinaris thinks of God and man as 'eternal opposites',[1] this is because of his profound sense of the gulf between the self-identical Being which is characteristic of the divine Nature, and the changeable being which is the lot of finite creatures. He is, in fact, calling attention to the fact that the distinction between creature and Creator is, as he sees it, to be interpreted in the light of the classical Platonic distinction between generate and ingenerate existence.

In the essential freedom of the human spirit, Apollinaris finds yet a third reason for denying the possibility of endowing Christ with a human intellect.

> If anyone thinks that a man was united to God beyond all men and angels, then he deprives angels and men of freedom, in the same way as the flesh is deprived of freedom. For not to be free is the corruption of the free living creature: but the nature is not corrupted by him who made it.[2]

The explicit point of this fragment is its denial that God would undo what he had originally done in making men and angels free agents ($αὐτεξούσιοι$). At the same time, however, it implicitly suggests that the union of divine and human spirit would entail the suppression of the creature's freedom, its power of self-determination. For such a union would mean that the creaturely will would be overwhelmed and compelled to act in accord with the motions of the divine Logos: it would, in fact, be reduced to that state of passive obedience which is the proper role of the flesh. Thus, if there were a human intellect in Christ, its characteristic nature would be destroyed as the result of its subjection to the government of the divine will.

The relation of this argument to that from the mutability of the human intellect must be noted carefully. The premisses of the two are, in fact, co-ordinate. For if the human spirit cannot preserve its freedom in union with the divine Logos, this is precisely

[1] Raven, op. cit., p. 183.   [2] Frag. 87.

because the form of its freedom is that mutability which makes it incapable of voluntary co-operation with a will that never varies in its pursuit of the Good. At the same time, however, the two arguments seem to be directed against different accounts of the union of perfect manhood with the Logos. When he points to the essential variability of human purpose, Apollinaris appears to be opposing a conception of the union which sees it as taking place by a kind of co-operation, and which therefore preserves to the human spirit in Christ a measure of substantial independence. Under such circumstances, however—so Apollinaris argues—the union could not be maintained, simply by reason of the constitutional unpredictability of human choice. If, alternatively, one conceives the Incarnation, not in terms of co-operation, but as a 'natural' or 'substantial' union, then the freedom of the creature is vitiated because the union is, from his point of view, involuntary. Thus, consciously or unconsciously, Apollinaris excludes both an Antiochene and a Cappadocian interpretation of Christ's Person. As against the latter, he insists that creaturely liberty would be corrupted in any natural union of created and uncreated substance. As against the former, he points out that this freedom, determined as it is by a constitutional mutability, could not conceivably maintain a perfect accord with the divine Will. And, of course, both difficulties are avoided by the admission that in Christ there was no human will, whether to co-operate or to be suppressed.

Finally, and most significantly, Apollinaris argues from the moral relation between flesh and spirit in human nature, in order to demonstrate that the redemption of mankind in Christ could only have taken place by means of the replacement of human by divine Spirit in the Incarnation. Here we enter into the sphere of soteriology.

> . . . the human race is not saved by the assumption of an intellect and of a complete man, but by the assumption of flesh, whose nature it is to be governed: what was required was an immutable Intellect, not submitting to it on account of weakness in knowledge, but adapting it to itself without force.[1]

Human spirit cannot control the flesh with which it is joined; and the point of the Incarnation was to alter this state of affairs.

[1] Frag. 76.

Every man has a conflict between flesh and spirit. But Christ does not. . . . Every man mortifies the flesh in order to be perfected in virtue. But Christ does not.[1]

For, as Apollinaris goes on to say,

The flesh of God is an instrument of life adapted in respect of its passions to the divine purposes; and neither the reasons nor the deeds are proper to the flesh, and being subjected to passions as is fitting for the flesh, it overcomes them because it is God's flesh.[2]

The basic theme of these passages is clearly the same. In man, spirit and flesh are at war.[3] Moreover, the created human intellect is unable to reduce the flesh to obedience. On the contrary, it is itself, through its constitutional weakness, rendered subject to the passions of the flesh which it ought to govern. Hence the job of redemption, of sanctifying the flesh by bringing it into natural obedience to spirit, must be accomplished by the work of the divine Logos himself, who is exempt from that weakness and mutability which renders the human soul powerless in its conflict with the carnal passions.[4]

These are Apollinaris' arguments. We must now look more closely at their premises, in order to sketch a more systematic account of the view of human sin, freedom, and salvation which underlies them and thus determines in part Apollinaris' christological position.

Apollinaris' Dualism

Sin, on Apollinaris' view, finds its sufficient condition in the passion to which flesh is naturally subject, and its necessary condition in that mutability of the human soul which enables it to be led astray by the flesh with which it is united. The concrete root of sin, then, lies in the flesh: in the material, essentially passive part of human nature. Of course, it is only by rational choice that a man may properly be said to sin, and there is, therefore, a sense in which sin must be the work of the spirit itself.[5] It remains nevertheless that the essential condition of this sin in man is an involuntary weakness: the indetermination of his rational nature which stems from his constitution as a creature. The spirit is never, in and of itself, the source of the impulse to sin. Rather,

[1] *Anacephalaiosis* 10, 11.   [2] Ibid. 29.
[3] See also Frag. 22.   [4] See *Anacephalaiosis* 25.
[5] Cf. the Frag. cited by de Riedmatten, art. cit., p. 211, n. 1.

it is brought to consent, through ignorance and through its constitutional variability, to the promptings and urgencies of the flesh. It is for this reason that redemption requires the incarnation of a Spirit which is righteous simply in virtue of its natural constitution, φύσει δίκαιος:[1] why, for Apollinaris, the fundamental and all-important difference between Christ and ordinary men lies in the fact that his is a rationality 'which is incapable of being overcome by psychic and carnal affections (παθήματα)'.[2]

In his apologetic, then, Apollinaris reintroduces a form of that dualism which, as we have seen, his doctrine of the constitution of man seems to repudiate or qualify. In his earlier works, concerned as they are primarily with the unity of Christ's Person, it is the connaturality[3] and mutual adaptation of spirit and flesh which Apollinaris emphasizes. When, however, his mind turns to questions of soteriology, and therefore to the moral valuation of the spirit-flesh relationship, what emerges is a sharp dualism between the material and immaterial components of human nature—a dualism which is revealed in his insistence upon the fundamental hostility which obtains between the soul and its corporeal partner. The contrast between these two estimates of the flesh is nowhere brought out more clearly than in Apollinaris' wavering between a description of flesh as essentially passive, receptive of form, and obedient, and a characterization of it as an actively irrational force which besets and masters the spirit. In this ambiguity, of course, he merely reflects his one-ness with a long philosophical tradition, stretching back to the *Timaeus* itself, and instanced in Plotinus' ambivalent attitude towards the sensible, material world as a whole. Speaking metaphysically or theoretically, Apollinaris is quite clear that man's physical nature is a normal, essential, and God-given part of his being; but speaking ethically or practically, he sees in the flesh as flesh the seat of that passion which is the root and source of sin. Where he differs substantially and radically from the broad philosophical tradition in which he stands is in his Irenaean-Christian insistence upon the need, and the possibility, of the flesh's redemption.

Apollinaris' Doctrine of Human Freedom

The full sense of this position emerges only when one looks again at Apollinaris' treatment of the will's freedom. He maintains,

[1] *Anacephalaiosis* 25.   [2] *Kata meros pistis* 30.   [3] See above, p. 107.

as we have seen, that it is of the very essence of human nature that the rational spirit should be capable of self-determination. Further, we have noted that the capacity of the human will for going astray is, after the manner of Nemesius and Nyssen,[1] related to its creaturely mutability. At the same time, however, Apollinaris maintains, not unexpectedly, that the natural propensity of the will is wholly towards the good. Here we may refer to an invaluable fragment cited by de Riedmatten:

> Those who do not voluntarily (ἑκουσίως) obey the good are led by force, not towards obedience: for the sovereignty of the good tends not towards compulsion, but is exercised according to desire.[2]

De Riedmatten cites this passage as illustrating Apollinaris' view of grace. The divine grace, the heresiarch writes, 'does not destroy our self-determination, but leads the power which is from God into virtue':[3] which is to say that the God who 'works in us both to will and to do' carries out this work by a sort of attraction, rather than by an overpowering of man's natural initiative. This 'optimistic' conception of grace, however, together with the correlative view that to turn from the good is to become enslaved to unnatural forces, points to another significant element in Apollinaris' thought. It reflects his adherence, in the last resort, to a version of the prevalent Socratic and Platonic opinion that, since the soul is naturally drawn towards the Good from which it derives, it does not sin voluntarily, but only through compulsion or through weakness of some sort. The reconciliation of this view with an emphasis on the responsibility of human spirit for its own sin is effected, for Apollinaris, by his doctrine of the mutability of the creaturely will. By its very nature, the human spirit is drawn towards conformity with the divine purposes: it is, after all, in a special sense, 'from God'. Nevertheless, as a creature, it is essentially mutable—for mutability is the form of its freedom—and is thus liable to be led astray, through its weakness, by the importunities of the flesh, to whose motions it consents in spite of itself.

These two emphases—on the natural and inevitable mutability of the will, and on its equally natural attraction towards

[1] See above, pp. 49 ff.
[2] *In Ezek.* xxix. 4. Cited by de Riedmatten, art. cit., p. 211, n. 2.
[3] *In Rom.* vii. 7 (Staab, *Paulus–Kommentare*, p. 64).

the good—are related in an intricate and difficult way in Apollinaris' thought. Their genesis we have already attempted to suggest. They derive from a comprehensible desire to assert the affiliation of the human spirit with its divine Source, and at the same time to explain its responsible involvement in sin. This configuration of ideas is already familiar from our discussion of the problem of freedom in late Platonic thought. And, of course, considered in the light of the motivations behind them, these two emphases plainly complement each other. The doctrine of mutability defines the 'weakness' which permits the created spirit to assent to its own enslavement by acting in a fashion contrary to the inner tendencies of its own nature. Together, moreover, these two principles go a long way towards accounting for Apollinaris' refusal to admit a human νοῦς in Christ. On the one hand, Apollinaris is able to assume (as Gregory Nazianzen in effect pointed out) that the human spirit does not, in itself, stand in need of redemption. It is the flesh which requires to be sanctified. On the other hand, he is able to argue that the coexistence in a single subject of a mutable human will and the immutable divine Will is ultimately inconceivable, because of the inevitable tendency of the former towards defection from the good. And these arguments conduce towards similar conclusions. The one implies that there need not have been, the other that there could not have been, a human rational faculty in Christ. Obviously, however, from a somewhat different point of view, these same two principles do not appear to be wholly consonant with each other. The notion of an empirical freedom of choice rooted in constitutional mutability is not easy to reconcile with that of an inevitable natural attraction towards the good. More specifically, it is hard to see how the view which identifies the good and what is naturally attractive to human reason can be reconciled with the doctrine that perfect co-operation between human and divine wills is unattainable. Apollinaris is trying to have his cake and eat it: or, more fairly perhaps, he is involved in the unavoidable antinomies of the late Platonic doctrine of freedom as that appeared in the context of Christian thought.

Apollinaris' Doctrine of Grace

In the end, it is his doctrine of the will's essential mutability that Apollinaris chooses to qualify or ignore. That he does so is

plain enough, not merely from his conception of grace as 'lead-ing', but also in the language which he uses when the question arises of how the human spirit participates in the salvation which Christ brings. Apollinaris' answer is quite clear: it 'assimilates itself' to the divine νοῦς.[1] By its own powers and inclinations it brings itself into accord with the character of divine Spirit.

To be sure, this self-assimilation of the human soul to the Logos does not and cannot take place apart from the sanctification of the flesh through participation in the divinized flesh of the Logos. The importance of this latter theme in Apollinaris' teaching cannot be overemphasized. For him, Christ became man 'in order that we might receive the likeness of the heavenly One, and be divinized after the likeness of the true Son of God by nature'.[2] But this process in turn has its essential condition in man's participation in the body of Christ, which has been brought within the sphere of the divine life.

His flesh vivifies us through the Deity which is substantially bound together with it. For it is the Divine which vivifies: so then the flesh is divine because it is conjoined with God. And this flesh it is which saves, while we are saved, sharing in it as in food.[3]

In this way, human flesh is sanctified and rendered immortal because it too is invigorated by the divine Life by which the flesh of Christ lives.[4]

Prestige, however, seems to go too far when he writes that for Apollinaris 'the only link between the divine Spirit of the Saviour and the spirits of mankind is a redeemed flesh', and that 'Salva-tion is only to be won when the human soul is sunk in quiescent passivity'.[5] On the contrary, Apollinaris seems rather to assume that the sanctification of the flesh enables the spirit to be itself: to follow its inherent tendency towards assimilation to the divine Logos. The link between the Saviour and the spirits of the re-deemed is the voluntary action of the free human will, freed from the enslaving power of a rebellious flesh, and thus made capable of moving and acting in accordance with its own nature and heavenly origin.[6] The will, no doubt, remains in principle mutable. But at this point in his thought, Apollinaris evidently

[1] Frag. 74.   [2] *Kata meros pistis* 31.
[3] Frag. 116. Cf. de Riedmatten, art. cit., p. 221; and Prestige, op. cit., pp. 112 f.
[4] Cf. Frag. 128.
[5] Prestige, op. cit., p. 113.   [6] Cf. Frag. 80.

wants to understand the mutability of the will in a revised sense: a sense which does not exclude its perfectibility in co-operation with the motions of divine Spirit. This view is, of course, Pelagian in its effect: and the 'Pelagianism' in question is one which derives from Apollinaris' strong sense of the affiliation, across the gulf fixed by the fact of the soul's createdness, between human spirit and divine Spirit. In Apollinaris' thought, as in that of most of his Christian and non-Christian contemporaries, it is an emphasis on the 'divine' nature of the soul which triumphs in the end.

Conclusion

To sum up our discussion, then, it appears that there are three intertwined anthropological themes which govern Apollinaris' apologetic for his denial of the presence of a human spirit in Christ. *First*, he propounds a sharp dualism between flesh and spirit, which sees in the flesh and its passions the force which, in the last resort, accounts for the sinful state of man. *Second*, and in close conjunction with this, he assumes that the spirit itself is naturally constituted in such a way that its native impulses lead it towards assimilation to the divine Spirit: an assumption which is no doubt related to his insistence on the heavenly origin of the rational soul. *Finally*, however, both as a result of his philosophical understanding of the doctrine of Creation, and as a result of the necessity for explaining how it is that human spirit comes to be subjected with its own consent to the motions of the flesh, Apol-linaris develops the theme of the mutability of the created will—its weakness, both of purpose and of understanding. This theme, however, retires into the background when there is question of explaining the salvation, as opposed to the sin, of man's spirit. It is on the basis of these three principles that Apollinaris erects his defence of the christology which, earlier, he had developed out of considerations of a slightly different, though related, sort.

What is the relation between Apollinaris' doctrine of man, determinative as it is of his christological outlook, and that of the secular Platonism which provides its philosophical background? Clearly, there can be no question of simply labelling Apollinaris a 'Christian Neo-Platonist'. Such a course is precluded by con-siderations of a more general, as well as of a specific, nature. In certain very obvious respects, Apollinaris reproduces Stoic, or Platonized Stoic, ideas which are in no sense typical of the

prevalent philosophical outlook of his own age: his anomalous traducianism is one instance of such an idea, as is his loyalty to a trichotomous view of human nature more reminiscent of Clement of Alexandria and Marcus Aurelius than it is of Neo-Platonic speculation. Furthermore, as we have seen, Apollinaris adheres whole-heartedly and without compromise to the view that man is a composite of body and rational soul, and not merely a soul whose inevitable destiny it is to be associated with a body; and together with this outlook, as indicating his divergence from the normative tradition of late Platonic thought, must be placed his insistence upon the redemption of the flesh in Christ.

Nevertheless, it would be wrong to minimize the extent to which Apollinaris' thought is formed by the philosophical tradition of the late Platonic schools. We have noted the fact that for his doctrine of mixture, which plays a central role in his christology as well as in his anthropology, Apollinaris is evidently indebted to Neo-Platonic sources. More than this, however, our consideration of his views on sin, grace, and freedom has indicated how genuinely the very shape and logic of his doctrine of man reflect the *problématique* of late Platonic anthropology. His ambiguous evaluation of the body; his governing sense of the soul's natural affiliation with divine Reason, qualified by a recognition of its nature as γενητός and τρεπτός; his consequent treatment of the problem of freedom; his assumption of a flesh-spirit dualism even against the background of his biblical emphasis on the unity of man's nature—each of these attitudes reflects an orientation towards the problem of man which is specifically late Platonic in its tendency. There can be no question here of attempting to discern in Apollinaris' writings the influence of any one philosophical writer. But it seems necessary to recognize that the lineaments of his philosophical anthropology reveal, in the respects we have noted, the influence of the presuppositions and central interests of the fourth-century Platonic school tradition; and, in addition, that this influence is a determining factor in the formation of Apollinaris' distinctive christology. Is it possible, as we turn now to the thought of Theodore of Mopsuestia, to detect in his philosophical anthropology a basis for his radical opposition to Apollinarian christology? And if so, what does this result imply about Theodore's relation to the Platonic philosophical tradition of his time?

Part III

THE ANTHROPOLOGY OF THEODORE OF MOPSUESTIA AND ITS BEARING ON HIS CHRISTOLOGY

10

Theodore's Doctrine of the Nature
of the Soul

AT no point in the works of Theodore of Mopsuestia are the problems of philosophical anthropology discussed systematically or in deliberate detail. We have seen that in other sources of this general period, Christian and non-Christian alike, anthropological issues of a speculative nature were the subjects of careful study and debate. The corporeal or incorporeal nature of the soul, its substantial or accidental character, the mode of its union with body, the problem of its 'parts', the nature of its freedom—all these topics were accorded a careful and systematic analysis by thinkers whose learning and dialectical skill, if not always their speculative originality, made them worthy heirs of the Greek philosophical tradition. The fact that little or nothing of this sort of discussion is to be found in the pages of Theodore indicates that his central interests were not philosophical or speculative, but theological—and suggests, at the same time, that the conclusions of the philosophical schools were not, for him, matters of moment to the same degree as they were for, say, Nemesius of Emesa. Theodore presents himself to the reader primarily in the role of a biblical exegete, even in his 'dogmatic' writings. It was no misapprehension of the nature of his work which led his Nestorian devotees to accord him the title of 'the Interpreter'.

Nevertheless, Theodore's exegetical and theological work presupposes a set of answers to the central problems of philosophical anthropology; and although he never addresses himself to these problems for their own sake, he mentions them and treats them summarily as they bear on the questions in which he is immediately interested. Consequently, it is possible to reconstruct Theodore's views in these connexions in such a way as to indicate both how he naturally accepted certain elements of the philosophical anthropology current in his day, and how he criticized and revised this

anthropology to bring it into accord with his own understanding of biblical religion. In undertaking such a reconstruction, we shall hope to show how his philosophical convictions influence his theological anthropology and—directly or indirectly—his christology.

The Composite Nature of Man

Theodore of course adheres to the axiomatic doctrine that by 'man' is meant a unity of two different elements, body and soul. He lays down the terms of this philosophical truism in his treatise *Adversus Apollinarem*: '... according to us, man is said to consist of a soul and a body, and we say that these—soul and body—are two natures, but that one man is composed out of both.'[1] So phrased, and directed against Apollinarian teaching, this formula has, for Theodore, implications which go beyond the mere affirmation of man's twofold nature. At this point, however, we are concerned only to note his consent to the commonplace affirmation which was the joint property of thinkers of every shade of opinion, and whose interpretation constituted, from one point of view, the whole problem of a doctrine of man. That Theodore himself accepted it as a commonplace, if an important and useful commonplace, is clear from his habit of alluding to it almost parenthetically, as a self-evident principle. He can observe in passing that Simon Peter was 'homo ex anima et corpore constitutus',[2] and can say the same of Christ by way of insisting upon his full and normal human nature.[3] For God to assume a man means that he assumes one who is 'composed of a body and of an immortal and rational soul'.[4] It is on the basis of this initial postulate that the structure of Theodore's doctrine of the human constitution is erected.

The Nature and Attributes of the Soul

Concerning the soul itself, the nobler part of the human com-

[1] In H. B. Swete, *Theodori Episcopi Mopsuesteni in Epistolas B. Pauli Commentarii* (2 vols., Cambridge, 1880), vol. ii, p. 318. This work is hereafter cited simply as 'Swete'.

[2] *In Evangelium Johannis commentarius* x. 18 (tr. Vosté, in *Corpus Scriptorum Christianorum Orientalium*, Scriptores Syri, ser. iv, vol. iii (versio), p. 149: hereafter cited as 'Vosté').   [3] Ibid.

[4] *Hom. catech.* v. 10 (in Tonneau ed., *Les Homélies Catéchétiques de Théodore de Mopsueste, Studi e Testi* 145, Vatican City, 1949, p. 113: hereafter cited as 'Tonneau').

posite, Theodore stands in agreement with his Neo-Platonic contemporaries that it is a substance in its own right, capable of independent existence, even though, as a matter of fact, existence independent of body is not its final destiny. Theodore substantiates this position by insisting upon the *hypostatic* nature of the human soul as contrasted with that of irrational animals. 'Now the human soul differs from that of animals in this alone, that the latter does not have its own hypostasis. . . . In the case of men . . . the soul exists in its own hypostasis, and lifted high above the body.'[1] Theodore's purpose in calling attention to the soul's hypostatic nature is plain. He means, first, to deny that the soul is essentially relative to a body in the sense that apart from its body it cannot subsist on its own; and, second, to insist upon the soul's natural transcendence of the body with which it is associated. In both of these emphases, Theodore affirms a traditional position of the Platonic schools—one which, as we have seen, was defined in opposition to the Peripatetic idea that the soul is an 'entelechy' or 'form'. In at least one significant respect, therefore, attempts to assimilate Theodore's to an 'Aristotelian' psychology must fail: and this doctrine of the substantiality of the soul may be expected to influence other parts of Theodore's psychology as well.

As Theodore asserts the substantiality of the soul, so also he affirms its incorporeality. There is no trace in his thought of the Stoic conception of a material soul. The soul is 'spirit', but for Theodore this signifies that it belongs to the order of things 'invisible', and that like the divine Nature, which is 'spirit' *par excellence*, it is incorporeal.[2] This conception emerges plainly in his *Commentary on Romans*, where he writes: 'God . . . wishing to join together all things in one, created man, who is constituted of a body which is visible and cognate with the perceptible creation . . . (and) an invisible soul akin to the invisible things.'[3] Here the incorporeality of man's rational part is presumed as Theodore sets it in contrast with the material and sensible body. Again, the axiomatic principles of Theodore's psychology follow the pattern of Platonist thought.

Moreover, Theodore accepts without question the postulate of

[1] *Hom. catech.* v. 15 (Tonneau, p. 121).

[2] See the discussion in *Hom. catech.* ix. 8, 9 (Tonneau, p. 227) and cf. ibid. ix. 12 (Tonneau, p. 231).

[3] *In Ep. ad Rom.* viii. 19 (in Staab, *Pauluskommentare aus der griechischen Kirche*, Münster, 1933, p. 137: hereafter cited as 'Staab').

the soul's immortality—although, as we shall observe later, he rejects the notion of pre-existence even in that modified form in which Nemesius was to affirm it. Indeed, part of Theodore's reason for insisting upon the substantiality of the rational soul lies in the connexion which he perceives between this doctrine and that of the soul's immortality. The fact that the souls of brute animals are without their own hypostasis means that after the death of the animal its soul, poured out in the blood, ceases to exist.[1] In the case of men, however, the situation is radically different. The human soul does exist in its own hypostasis, 'since the body is mortal and receives its life from the soul; and it dies, is dissolved, if it happens that the soul departs from it. And (the soul) as it leaves remains indestructible; but continues for ever in its hypostasis, because it is immortal.'[2] Of course, Theodore does not regard this affirmation of the immortality of the soul as inconsistent with a thorough-going emphasis upon the mortality of *man*, the composite of body and soul. To say that 'man' is mortal is to say that he dies because his body is separated from his soul;[3] and this state of affairs is quite consistent with the continued existence of the soul as a separate substance. It is the body, and not the soul, which must receive the gift of incorruptibility.[4] As an incorporeal creature subsisting in its own hypostasis, the soul is possessed of immortality by its very nature.

And from the soul's immortality there follows its essential rationality. 'Indeed whatever is immortal by its nature and possesses an imperishable life is also, in truth, capable of intellection and endowed with reason.'[5] Here the classically Platonic connexion of ideas is not to be missed. 'So who will be mad and empty-headed enough to say that the soul of a man is without knowledge or reason? Unless he choose to become the upstart teacher of something that does not exist in the world: that there should be a nature which is immortal and lives with an imperishable life, and is yet without reason.'[6] This argument is, of course,

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[1] *Hom. catech.* v. 15 (Tonneau, p. 121).   [2] Ibid.

[3] *In Ep. ad Ephes.* i. 10 (Swete, i, p. 129, ll. 15 f.); and *In Ev. Jo.* x. 16 (Vosté, p. 146), where Theodore points out that Christ's death differs from that of ordinary men 'quia sciebat breve fore intervallum (in sepulcro) et mortem esse solvendam, *revertente anima ad corpus*'. (My italics.) Cf. also *In Ps.* xxx. 6 (Devréesse, p. 138).

[4] See *Hom. catech.* v. 11 (Tonneau, p. 117); viii. 9 (pp. 173 f.); xiv. 7 (p. 417). Cf. *In I Cor.* xv. 45 ff. (Staab, p. 195).

[5] *Hom. catech.* v. 16 (Tonneau, p. 123).   [6] Ibid.

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directed against Apollinarian teaching: and its principal purpose is to call in question Apollinaris' trichotomism. Its importance for us, however, lies in the incidental fact of the ground on which Theodore elects to criticize his opponent. He affirms the principle that intellectuality or rationality are essential properties of the invisible kind of existence—the kind which the soul enjoys. Behind this argument, though not explicit in it, lies the popular Platonist view of the world, with its assumption of a dualism of sensible and non-sensible substance, and its characterization of the latter as at once intelligible and intelligent. On this basis Theodore argues that one cannot admit the immortality and incorporeality of the soul without at the same time asserting its natural rationality. In this, as in the other respects we have noted, Theodore accepts quite automatically a fundamental postulate of the Platonic psychology which was current in his day.

Theodore's Conception of Reason: its Freedom and Mutability

At this point, however, it becomes necessary to notice that in his treatment of the nature and functions of reason, Theodore departs significantly from the emphases of the Platonist tradition on which he draws. For the Platonist, we have seen, reason in its highest (and in that sense 'normal') form is essentially a contemplative faculty. Left to its own devices, the rational soul naturally seeks to realize its given nature in a contemplative adherence to the timelessly intelligible. In the writings of Theodore, however, there is little or no trace of this emphasis on reason as a contemplative faculty, nor, for that matter, any obvious manifestation of interest in the scientific or discursive reason. Theodore invariably treats of human reason in the context of practical action. He conceives it as a faculty whose noblest function is seen in the guidance of moral conduct and in the making of ethical choices. And the exclusiveness of this emphasis marks the degree of his departure from the central stream of Platonist thought, in its Christian as well as in its secular expressions. Rationality, for Theodore, turns out to be essentially an *eligendi potestas*[1]—a capacity, as he puts it, for the 'discretio contrariorum, ex quibus et meliorum electio adquiri potest—haec enim summa est cognitio rationabilium omnium'.[2] The perfection

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[1] *In Ep. ad Gal.* ii. 15 f. (Swete, i, p. 26, l. 15).

[2] Ibid. (Swete, i, p. 27).

of reason is to be found in its capacity to distinguish good from evil and to adhere actively to the former: that is to say, in its voluntary moral conformity with a pattern of right action. Man's reason, therefore, as Theodore understands it, is a faculty whose nature is to be understood with reference to its function within the world of time and space. As he relinquishes the Neo-Platonic emphasis on the contemplative activity of reason, so also he ignores the idea of the soul's transcendence of the visible world—its interior exemption from the forms of temporal existence.

It is not surprising, then, that when Theodore treats of man's freedom he should be found insisting ever and again upon the matter of a practical freedom of choice, the freedom which is implied in the very notion of an *eligendi potestas*. In his *Commentary on Romans*, Theodore sets forth his conception of man's reason and its freedom in explicit terms:

> For irrational (creatures) everything happens according to nature (φυσικῶς). They are not able to distinguish evil from good, or to follow what seems good by the power of the will (γνωμή). Rather they continue of necessity within the bounds of nature. To them, therefore, all law is superfluous, since they can neither learn nor understand anything of that sort. But where rational (creatures) are concerned, the exact opposite is the case. For they are able to distinguish good from evil and also they choose (αἱροῦνται) what seems best by the power of the will. Further, for them the promulgation of law is altogether appropriate, since they can learn from it what is good.[1]

Theodore considers that reason carries with it a double capacity: the ability to learn what is right and what is wrong, and the ability to choose what seems good to the agent. Reason is thus informed by law and—as he writes in another place—perfected in the exercise of choice,[2] which presupposes that 'quod volumus eligamus'.[3] The rational will, therefore, has the power (*auctoritas*) to determine the way in which it will go, whether in accord with the teaching of the divine Law, or in accord with the promptings of desire: '. . . haec ambo nos omnes possidemus, ut faciamus si volumus, et si nolumus, non faciamus.'[4] And because the course

[1] *In Ep. ad Rom.* xi. 15 (*PG*, lxvi. 853CD).
[2] *In Ep. ad Gal.* ii. 15 f. (Swete, i, p. 28).
[3] Ibid.
[4] In Sachau ed., *Theodori Mopsuesteni Fragmenta Syriaca* (Leipzig, 1869), p. 11. This work is hereafter cited as 'Sachau'.

which any man takes is in this sense self-charted, it is possible to lay it down that

> Those who . . . do not believe are themselves the cause of their own damnation. . . . If some . . . do not believe, they are the authors of punishment for themselves; for his grace is offered to all who are willing.[1]

Theodore insists unequivocally upon man's responsibility for his deeds, be they good or evil; and this affirmation of human answerability is grounded in a firm apprehension of the freedom of choice which it presupposes.

Theodore's understanding of the nature of human reason, and of the freedom which essentially belongs to it, is further illuminated by his treatment of the question of the soul's mutability. This doctrine, as we saw, is emphasized by Nemesius of Emesa and Gregory Nyssen, not to mention Apollinaris, in their respective attempts to account for the soul's ability to go wrong—to be false to its own nature as rational. For such thinkers as these, there is something paradoxical, if not self-contradictory, in the very notion of a reason gone voluntarily wrong, since for them the natural dynamic of reason and the dynamic of virtue, as for Plotinus and the Platonist tradition generally, are ultimately the same. In the last resort, therefore, they can only explain the fact of sin by appealing to a constitutional weakness in the created rational agent: an indetermination in the will which stems from the ontological instability of a being made ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων. With Theodore, however, the case is somewhat different. He speaks of the mutability of the soul of man.[2] He considers further that this mutability—which is to the soul what mortality is to the body, the symptom of a constitutional instability—is natural to man as he came from the hand of his Creator.[3] But—and this is the essential point—Theodore does not connect the mutability of the soul so much with its createdness as with its very rationality. He avers significantly that the Creator might in fact have created the soul immutable. God did not do so because such a course would have meant reducing man to the level of the brute creation: 'For if he had made us immortal and immutable from the very beginning,

[1] *In Ev. Jo.* iii. 18 (Vosté, p. 52).
[2] For the mutability of the soul, as distinguished from the mortality of the body, cf., e.g., *Hom. catech.* xiv. 10 (Tonneau, p. 423), and *PG*, lxvi. 634A.
[3] *PG*, lxvi. 633A.

we should have been in no way different from irrational creatures, since we should have been ignorant of our own good.'[1] As Theodore sees it, reason is a capacity for moral judgement and moral choice. As such, its perfection requires that it be educated both in knowledge of the good and in loyalty to the good. But such a process of education presupposes two conditions: first, the inherent capacity of reason to choose, and therefore, at least in principle, to choose wrongly; and second, the provision of an environment in which not merely the opportunity, but the necessity, for exercising rational choice is afforded the created agent. In the first of these conditions is found the ground of Theodore's affirmation of the mutability of the soul; in the second, as we shall see, a ground for God's decision to constitute man in a mortal nature, with all that that implies. Unlike Nemesius, then, or Nyssen, Theodore sees in the mutability of the soul not so much an inevitable weakness of the *creaturely* reason, as an inherent property of its nature *as rational*, and therefore a precondition of its proper perfection. And what underlies this difference is not in the first instance a disagreement about what mutability is or entails, but more a disagreement about the character and function of reason itself. We have seen how Theodore surrenders the Neo-Platonic emphasis on the contemplative nature of reason and on its interior freedom from the categories of Becoming. In his discussion of the soul's mutability, however, a further difference with the Platonist tradition emerges. For Theodore, a rational act is a free act and, so to speak, an informed act: but it is not, simply as rational, a *virtuous* act. Theodore's thought plainly shows a tendency to treat of reason in a way which implicitly repudiates the intellectualism of Greek and Hellenistic ethics: it is this tendency which enables him to affirm the inherent mutability of reason itself, and thus its inherent capacity for deliberate false choice.

The Question of the Soul's Passibility

Theodore's differences with Platonist philosophy over the question of the nature of reason and its freedom go a long way towards explaining his attitude with reference to two others among the central problems of philosophical anthropology: the questions,

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[1] *PG*, lxvi. 633AB. Theodore says the same of the disembodied rational creatures: they too were created mutable, and for the same reasons. Ibid. 633BC.

that is to say, of the soul's impassibility and of its 'parts'. We must glance in turn at his treatment of each of these.

If Theodore regards the soul as inherently mutable, does he therefore repudiate the Platonic principle that man's rational part is impassible? By assembling a number of allusions and casual references to the question of passion, we can show without much difficulty that Theodore quite naturally uses language which accords with the Neo-Platonic view of this question. He is aware that passion is not usually ascribed to incorporeal beings,[1] and he seems to share the view that passion has, not the immaterial soul, but the body, as its subject. He speaks of 'corporeal passions',[2] and ascribes passibility, together with mortality and corruptibility, to the flesh.[3] Again, it is from man's mortality—which, as he says, is what St. Paul frequently means by 'the flesh'[4]—that Theodore derives the human liability to be afflicted by passion.[5] He further explains that this affliction takes its source from ἡδονῆς τῆς περὶ τε βρῶσιν καὶ πόσιν καὶ τὸν ἔξωθεν κόσμον καὶ μὴν καὶ τὰς τῶν γυναικῶν ἐπιμιξίας.[6] From such language as this it is impossible not to conclude that Theodore's use of the notion of passion is influenced strongly by the teaching of thinkers in the Platonic tradition.

On the other hand, when there is reason for it, Theodore has no hesitation in occasionally ascribing passion to an incorporeal being. He attributes passion to Satan:[7] and in more than one place he speaks of the soul as the subject of passion.[8] His view seems to be that passion does in fact have its seat in the material part of man's nature, but that the soul becomes subject to passion insofar as it yields to the *aestus cupidinis* which threatens to overwhelm it, and thus itself becomes the seat of desire.[9]

In fact, however, Theodore offers no consistent or thought-out statement on the question of passion and its seat—least of all on the problem of the soul's passibility. And the reason for this seems

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[1] *Hom. catech.* v. 12 (Tonneau, p. 117). Theodore speaks of pride as a 'passion' 'que Satan, *bien qu'incorporel*, possède par la malice de sa conscience'. My italics.

[2] *Hom. catech.* xi. 17 (Tonneau, p. 319).

[3] Ibid.

[4] e.g. *In Ep. ad Rom.* vii. 5 (Staab, p. 124).

[5] *In Ep. ad Rom.* v. 21 (Staab, p. 121).

[6] Ibid. (Staab, p. 120).

[7] *Hom. catech.* v. 12 (Tonneau, p. 117). Cited above, n. 1.

[8] Sachau, p. 65 *ad fin.*; and cf. *In Ps.* lix. 5b (Devréesse, p. 392).

[9] Sachau, p. 65.

to be simply that the question is not an important one for him. His ethic, in the last resort, is not an ethic of purification from passion, but rather, as we shall see, an ethic whose fundamental categories are those of obedience and disobedience to divine law. If yielding to passion is wrong, this, for Theodore, is because it is contrary to the commandment of the Creator, who has forbidden the indulgence of certain kinds of fleshly desire. In an ethical context, therefore, Theodore tends to use 'passion' to mean desires which, if followed out, alienate man from the fellowship of his Creator: and this general, more or less popular use of the term indicates that Theodore has in fact departed from the more exact logic of Neo-Platonic discussion of passion and its relation to the rational soul. The concept in its customary philosophical use does not fit into the pattern of Theodore's thought about the soul as a moral agent.

Theodore and the 'Parts' of the Soul

A somewhat similar conclusion emerges when Theodore's view of the soul's unity is considered. We have seen that he does not reproduce the typically Platonist insistence on the soul's natural transcendence of the space-time order: and this fact, together with his unsystematic use of the idea of 'passion', inevitably results in an attitude of apparent disinterest where the systematic question of the soul's 'parts' is concerned.

In fact, Theodore deals with this problem only in the course of his polemic against Apollinarianism, where, together with other orthodox critics of the Laodicene, he is swift to controvert the trichotomous analysis of human nature which Apollinaris had propounded. He insists that the soul is not to be distinguished from intellect, as one substance from another, but that it is intellectual in its own nature.

Not to recognize that the Messiah took a human soul is therefore a great insanity; and mad too is the man who says that he did not take a human intellect, since he says also, either that he did not take a soul, or that he took one which was not human, an unintelligent soul, that soul which vivifies animals and brutes.[1]

For Theodore insists, as we have seen, that there can be no immortal nature, such as the human soul unquestionably is, which

[1] *Hom. catech.* v. 15 (Tonneau, p. 121).

is not in its own right essentially intellectual.[1] Intellect is thus, for Theodore, an attribute of soul—a view in which he concurs with Nemesius and Gregory Nyssen, as well as with other Christian writers of this era.

For the rest, however, apart from this negative judgement on the views of Apollinaris, Theodore does not treat of the problem of the soul's parts. No more does he speak in terms which suggest that a distinction between rational and irrational soul in man was in any sense significant for his outlook. Doubtless he was aware of this distinction; and it is hard to suppose that he would not have admitted its legitimacy in some form. But for his purposes as a theologian and an exegete, the question of the soul's parts apparently had no direct interest. Nor, as we have suggested, is a reason for this attitude far to seek. The distinction between νοῦς and ψυχή, or between rational and irrational soul, was of ethical and religious significance because it enshrined a sense of the soul's transcendence of the natural order and its interior exemption from the passionate life of the animate organism. Theodore agrees, as we have noted, that passion stems initially from the mortal body. But he denies in effect any view which would remove the soul in its highest 'part' from the system of the visible world, nor does he hesitate to suppose that the rational soul may be affected by passion. Hence Theodore lacks the characteristic motives which would have led him to attach a profound religious or ethical meaning to the distinction between the two 'parts' of the soul. He is content to affirm, as against Apollinaris, the unity of the soul; and he sees no pressing religious necessity, as did his Neo-Platonic contemporaries, for qualifying this affirmation, whether by the introduction of a second, inferior vital principle, or by developing the idea of a structural articulation within the unity of the soul.

Conclusion

We have attempted to reconstruct, out of scattered and

[1] Ibid. v. 16 (Tonneau, p. 123): cited above, p. 128. Compare the following dogmatic fragment translated by Sachau (pp. 36 f.): '(*Anima*) procul dubio cognitione praedita est. Nam si mortales in ipsa vita sua motus naturales habent, multo magis immortales . . . cognitionem penetrantem validamque habent. Jam vero forsitan dicunt 'nos non dicimus, animam non esse cognitione praeditam.' Dicant ergo nobis, quare requiratur natura tertia, quam appellaverunt 'cognitionem', et quid significet subsistentia ejus aut in quo adjuvet et finiat hominem.'

unsystematic evidences, the outlines of Theodore's view of the nature of the soul and its character as a free rational agent. In the process of this investigation it has been impossible not to note the affinities between Theodore's thought and the teaching of the Platonic tradition of his time. In so far as Theodore draws on any philosophical source, it is this which he employs—not self-consciously, but rather almost unthinkingly. This influence reveals itself at a number of significant points: in Theodore's insistence upon the substantiality, immateriality, and immortality of the soul, as well as in his automatic association of 'passion' with the desires of the material body.

On the other hand, it is plain that this influence is neither systematic nor thoroughgoing. Theodore is not a Neo-Platonist: and this fact is nowhere more evident than in his emphasis on the practical as opposed to the contemplative reason. This interest governs his elaboration of the doctrine of man's freedom, which he understands in terms of a capacity for practical choice, rather than of exemption from the forms of spatio-temporal existence. Furthermore, it affects his view of the soul's mutability, which he associates not with createdness, but with the power of rational choice itself. In consequence, Theodore's view of the soul as a rational agent is in several respects directly opposed to that of his Neo-Platonic contemporaries. Not only does he seem to lack interest in the theme of the soul's transcendence of the visible world; but he appears also to have called in question the intellectualism which made the notion of voluntary sin so difficult for the philosopher to come to terms with. But in order to grasp the full sense of Theodore's doctrine of the nature of the soul, we must pursue these themes further by investigating first his view of the soul's relation with its Creator, and second his treatment of the soul-body problem.

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The Soul in its Relation with God

TYPICAL of psychology in the Platonic tradition generally is a belief in the affiliation of the soul with its transcendent divine Source. In its highest phase, the Platonist held, the soul participates in the pure, timeless intuition of νοῦς; and in this sense, as sharing in the nature of the divine substance from which it derives, the soul is itself divine. Christian writers in the Platonic tradition were prevented by their loyalty to the doctrine of creation from any direct or unqualified espousal of this conception. Nevertheless, as we have indicated, they permit their exposition of the doctrine of man in the image of God to be influenced by this point of view. For they tend to see in man's rationality his 'sharing' in the nature of the divine νοῦς—a sharing which enables him to enjoy the vision of God.

From what we have already observed of Theodore's treatment of the nature of the soul and its rationality, his apparent rejection of the contemplative ideal and his interest in reason as the seat of a practical moral activity, it is natural to suppose that he repudiated or qualified this characteristically Platonic view of the relation of the soul to God. But in order to substantiate this supposition, and further to elucidate Theodore's own teaching, we must inquire more closely into this aspect of his thought: his view of the relation of man to God as it appears in his treatment both of the origin of the soul and of the doctrine of man 'in the image'.

The Soul as Creature

Theodore is uncompromising in his Christian insistence that the soul as a creature exists at an infinite remove from its Creator. This attitude is determined by his apprehension of the sublimity and transcendence of the divine Nature. He asserts that it is God alone who can truly be said to 'be',[1] who is the cause of all things,

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[1] *Hom. catech.* ix. 11 *ad fin.* (Tonneau, p. 231); cf. ii. 9 (Tonneau, p. 41).

who exists from all eternity,[1] whose nature it is to be above temporality,[2] to be immortal[3] and infinite.[4] Against the background of this conception of God, Theodore develops the contrast between Creator and creature:[5]

This is why it was said to Moses: *It is I who am cause of everything*, in order that we might learn that this is the one who truly exists, who exists from (all) eternity and exists at all times, and he it is who is God. And one who is different from this and is not from all eternity, he does not exist truly, because he is made, and because he was made when he did not exist, when he who exists from (all) eternity, he who is God, willed to make him.[6]

The creature, then, is possessed of an existence merely derived and secondary: and because this is true, Theodore can assert further:

There is in truth a great contrast between the one and the other, between that which exists from (all) eternity and that which received a beginning of its becoming; there is such a distance between them that it is not possible that the two be found together . . . it is certain that the one who exists from all eternity is very far and at an immeasurable distance from the one who has a beginning, because the one who is from all eternity is infinite.[7]

This judgement, moreover, applies to invisible as well as to visible creatures, to the soul of man and to the disembodied intelligences as well as to the material creation.

Although the visible natures differ from the invisible, nevertheless they are all created, visible and invisible; although there is as we know a difference between them, nevertheless they all exist by the will of their author.[8]

All creatures are equal in this essential regard: that they were made out of nothing.[9] The rational soul of man, therefore, falls clearly on the creaturely side of the gulf between God and the things which he has made.

The Question of the Soul's Pre-existence

This outlook is reflected in Theodore's treatment of the origin

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[1] *Hom. catech.* ix. 10 (Tonneau, p. 229).   [2] Ibid. iv. 2 (Tonneau, p. 79).
[3] Ibid. x. 6 (Tonneau, p. 253).
[4] Ibid. ix. 9 (Tonneau, p. 227); cf. ix. 10 (Tonneau, p. 229).
[5] Cf. ibid. i. 14 (Tonneau, p. 23).   [6] Ibid. i. 15 (Tonneau, p. 25).
[7] Ibid. iv. 6 (Tonneau, p. 83).
[8] Ibid. ii. 11 (Tonneau, p. 43).   [9] Ibid. (Tonneau, p. 45).

of the soul, whose createdness he emphasizes while at the same time he asserts its natural and primordial association with a material frame. He raises the question in his exegesis of Ps. xxxii. 15 (ὁ πλάσας κατὰ μόνας τὰς καρδίας αὐτῶν):

Certain (exegetes) thought that the blessed David was saying here that (God) formed the souls of men *alone*—in separation from the body, taking *hearts* to mean 'the souls'. Whether or not this is the case . . . it is not what is meant here. Rather, he writes *their hearts* meaning 'them', naming the whole from the part. The effect of the statement is: 'He brought them into existence when they were not.'[1]

In his exegesis of the creation-narrative in Genesis Theodore goes farther, and argues that in fact the creation of rational natures occurred with and within the framework of the material world.

It seems amazing to me that some men suppose that the invisible and rational creatures came to be of God prior to the heaven and the earth, since everywhere through Holy Writ we are taught that they are within these and are circumscribed by them.[2]

All intellectual natures, and not merely the souls of men, were originally constituted within the space-time universe. According to Genesis as Theodore understands it they were created together with the heaven and the earth. In support of this view Theodore alludes to Ps. cxlviii, where he notes a distinction between heaven and earth as parts of the material creation, and observes that David refers to the 'angels' and 'powers' of God as praising him 'from the heavens'. He concludes, therefore,

He [David] would not have made mention of the invisible powers together with these [the heavens], numbering the former among the things 'from the heavens', if he had not surely known that they did not come to be before the heaven and the earth, but received their being together with them, inasmuch as they too were part of the creation.[3]

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[1] *In Psal.* xxxii. 15 (Devréesse, p. 153).
[2] *In Gen.* i. 16, cited by R. Devréesse, *Essai*, p. 8, n. 4.
[3] *In Gen.* i. 18, cited by Devréesse, ibid., p. 9, n. 1. In thus rejecting the notion of the pre-existence of the rational soul, Theodore does not make it altogether plain where he stands on the matter of its temporal generation. However, there is no indication in his extant writings that he adopted a traducian view—and in this, at any rate, he seems to differ both from Apollinaris and from Gregory Nyssen. Such evidence as there is, therefore, points to his having held with some form of creationism; and it is possible that this view is reflected in an observation which he

Rational spirits, and *a fortiori* human souls, are therefore a part of the creation, not only in the sense that they are γενητά, but also in the sense that their association with the material world is an aspect of their constitution in existence and thus a part of their natural character. Together, rational spirits and material objects make up the single *corpus* of creation; together they look to God as the infinite source of their finite being.[1]

Theodore on the Image

Given this background, we might anticipate that Theodore's treatment of the image-theme would turn out to differ somewhat from the Platonist treatment favoured by some among his contemporaries. His strong emphasis on the creatureliness of man, as well as on the unity of visible and invisible natures in the creation as a whole, would have a natural tendency to discourage any account of the image of God in man which stressed the 'participation' of the human rational faculty in the divine νοῦς. So, in any case, it turns out to be.

For one thing, Theodore points out, in an interesting passage of his commentary on Colossians, that the very notion of an 'image' implies that it is visible: an idea which would not have appealed greatly to such a thinker as Gregory Nyssen.

. . . every image, while itself seen, points to what is not seen. So it cannot happen that an image be made which is such as not to be seen. For it is plain that this is the reason why it is customary to make images among those who make them for the sake of honour or affection—so that there is a remembrance of those who are not seen.[2]

It follows that for Theodore it is man as a visible creature who is made 'in the image of God'—man as a composite of body and soul. In his visible nature he serves as a 'reminder' of the Creator.

makes in the course of his instruction on baptismal regeneration. The man who descends into the waters of baptism, he says, is reborn to a higher life by the operation of the divine Spirit; and he likens this second birth to the first conception of man, when 'un germe tombe dans le sein de sa mère, n'ayant ni vie, ni âme ni sensation, mais . . . formé par la main divine il en sort homme vivant, doué d'âme et de sensation' (*Hom. catech.* xiv. 9: Tonneau, p. 421). In view of Theodore's explicit repudiation of the doctrine of pre-existence, this text would seem to indicate that he worked on a creationist hypothesis.

[1] *Hom. catech.* ii. 11 *ad fin.* (Tonneau, p. 45).
[2] *In Ep. ad Col.* i. 15 (Swete, i, pp. 262 f.).

How this can be so, Theodore explains in general terms in his *Catechetical Homilies*.

Since it is in the image of God that we have been made, as in an image, from what is proper to us (and) with reflection, we conceive how what is said of God is more sublime. In this way it is possible, from what is proper to us, to conceive in God the difference between recognizing [him] (as) father and (as) creator, its nature and degree—it being clearly known that there is a great difference between us and God—and thus (it is possible) for us to acquire a just idea of the divine Nature and his works.[1]

Between man and God there is a sort of analogy in operation, and therefore in nature. God is Father and God is Creator; similarly, but at a totally different ontological level, man is father and man is creator. This relationship of similarity, one term of which is man in his visible, corporeal nature, is sufficient to enable a certain knowledge of God by rational reflection on the activities of man—reflection which must follow at once the *via negationis* and the *via eminentiae*. But the relation, as Theodore conceives it, comes simply to this: that at the level of the creature, man is 'like' his Creator.[2]

In what, more specifically, does this likeness consist, and what is its purpose? Mgr. Devréesse, in his reconstruction of Theodore's commentary on Gen. i. 26,[3] notes four themes in the Interpreter's account of the nature of the image, which we may rehearse briefly here. The first is one which we have already seen adumbrated in the *Catechetical Homilies*. Man is, in a certain limited sense, endowed with the power of creation. He cannot, of course, bring into existence what has not previously existed at all: this is the prerogative of God alone. Man's creativity is limited by the fact that his 'making' always takes the form of a reshaping of given materials and natures. But within these limits he is genuinely a creator, and thus possesses a μίμησις[4] of the divine creativity. In the second place, man is possessed of an αἴνιγμα of the omnipresence of the divine Nature in his faculty of understanding: νοῦς. For the latter, though remaining in one place, can transfer

[1] *Hom. catech.* ii. 16 (Tonneau, p. 49).
[2] For a further explanation of the general sense of 'image' (that which 'represents' by way of resemblance) see *Hom. catech.* xii. 2 (Tonneau, p. 325 *ad fin.*).
[3] *Essai sur Théodore de Mopsueste* (Rome, 1948), pp. 13 f., from which I have drawn the following account.
[4] Devréesse, *Essai*, p. 13, n. 4, where the relevant passage is cited.

its intentional presence from one end of heaven to the other: and in this respect it reflects the indivisible, immanent presence of God to his entire creation. A third aspect of this similarity is seen in man's royal prerogative to rule and to pass judgement—a privilege in virtue of which men may even be called 'gods': ἔδωκεν ἡμῖν καὶ βασιλείας ἀρχὴν καὶ κρίσεως ἐξουσίαν, οὓς κριτὰς καὶ βασιλέας ἀνθρώπους ἀπὸ τοῦ βασιλεύειν, ἤδη καὶ θεοὺς προαγορεύεσθαι διὰ τοῦτο.[1] But finally, Theodore writes, human life (ζωή) and reason (λόγος), in their relation to soul, supply a reflection of the internal structure of the divine Nature. For as the divine Word and Spirit proceed in a like but not identical way from the Father as his Powers, so also the human soul has two powers, reason and life, in virtue of which it both lives itself and vivifies its body. Thus in the human soul there is a clue to the threefold interior life of the Godhead.

What is important for our purposes, however, is not the detail of Theodore's characterization of the image, but rather the general manner in which he conceives it: and here the same pattern of thought is discernible as in the *Catechetical Homilies*. To say of man that he is in the image of God is to say, essentially, that in man's nature and in his activities one may discover various clues to aspects of the reality of the divine Nature itself. Man is, in some sort, a μίμημα of his Creator, as a statue is a μίμημα of its original. The relationship is one of *representation* founded on *resemblance*; and the resemblance in question is defined externally, without reference to the themes of participation or natural affiliation.

Man's Cosmic Function as Image

From this given relationship of resemblance, by which man is constituted the representative of God, Theodore argues to a quite distinctive characterization of the nature of man's office as image. He likens man, the image of God, to the statue of a great king, set in the midst of a city which the king has founded, built, and beautified. Such a statue, Theodore writes, 'must be honoured (θεραπεύεσθαι) by all the inhabitants of the city as an image of the king who erected it'.[2] For by honouring the image which

[1] Devréesse, *Essai*, p. 14, n. 2.
[2] Cited by Devréesse, 'Anciens commentateurs grecs de l'Octateuque', *Rev. Bib.* xlv (1936), p. 368, n. 1.

represents the king, they express their gratitude to the one who has supplied them with a home. And so it is with the creation itself, the 'cosmopolis' which God has made and ordered. The culmination of his creative activity is man, who is not a creature like every other creature, but the representation, and therefore the representative, of the Maker himself. Man is set in the midst of the universe as its focal point, as the creature whom every other creature must serve in loyalty to the Father of all. As the image of God, then, man is the crowning work of God and the keystone of the created order. In the service of man, their Maker's image, the creatures of God are held together in unity and harmony.

And this explains why it is that man was created as one in whom material and immaterial elements, body and soul, are 'knit together' (συμπεπλεγμένον).[1] In order that man might properly fulfil his unique cosmic function, God constituted him to be one in whom all the elements of the created order were united in a single person.

It is plain that since God purposed to bring the Whole to perfection as a single order, and wanted to gather up the whole creation—composed as it is of different natures, mortal and immortal, rational and irrational, visible and invisible—into a unity, he constituted man as the bond (σύνδεσμος) of them all. . . . For this reason, then, he gave him both soul and body—the one visible, akin to the visible (creatures), made up of earth and air and water and fire; the other intelligent (νοεράν) and immortal and rational, like to the invisible and rational substances, in order that the creation might not be bound to him by need alone, but also by kinship of nature.[2]

In this passage Theodore synthesizes two intrinsically independent notions: that of man as the image of God, and that of man as the microcosmic bond of the whole universe. And the connecting link between these ideas is Theodore's interpretation of the image-theme in terms of representative function.

Needless to say, the notion of man as 'microcosm' is by no means original with Theodore.[3] However, he appropriates the idea and employs it in his own way and for his own distinctive purposes. In his comments on Eph. i. 10[4] he uses it to underline

[1] Ibid., p. 375.
[2] Devréesse, art. cit., p. 368, n. 1. Cf. Sachau, p. 5.
[3] See the Appended Note at the end of this chapter.
[4] Swete, i, pp. 128 ff.

the cosmic effects both of the Fall of Adam and of the restoration of all things in Christ, the Second Adam. Through Adam's sin, he writes, and the death which it brought in its train, 'Dissolvebatur . . . creaturae copulatio'.[1] Contrariwise, by the work of Christ, God 'universae creaturae vinculum amicitiae visus est condonasse'.[2] In Christ there is a recapitulation, 'eo quod omnia collecta sunt in unum, et ad unum quoddam inspiciunt, concordantes sibi'.[3] Theodore thus employs the doctrine of man as microcosm to elucidate the universal consequences of sin and redemption, so that 'salvation-history' becomes the story of man's failure through sin to fulfil his office as image, and of God's remedy for this failure in the Second Man, Christ.

But these two uses of the microcosm-theme have their presupposition in another which is more fundamental. Underlying it is Theodore's distinctive interpretation of the image-doctrine in terms of man's cosmic function as δέσμος. And the significance of this more basic use of the microcosm-idea lies in the fact that Theodore conceives the status of man as image of God primarily in terms of his twofold office within the structure of the created world. Man as image is God's representative within the created order. At the same time he is the creature in whom the structure of the creation itself is summed up. And in Theodore's mind (for this, no doubt, is the explanation of his conjunction of these two ideas) each of these offices presupposes the other. To be the creature whom all others may serve as God's representative image, man must be naturally akin to all who are to serve him; and if, as microcosm, he is to be the bond of creation, this office can only rightly be his if he stands in the world as one in whom the nature and authority of God himself are genuinely represented.

For Theodore, then, the doctrine of the image is not primarily a statement, as it is for Gregory Nyssen, of the way in which the human νοῦς is affiliated with the divine Intellect, but rather a characterization of man's status and function as a creature within the creation. His phrasing of the doctrine of the image therefore reiterates in effect the principles which underlie his treatment of the origin of the soul: the unity of intellectual and

[1] Swete, i, p. 130, ll. 1 f. Cf. *In Ep. ad Rom.* viii. 19 (Staab, p. 138); *In Ep. ad Col.* i. 16 (Swete, i, p. 268, ll. 16 f.).

[2] *In Ep. ad Ephes.* i. 10 (Swete, i, p. 130, l. 9). Cf. *In Ep. ad Col.* i. 16 (Swete, i, p. 269).

[3] *In Ep. ad Ephes.* i. 10 (Swete, i, p. 130, ll. 13 f.).

material substance within the creation, and the nature of man as a creature among creatures. Man's uniqueness, for Theodore, consists not in an ambiguous transcendence of the finite world in which he is involved, but rather in his fulfilment of a particular office within it.

Man in his Relation with God

As Theodore sees it, then, the relation of man to God is to be understood in terms of two governing ideas, neither of which is involved in the constellation of themes associated with the Platonist notion of the soul's participation in the transcendent divine Nature. The first of these is the idea of *resemblance*, which, as we have seen, is always tied up in Theodore's mind with that of representation. Within the universe man has a special office because his nature 'images' that of the Creator, and he can therefore stand as the representative of God, the one in whose service the other creatures serve God and his purpose of universal unity and harmony. But at the same time, man's fulfilment of the office to which his representative status entitles him is dependent upon his *obedience* to God. Man may in some sense be the image of God without actually functioning as the image. By disobedience he may fail to do the job for which his very constitution equips him. Thus it is Adam's disobedience (his failure to fulfil the office of image for which, in the divine economy, he was created) which results in the disunity of the creation.[1] Conversely, the restoration of man to his primordial status as image presupposes his return to a relationship of perfect obedience to God.

Interpreted in the light of these two ideas, Theodore's understanding of the image-theme coheres perfectly with what we have already seen of his doctrine of the nature of man and of the soul. He treats man's status as image in terms of his immanent function as a member of the created order; and in so doing he implicitly repudiates that form of the Platonic dualism which had assimilated the soul's nature to an order of existence alien to that of the material world. By just so much he sets himself apart from such thinkers as Nemesius, Gregory Nyssen, and Apollinaris, all of

[1] *In Ep. ad Col.* i. 16 (Swete, i, pp. 267 f.): 'Propter hominum etenim malitiam omnis . . . creatura disrumpi videbatur. Avertebant enim se a nobis angeli et omnes invisibiles virtutes, propter indevotionem nostram quam erga Deum exercebamus.' Cf. *In Ep. ad Rom.* viii. 19 (Staab, p. 137 *ad fin.*).

whom, though in different ways and to different degrees, had made much of the 'heavenly' origin and nature of the soul. But by the same token this interpretation of the image-doctrine confirms Theodore's emphasis on the practical reason, with its involvement in the concrete decisions and choices of man's life within the visible world. Furthermore, if man's fulfilment of his office as image is intimately bound up with his active obedience to God, this is because, as Theodore sees it, man's rational nature is one which is perfected fully only in the exercise of moral freedom under the law of God.

One conclusion, then, seems inevitable. Theodore's denial of a *natural* affiliation between the soul of man and God has as its counterpart a positive conviction that fellowship between Creator and creature is effected through a *moral* relationship in which the part of man is obedience, or reverence for the will of God. It will be our business, as we proceed in our discussion of Theodore's anthropology, to see how this theme is developed—and in particular how Theodore expands it when he treats the problem of moral conflict in man.

NOTE

Man as 'Bond' of the Creation

Theodore's explanation of man's office as image combines the idea of man as 'bond' of the cosmos with that of man as a microcosm. Its roots, therefore, are spread out widely in the history of Greek thought.

At the base of the notion of man as 'microcosm' (the expression μικρὸς κόσμος is first used—unsympathetically—by Aristotle, *Physics* 252ᵇ26) lies the analogy which permits the Plato of the *Timaeus* to conceive the cosmos, on the model of human nature, as a 'living creature', composed of soul and body. It is by the Stoics, however, that this analogy is employed for its anthropological, as opposed to its cosmological, interest: that is to say, for what it suggests about human nature and the human good. Moreover, it is within the Stoic system, with its emphasis on a wholly immanent divine Reason which vivifies and governs the 'body' of the cosmos, that the analogy ceases to be a mere analogy, and becomes a sober statement of the relation of man's soul and body to the universal Spirit and the Body which it animates. We may consider in this connexion the well-known words of Seneca (*Ep.* 65. 24): 'Quem in hoc mundo locum deus obtinet, hunc in homine animus. Quod est illic materia, id in nobis corpus est.' And these words must, of course, be read in the light of what Seneca says in another

place (*Ep.* 66. 12; cf. 92. 1): 'Ratio . . . nihil aliud est quam in corpus humanum pars divini spiritus mersa.' Although the Stoics apparently did not themselves employ the term 'microcosm', the idea behind this expression was certainly prominent, not merely (or chiefly) in their physics, but most significantly in their ethics, which is in part founded on the substantial identity between the reason in man and the universal Reason.

It is no doubt Stoic inspiration which lies behind Philo's encomium on man the βραχὺς κόσμος (*De vita Mos.* ii. 14), whose reason is a 'reproduction or fragment or ray' of the immanent divine Logos (*De op. mund.* 51; cf. *Quis rer. div. her.* 31). In Philo's thought, however, the setting of this conception is somewhat different from what it had been in classical Stoicism. Placed explicitly in the context of a Platonistic dualism, it now portrays man as the 'borderline', the mean, between the two contrary spheres of material and spiritual existence (*De op. mund.* 46). At the same time it is combined with the conception of a wholly transcendent Deity—a Deity excluded from the 'world' of which man is the small-scale reproduction. The conception reappears in later Platonism (though it is not to be found in the *Enneads*: for Plotinus, man is 'microcosm' in so far as his intellectual soul contains and apprehends the 'Ideas' whose home is the divine νοῦς)—and it reappears in much the same form as that in which Philo propounds it. Cf. Chalcidius, *In Tim.*, cap. ccii; Proclus, *In Tim.* i, pp. 5, 33, 202; iii, pp. 172, 355 (Diehl). Man is an image of the cosmos he inhabits, summing up in himself the manifold phases or levels of existence which are manifested in the time-space world. In Neo-Platonic use, however, as in Philo's, Divinity itself, as radically transcendent, is excluded from the cosmos of which man is an image, and at the same time emphasis is placed on the fact that man's corporeal nature is made up of the very elements which constitute the frame of the physical universe.

These themes are reflected in Christian use of the microcosm-idea. As Methodius of Olympus, for example, expounds it (*De res.* ii. 10, ed. Bonwetsch, *G.C.S.*, pp. 350 f.), all the emphasis is placed on man's kinship with the elements of the physical world. It is in this form that Gregory Nyssen (*De op. hom.* 16. 1) once rejects the idea, on the ground that it endangers the divine image in man by making him the image of the corruptible material cosmos. Elsewhere (*De an. et res.*, *PG*, xlvi. 28ʙᴄ) he accepts it as obtaining in the case of the human body, but insists that the soul is the image not of anything within the created world system, but of the transcendent God himself. At the same time Nyssen accepts the Philonic idea of man as the 'mean', the 'borderline' being between the 'divine and incorporeal nature' and irrational life (*PG*, xliv. 181ʙᴄ, cf. 133ʙ)—which is, as a parallel passage from Gregory Nazianzen makes it clear (*PG*, xxxvi. 184ᴄ), closely linked with the notion of man as the 'bond' of creation. It is not plain, however, either that Nyssen clearly associated this theme with the microcosm idea—or indeed that, as he understands it, it is wholly consistent with the microcosm-idea. It appears to be the case that he regards man as the mean, not between the material and spiritual spheres of the created world, but (as is consonant with his doctrine of man in the image) between material substance and the divine Nature in which man's reason participates. And read

in this way, his treatment of the conception of man as the 'mean' being is inconsistent with the microcosm idea in its classic form.

The closest parallel to Theodore's use of the microcosm-idea is found, of course, in Nemesius' *De hominis natura*. Man, writes Nemesius (*PG*, xl. 533A), is an εἰκών of the whole creation, and for that reason is correctly termed a μικρὸς κόσμος. With this conception Nemesius links, as Theodore had done, that of man as the σύνδεσμος of the creation: a role, be it noted, which had more traditionally been reserved for the immanent divine Power or Reason (cf. Cicero, *De nat. deor.* ii. 115; pseudo-Aristotle, *De mundo* 5; Philo, *De Fuga et invent.* iii; Nyssa, *De hom. op.* i; Basil, *Hexaëm.* 33A, where the v.l. δέσμῳ for θέσμῳ is significant even if incorrect; and Gronau, *Poseidonios und die judischchristliche Genesisexegese*, 142 ff., where the passage from Nyssen is under discussion). Nemesius' synthesis of these two conceptions is motivated by his desire to explain how a world-order sundered by the opposition of spirit and matter can be an harmonious and unified whole. In fact, he gives two not wholly consistent answers to this question. First, he sounds the (Posidonian) theme of a graded continuity in the levels of existence from inanimate matter at one extreme to intellectual life at the other—each level including and advancing over the one before it (cf. *PG*, xl. 508A *infra*, 508C–512B). But he caps this train of thought with the contention that man, as one who lives on the borderline of two contrary spheres of existence, the intelligible and the sensible, participating himself in both kinds of being, is the mean, and thus the bond, between the two (ibid. 508A, 512B; and cf. *Timaeus* 31BC for the conception of a mean as the bond between the two extremes). The former of these two solutions may well be Posidonian in origin, with its implication of a continuity between corporeal and intelligible existence. The second, however, is premissed on the Platonic dualism which it seeks to minimize—a dualism for which there can be no continuous scale on which one can move from corporeal to incorporeal, and for which, consequently, the 'link' between them must take the form of a single creature, man, in whose nature both kinds of existence meet. Cf. K. Reinhardt, art. 'Poseidonios von Apamea', in Pauly-Wissowa, *Real-Encyclopädie*, vol. xxii. 1, cols. 777 f.; and idem, *Poseidonios* (Munich, 1921), pp. 344 ff.

Theodore's use of this theme reflects his preoccupation with theological as distinct from philosophical problems. The fact that he employs it to define the office of man as image of God sets him apart both from Nemesius and from earlier Christian writers: and at the same time it emphasizes his differences with Gregory Nyssen, who insisted firmly that a systematic use of the microcosm-idea would destroy the foundations of the Christian doctrine of man in the image. Theodore shares Nemesius' interest in the reconciliation of the spirit-matter dualism to which both adhere: but he fails to reproduce the distinctively Posidonian elements which are contained in Nemesius' account. On the whole, Theodore's treatment of this theme appears to reflect little more than the use of a common late Platonic theme to elucidate his conception of the crucial cosmic significance of the fall and redemption of man: and, at the same time, to underscore his emphasis on the involvement of man in the physical, created order.

12

Theodore's View of the Soul-Body Relation

How does Theodore conceive the relation between body and soul in man? We have seen that in one significant respect he sets aside the dualism of the Platonic tradition. He declines, not only in theory, but in practice, to set the soul apart from the visible, created world in virtue of its invisible and intelligent nature. So much at any rate appears from his treatment of the doctrine of the image. We must now ask further whether he carries this repudiation of dualism to its logical conclusion: whether, that is to say, he follows it out when he turns from the question of the soul's relation with God to that of its relation with the body which it animates.

As we saw in the case of Apollinaris, there are really two distinct issues involved in this question. There is first of all the question of Theodore's treatment of the problems arising from the fact of the physical union of soul and body. Then second, and related to the former question, there is the matter of his attitude towards the soul-body dualism when that is viewed in the context of ethical problems. Does he conceive man's moral problem in terms of a conflict between body and soul? And if so, how does this affect his understanding of the nature of sin? These are crucial issues in any discussion of Theodore's teaching, and their solutions must directly affect any interpretation of his more strictly theological doctrine of man.

The Union of Body and Soul

Generally speaking, two contrary views have been propounded of the way in which Theodore accounts for the physical union of soul and body.[1] Fr. Arnou seems to suggest that his outlook in

[1] See below, Appendix II, for a more extensive treatment of the varying views on this point.

this regard is, in at least one respect, Neo-Platonic in its affinities. Dr. Kelly, on the other hand, has followed the more widespread view in describing it as 'Aristotelian'. What evidence is there which can assist in settling this question?

There is a possible clue to Theodore's position in one of the passages in the *Catechetical Lectures*. Here Theodore is discussing the idea (this time attributed to Arius and Eunomius) that the divine Son, in becoming incarnate, took a body but not a soul. Of those who take this position, he writes:

. . . they lower the divine nature of the unique Son to the point of saying that he declines from his natural grandeur and performs the actions of the soul, enclosing himself in this body and accomplishing everything to make it subsist.[1]

Theodore objects to the views of his opponents on the (customary) ground that their teaching endangers the dignity of the divine Nature. This is the final point of the whole passage; but as he continues, he shifts his ground for a moment.

Consequently, if the Divinity takes the place of the soul, it [sc. the body] had neither hunger, nor thirst, nor was it tired, nor did it have need of food; for all this happens to the body because of its weakness and because the soul is not equipped to satisfy the needs which it has save according to the law of the nature which God has given it.[2]

This observation constitutes, in effect, a second objection to the heterodox thesis: for of course it is clear from the Gospels that the Lord did in fact suffer from the weaknesses of the flesh. Theodore maintains that this was only possible because of the presence of a genuinely human soul in Christ: and accordingly he proceeds to explain why he holds this position.

But it [sc. the soul] requires that the body be perfect in every respect in order to make it subsist; now, if it is lacking in some respect, not only can the soul not help it at all, but it is conquered by the weakness of the body and is forced, against its will, to depart.[3]

It is because the soul's powers are limited that the body must suffer and the man die. Consequently, Theodore insists, the fleshly sufferings and the death of Christ (on which the Arians had placed so much emphasis in their attempts to demonstrate

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[1] *Hom. catech.* v. 9 (Tonneau, pp. 111 ff.).
[2] Ibid.   [3] Ibid.

the creatureliness of the Logos) are really only explicable if Christ possessed a human soul.

At the moment, however, we are not interested so much in Theodore's rather clever attempt to outflank the Eunomians dialectically, as in the view of the relationship between soul and body which is implicit in his language. The passage as a whole very clearly witnesses to Theodore's sense at once of the unity of human nature in its visible and invisible parts, and of the involvement of the soul in the affairs of its corporeal partner. The soul only deserts the body against its will: its natural effort is to care for the body with which it is united, and (as far as it is able) to preserve it from the ills which necessarily afflict it. Theodore shares none of that attitude which would see the body as the soul's 'prison'. At the same time his language here confirms what we have already seen of his view that the soul is a substance intrinsically independent of body. As he writes elsewhere, they are two dissimilar 'natures':[1] their relation is that of two separate objects or subjects, and, as his language seems to suggest, it is at least partially effected by the *interest* of the soul in the affairs of its body.

The pattern of thought which is hinted at in this passage from the *Catechetical Lectures* is confirmed by those few passages in which he explicitly alludes to the manner of the body-soul union. Such passages are, to be sure, invariably christological in their immediate purpose. But there is no good reason to suppose that Theodore has permitted his christological position to dictate an arbitrary and *ad hoc* treatment of the problem of body-soul union. On the contrary, the outlook which he reveals in these passages is wholly consonant with his known opinions as to the hypostatic nature of the soul. The doctrine which they seem to presuppose, therefore, is not unexpected at all. It is put most clearly in a fragment of Theodore's fourth book *Adversus Apollinarem*, preserved by Facundus of Hermiane:

According to us, man is said to consist of a soul and a body, and we say that these—soul and body—are two natures, but that one man is composed out of both. Is it proper, in order to assure that the two are one, that we confound the natures and say by conversion that the soul is flesh and the flesh, soul? And because the soul is immortal and

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[1] Cf. Sachau, p. 39: 'corpus enim et animam duas naturas esse neque inter se similes'.

rational, but the flesh mortal and irrational, shall we convert and say that the immortal is mortal and the irrational, rational? . . . The division of natures persists: the soul is one thing, the flesh, another. The one is immortal while the other is mortal; the one is rational, but the other, irrational. Yet the two are one man, and one of the two (natures) is never absolutely and properly said to be 'man' in itself—unless perhaps with some added qualification, such as 'interior man' and 'exterior man'.[1]

The position stated here is both similar and dissimilar to that of the Neo-Platonic teachers. Theodore's final observation clearly rejects the Neo-Platonic view that the soul is the man. He insists, as we should have expected, that the corporeal frame is a constitutive part of human nature. On the other hand, he insists upon the substantiality of the soul, and refuses to subordinate soul in any way to its body. Soul is united to body, but it is not an attribute of body, nor is it inseparable from body, nor is its essential nature as immortal and rational affected by its union with 'flesh'. What is missing in this passage is any indication of the *manner* in which soul and body, as two distinct 'natures', are united.

Does Theodore's treatment of the christological analogate of the body-soul union indicate that he conceived the manner of the body-soul union, like Nemesius, in terms of inclination and will?[2] Such a conclusion would, of course, extend even farther the area of agreement between Theodore and thinkers in the Neo-Platonic tradition, from whom Nemesius took his conception. There is, however, little direct or explicit evidence for this conclusion in Theodore's writings—though, by the same token, there is no evidence against it. Certain it is that, in the case of the divine Nature, Theodore insists that there can be no question of *local* presence or action: 'Affectionaliter . . . non localiter, Deus vel recedere vel accedere dicitur.'[3] But the reason he assigns for this doctrine ('qui ubique per naturam est omnibus semper praesens') does not immediately imply that the principle could be extended to apply in the case of the soul, which is not, after all, omnipresent, even though it is incorporeal. It would, therefore, be

[1] Swete, ii, pp. 318 ff.
[2] Cf. Arnou, 'Nestorianisme et Néoplatonisme', in *Gregorianum*, xvii (1936), p. 129, where some such conclusion as this is hinted at.
[3] *In Ps.* ix. 22 (Devréesse, p. 56).

dangerous to argue from Theodore's view of the mode of the divine presence to creatures to his view of the mode of the soul's presence to its body. He himself suggests no such analogy.

On the other hand, there are possible hints that Theodore may have conceived the manner of the body-soul union in the way suggested. We have seen one rather vague indication of this sort in a passage just cited above from the *Catechetical Lectures*.[1] The supposition finds what is possibly an indirect confirmation in another of Theodore's analogies for the union of Divinity and humanity in Christ: if, that is to say, it is possible to use one such analogy to interpret another. In the *Catechetical Lectures*, Theodore quotes Matt. xix. 5 ('They are no longer two, but one flesh'), and proceeds to exhibit the relation of husband and wife as illustrative of the union of the divine Son and the 'assumed Man' in the Incarnation.[2] He does not, however, make it quite clear what he takes to be the *tertium comparationis* in this case. Is it merely the fact that husband and wife are so obviously two? Or is part of his reason for using this analogy to be found in the volitional nature of the union between them? If the latter, then this may afford an indication that he saw a similar aptitude in the parallel analogy of the body-soul union. But it affords no more than an indication.

Obviously, one must not press the matter of Theodore's 'Neo-Platonism' too far in this matter. From the evidence we have surveyed it is apparent that there is no question of his having propounded an 'Aristotelian' view of the manner in which body and soul are related. He continues to insist upon the independent substantiality of the soul. As he sees it, body and soul are plainly two different 'things' which are brought into a peculiarly intimate relation without either's nature being essentially altered in the relation. To this extent he rejects the Peripatetic account of the body-soul union. It is noticeable, however, that he makes no reference to a doctrine of 'mixture'—even in its Platonic form; and the effort to discern in Theodore's writings parallels to the quasi-voluntaristic doctrine of body-soul union which Nemesius takes over from Ammonius and Porphyry fails for lack of sufficient evidence. It may be, again, that Theodore was not interested in the question: and if so, this fact must clearly have a bearing on the way in which his christology is to be understood.

[1] See above, p. 151.
[2] *Hom. catech.* viii. 14 (Tonneau, p. 207).

Dualism of Body and Soul in Theodore

Theodore's sense of the radical difference of nature between soul and body, and his insistence on their separateness even in union, provide the presupposition of his treatment of the ethical aspect of the body-soul relation. We have seen that for Apollinaris, as for Neo-Platonic thought generally, man's fundamental moral problem is that of overcoming the irrational motions of the flesh by the rule of reason. The pagan cried out for redemption *from* the body; the Christian writer sought a redemption *of* the body through its divinization. But for both, the fundamental problem was the same: the flesh, whose lustful solicitations distracted the soul from its heavenly Good. An examination of Theodore's writings shows that he has a strong tendency to reproduce this strain in the philosophical tradition of which he was the heir: to see the root of moral evil in the weakness of a corporeal nature, and therefore to envisage the moral struggle as a conflict between rational soul and mortal body. But accompanying this tendency, and perhaps only superficially reconciled with it, is another, which sees the root of sin in the self-determined disobedience of the soul itself, that is to say, in the will. It is these two themes in Theodore's thought that we must attempt to trace out now.

Probably the best point of departure is Theodore's interpretation of the Pauline flesh-spirit dualism. In general, he takes this dualism to signify a contrast between the mortal and the immortal.[1] 'Flesh' denotes human nature considered as dissoluble and passible. 'Spirit', on the other hand, denotes this same human nature as transfigured through the gift of immortality; or else, as taken specifically of the Holy Spirit, it signifies the active cause and source of such immortality. In this perspective, the contrast between 'flesh' and 'spirit' approximates to the difference between the two successive states of man—the Present Age, and the Age to Come.

Nevertheless, Theodore often shows a comprehensible tendency to alter his perspective somewhat, and to identify flesh and spirit simply with the corporeal and incorporeal parts of human nature; and it is this aspect of his thought which must interest us here.

The ground of this interpretation of the Pauline scheme lies in the first instance in the identification of 'flesh' (in St. Paul's use) with 'body'. Theodore makes this point in general terms in his comment on John iii. 6: '. . . quando ergo caro generat carnem, necessario et nativitas *corporalis* est.'[1] More specifically, the equation appears in Theodore's habit of substituting 'flesh' for 'body' in the expression 'soul and body'.[2] By the same token, Theodore not infrequently interprets 'spirit' as 'soul', or alternatively of some function or faculty of the soul. In this sense, 'spirit' can mean προαίρεσις,[3] πρόθεσις,[4] or διάνοια or προθυμία.[5] It is in this way that the terms of St. Paul's dualism get identified with the elements of the human constitution.

If Theodore identifies the 'flesh' with the corporeal frame, however, he sees at the same time that the term carries with it a wealth of further connotation.

The divine Scripture sometimes uses 'flesh' of the thing (φύσιν) itself. At other times, however, (it does) not (mean) simply the thing, but calls it so by reason of its mortality. . . . There are also times when (the Scripture) knows to call suffering (πάθος) itself 'flesh', as when it says, *Who in the days of his flesh*, meaning: 'in the time of suffering, when death was upon him'. It also knows to apply this name to what is ephemeral and easily dissoluble.[6]

Theodore sums all this up in the conclusion that the primary connotation of 'flesh' is 'mortality'. 'The saying, *Flesh and blood cannot inherit the Kingdom of God* means *When we were in the flesh*: that is, "when we were mortal".'[7] And this conclusion is, of course, wholly consonant with an identification of 'flesh' and 'body'; for it is, as we have seen, the body alone to which Theodore will in the first instance apply the epithet 'mortal'. At the same time, however, it is fairly plain that Theodore means a great deal more by 'mortal' than merely 'subject to death'. The term connotes also all those bodily weaknesses and needs which make it possible—and necessary—for the flesh to die: and by extension,

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[1] *In Ep. ad Gal.* v. 16 (Swete, i, p. 98): '. . . e contrario enim "carni" statuit "Spiritum". Nam et "Spiritum" pro resurrectione accepit et futura inmortalitate. . . . Sicut et "carnem" sumpsit ad mortalitatem.' Cf. *In Ep. ad Gal.* iii. 3 (Swete, i, p. 37), and *In Ep. ad Rom.* vii. 5 (Staab, pp. 124 f.).

[1] *In Ev. Jo.* iii. 6 (Vosté, p. 48). My italics.
[2] See, e.g., Swete, ii, p. 318 *ad fin.* (cited above, pp. 151 f.).
[3] *In Ps.* l. 12b (Devréesse, p. 339).
[4] *In Ep. ad Rom.* ii. 29 (Staab, p. 116).   [5] Ibid. i. 9 (Staab, p. 114).
[6] Ibid. vii. 5 (Staab, p. 124).   [7] Ibid. (Staab, p. 125).

therefore, it signifies whatever it is in the constitution of the body itself which renders it corruptible and subject to passion. In Theodore's mind, corruptibility and passibility are the natural correlates of mortality.[1]

And for just this reason, the body in its weakness and mortality has a natural tendency towards sin. This is a teaching which Theodore never tires of reiterating: τοῖς θνητοῖς ἕπεται τὸ ἁμαρτάνειν.[2] He phrases the same thought quite as tersely in his commentary on Romans: referring to St. Paul's use of 'flesh', he observes, λέγει δὲ τὴν ἀπὸ τῆς θνητότητος ἐνοῦσαν ἡμῖν τῆς ἁμαρτίας ἐνόχλησιν.[3] The connexion, as Theodore sees it, between mortality and sin lies in the fact that the mortal body is naturally subject to passion. He speaks of man's 'vitam mortalem . . . multis passionibus subditam', and explains this expression by saying that 'naturalis mortalitas multam nos fecit praesentium habere cupiditatem'. Covetousness, or desire, springing from the needs of a mortal, that is a corporeal, nature, subjects men to passion and leads them to the indulgence of appetite: and so it is that they inevitably fall into sin.[4] Sin thus springs in the last resort from corporeity: it is the consequence of that passion which inevitably afflicts an unstable, material and mortal nature.

Against this background, it is not surprising when Theodore writes (paraphrasing Rom. vii. 25): 'In my soul, he says, I choose what God's law finds right, but I am drawn away to sin by my mortality.'[5] He reiterates the same interpretation of Paul's words in another place:

Similarly too the Apostle, speaking in the Epistle to the Romans of our soul and our body, and teaching us how the soul is able to move towards virtue, but how the body, on account of its natural mortality, is easily inclined to sin by the motion of its nature, says: 'So I find it a rule, when I want to do what is good, that evil lies to my hand.'[6]

In both of these passages Theodore interprets Paul's flesh-spirit dualism as a dualism of body and soul, and finds in the opposition between them the source of man's moral conflict. The body tends

[1] Cf., e.g., *Hom. catech.* xiv. 3 (Tonneau, p. 409): '. . . celui qui de la chair naît à la chair, est par nature mortel, passible, corruptible, et muable en toute chose.'
[2] *In Ep. ad Ephes.* iv. 22 ff. (Swete, i, p. 173).
[3] *In Ep. ad Rom.* viii. 9 (Staab, p. 135).
[4] *In Ep. ad Gal.* ii. 15 f. (Swete, i, pp. 26 f.). Cf. *In Ep. ad Rom.* vii. 8 (Staab, p. 127), and *In Ep. ad Gal.* v. 16 (Swete, i, p. 37).
[5] Staab, p. 133.   [6] *In Ev. Jo.* viii. 6 (Vosté, p. 119).

naturally to sin: the soul is at least capable of virtue. Elsewhere, Theodore makes this principle even plainer. He explains that the 'peace' of which the Apostle speaks at Rom. i. 7 signifies harmony of soul and body: καὶ τὸ μὴ στασιάζειν τὸ σῶμα πρὸς τοὺς τῆς ψυχῆς λογισμοὺς καὶ ἡ πρὸς ἀλλήλους εὐσεβὴς συμφωνία.[1]

In this point of view it is impossible not to see a reproduction in Christian terms of the Platonic dualism of material and intelligible existence, according to which evil is to be explained as the result of the passions of the body. The question is, How far does Theodore pursue the logic of this point of view? He sees in the mortality of the flesh—that is to say, in its weakness, its passionate nature, and its consequent attachment to the material goods of this world—the root of man's sin. But this outlook, as we have seen, had a corollary for thinkers in the Neo-Platonic tradition. It went hand in hand with a strong tendency to deny that the soul, save accidentally or involuntarily, can be responsible for sin. We have seen that this second principle exercises a strong influence over Apollinaris' doctrine of man and redemption. Does Theodore also adhere to it?

Sin and the Soul

The answer to this question appears to be, though perhaps unexpectedly, an emphatic No. In the very passage of his commentary on Romans where he propounds the view that sin has its root in desire, Theodore insists at the same time that sin in the proper sense of the word can never be indeliberate. 'Sin does not consist simply in the deed, but . . . in doing what is contrary to what is known to be good.'[2] Objectively considered, sin means 'doing something which is inconsistent with the divine laws';[3] but it is rooted in an inimical disposition of the will (γνώμη), which expresses itself in outward action (πρᾶξις) and deliberate intent (πρόθεσις).[4] Sin, then, is the work of the soul, not of the body. Although, considered materially, it may in fact take the form of a yielding to fleshly lust, considered formally it is an act of voluntary repudiation of the good. Theodore returns to this point in his *Catechetical Lectures*, in the course of a discussion of the christological aberration of the Arians and Eunomians.

[1] *In Ep. ad Rom.* i. 7 (Staab, p. 113).
[2] Ibid. vii. 8 (Staab, p. 127).
[3] Ibid. vii. 13 (Staab, p. 129).
[4] *In Ps.* liv. 4a (Devreesse, p. 354).

. . . it is plain that the inclination to sin has its beginning in the will of the soul, since, even in the case of Adam, it was the soul first which accepted the mistaken advice and not his body: for it was not his body which Satan persuaded by means of its lust for sublime goods. . . .[1]

In the case of the primordial sin of Adam, then, the source of temptation was not the mortal body's desire for earthly goods, but the soul's own aspiration towards 'sublime goods': so it cannot be thought that sin originates, or has its seat, in the body. Theodore goes on to reiterate the principle with a christological application.

. . . if the soul only committed those sins which come to it from the passions of the body, perhaps it would have been enough for our Lord to take only a body in order to save (the soul) from sin; but now, the soul itself gives birth to the numerous and shameful evils of its sins, and above all . . . pride.[2]

According to this statement of the matter, the passions of the body may be the occasion of some, or even most, sin; but sin itself is properly a deliberate act of the rational agent, having its root in the power of choice and of judgement which is native to reason. The focus and centre of the human problem, then, lies not so much in a conflict between the natural tendency of the soul towards God and the natural tendency of the flesh towards indulgence in earthly delights, as it does in the conflict between the demands of the divine law and the voluntary dispositions of the human will.

And needless to say, this analysis of the nature of sin is consonant with much that we have already seen of Theodore's anthropology. It coheres with his interest in the practical reason as an active moral agent. It follows directly upon the effective denial of Greek intellectualism in his doctrine of freedom. At the same time it agrees with his denial of a natural affiliation of the soul with its divine source, however conceived; and with his interpretation of the doctrine of the image in terms of man's office within the created world—an office which he fulfils by free obedience to divine law. In all these ways, Theodore's insistent affirmation of the voluntary nature of sin appears as a reaffirmation of certain elements of biblical religion and morality as

[1] *Hom. catech.* v. 11 (Tonneau, p. 115).
[2] Ibid. v. 12 (Tonneau, p. 117).

against the teachings of late Platonism. Similarly, it serves to set Theodore's point of view in direct contrast to that of Apollinaris, whose conceptions of human sin, freedom, and redemption have their roots in a fundamentally Platonist outlook.

Conclusion

But the matter is not so simple as this. For, as the evidence we have considered in this Chapter clearly indicates, there is a systematic ambiguity, if not an outright self-contradiction, implicit in what Theodore says about the nature and source of sin. Half of him is not unsympathetic with the sort of analysis which the view of Apollinaris presupposes: and this fact emerges quite clearly in his habitual affirmation that sin is the inevitable accompaniment of mortal, fleshly existence. It would be easy, no doubt, to try to reconcile the two conflicting points of view which Theodore espouses by saying that, as he understands it, the essence of sin is voluntary disobedience, whereas its occasion is fleshly lust. The distinction is a nice one: but it fails, because in certain moods Theodore is prepared to say a great deal more than that the lust of the flesh furnishes the temptation or occasion for sin. Not infrequently, he makes it clear that he thinks of sin as the *necessary* consequence of mortality: and such behaviour must disarm the apologist completely. The fact appears to be that the Interpreter's thought in this connexion is not wholly of a piece, that (to put the matter crudely) he wavers between a more Platonist and a more biblical outlook.

The question that we must ask is this: How do these different strands in Theodore's thought affect his strictly *theological* anthropology? Is it possible to arrive at a more exact analysis of his doctrine of the Ages and his doctrine of the Fall by envisaging them as the product of a dialogue between two not wholly consistent philosophical points of view? It is, at any rate, worth while to make the attempt. It may be that one or the other of these strains will turn out, in the end, to be predominant. But in any case it would be strange if the ambiguities in Theodore's philosophical outlook proved to have no bearing whatever on the puzzles which scholars have turned up in seeking to understand his theological anthropology.

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Theodore's Doctrine of the Two Ages

PROBABLY the most characteristic conception embodied in Theodore's theological doctrine of man is the so-called doctrine of the 'Two Ages', which governs and influences every aspect of his thought. The doctrine of the Ages is the historical pattern in terms of which Theodore spells out his understanding of the situation and the destiny of man. As such, it supplies the basis at once of his soteriology and of his picture of the redeemed state of man. The scheme presupposes Theodore's view of the human constitution and of the nature of the soul. It assumes that man is a creature made up of an immortal and rational soul and a mortal, material body. At the same time it envisages man as a being wholly involved in the created order. By reason of this latter premiss, the historical dualism of the Ages becomes, in effect, Theodore's alternative for the metaphysical dualism of the Platonic tradition. Where the Platonist, with his doctrine of the soul as a member of the intelligible order involved in the world of time and space, had conceived the human problem in terms of a 'vertical' contrast between two contrary levels of existence, Theodore, who emphasizes man's thorough-going involvement in the processes of generated existence, thinks primarily in terms of an 'horizontal' contrast between two successive states of a single, created human existence. In this way the very structure of the doctrine of the Ages reflects Theodore's most fundamental divergence from the outlook of late Platonism. Nevertheless, an analysis of this conception will reveal the presence of the fundamental ambiguity which we have already detected in the philosophical bases of Theodore's anthropology: the ambiguity which stems, apparently at least, from his inability completely to shake himself free from the Platonist dualism which in principle he repudiates.

The Pattern of the Two Ages

The clearest and most terse statement of the outlines of the doctrine of the Ages is to be found in a well-known fragment preserved by the Fathers of the Fifth General Council: 'What pleased God was to divide the creation into two states: the one which is present, in which he made all things mutable; the other which is future, when he will renew all things and bring them to immutability.'[1] This is a statement of God's purpose in creation. The division of the history of the world into two successive and contrasting stages is an original part of the divine intention in bringing the universe into existence. Furthermore, this divine plan is fixed and unalterable. It defines the path along which God will infallibly lead his creation. In his commentary on Jonah, Theodore explains why God supplies prophecies and foreshadowings of the Coming One in the Old Testament. Partly, his intention was to instruct his Chosen People about things to come. But more than that, he wanted to show that his purposes, once formed, are subject to no change or alteration. The portents and predictions of the Old Testament are evidence at once of the faithfulness of God and of the consistency of his purposes: and this is the God who 'judged it . . . necessary that we first experience our present condition, and then, through the resurrection from the dead, be transferred to the future state'.[2]

There is therefore a definite temporal boundary between the Two Ages. It is constituted by the event of the general resurrection. The ministry and the resurrection of Christ are the beginnings of the new Age,[3] but its fulfilment awaits the day when all who are of Christ's Body will be raised to share the resurrection which is already his. The Lord therefore says to his disciples (so Theodore paraphrases John vi. 62), 'When you see me become immortal and ascended to heaven, by what is worked in me you shall believe that you too, by reason of your association with me, shall receive what has been done in me by the divine Nature which indwells me.'[4] The time when this will come to pass is future; but it is not uncertain. 'Praefinitum est a Deo tempus consummationis, licet nobis . . . incerta esse videatur.'[5] Thus the history of man is divided clearly on a temporal scheme, upon which Theodore insists uncompromisingly. The reality of the

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[1] *PG*, lxvi. 633C–634A.   [2] *PG*, lxvi. 317C.
[3] *PG*, lxvi. 317C: '. . . cuius initium Christi domini incarnatione fecit.'
[4] *Hom. catech*. viii. 11 (Tonneau, p. 203).
[5] *In Iam ad Thess*. v. 4 (Swete, ii, p. 33).

Future Age is not yet: 'omne quicquid illic boni in futura expectamus die tunc quando adveniet dominus noster Iesus Christus ad examinanda universa.'[1] There is no question of Theodore's identifying in practice the Future Age with an eternally real ontological realm which is future only from the point of view of the individual who has not yet realized his membership in it. The Future Age is a new *state* of a creation which already exists but which has not yet been transformed save in the single person of Christ.[2]

This principle is admirably illustrated in Theodore's view of the present state of the baptized Christian believer, who, as he sees it, lives for practical purposes in the Present Age. The convert after his baptism is not already enjoying the full fruition of Christ's benefits: '... nunc in promissione eorum sumus tantum per fidem'.[3] This promise of the life to come is, to be sure, sealed by the gift of the Spirit. Nevertheless, the reality itself is yet to come.

So too in the birth which is here made ours through baptism, which is the type of the resurrection, we shall receive grace through the same Spirit, but partially and as a first instalment. Then, however, we shall receive it completely, when we rise in truth, and incorruptibility is in reality communicated to us.[4]

The believer, in fact, is in a situation similar to that of a new-born child, who is endowed with all the faculties and capacities of mature human life, but is without the ability to exercise them fully.

... he who is born in baptism possesses in himself all the power of the immortal and incorruptible nature and he possesses all (its faculties); being incapable of using them, of putting them into action ... until the moment which God has fixed, when we shall rise from the dead. ...[5]

There is, then, a sense in which the Age to Come is already at

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[1] *In I^am ad Thess.* ii. 20 (Swete, ii, p. 17).

[2] It is interesting here to note that Theodore conceives the relation between the legal institutions of the O.T. and the heavenly realities of which they are 'shadows' strictly as a relation of *fore*shadowing. Cf. *Hom. catech.* xii. 5 (Tonneau, p. 329).

[3] *In Ep. ad Ephes.* i. 4 (Swete, i, p. 123). Cf. *Hom. catech.* xii. 13 (Tonneau, p. 341); and for Theodore's definition of faith in terms of hope, *In Ep. ad Gal.* ii. 20 f. (Swete, i, p. 35).

[4] *In Ev. Jo.* iii. 29 (Vosté, p. 56).

[5] *Hom. catech.* xiv. 10 (Tonneau, p. 423).

work within the believer: 'quasi medii quidam sumus praesentis quoque vitae et futurae.'[1] The present reality of the work of the Spirit is an anticipation of the Future Age, and the ground of the believer's ability and obligation to trace out the lineaments of the resurrected life even in the medium of his mortal existence.[2] Nevertheless, Theodore is careful to formulate this truth in such a way as not to compromise the further truth that the history of man's salvation is objectively incomplete: that, in the scheme of the divine Providence, the Future Age is still unqualifiedly future.

The Life of the Present Age

What, then, are the specific characteristics of the Present Age, and how does Theodore contrast it with the Age to Come? Earlier we had occasion to note that Theodore tends for the most part to identify the Pauline 'flesh' and 'spirit' with the marks of human life in the Present Age and the Future Age respectively. 'Just as here', he writes, 'our body, with the presence of the soul, enjoys a visible life, so there it will know an eternal, incorruptible life through the power of the Spirit.'[3] Marking the Two Ages, then, are two distinct modes of life, the one visible and corruptible, the other immortal—the one fleshly, the other spiritual.

In the first instance, then, the Present Age is characterized by all that Theodore associates with 'flesh'—that is to say, as we have seen, by mortality and corruptibility: or, quite as commonly, by mortality and mutability.[4] On occasion, he will refer

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[1] *In Ep. ad Gal.* ii. 15 f. (Swete, i, p. 30).

[2] Cf. *In I^am ad Thess.* iv. 7 (Swete, ii, p. 24), and *In Ep. ad Gal.* ii. 15 f. (Swete, i, p. 30).

[3] *In Ev. Jo.* iii. 29 (Vosté, p. 56).

[4] Here we must raise the question what in fact Theodore understands by 'mutability'. Earlier, we saw that he speaks of the 'mutability' of the soul, by which he meant, in effect, the freedom of choice which belongs to it as a rational agent. See above, pp. 129 ff. However, he uses the same epithet of the *body*—or at any rate of the instability which man suffers by reason of the ebb and flow of corporeal desires. And it is in this sense that Theodore appears to associate 'mutability' with 'mortality'. Cf. *In Ep. ad Gal.* ii. 15 f. (Swete, ii, pp. 26, 30). Thus mutability is characteristic of the *flesh*, and is indeed a part of what Theodore means by man's 'mortal nature'. We must conclude, then, that he uses the term in two differing senses—of which, however, the second seems the more frequent and the more basic. Inevitably, however, these senses tend to merge: and the fact that this is the case may supply part of the explanation for Theodore's dexterity in adhering to two inconsistent ideas of the origin and nature of sin.

simply to the 'weakness' of human nature in the Present Age, and this description conveys his general meaning admirably. He is concerned to supply an impression of the present life of man as characterized by all the disadvantages and limitations natural to corporeal, spatio-temporal existence, of which bodily death and mutability are at once the symbols and the sources. Furthermore, as we have seen, Theodore takes it that it is this condition of man which makes sin—failure to conform to God's will—not merely possible, but unavoidable. Sin is occasioned by mortality,[1] by mutability,[2] by the essential weakness of human nature.[3] Thus man in the Present Age is the victim of sin by reason of his constitutional instability.

This characterization of the Present Age brings us once again face to face with the quasi-Platonic strain in Theodore's thought. Man's essential problem is that of the mortality of his body, with all that such mortality implies and entails. If man is sinner, it is because 'naturalis . . . mortalitas multam nos fecit praesentium habere cupiditatem';[4] if the soul is disobedient to God, that is because it is led astray by the lusts of the flesh. In this mood, Theodore appears almost as the typical Christian Platonist, arguing in effect that what man most sorely needs is a redemption, not from finitude (this is one notion which does not tempt him), but from the normal accompaniments of corporeal existence: mortality and passibility.

But, as we might expect, there is another, and more distinctive, strain in Theodore's understanding of the Present Age, which appears when he begins to explain why it is that God decided to set man in such a situation. In answering this question he reverts in effect to the point of view which is rooted in his analysis of the nature and function of human reason. Taking his stand on the conception that reason is basically a faculty of moral discrimination and choice, he argues that the scheme of the Two Ages is the creative design of divine Providence. The life of the Present Age, with all its limitations, is the necessary prelude to man's immortalization through the Spirit.

In order to understand the full sense of Theodore's argument,

[1] See above, pp. 155 f.
[2] Cf., e.g., *Hom. catech.* v. 10 (Tonneau, p. 115): 'en notre mutabilité nous péchons'.
[3] *In Ep. ad Gal.* i. 33 f. (Swete, i, p. 8, l. 21).
[4] Ibid. ii. 15 f. (Swete, i, p. 27).

and thus to grasp in its full scope his portrayal of man's life in the Present Age, we must return for a moment to his conception of the nature and function of human reason, and to the view of the relation between man and his Creator which is implied in it. For just as Theodore discerns the nobility of man's reason in its ability to discriminate between right and wrong, and to choose what is right, so he conceives the relationship between God and man in terms of the categories of obedience and disobedience to the will of God as expressed through law.

This outlook, to which we have already had occasion to call attention, is nowhere more plainly in evidence than in his lectures on The Lord's Prayer. After delivering the text of the Prayer to his catechumens, he opens his discourse with the following observations:

> . . . prayer does not consist in words, but in morals, love, and application to the good; because he who is inclined to the good must have his whole life in prayer—which appears in the choice which he makes of the good . . . true prayer is moral uprightness, love for God, and zeal for that in which he takes pleasure.[1]

The whole end of prayer is to obtain assistance from God for the pursuit of the good life. The man who is devoted to the good, Theodore writes,

> has endless need of the petitions of prayer; for it is for the one who applies himself to the good that it is right to ask help of God, who helps him in return for the effort he makes to bring all his life into conformity with the will of God. And it is sure that such a man will also receive what he asks, because he who devotes himself to the divine laws . . . it is not possible that he ask help and not receive assistance in some fashion from Him who has given us these commandments.[2]

Clearly, Theodore sees the business of man's life to consist in the choice of the good in action. Even the activity of prayer is directed wholly to this end. Further—for so this passage makes it plain—

[1] *Hom. catech.* xi. 3 (Tonneau, p. 287). Cf. *In I^{am} ad Tim.* ii. 1 (Swete, ii, pp. 85 f.) for a similar argument as to the reason for the necessity of prayer. It is almost as interesting to note what Theodore does *not* say in this connexion as to record what he does say. It is worth while, to this end, to contrast Theodore's outlook with the mystical bent expressed by Gregory Nyssen in his own lectures on the Lord's Prayer. 'Prayer', he writes, 'is intimacy with God and contemplation of the invisible'; '. . . the effect of prayer is union with God' (Sermons on the Lord's Prayer, I, tr. H. Graef, in *Ancient Christian Writers*, no. 18, p. 24).
[2] *Hom. catech.* xi. 3 (Tonneau, pp. 287 f.).

as the good is seen to consist in the conformity of man's will with that of his Creator, so God's will is to be grasped and obeyed through obedience to Law, which Theodore defines for us: 'omnis enim constitutio aliud agi praecepit, aliud iubet caveri; haec autem et lex est et dicitur'.[1] The good for man, then, is obedience to divine precept, whether that comes in the form of 'natural law' or of the law found in the Scriptures.[2] And accordingly, the history of man's salvation, enacted within the Present Age, is the history of man's growth, as a rational agent endowed with the power of free choice, into a perfect obedience to the expressed will of his Creator. This is the full sense of what has been called Theodore's 'moralism': rooted in his conception of reason and its freedom, it expresses itself in an emphasis on obedience to God through adherence to his Law.

When this has been said, it becomes possible to see more exactly the logic of Theodore's conception of the Present Age as the creative design of divine Providence. God's motive for instituting the pattern of the Two Ages was, from at least one point of view, a pedagogical one. We must remember that, for Theodore, the free rational will is not, of itself, a natural dynamic towards the good. Its freedom is a freedom to judge and to choose: and for these functions it requires to be educated. Consequently he writes: 'It is . . . necessary that all the rational creatures—I mean the invisible ones and ourselves as well—here undergo (their) present mutability, in order that we may be instructed in the best teaching of piety and settled in (a disposition of) good will.'[3] God, Theodore reiterates, 'gave . . . us this present mortal life—as I have said—so that we may be trained in virtue and learn those things which it is right for us to do'.[4] The fact that man was created in a mortal body, with all the disadvantages which that implies, is not to be charged to the Creator as a mistake or an obvious act of evil intent. On the contrary, it was God's philanthropy which motivated him: his desire to educate the rational creature in the ways of obedience to the good.

But this purpose of education, as Theodore sees it, presupposes three conditions for its fulfilment. First, of course, it presupposes

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[1] *In Ep. ad Gal.* ii. 15 f. (Swete, i, p. 25).
[2] For this distinction, see *In Ep. ad Rom.* ii. 29 (Staab, p. 116), and *Hom. catech.* vi. 2 (Tonneau, p. 133).
[3] *PG*, lxvi. 633BC.   [4] *In Ep. ad Gal.* ii. 15 f. (Swete, i, p. 26).

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that kind of mutability which is involved in rational freedom of choice: it presumes a reason which needs to be educated both in the knowledge and the practice of what is right. Second, it presupposes that God should make known his will for man in the form of Law: for Law is the instrument of man's education.

Because, then, God so created us, and because it is of concern to him that we follow his laws and instruct our soul in the knowledge of piety, he began from Adam . . . and straightway after he was created, God gave him laws, through which he ought to have known him.[1]

It is through the Law alone that man achieves a knowledge of right and wrong. Apart from the Law of God, man's reason is uninformed, and to that extent irrational: ἡ δόσις τῆς ἐντολῆς καὶ διάκρισιν αὐτῷ τοῦ τε καλοῦ καὶ τοῦ χείρονος παρέσχεν.[2] And finally, in addition to creating man free and providing him with a Law for his guidance, God also set him in a mortal body. By this means, having made man rational and afforded him a knowledge of right and wrong, the Creator also provided him the opportunity for testing his loyalty to the good, and for learning virtue in practice by overcoming the impulses of a carnal nature: '. . . vitam mortalem et multis passionibus subditam, et ad discendam virtutem opportunam fecisse visus est.'[3] Thus the constitution of the First Age—the age of mutability, law, and mortality—was the provision of a beneficent Providence, which sought by this scheme to bring man, and with him the creation of which he was the centre, to perfection in a way appropriate to his rational freedom.

So stated, this view has an obvious and appealing coherence. Human history appears as an easy evolutionary progress from small beginnings to a greater end: a progress which is effected by education. It is this side of Theodore's teaching, no doubt, which justifies Gross in speaking of the Interpreter's *Schöpfungsoptismus*. In fact, however, the doctrine of the Ages itself is a denial that the evolutionary process can ever, without extraordinary divine intervention, reach its goal: and the reason for this is just that element of pessimism which is contained in Theodore's doctrine of mortality. Man's mortality does not merely serve to stimulate him to virtue and equip him to contend against

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[1] Sachau, p. 9 *ad fin.*
[2] *In Ep. ad Rom.* vii. 13 (Staab, p. 129).
[4] *In Ep. ad Gal.* ii. 15 f. (Swete, i, p. 26).

strong temptation: it makes his perfection impossible, and his falling into sin inevitable. 'Iustificari . . . in praesenti vita . . . inpossibile est.'[1] And here the ambiguity or incoherence in Theodore's teaching reappears with a vengeance. It is not merely that the doctrine of the Ages itself presents two aspects, that of an evolutionary progress to perfection, and that of a divine reversal of the order of creation. Underlying this conflict, there is the more basic antinomy between the idea of sin as the inevitable fruit of a corporeal nature, and the view that sin is the voluntary disobedience of a free rational agent. The extent of this incoherence can be better estimated when we have looked for a moment at Theodore's portrayal of the Future Age, man's redeemed state.

The Life of the Age to Come

As the present life of man is one in which mortality reigns, so the Future Age is pre-eminently the age of immortality, accorded to man through participation in the gifts of the Spirit. For Theodore, needless to say, this 'immortality' connotes far more than just the abolition of bodily death. Of those who seek 'the good things to come' in Christ, he writes:

. . . they are going . . . to become completely different and to acquire a great variety of virtues by the gift of the divine grace which they are going to receive. They are going to become, in fact, immortal instead of mortal, incorruptible instead of corruptible; impassible instead of passible; immutable instead of changing; instead of slaves, free men; instead of enemies, friends; from strangers (they will become) sons and will no more be thought of as Adam's but as Christ's.[2]

This state of affairs is what is signified by such expressions as 'the New Covenant',[3] 'the New Creation',[4] 'the Heavenly Jerusalem',[5] and 'the Resurrection'.[6] When he says that the attainment of this state is the work of divine grace, what Theodore means is that it is of the gift of the Holy Spirit. Christ himself was raised from the dead by the power of the Spirit;[7] and accordingly, the

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[1] In Ep. ad Gal. ii. 15 f. (Swete, i, p. 28).
[2] Hom. catech. i. 4 (Tonneau, p. 9).
[3] Ibid. i. 3 (Tonneau, p. 5).
[4] Ibid. Cf. In Ep. ad Ephes. ii 10 (Swete, i, p. 147).
[5] Hom. catech. xii. 12 (Tonneau, p. 341).
[6] e.g. ibid. xii. 9 ad fin. (Tonneau, p. 337).
[7] Ibid. x. 11 (Tonneau, p. 263).

transformation of human life in the Future Age presumes that 'per Spiritum ad vitam incorruptibilem nati sumus'.[1]

The concrete significance of the metamorphosis effected in man by the work of the Spirit is delineated by the biblical images which Theodore uses to interpret the notions of immortality and immutability. The advent of the New Age brings man to a state in which he is unable to sin.[2] By the same token, it delivers him from the yoke of death and from servitude to the Law.[3] These are the three enemies of man which, overcome in Christ, can be overcome in other men too through the Spirit of Christ, whose work is thus a work of liberation as well as of recreation.[4]

Before looking more closely at the positive sense of this conception as Theodore develops it, it will be as well to make it clear that there is no trace in his thought of the idea that salvation consists in 'divinization'. We have seen already that he rejects any account of the origin of the soul which would compromise the creaturely nature of man; and he carries this attitude over into his understanding of man's redeemed state.

Theodore's treatment of the biblical-Platonic theme of 'likeness' makes this fact indirectly evident, and at the same time indicates the substance of his positive teaching about the nature of salvation. Theodore characterizes the redeemed state of man in terms of assimilation to Christ, as in the following prayer which the Lord himself is made to speak:

. . . all of them . . . let them be in the likeness of my own glory, and let them possess conjunction with me, by which they may be exalted to the honour of intimacy with the divine Nature.[5]

Men are to be in the 'likeness' of Christ, then. But the Christ who

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[1] In Ev. Jo. x. 31 (Vosté, pp. 152 f.).
[2] In Ep. ad Rom. viii. 2 (Staab, p. 133): τότε δὲ καὶ τῆς ἁμαρτίας ἀπαλλαττόμεθα, τότε ἄτρεπτοι γεγονότες τῇ τοῦ πνεύματος χάριτι, ἁμαρτεῖν οὐκ ἐπιδεχόμεθα. Cf. In Ep. ad Col. i. 14 (Swete, i, p. 261): '. . . peccare ulterius non poterimus.'
[3] In Ep. ad Rom. vii. 6 (Staab, pp. 125 f.): οὐδεμίαν ἁμαρτημάτων ἐνοχλήσιν ὑπομένομεν, οὐκοῦν οὐδὲ νόμων δεόμεθα καὶ γραμμάτων τῶν διδασκόντων ἡμᾶς τοῦ κακοῦ τὴν ἀποχήν. Cf. In Ep. ad Phil. iii. 8 ff. (Swete, i, p. 237): 'ultra non indigens legem'. Cf. also Hom. catech. x. 21 (Tonneau, p. 279).
[4] Hom. catech. ix. 15 (Tonneau, p. 237).
[5] Ibid. x. 18 (Tonneau, p. 273). Theodore apparently makes no distinction between 'image' and 'likeness': at any rate, the fact that men are to be 'facti secundum imaginem (Christi)' (In Ep. ad Col. iii. 10, Swete, i, p. 302) means, for him, the same as that they should receive the 'similitudinem immortalitatis eius' (In Ep. ad Ephes. v. 32, Swete, i, p. 187).

speaks here is, Theodore points out, the 'assumed Man' rather than the divine Nature. It is not likeness to God, or to the divine Son, of which Theodore writes, but likeness to the resurrected humanity of the Lord.

> . . . you have become the unique body of Christ, since its head is the assumed Man, by whom we have familiarity with that divine Nature —we who expect in the world to come to receive association with It, because we believe that *the body of our humiliation will be transformed and that it will become in the likeness of his glory.*[1]

Here the scheme is exactly the same. Believers receive fellowship and communion with God their Creator through assimilation in baptism to the glorified humanity of Christ. If human beings are called 'gods' by the Scriptures, this is not because they are 'transformed into the divine Nature, but they receive this title by the grace of God'.[2] There is, therefore, no question of their becoming other than creatures, or of their 'participating' in the divine Nature. Man as redeemed 'participates' in the resurrected manhood of the Redeemer, and by this fact he is brought into a relationship of *familiaritas* (οἰκειότης), *filiatio adoptiva*, with the Father.[3]

What this new relationship presupposes in man is, in the first instance, freedom from sin, a life of perfected conformity with the will of God.[4] The man of the Future Age is the man whose sins are forgiven him, not merely in the sense that God remits the penalty of his fault and accepts him despite his sin, but in the more radical sense that his sin is *removed*. Theodore, in fact, identifies the forgiveness of sin with its abolition, and therefore with impeccability.[5] Man as re-created through the agency of the Spirit will be unable to sin: he will be wholly at one with the will and the purposes of God. This, for Theodore, is the dominant

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[1] *Hom. catech.* ix. 17 (Tonneau, p. 243). Cf. *In Ep. ad Col.* i. 13 (Swete, i, pp. 259 f.): 'nec enim participes regni Dei Verbi efficimur . . . sed suscepto homini dicit, cui et participabimus honoris propter naturae similitudinem.'

[2] *In Ev. Jo.* x. 34 ff. (Vosté, p. 154).

[3] Cf. *In Ev. Jo.* xvii. 11 (Vosté, p. 226): 'Atque nos similiter cum naturali conjunctione quam habemus cum Christo in carne . . . recipimus etiam participationem spiritualem cum eo. . . . Ita ergo per eum ad Deum Verbum accedentes, necessario familiaritatem cum Patre accipimus.'

[4] *Hom. catech.* xi. 12 (Tonneau, p. 305).

[5] *In Ep. ad Ephes.* i. 7 f. (Swete, i, p. 126): 'remissionem enim hoc in loco, non confessionem, sed plenariam dicit peccatorum abolitionem'; and cf. *In Ep. ad Col.* i. 14 (Swete, i, p. 261), on the phrase *remissionem peccatorum.*

characteristic of the new life in Christ, as that will be realized through the resurrection.

But freedom from sin requires, in its turn, freedom from death: and that is why, for Theodore, the Future Age is most frequently described in terms of 'immortality'. As, in the Present Age, man's mortality presses him to disobedience, so in the Age to Come the removal of mortality will effect the abolition of that *vertibilitas* in which his disobedience has its root. 'Inmortalitatem adsecuti estis, in qua constituti ultra non peccabitis, quod ex mortalitate sustinebatis necessitatem.'[1] God's purpose, then, in introducing the Second Age is to free man from those conditions of the present life which render him unable to follow the Law of God in all respects; and the chief among these conditions is mortality.

But finally, if sin is abolished through the immortalization of man, the Law itself becomes superfluous: or so Theodore, interpreting St. Paul, insists. The Law, he argues, was designed for creatures of a mortal nature—to hold them back from sin as well as to instruct and lead them.

> The law was necessary for those who were subject to sin, holding them back and keeping them from sin. But because those who rise (from the dead) have been made immortal, they will no longer be able to sin. And therefore the law is superfluous for men in this state (*huiusmodi*).[2]

It is in this sense, as men on whom sin no longer has any hold, that the redeemed in Christ are liberated from the trammels of the Law.

The life of the Second Age, then, consists positively in a perfected fellowship with God based upon full and spontaneous obedience to his will; negatively, it is characterized by freedom from that mortality in which man's capacity for sin is grounded. Theodore continues to insist that the central problem of human history and human existence is the problem of the rational creature's obedience to God—the problem of sin, in the biblical sense of that term. But at the same time, as he works out the economy of human history in the scheme of the Two Ages, he does so in such a way as to suggest, contrary to his own understanding of the freedom of man, that in fact it is man's natural mortal constitution which is the obstacle to his perfection. Sin he

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[1] *In Ep. ad Col.* ii. 11 (Swete, i, p. 287).

[2] Ibid. ii. 17 (Swete, i, p. 290).

defines as voluntary disobedience to the divine will; redemption he understands as the alteration of an involuntary natural condition.

Conclusion

It is scarcely necessary to call attention again to the sources of this conflict in Theodore's thought. The one strain is clearly his inheritance from the Platonic philosophical tradition on which he unconsciously drew. The other is the fruit of his own understanding of the nature and function of human reason in the light of the biblical account of man's situation and his relation to God. The question which must now be asked, however, is not one about the sources of this inconsistency, but rather one about the way in which Theodore seeks to overcome it and to reconcile the two different strains of thought which together determine his outlook in anthropology.

His problem is basically, as we have attempted to indicate, the nature and origin of sin. It has become customary to characterize Theodore as a thinker whose whole outlook is determined by his enthusiastic 'libertarianism'. And there can be no doubt that this represents a significant and dominant aspect of his thought, if it be correctly understood against the background of his conception of man's rationality and his biblical emphasis on obedience as the form of the right relation between man and his Creator. Nevertheless, this 'libertarianism' is contradicted by his concentration on corporeal mortality as the root of man's moral dilemma: and so, for that matter, is the theodicy of which his doctrine of freedom is the corner-stone. Consequently, both Theodore's analysis of man's present situation and his defence of God's goodness in creation depend upon the resolution of the conflict between a 'libertarian' strain of thought which understands sin as the effect of voluntary lawlessness, and a Platonist strain which sees it as the product of corporeity. We have seen, in Theodore's portrayal of man's history as a process of *paideia*, a preliminary and not wholly successful attempt at the resolution of this conflict. But a better understanding of his treatment of this problem requires that we turn to consider his discussion of the theme of Adam's Fall and its consequences. It is the necessity of dealing with this biblical theme which compels Theodore to come to grips with the problem implicit in his doctrine of man.

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The Fall of Man: Theodore's 'Pelagianism'

HITHERTO we have had nothing to say of Theodore's treatment of the doctrine of Adam's Fall, its consequences, and their remedy in Christ. And this fact in itself is significant, if only because it tends to show that the bases of Theodore's anthropology, his doctrine of man's constitution and his historical scheme of the Two Ages, are essentially independent of the Genesis myth and its traditional Jewish and Christian interpretations. This is not to say that Theodore does not take the story of Adam seriously, or that he does not feel the necessity for making theological sense of it. His loyalty to the tradition and his exegetical literalism alike exclude any such possibility. It does mean, however, that the Adam story in its customary acceptance is not, for him, the logical starting-point of a doctrine of man. Rather, it is the *explicandum* which brings him face to face with the implications of his doctrine of man and of human history, and thus impels him to attempt a resolution of the contrary strains in his thought. We shall see, as we proceed to analyse Theodore's doctrine of the Fall and its remedy, what may be plain already: that the problems with which Theodore is confronted in his attempt to formulate a consistent doctrine of man are not those which generated the Pelagian controversy in the West. His thought has its own logic and its own incoherence: and it is these, in the first instance, that we must seek to understand. If it turns out that the results of our inquiry do not reveal Theodore either as a consistent Augustinian or as a consistent Pelagian, the conclusion should not come as a surprise.

Theodore and the Fall of Adam

There is little evidence out of which to reconstruct Theodore's view of Adam's state before the Fall; and such evidence as there is does not always tend to a uniform conclusion. On the one hand,

there are passages which suggest that the Interpreter took the widespread view that Adam as originally created was endowed with immortality. The most important of these, perhaps, is found in his commentary on Galatians.

> When the first man was made, if he had remained immortal, there would have been no existence (βίος) of the sort which is now come upon us (ἐνεστώς), inasmuch as it would have had no end. But since (man) became mortal through his sin, the present life (ἡ παροῦσα ζωή) is rightly called 'the existence which is now come upon us', as inferior to the life which is to come.[1]

This passage appears to contemplate the usual interpretation of the history of Adam. Man was created immortal. By his sin, however, he brought death upon himself and (as Theodore seems to imply) upon his posterity. Man's present existence, then, is not a continuation of his original state. Rather, it is an inferior sort of life which is to come to an end and to be superseded by the higher, immortal life of the Age to Come.

This picture of Adam's state before his Fall is, however, contradicted, or seemingly so, by other passages in the same work. Commenting, for example, on Gal. ii. 15, he writes: 'Dominus Deus mortales quidem nos secundum praesentem vitam instituit.'[2] And needless to say, it is this teaching which accords most naturally with Theodore's scheme of the Two Ages as a part of the divine purpose in creation. Gross has rightly pointed out that a two-stage analysis of human history is scarcely to be reconciled with the traditional interpretation of the Adam story, which divides the history of man into *three* stages—the state of Adam before the Fall, the state of Adam and his posterity resulting from his disobedience and its punishment, and the state of man as finally redeemed in Christ.[3] If Theodore, then, is to take his doctrine of the Ages seriously, he must inevitably call into question the distinction between Adam's condition as first created and man's present situation: which is, of course, exactly what he does

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[1] *In Ep. ad Gal.* i. 3 ff. (Swete, i, p. 7).

[2] Swete, i, p. 25 *ad fin.*

[3] 'Theodor von Mopsuestia, ein Gegner der Erbsündenlehre', *Zeitschrift für Kirchengeschichte*, lxv (1953/4), p. 4. Gross draws the obvious conclusion: for a proponent of the Two-Ages doctrine, 'Adams urständliche Ausstattung war von derjenigen seiner Nachkommen nicht wesentlich verschieden'. Cf. idem, *La Divinization du chrétien d'après les Pères grecs* (Paris, 1938), p. 263.

in those passages where he assumes that man was *created* mortal[1] and that mortality pertains to the 'nature' of man.[2] A further general confirmation of this conclusion as to Theodore's view of the first state of Adam can be found in his formulation of the σύνδεσμος doctrine, which neither entails nor suggests that man as originally constituted was endowed with praeternatural gifts of body and soul, but rather the reverse. As created, man was made up of a rational, immortal soul, and a body akin to the lower orders of creation. There is no indication here that Theodore contemplated affirming either that man's soul was initially immutable or that his body was naturally immortal.

Gross, in his most recent treatment of this problem, suggests that Theodore's view may have had something in common with that strain in patristic thought which held that Adam before his Fall was neither mortal nor immortal, but capable of either state. This supposition would, he thinks, help to explain how Theodore can make use of traditional language with reference to the Fall of Adam, without sharing in the conceptions which underlay that language.[3] Certainly it would serve to explain, at least in part, how Theodore can speak of Adam now as one who lost immortality through his sin, and now as one who was created mortal. This view of Adam's state before his Fall has precedent in the writings of Theophilus of Antioch.[4] Moreover, it is combined by Theophilus with a conception of the newly created Adam as a 'child'—an idea which Theodore might well have found consonant with his conception of human history as a process of divine *paideia*.[5] Is it in this idea that we are to find the explanation of Theodore's thorough-going ambiguity on the subject of the first state of man?

There is no direct evidence to show that Theodore shared the Theophilean view that the newly created Adam was neither mortal nor immortal, but occupied a 'middle' state. A survey of all the evidence available on this point would merely serve to

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[1] For example, see above, pp. 163 f., 166 f.; and *Hom. catech.* xiv. 14 (Tonneau, pp. 431 f.).

[2] Thus, for example, Theodore observes repeatedly of Christ that it was not because of sin that he died, being free of all sin (*Hom. catech.* xiv. 23, Tonneau, p. 451), but 'according to the law of [human] nature' (vii. 4, Tonneau, p. 167 *ad fin.*).

[3] Op. cit., p. 7.

[4] *Ad Autolycum*, 24–27.

[5] For a working-out of this view cf. R. A. Greer, *Theodore of Mopsuestia* (London, 1961), pp. 23 ff.

re-emphasize the conclusion which we have already outlined. On the one hand, Theodore affirms that man lost his immortality through sin: indeed he generalizes this statement of fact into a universal principle when he lays it down quite simply that death is the merited reward of any sin whatsoever.[1] Yet on the other hand, he retains—and reiterates—his conception that God created man mortal with a view to his education and growth in righteousness.[2] Furthermore, the notion that the unfallen Adam was a 'child' does not, in itself, offer any possibility of reconciliation between these two contrary views. In so far as Theodore in fact propounds an evolutionary view (he never, as far as I know, simply *says* that Adam was a 'child'), it represents, not his proposed solution to the problems of a doctrine of the Fall, but rather a crystallization of one of the attitudes whose fundamental opposition constitutes his problem.

The persistence of this problem in Theodore's thought can be further illustrated from his accounts of the temptation and disobedience of Adam. For here too he weaves together, almost imperceptibly, two not wholly consistent themes. From one point of view, he emphasizes the weakness of Adam, and his innocence: a mortal creature, Adam is victimized by Satan. But from another point of view, he insists that it is no use to seek in man's mortality (in the lusts of his fleshly nature) the ground of his sin. It was not Adam's weakness which caused him to fall, but an arrogant ambition by which he deliberately disobeyed God, and which led to the appropriate punishment for his disobedience, which is death. It is possible to notice how Theodore juxtaposes these two points of view simply by rehearsing some of his observations on the subject of Adam's Fall and watching the apparent ease with which he occupies both standpoints at once. Thus the divine commandment to Adam that he should not partake of the fruit of the Tree which stood in the centre of the Garden was enforced upon Adam 'by a promise and by fear'—the promise of life and the fear of punishment.[3] (Plainly, from Adam's point of view, the gift of positive immortality was something to be realized only in the future.) When Satan tempted Adam, he did so by removing

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[1] *In Ep. ad Rom.* v. 13 (*PG*, lxvi. 797A).

[2] See, in this connexion, the crucial passage in *Hom. catech.* xiv. 14 (Tonneau, 431 f.), where Theodore outlines clearly his evolutionary doctrine of human history.

[3] See the fragment cited by Devréesse, *Essai sur Théodore de Mopsueste*, p. 21, n. 1.

the fear and perverting the promise. Hence it was not to the lust of the flesh that the Devil appealed in his effort to lead man astray. Rather was it to the soaring ambition of the human soul itself.[1] Yet there was a kind of deception involved in Satan's strategy. For its success depended upon his assuming the role of man's ally and helper,[2] exploiting his *naïveté*, his carelessness and negligence in attending to the divine command.[3] It was, then, of his own will and desire that Adam yielded. He disobeyed God because he chose to accept Satan's assurance that he would be as a god; yet the sin which he committed depended in some sense upon the weakness of a carnal, mortal nature.[4]

We can see what Theodore's problem is: and its lineaments are not unfamiliar. Again, it is a question of the origin and nature of sin. Theodore, as always, is clear about one fact: that the human problem is the problem of the possibility of creaturely obedience to God, the problem of righteousness in the free, rational will. But what is to explain man's present state of disobedience? It is plausible to think that sin stems from the inevitable weakness of a mortal nature: and plausible too, by appeal to the principle of divine *paideia*, to argue that there is a positive purpose in God's creation of man in a mortal, passionate nature. The picture of man's history which grows out of this view is one which is far from unacceptable to the Christian thinker. But in the last resort, such a conception must obscure, if it does not obliterate, the fact that sin has its origin in the free will, that, by its very nature, it is an act of deliberate, rebellious disobedience to divine law. It is not, therefore, merely a decent respect for the opinion of Christian mankind that leads Theodore to retain the traditional view of Adam's Fall—the view which sees in man's mortality the punishment of his deliberate sin. Despite the fact that this conception leaves sin in one sense unexplained, it stands as a way of asserting what above all, as we have seen, Theodore wants to maintain—that man's problem is the problem of a rebellious will.

Confronted with the pattern of systematic ambiguity which informs Theodore's account of the Fall, it is tempting to see it as

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[1] *Hom. catech.* v. 11 (Tonneau, p. 115).

[2] Ibid. xii. 8 (Tonneau, p. 335).

[3] Ibid. xii. 19 (Tonneau, p. 353); xii. 25 (Tonneau, p. 363).

[4] *In Ep. ad Rom.* vii. 8 (Staab, p. 127).

the result of an unwillingness to come to terms with tradition, as a resort to the sort of equivocation which inevitably results when a theologian seeks to use a traditional language while at the same time giving it a wholly new content. But to analyse Theodore's position in this way is to misconceive his problem. He sees quite clearly the importance of the traditional view of the relationship between sin and death; and he sees also that this view is consonant with his own understanding of the nature of sin as voluntary disobedience. The question is, What motivates him to retain alongside this analysis a developed Platonist outlook which sees sin as the result of mortality, the product of corporeity? We have had ample occasion to observe that in fact he does retain this outlook: the possible reason for it we may detect as we turn to consider his account of the effects of Adam's Fall.

Adam and His Posterity

One point must be made clear from the outset. Theodore affirms, not equivocally, but clearly, that the first consequence of Adam's disobedience was death. Death, he affirms, was 'brought in' by the sin of Adam.[1] Man turned from God through disobedience, and was in consequence made subject first to death, and then to Satan.[2] '. . . as (man) . . . put away from himself the laws which God had given him . . ., (God) inflicted on him the punishment of returning to the earth from which he had been taken. By sin therefore death entered in. . . .'[3] Elsewhere, Theodore expounds this theme of the effect of Adam's Fall in terms of his own understanding of the place of man in the universe. The death which resulted from man's sin necessarily brought in its train the dissolution of that cosmic unity which had subsisted in man as the creature in whom spiritual and material natures were perfectly united and harmonized.[4] Death means the separation of soul and body: and in the death which sin brought to man is found the source of the disharmony which now reigns in the creation. There can be no question, then, either that Theodore chooses to affirm that the divine sentence of death was the result of Adam's sin, or that he makes use of this conception in the

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[1] *In Ep. ad Rom.* v. 17 (Staab, p. 120). Cf. ibid. v. 13 (Staab, p. 119).
[2] *In Ev. Jo.* xii. 31 f. (Vosté, pp. 173 f.). Cf. ibid. xii. 18 (Vosté, p. 170).
[3] *Hom. catech.* xii. 8 (Tonneau, p. 335). Cf. xii. 19 (Tonneau, p. 353).
[4] *In Ep. ad Col.* i. 16 (Swete, i, 267 f.).

development of his own peculiar view of the functional office of man within the creation.

But what of the relation between Adam's sin and the condition of his posterity? They inherit, Theodore says, his nature[1] and his punishment.[2] This means, as it turns out, that they are 'one body' with him in his mortal state.

> The beginning for us of (our) condition in the present life was Adam. That of our condition in the future life will be Christ our Lord. For as Adam, the first man, was mortal, and thence everyone (else) on his account, so also Christ was the first to rise after death.[3]

> We are all one body according to nature, and Adam is the Head of all of us, because he was the first to be of our nature.[4]

The point of this is that all men share in Adam's death—his mortality—as a matter of *nature*. They are his progeny, and the mortal nature which was, or became, his is inherited by his posterity along with all the other characteristics of the human constitution.

But do Adam's posterity inherit also his sin and his guilt? A positive answer to this question constitutes the heart of an Augustinian anthropology—the heart of a doctrine of original sin in the classical sense of that expression. But Theodore's reply is an emphatic negative. His position is most uncompromisingly stated in the fragments of the work which Photius refers to under the title (suggestive in itself of Theodore's view), *Against Those Who Say that Men Sin by Nature and not by Will*.[5] It happens, as Gross has pointed out, that the fragments of this work which remain to us are largely concerned to reaffirm the view that Adam was created in a state of mortality, and therewith to controvert the notion that the mortality of Adam's posterity is divine punishment for a sin of which they were not guilty.[6] Confronted with a doctrine of inherited sin, Theodore reiterates in effect that it is only *nature* which can be inherited, not sin, which is the disobedience of the free and unconstrained will. He reverts therefore to a systematic affirmation of that strain in his thought which locates man's

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[1] *In Ep. ad Rom.* vii. 4 (Staab, p. 124).
[2] *In Ev. Jo.* xvii. 11 (Vosté, p. 224); cf. *Hom. catech.* i, 5 (Tonneau, p. 11).
[3] *In Ev. Jo.* iii. 19 (Vosté, p. 55).   [4] Ibid. x. 31 (Vosté, p. 153).
[5] *Bibliotheca*, 177 (*PG*, ciii. 513AB). For the identity of the fragments contained in the *Codex Palatina* with this work referred to by Photius cf. the comments of Swete, ii, p. 332, and Gross, op. cit., pp. 11 f.
[6] Swete, ii, pp. 334 f.

problem in his constitutional mortality, and sees in Christ the conqueror of the mortality with which Adam was endowed from the beginning.[1] He is prepared to agree with his opponents that man's debility is something inherited: but he cannot agree that a moral posture of the will before God is hereditary. If it were, then it would cease to be a moral posture of the will before God. Consequently, in order to safeguard his understanding of sin as deliberate, rational disobedience to divine law, Theodore reverts to an essentially Platonist analysis of man's situation which (though he clearly cannot recognize this) is itself, in another way, a threat to his understanding of sin as free disobedience.

The singular logic of this position is reflected elsewhere in Theodore's works. It is adumbrated, as Gross has pointed out, in his comments on Ps. l. 7 ('Ἰδοὺ γὰρ ἐν ἀνομίαις συνελήφθην . . .').

He (David) is not lodging an accusation against the nature of the children—surely not! For he is not speaking at all about their nature, but rather he refers to the will of the parents . . . and brings an accusation against it—but not against the nature of the parents, as the fools would have it.[2]

Here, in an early work of Theodore's, is the same distinction between 'nature' and 'will' which we have encountered in his late treatise against hereditary sin; and it is applied to exactly the same purpose. A disposition of the will cannot be inherited: and nature cannot be 'blamed'. For both these reasons, the notion of an hereditary guilt is out of the question. But as Theodore's commentary on Romans makes it clear, the purposes of a doctrine of hereditary sin can be at least partially served, and its essential truth retained, by appeal to the mortality, with its concomitant tendency to sin, which all men inherit from Adam as a matter of 'nature'. Man is 'mortal . . . by nature and therefore possessed of an ability to sin easily'.[3] His mortality has as its inevitable consequence τὴν ἐπὶ τὸ χεῖρον ῥοπήν,[4] which expresses

[1] Cf. Swete, ii, p. 335: 'Dominus auctor omnium bonorum hominibus factus est, ut sicut Adam primi et mortalis status extitit inchoator, ita et ipse secundi et inmortalis status existens initiator, primitus Adae prioris naturalia custodiret . . . sic . . . et mortem . . . postremo suscipit, ut secundum legem humanae naturae moriens et a mortuis divina virtute resurgens, initium cunctis hominibus qui mortem secundum . . . naturam suscipiunt fieret ut a mortuis surgant.'

[2] Devréesse, p. 337.

[3] *In Ep. ad Rom.* vii. 14 (Staab, p. 131).

[4] Ibid. vii. 25 (Staab, p. 133).

itself in the power of carnal desire.[1] What men inherit from Adam then is not his sin, or his guilt, but his mortality: and it is this, the moral weakness of the flesh, which serves to explain, from one point of view, the involvement of mankind as a race in disobedience to God. This is the Platonist strain in Theodore coming again to the fore: and its usefulness and importance to him is obvious. Just because it roots man's sin, not in his will but in his corporeal nature, this outlook can assist the theologian to make sense of the difficult idea of an *inherited* alienation from God. Whether or not it can be reconciled with the voluntarism which Theodore wants ultimately to defend in his doctrine of sin is a question which the Interpreter does not raise.

But he leaves no doubt in anyone's mind that he has not surrendered his grasp on the principle that sin, in the last resort, is a matter of voluntary disobedience—an act of will, and not, in itself, a deficiency of nature. Even while, on the one hand, he dwells upon a natural, inherited mortality as the basis of man's moral failure, he reverts ever and again to the theme that death itself is a divine punishment for sin.

Death reigned over all who had sinned in any way whatsoever. For the rest of mankind are not free from death because their sin was not of the same sort as Adam's. Rather, all were placed under the decree of death because they sinned in any way whatsoever. For death is not set as the punishment of this or that kind of sin, but as the punishment of all sin. . . . When Adam had sinned, and had become mortal on account of his sin, sin gained access to his descendants and death ruled over all men, as was just. For since all had sinned—if not with a sin of the same sort as Adam's, then in some way, this one in his fashion, that one in another—it was necessary that death should rule over all in the same way.[2]

The suggestion of the last part of this passage is the curiously mixed one that the sins of Adam's descendants, which drew divine punishment rightfully upon them, were themselves occasioned by the mortality which his posterity had inherited from Adam. Thus, as Gross rightly observes, Theodore appears, in this one passage, to be committed to three contrary views of the relation between sin and mortality. He speaks at once as though mortality were the result of Adam's sin, as though it were for each man the

[1] *In Ep. ad Rom.* v. 21 (Staab, pp. 120 f.).

[2] Ibid. v. 13 (Staab, p. 119).

punishment of his own sin, and as though it were a part of every man's natural inheritance from Adam. It should by now be fairly clear what are the roots of this confusion in Theodore's thought: and it should also be clear that there are good reasons why, in Theodore's mind, each of these contrary assertions must be made. Does he then make an attempt to reconcile the apparent inconsistencies in his thought? Does he have an explanation of his curious habit of regarding mortality as at once the cause and the consequence of sin?

Mortality and Sin

The answer to this question is supplied, I think, by a passage from Theodore's treatise against the proponents of a doctrine of inherited sin. He is arguing against the proposition that man as originally created was endowed with immortality.

Whether God was ignorant that Adam would sin. . . . Let this be the answer to these eminently wise men—that it is madness even to consider this notion. It is obvious both that (God) knew he would sin, and that for this reason he would, beyond doubt, die. How then is it not the part of the most serious insanity to believe that (God) first made him immortal in six hours . . ., but after he had sinned, made him mortal? For it is certain that if he had wanted him to be immortal, not even the intervention of the act of sin would have changed the divine decree. For he did not reduce the devil from immortality to mortality. . . .[1]

From this argument it seems perfectly plain that even in his last, most extreme word on the subject, Theodore has by no means surrendered the axiom that death is for man the punishment of sin. He maintains, however, that it is inconceivable that the divine purpose in creation should be frustrated by the sin of man. If God had created man immortal, immortal he should have remained. Since, however, death was the appropriate punishment of man's sin, and since God knew beforehand that Adam would yield to Satan's wiles, God created man mortal from the start, in order that after man's defection the due penalty—death—might properly and consistently supervene. Thus death turns out to be both a punishment for sin, and a part of the constitution of human nature.

With this statement we may usefully compare a well-known

[1] Swete, ii, pp. 332 f.

fragment of Theodore's Commentary on Genesis, which we will quote at length:

Since I have heard certain persons inquiring, 'If God foreknew that Adam would disobey, why did he furnish an opportunity for disobedience by the gift of the Law?'—this is my answer. It was because God well knew that mortality is an advantage for men. For if they remain without death, they will fall everlastingly. Also, it was because it is well for such creatures if, when the body is dissolved in death, the body of sin should be done away together with it. (Yet God) did not confer the advantage (of mortality) straightway, lest he be reviled for not having conferred immortality from the beginning. But first he gives the commandment, which he knew they would not keep: and this in order to demonstrate that (men)—promised immortality if they obeyed and death if they disobeyed—would so disbelieve their Maker and Benefactor as to hope that if they disobeyed they would not only acquire immortality, but also lay hold on the dignity of divine status. And if their flesh had possessed immortality, how should they not the more have supposed that through disobedience they should be gods? . . . First, therefore, by giving the commandment and by the disobedience of Adam, (God) shows that mortality is necessary (for man): and then he makes the gift of mortality, at once instructing men, and not withholding what is necessary. For the very pattern of male and female shows that (God) prepared men for the mortal life. . . . Thus the formation of man was adapted to the mortal life.[1]

Again, in this much earlier passage, Theodore's assumptions are much the same. He argues implicitly that if God had created man immortal, man would have remained immortal, despite the tragedy which that would have entailed for one who had sinned. But God foreknew that Adam would sin, and for just that reason he purposed a mortal nature for his creature from the very beginning, not merely for the sake of punishment, but in order that man's foreknown sin might be corrigible, and that man might profit from the opportunity for moral struggle thus afforded him. Accordingly, Adam as first created, although not under sentence of death, was made susceptible of dying—mortal, though capable of immortality. And his creation in this state was motivated both by God's foreknowledge (though not his foreordination) that man would sin, and by his desire that man should, as a free agent, grow up into righteousness through

[1] *PG*, lvi. 640c–641a.

struggle against temptation. Mortality is at once the consequence of sin and an aspect of man's primordial nature.

Theodore, then, is quite deliberate in his assertion that Adam's mortality fulfils a threefold purpose from the point of view of the divine Providence in creation. At one and the same time it is God's punishment for sin foreseen, his provision for its ultimate expiation through death, and his instrument for the moral education of the race. It appears then in two characters: it is that natural weakness of man's corporeal nature which subjects the soul to the temptations of passion; on the other hand, it is the *decretum* by which God punishes sin, a penalty contingent upon the fact of disobedience. It is because Theodore can speak of mortality from these two points of view at once that he can, in the same breath, assert both that men 'have become mortal', and that they are so 'by nature'.[1] Mortality is chronologically prior to sin; but sin is logically prior to mortality: and this is true, not merely in the case of Adam, but also in the case of his posterity, whose mortality is at once a natural inheritance from the First Man, and a punishment for the sin which, after the manner of Adam, each commits for himself. This is the scheme which enables Theodore to view the relationship between sin and mortality in a double perspective and to think both that man's sin presupposes his natural mortality (the Platonist strain), and that his mortality is the consequence of his free disobedience (the 'biblical' strain). It may be that this scheme will not stand too close a critical inspection: but what is important for our purposes is the fact that Theodore proposes it, affirming both elements in his thought, and attempting to reconcile them.

Theodore's Analysis of Man's Situation

It scarcely needs to be said, in the light of this portrayal of Adam's Fall and its consequences, that Theodore's teaching is inadequate from a strictly Augustinian point of view. Nevertheless, he offers neither a Pelagian account of man's problem nor (as we shall see) a Pelagian doctrine of grace. Theodore's understanding of the freedom and moral responsibility of man cannot permit him to consent to a doctrine of inherited sin or guilt; and similarly, his respect for the infallibility and consistency of the divine purpose cannot permit him to suppose that God created

[1] *In Ep. ad Rom.* v. 21 (Staab, p. 121).

man immortal only to see him fall into mortality through sin. Even so, there can be no doubt that man, as Theodore portrays him, is a 'fallen' creature, one who is inextricably involved, not merely in a natural mortality and finitude, but also in the sin which, nourished and multiplied by the weakness of a changeable nature, is rooted in the soul as a disease. He grasps the biblical sense of man's incorrigible tendency to evil,[1] which he expresses now in terms of the limitations of a mortal nature, now in terms of a perversion of the will itself.[2] The Colossians to whom the Apostle wrote had, before their knowledge of Christ, found themselves 'alienos . . . extantes a Deo et in parte inimicorum illi constitutos, ob illam quam erga pravitatem habebatis diligentiam.'[3] This grasp of the human problem is, indeed, reflected in Theodore's insistence that man's mortality, in one of its aspects, has the character of *punishment*.

The effect of the Interpreter's position can perhaps best be seen in an important passage from the Catechetical Lectures. This must be read, of course, in the light of what has been said about Theodore's view of the relationship between mortality and sin in history: at the same time it must be seen for what it primarily is—an account of the human situation in the present.

By sin therefore death entered in; now death, which weakened nature, brought it about that the inclination to sin became stronger: and both (death and sin) grew, the one together with the other. Death strengthened, aggravated the abundance of sin, and mortality, through weakness, gave birth to a multitude of sins, to the point that even the laws given by God to amend them assisted in their multiplication, and that the transgressors of these (laws) constrained (God), by the abundance of their sin, to punish them.[4]

Man's position is that of one for whom sin and slavery to Satan have become habitual 'to the point that the shameful and depraved acts of sin please us and are agreeable to us'.[5] Sin takes root in the mortality which is its punishment, so that deliberate disobedience and natural weakness, as correlative and reciprocal forces, combine to bind man to the visible life of the Present Age.

[1] Cf., e.g., *In Ps.* lxi. 10b (Devréesse, p. 405).
[2] Cf. Sachau, p. 65: the will 'sua ipsius inclinatione ad peccatum trahitur'.
[3] Swete, i, p. 278.
[4] *Hom. catech.* xii. 8 (Tonneau, p. 335).
[5] Ibid. xii. 19 (Tonneau, p. 353).

It is this condition, the condition of the fallen Adam and his posterity, which demands the intervention of God to effect the renovation of mankind.

> Since sin was reigning in our mortality, and conversely death was growing stronger in us on account of sin, our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ came . . . and having destroyed death by his death, he also destroyed the sin which was rooted in our nature by reason of its mortality.[1]

Here is a doctrine which cannot properly be called either Augustinian or Pelagian. It is based, fundamentally, upon an assessment of man's present state: man is alienated from God through the interaction of his own disobedience with the weakness of a mortal nature. Theodore transforms this analysis into an historical form, when he attempts to use it in interpreting the biblical and ecclesiastical tradition of Adam's Fall. The resultant historical account, to be faithful to Theodore's psychological analysis, must inevitably equivocate on the question of the relative priority of voluntary disobedience and natural mortality as the source of Adam's defection: and the consequence is the doctrine which we have seen, with all its attendant ambiguities. Mortality is man's natural state: but it is a natural state accorded him by God as the consequence of his foreseen sin. This is a 'Pelagian' account of Adam's Fall: but it derives from, and issues in, an understanding of man's present situation which is far from Pelagian either by intent or in substance.

The Doctrine of Grace in Theodore

This conclusion can be checked to some extent by reference to Theodore's wrestling with the problem of grace and freedom. Since for Theodore redemption from sin means the salvation of the rational will in its freedom—and not, as for Apollinaris, *merely* the freeing of the will through divinization of the flesh—it follows that the Interpreter is brought face to face with the problem of grace in a form in which Apollinaris had never conceived it: the problem of grace as the interaction of divine assistance with the free human will which is the subject of redemption.

That Theodore does conceive the redemption of man in terms of grace is evident from a number of considerations. There is, of

[1] *In Ev. Jo.* i. 29 (Vosté, p. 29).

course, the fact that he habitually attributes the immortality and immutability of the redeemed state to the direct action of the Holy Spirit. Further, he sees that this divine action is necessitated by the condition of man's will: by his voluntary disobedience as well as by the natural weakness of his mortal nature. 'For', he writes, 'virtue has its seat in the will. But the will requires the help of God to this end, because by its own inclination it is drawn to sin.'[1] Man cannot extricate himself from the power of sin: 'The ordinary man, when he fights with sin, cannot overcome its power.'[2] Consequently, man's ability to overcome sin must, in the last resort, be dependent upon the assistance of divine $\chi\acute{\alpha}\rho\iota\varsigma$.[3] This grace, moreover, is not to be equated merely with the external gift of the Law, or of the moral example of Christ. On the contrary, it is a condescension of the divine will,[4] the gift of the Spirit,[5] the inward operation of the Spirit himself.[6]

But though it be true that man can bring no work to perfection without the help of God,[7] it is also true that the divine action of grace is not such as to overpower or to cancel out the free will of man. Theodore indeed recognizes that the initiative in the redemption of man lies with God. He makes Christ to say, '. . . non dilexi vos propter mercedem, sed ego incepi conferre vobis praemium et donum.'[8] More frequently, however, he speaks (not unlike the Semi-Pelagians later) as though the divine grace presupposes some prior good intention on the part of man: or at least a will which God in his foreknowledge recognizes as one which will be freely disposed towards obedience. 'Pater eos, qui voluntate sua bona digni sunt, gratia sua invisibili adducit mihi [Christo]; cum eius operatio teneat ipsis locum auditus et intuitionis.'[9] With this statement, we may compare Theodore's comment on Rom. ix. 13 (Mal. i. 2 f.): 'I loved Jacob, but Esau I hated.'

> (The Apostle) declares clearly throughout that God is not a slave to the order of nature, but that by his grace and generosity he chooses

[1] Sachau, p. 65.   [2] Sachau, p. 62.
[3] *In Ep. ad Rom.* iii. 27 (Staab, p. 117).
[4] '. . . per gratiam suam super illum, qui dignus est, descendat [Spiritus] per voluntatem suam aut per voluntatem Patris': *In Ev. Jo.* xiv. 17 (Vosté, p. 195).
[5] *Hom. catech.* x. 9 (Tonneau, p. 259).
[6] 'Intelligamus . . . Spiritum Sanctum frequenter non personam Spiritus Sancti designare, sed eius operationem eiusque gratiam': *In Ev. Jo.* vii. 39 (Vosté, p. 115).
[7] *Hom. catech.* xi. 13 (Tonneau, p. 307).
[8] *In Ev. Jo.* xv. 16 (Vosté, p. 203).   [9] Ibid. vi. 45 (Vosté, p. 104).

those whom he judges to be worthy of election. These, being first judged worthy of grace by him, are then able to make their own contribution together with him, showing their own choice ($\pi\rho o\alpha i\rho\epsilon\sigma\iota\varsigma$) to be proportioned ($\dot{\alpha}\nu\dot{\alpha}\lambda o\gamma o\nu$) to grace.[1]

This passage affords us the clearest statement of Theodore's views on the doctrines of predestination and election. He adopts a conception of foreseen merit, which issues naturally in a view of the relation between grace and human initiative as one of co-operation.

> ... we ourselves are never able to perfect works of virtue by our own power—just as we should never obtain the fruits of the earth, though we laboured greatly, unless God deigned to give them.[2]

He takes essentially the same stand in his comments on Phil. ii. 13: '. . . thus your own zeal shall have found the grace of God co-operating with it, since he necessarily works together with you in order that you may think and do what is pleasing to God.'[3] For Theodore, the matter can be understood either way: as man's co-operation with divine grace, or as God's co-operation with the will which seeks the good. In either case, the situation as he understands it remains the same. The work of divine grace is not merely that of conferring immortality on the mortal body. It is also that of leading the human will into a perfect obedience to the divine purposes, out of the way of sin: and in this aspect, man's redemption is a matter of the working together of man's rational initiative with the power of the indwelling divine Spirit.

Conclusion

Looked at in perspective, then, Theodore's account of man's sin and its consequences, integrated with his doctrine of the Two Ages, appears as a unity, even though, in its roots, it is not wholly coherent or self-consistent. On the one hand, he envisages the scheme of the two ages as an evolutionary pattern which traces out the course of man's progress in the knowledge of God through obedience to his Law—a growth which is both stimulated and limited by God's endowment of man with a mortal nature. On the other hand, he conceives the same scheme as portraying a pattern of sin, punishment, and redemption, in

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[1] Staab, p. 144.   [2] *In Ep. ad Gal.* v. 23 (Swete, i, p. 101).
[3] Swete, i, p. 225.

which the crucial transition from the present to the Future Age is effected by God's gracious reversal of the processes set in motion by man's rebellious disobedience. These two points of view, stemming from two diverse sets of philosophical presuppositions, Theodore holds together in synthesis by an appeal to the beneficent wisdom of divine Providence, whose single intent, to bring man to a life of immortal fellowship with his Creator, reconciles the demands of love and of justice by constituting man in the mortal nature which is both the punishment of his sin foreseen and the means of his training in virtue. In this somewhat ambivalent analysis of man's present condition, Theodore seeks to express his comprehension of, and his assent to, the paradoxical data of the Christian experience of sin. On the one hand, he insists without compromise that sin is the free act of a rational agent, which is incomprehensible because it is susceptible of no explanation in terms of forces external to the will. On the other hand, in his analysis of the relation between mortality and sin, Theodore attempts to account for the universality of sin, and its character as the fundamental problem to which the divine act of redemption in Christ is addressed.

What is basic to this whole outlook, and what most obviously differentiates Theodore's position from that of Apollinaris, is the Interpreter's concentration on the problem of voluntary rational obedience to divine law as the key for the understanding of man's history and his destiny. It is in the prominence of this theme, rooted as it is in his conception of reason, that the 'biblical' element in Theodore's thought triumphs over the Platonist heritage which, nevertheless, he exploits freely for his purposes. It is, further, his concentration on this problem which, as we have seen, elevates the puzzles of a doctrine of grace to a central position in his thought. The redemption of man means his elevation to a life of perfected, free obedience to God. This involves the immortalization of the passionate flesh. But more than that, it involves divine tutelage and assistance to a will habituated to the ways of sin. And in more than one respect, Theodore's christology, to which we must now turn, can be envisaged as an effort to understand what kind of Redeemer it is who can bring this sort of redemption.

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The Sources of Theodore's Christological Dualism

THE most obvious mark of Theodore's christology is its dualism. Individual scholars have offered widely varying evaluations and interpretations of this phenomenon: but the fact remains for all to see. It is manifested in Theodore's systematic development of a doctrine of 'two natures' in Christ. It appears in his exegetical practice of 'dividing the sayings': of assigning epithets applied to Christ, or sayings of Christ, some to his human nature and others to his divine nature. It reveals itself in his assertion that the Incarnation took place by the 'inhabitation' of the divine Son in a whole and perfect Man.

Hitherto we have been occupied wholly with anthropological questions: with the project of expounding Theodore's philosophical and theological doctrine of man against the background of the Platonism which dominated the philosophical schools of his era. In the process, two facts have become fairly plain to see. Theodore was not the product of any particular school or sect of philosophical thought. In so far as he is indebted to the speculations of philosophers, he tends to reproduce the commonplaces of the diffused Platonism which was the ordinary intellectual fare of his time. This influence can be detected not only in certain parts of his doctrine of the soul, but, perhaps most significantly, in his all but unthinking half-assent to the soul-body dualism which was fundamental to the Platonist ethic. Nevertheless, this Platonist strain was not the only, nor even the dominant, element in Theodore's outlook. Wedded, perhaps rather loosely, with it was another, and one which undoubtedly had its source in Theodore's meditations on the biblical themes of divine law and human obedience. This strain in his thought expresses itself philosophically in a conception of the nature and function of reason, and therefore of man's relationship with God, which is quite foreign

to the Platonic tradition. Thus it sets him apart, not only from his philosophical teachers, but also from such a Christian thinker as Apollinaris, in whose writings much of the logic, if not the detail, of a Platonist anthropology is reproduced.

The question which we must face now is that of the extent to which Theodore's anthropological position influences, and therefore can assist us to understand, his peculiar christological language. It would, as we have suggested before, be quixotic to expect that every detail of Theodore's christology should be explicable in terms of what we have learned of his doctrine of man. There are other factors which must have counted in his thought for just as much as his anthropology: his doctrine of God, as well as the necessity for coming to terms with the language of the ecclesiastical tradition of which he was the heir. Nevertheless, in the light of the relation between anthropology and christology which we have seen to obtain in the case of Apollinaris, it would be odd if an inquiry into the anthropological sources of Theodore's christological dualism did not equip us to comprehend better the peculiar form of his doctrine of the Incarnation.

The Structure of the Work of Redemption

The most useful approach to the question of the anthropological sources of Theodore's christological formula lies, unquestionably, in a consideration of his understanding of the work of Christ. This is not so much a question, however, of what 'theory' of atonement Theodore propounds, as it is of comprehending the agencies by which redemption, as he envisages it, is wrought.

From our earlier discussion of Theodore's doctrine of the two ages it should be clear what he took the goal of redemption to be. His is not, we have seen, a theory which finds the substance of salvation in any 'divinization' of man. Consistently with his understanding of the image theme, he is interested in the redemption of man as a creature implicated in the life of the created world. The restoration of man to his ideal state—and with this the 'reintegration' of the cosmos—depends primarily upon humanity's return to a state of perfect obedience to God and to the fellowship with God which such obedience effects.

This goal, in its turn, presupposes the salvation of man from sin. There are a number of passages in Theodore's works which indicate that he was capable of understanding such redemption

in terms of some idea of 'satisfaction' for disobedience. He frequently pictures Christ as one who, by his obedience to the law of God, pays the debt of man's sin.[1] But this remains a minor theme in his portrayal of the work of Christ. As we saw earlier, his interest centres rather upon the positive idea that Christ has initiated a new kind of life, a Second Age, in which sin is not merely forgiven, but abolished. 'Christ lavished upon us both release from our sins and redemption from death by the hope of the resurrection, according to which we shall live apart from all sin.'[2] By the gift of Christ 'we shall both obtain the resurrection and, being incapable of sin, shall be perfected in righteousness.'[3] Just as Theodore sees the heart of man's trouble in the interaction of voluntary sin and natural mortality, so he conceives man's redemption in terms of the acquisition of immortality and moral *invertibilitas*.[4]

In his doctrine of redemption, as in his doctrine of the Fall, Theodore sees a close causal relationship between mortality and disobedience: the abolition of the one entails and implies the abolition of the other. The relationship remains, however, a thoroughly ambiguous one. A close reading of the relevant passages reveals, as might have been expected, that Theodore is not altogether clear as to whether sinlessness is the fruit of immortality, or vice versa. When he speaks of the work of Christ himself he emphasizes the fact that the Redeemer won immortality by overcoming sin[5]—a conception which we shall meet again as we proceed. When, however, he speaks of the salvation of those whom Christ came to redeem, he avers that they find their hope of perfect righteousness in the immortality which the Lord confers on them through the Spirit.[6] Nevertheless, despite this familiar ambiguity, the central concern of Theodore's teaching about redemption is clear. It is moulded by his overriding interest in the

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[1] Cf. *In Ev. Jo.* xiii. 31 f. (Vosté, p. 174): '. . . tributum legi a Deo positae debitum solvi. . . .' Also *Hom. catech.* vi. 9 (Tonneau, p. 147): '. . . il a payé pour nous au Législateur la dette de justice. . . .' It should be noted, however, that Theodore sees Christ's payment of this debt not so much in his death as in his obedient life.

[2] *In Ep. ad Rom.* v. 18 (Staab, p. 120).

[3] Ibid. 17 (Staab, p. 120). Cf. *In Ev. Jo.* iii. 29 (Vosté, p. 55).

[4] Cf. *In Iam ad Tim.* i. 12 (Swete, ii, p. 78): '. . . in futuris illos constituens bonis, in quibus et persistentes invertibiles ultra sine peccato. . . .'

[5] Cf. *Hom. catech.* v. 19 (Tonneau, p. 127 *ad fin.*).

[6] Cf. *In Ep. ad Col.* ii. 16 (Swete, i, p. 292).

achievement of a free, rational obedience to God. The problem of man's redemption, for Theodore, is in the first instance the problem of the salvation of his will from the domination of sin.

How does this redemption come about? In the final analysis it is always God himself whom Theodore sees as the primary agent of redemption: and this point, an essential one, must be emphasized carefully. Over and again he lays this principle down, often simply by the shape of his language. By the Incarnation, he says, 'The divine nature becomes our Saviour'.[1] Indeed, the human nature of Christ is the 'instrument' by means of which the divine Son effects the salvation of his creatures.[2] In consequence, Theodore can write emphatically: '. . . it is God who was the cause of all our good . . . and it is He who gave us victory over everything which opposes us.'[3]

Theodore states the premisses of this principle when he asserts the necessity of divine action both with regard to man's achievement of perfect obedience and with regard to the gift of immortality. He affirms that it is only through the action of God himself in the Incarnation that the human will is enabled to achieve perfect righteousness and thus to overcome the power of sin.[4] Similarly, immortality is the gift of God, and not a state which any man could achieve by his natural powers. *Invertibilitas*, which belongs to God 'by nature', is man's only by grace,[5] and hence it is, of necessity, 'divina . . . gratia, quae inoperatur mortalitatis ablationem'.[6] Theodore epitomizes his point of view in the statement that man's redemption presupposes what it is God's alone to give: an 'opificationem . . . secundam, secundum quam et recreamur'.[7]

What then did the Lord do, since we, on account of that infirmity which was ours by reason of mortality, could do nothing, and since we were not strong enough to move on the way to perfect virtue? He created us again, the second time, giving us that second, immortal

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[1] *Hom. catech.* iii. 2 (Tonneau, p. 55).

[2] Ibid. vii. 15 (Tonneau, p. 185); cf. viii. 3 (Tonneau, p. 189), viii. 12 *ad fin.* (Tonneau, p. 205).

[3] Ibid. v. 21 (Tonneau, p. 129).

[4] Cf. Sachau, p. 62: '. . . inhabitatio Dei Verbi requisita est, ut dum voluntas morum ab homine (procedens) integra servabatur, auxilio autem Dei Verbi qui dabat, ut perfecte valeret, a peccato facile sese liberaret atque inobedientiam . . . dimitteret.'   [5] *In Iam ad Tim.* i. 4 (Swete, ii, p. 77).

[6] *In Ep. ad Col.* ii. 11 (Swete, i, p. 288).

[7] *In Ep. ad Eph.* ii. 10 (Swete, i, p. 146).

life: and once brought to this state . . . we shall be possessed by an
immortal nature so that we can sin no more.[1]

The redemption of mankind in Christ, therefore, is to be under-
stood in the terms in which the Fathers of Nicaea set it forth when
they said that 'for us men and for our salvation' the divine Son
'came down from heaven'. That is to say, it is to be understood
in the first instance as the product of a divine initiative which
takes the form of a unique entrance of the Creator into the
world of his creatures.[2] We need not at this point concern our-
selves with the question how, in Theodore's view, this entrance
occurred. But of his grasp of the fundamental principle there
should be no doubt. The primary agent of man's redemption is
God himself, acting in his eternal Son.[3] Nothing that Theodore
says about the redemption of man or the Person of Christ is
meant to contravene this basic presupposition of his teaching.

Yet Theodore's understanding of human nature and of the
human situation requires equally an activity of man in the work
of salvation. As Sellers has pointed out,[4] Theodore's characteristic
idea that man's redemption consists in the achievement of a free
obedience to God demands that divine salvation be wrought not
merely in man, but through man. Human as well as divine action
is requisite, not so much because it is man who is to be saved, as
because the kind of salvation which is in question presupposes the
free accord of the human will as one of its constituent elements.
Consequently, alongside Theodore's emphasis on the divine agency
and initiative in redemption there is a further emphasis on the
work of Christ *as man*, which far oversteps the bounds of an assent
to the proposition that the divine Son subjected himself to the
'measures' of human nature. Christ is not only the *locus* of divine
intervention; he is also the *locus* of man's conquest of sin. This
conception reveals itself in at least two significant aspects of
Theodore's treatment of the work of Christ.

There is, first of all, the prominence which he invariably gives
to what we may call the *homo victor* theme. In his lectures on the
Sacrament of Baptism, as elsewhere, Theodore presents the work
of Christ as a forensic victory over Satan and death, portraying

[1] *In Ep. ad Eph.* ii. 10 (Swete, i, p. 147). Cf. *In Ev. Jo.* iii. 29 (Vosté, p. 55).
[2] *Hom. catech.* v. 3 (Tonneau, p. 103).
[3] Cf. Devréesse, *Essai sur Théodore de Mopsueste* (Rome, 1948), pp. 109 f.
[4] *Two Ancient Christologies* (London, 1954), p. 137.

Christ as 'a man who was an exact observer of the divine laws'.[1]
He continues:

because he was found free of all sin, he showed himself free and
exempted from any sentence of death. But the usurper . . . brought
upon him an unjust death through the Jews. . . . But he accepted it
with good will, and before God, the just judge, had a trial against
(the usurper); and he was released from the sentence of death,
because death had taken him wickedly and without justice. He be-
came absolutely strange to death, immortal and incorruptible by
nature.[2]

The victory of Christ is thus to be understood as the exculpation
of a representative man before the judgement-seat of God. It is the
fruit of his perfect human obedience. 'He led his life in great
integrity, as is not possible for human nature. Thus, moreover, he
received participation with [God the Word] . . ., the assumed Man
on behalf of all men.'[3] The human nature of Christ, assisted
by divine grace, accomplished what no other man had been able
to accomplish. By his whole human life, which was a voluntary
offering of free obedience to God, he merited deliverance from
that mortality which is the natural fate of other men, but which
he, because of his perfect righteousness, accepted only for the
sake of others.[4] Thus the work of redemption is effected by the
human activity of the assumed Man.

Implicit in this emphasis on the agency of the human nature in
redemption is yet another conception, which Theodore is quick
to accept and expound, deliberately if cautiously. For plainly
enough, on this view, Christ must be not only the bearer of salva-
tion and the bringer of the Second Age of immortality; he is also
one for whom the salvation of God is wrought. He is the 'pioneer'
of salvation in the exact sense that he is the first to cross the
boundary between the present life and the life of the Age to
Come. He won for himself, by reason of his union with God the
Word, the very redemption which he lavishes upon others. In
innumerable passages Theodore makes his adhesion to this prin-
ciple clear by the way in which he speaks of a progress or
development in Christ towards the goal of the Second Age—

[1] *Hom. catech.* xii. 9 (Tonneau, p. 335).
[2] Ibid. (Tonneau, p. 337).
[3] *In Ev. Jo.* xvi. 14 (Vosté, p. 212).
[4] Cf. *In Ev. Jo.* xii. 31 f. (Vosté, p. 174); cf. x. 18 (Vosté, p. 148).

a progress in which his death and resurrection together constitute the critical turning-point. 'Our Lord Jesus Christ, assumed from us and for us, died according to the human law and has become, by the resurrection, immortal, incorruptible, and absolutely immutable.'[1] The same idea evidently lies behind the parallelism which Theodore carefully develops between the life of Christ himself and the life of Christian believers. They are to be baptized as he was baptized,[2] to receive the anointing of the Spirit as he did,[3] to live the life of obedience of which he is the model,[4] and finally, in the end, to be raised from death to an immortal life, as he was raised.[5] Theodore likens Christ to the High Priest, whose function it is to lead in the way which others are to follow.[6] And, of course, this presupposes that he himself was one of those whose Leader he is: a man whose peculiar glory lies in that intimate relationship with God which enabled him to follow the path which no man before had found. Here too Theodore calls attention to the agency of Christ's manhood in redemption. The Lord himself, by reason of his divinely evoked human obedience to God, moved from the mortal life which is the heritage of Adam to the immortal life which he now makes available for all of his race.[7]

Unquestionably, then, as Theodore understands it, the work of redemption involves a double agency. It requires to be the deed both of God and of man—the product at once of divine self-giving and of human obedience. The significance of this pattern of thought is not to be limited merely to its implied recognition of two 'elements' in Christ. This, after all, is a necessary ingredient in any christology whatever: indeed, from one point of view, it is simply an acknowledgement of the christological problem. The importance of Theodore's conception lies rather in the fact that it suggests an understanding of these two 'elements' as *agents* in a single work. The question that we must ask, therefore,

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[1] *Hom. catech.* xii. 6 (Tonneau, p. 331). Cf. vii. 9 (Tonneau, p. 175), and *In Ev. Jo.* iii. 29 (Vosté, p. 57).

[2] *Hom. catech.* xiv. 23 (Tonneau, p. 451).

[3] Ibid.

[4] *Hom. catech.* vi. 11 (Tonneau, pp. 151 f.).

[5] *Hom. catech.* x. 17 (Tonneau, p. 271).

[6] *Hom. catech.* xii. 3 (Tonneau, p. 327).

[7] Cf. *Hom. catech.* xii. 9 (Tonneau, p. 337): '. . . l'homme assumé de nous fut fait légat pour la race . . ., afin qu'en cette transformation excellente, le reste des hommes lui fut associé. . . .'

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is this: To what extent does Theodore's exposition of his christological formula reflect the influence of his analysis of the work of redemption? Is there evidence to show that his doctrine of the two natures is related, directly or indirectly, to the themes we have detected in his account of the work of Christ?

Theodore's Use of the Two-Natures Doctrine

With the ecclesiastical tradition generally, Theodore affirms that Christ is at once God and Man,[1] and that, at the same time, these two in him are one. The formula in which he states this dogma recognizes, in his own characteristic and well-known terminology, 'both the difference of the natures . . . and the unity of the person (*persona* = πρόσωπον)'.[2] However, the tone of Theodore's dogmatic and exegetical writings is unquestionably calculated to call special attention to his way of distinguishing between Deity and humanity in the one Person of Christ. It is Theodore's christological dualism which, as we have already observed, is the most distinctive aspect of his teaching about the Incarnation: and it is with this strain in his thought that we must, for the moment, concern ourselves. How does Theodore expound and develop it?

First of all, where scriptural exegesis is concerned, Theodore is painstaking in his insistence that certain sayings of Christ, or statements about Christ, befit rather his humanity than his Deity, or vice versa. This habit of his is well known and can be abundantly and tiresomely illustrated from his works. Here, for example, is his comment on the phrase 'justified in the Spirit', as applied to Christ: 'Plainly this (expression) cannot pertain to the Deity: but it can evidently be adapted to the human nature.'[3] Again, with reference to the saying of Christ, 'I cannot do anything of myself'. Theodore writes:

For the correct understanding of what has been said, we must also note that these words *He cannot do anything of himself* are scarcely fitting if taken of the divine Nature, since they imply weakness. . . . But if they are taken of the human nature, they make the best sense, because all the things which transcend this nature . . . proceed, not elsewhere—least of all from that (human) nature itself—but from the divine Nature conjoined to it.[4]

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[1] Cf. *In Ev. Jo.* v. 20 (Vosté, p. 80).   [2] Swete, ii, p. 302 *ad fin.*.

[3] *In I^am ad Tim.* iii. 16 (Swete, ii, pp. 136 f.).

[4] *In Ev. Jo.* v. 30 (Vosté, pp. 86 f.)

These fairly typical and unobjectionable utterances illustrate admirably what, at one level, Theodore seems to intend by his 'distinction of natures'. There are certain properties or capacities or activities which can be predicated of man, but not of God. When, therefore, they are attributed to Christ in the Scriptures they must be taken of what is human in him rather than of what is divine. It is in accordance with this principle that Theodore explains the reference in the Creed to 'the Only-Begotten Son, First-Born of all creatures'. By these two successive expressions, he says, the Fathers meant to denote the divine and human natures of Christ. Moreover, in doing so they were not making an innovation, but merely following the sound example of the Bible itself.

> . . . for the blessed Paul says: *It is from them (the Jews) that Christ according to the flesh stemmed, God above all.* . . . It is not that the former, who stemmed from the House of David according to the flesh, is naturally God, but he says *according to the flesh* to designate the assumed human nature; while *God above all* is to teach us the divine nature. . . .[1]

The Scriptures themselves indicate the truth of the distinction of natures by their simultaneous attribution to Christ of contrary properties.

This principle, so stated, says little more than that the characteristic properties of the two natures, divine and human, are logically incompatible,[2] and that, as a consequence, each of the natures must retain its own distinctive attributes in the one Christ. Theodore's language, however, often suggests more than just this. In other contexts he employs a distinction between the divine Son (or Word) and the 'assumed Man' as an alternative for that between the two natures—a usage which clearly indicates a tendency to think of the humanity and the divinity of Christ as two separate 'things'.

> When . . . we hear the Scripture saying either that Jesus was honoured or glorified, or that something was added to him, or that he received domination over all things, let us not understand God the Word, but the assumed Man.[3]

The basis of this distinction is the familiar one; but the terms distinguished are now not two abstract 'natures' but two objective

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[1] *Hom. catech.* iii. 6 (Tonneau, p. 61).   [2] Ibid.
[3] *In Ps.* viii. 5 (Devréesse, p. 47).

substances to which names or definite descriptions might be given: the divine Son and 'the Man'. This fact seems even more obvious when Theodore asks, 'How is it not plain that the divine Scripture clearly teaches us that God the Word is one thing, and the man another, and that it shows us the great difference between them?'[1] The teaching of these two passages, which are both from the early commentary on the Psalms, is plainly calculated to confirm Diepen's observation that Theodore tends to 'distinguish in Christ not only a double *quid* but a double *quis*'.[2]

The same essential teaching is found in Theodore's later works, where, moreover, it becomes obvious that he regards his differentiation of 'the one' and 'the other' as signifying the same as the distinction of 'natures'. Interpreting the saying, 'I have gone out from the Father and come into the world; again I leave the world and go to the Father' (John xvi. 28), Theodore explains:

> The expression *I have gone out from the Father*, as I have said, can be understood of the Divinity . . . but plainly can in no way be taken of the assumed Man. On the other hand, the expression *I leave and go* can in no wise be said of the Divinity. . . . But it can be said of the Man. Therefore, it is impossible for both of the expressions at once to be taken of one of the natures: the two together fit neither God the Word nor the Man. But according to the sense we have set forth . . . the first befits the Divinity, the other the assumed Man.[3]

From Theodore's language here it seems clear that when he speaks of 'divinity' or 'humanity', or of the 'two natures', what he takes these phrases to denote is the concrete realities of the Son of God and the man Jesus. Indeed he observes in one place that the expression 'the divine Nature' means nothing more or less than simply 'God'[4] and by the same token, that 'Jesus' is the name of the *assumptus homo*.[5] A passage from the Catechetical Lectures illustrates his usage further:

> . . . we must know both: the nature which assumed and (the nature) of him who was assumed, of the one who is God and the one who is the form of a slave. And God is the one who indwells, but man is his temple, which he himself who built it also makes his dwelling-place. Also he says *Destroy this temple and in three days I will restore it* . . . in explaining

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[1] Ibid. (Devréesse, p. 46).
[2] H. M. Diepen, 'L'*Assumptus homo* à Chalcédoine', *Revue Thomiste*, li (1951), p. 579.   [3] *In Ev. Jo.* xvi. 28 (Vosté, p. 217).
[4] *In Ep. ad Eph.* i. 16 (Swete, i, p. 136).
[5] *Hom. catech.* iii. 4 (Tonneau, p. 57).

which the Evangelist says: *he was speaking of the temple of his body*. It is therefore his temple, which he called this assumed Man, indicating of himself that he indwells this temple. . . .[1]

For practical purposes, Theodore employs as synonymous expressions 'the nature who . . .' and 'the nature of him who . . .'—making, as Sullivan has painstakingly demonstrated, no distinction between the abstract and the concrete senses of 'nature'.[2] In the Interpreter's terminology, 'human nature' essentially means 'the assumed Man' (i.e. Jesus), just as 'divine Nature' essentially means 'God' or 'the Son of God'. Such phrases signify not merely the totality of human or divine properties, but concrete human or divine subjects.[3]

This fact becomes even more abundantly clear when we turn from passages in which Theodore is consciously applying and explaining his doctrine of the two natures, to those in which he speaks of Christ, or paraphrases Christ, in the fashion which that doctrine seems to him to demand or permit. A careful examination of several such passages indicates that Theodore sees in the 'two natures' not merely two subjects of attribution, as Sullivan rightly points out, but also two centres of action or initiative.

We may look first at an excerpt from the Commentary on John, where Theodore is paraphrasing the words of Christ, 'Now is the judgement of this world'.

But I [the Lord is speaking], because I have led a blameless life and have paid the debt owed to the Law laid down by God; and (because) I have done everything according to his will and good pleasure; although there is no reason to be found for my deserving death, I shall not depart as did Elijah and Enoch . . ., but I shall accept death voluntarily (*haud necessitate*), as though I were deserving of it, so that, before God the Lord of all, I may condemn him who has brought death. God the Word, who has assumed me and joined me to himself, faithfully gives me victory in the judgement. For he made me his once for all, when he assumed me.[4]

Here, needless to say, it is the *assumptus homo* who speaks of and for himself, referring to the divine Son in the third person. He

[1] *Hom. catech.* viii. 5 (Tonneau, p. 193).

[2] *The Christology of Theodore of Mopsuestia* (Vatican City, 1956), pp. 204 ff., and the conclusion, p. 228.

[3] Cf. *Hom. catech.* viii. 1 (Tonneau, p. 187).

[4] *In Ev. Jo.* xii. 30 (Vosté, p. 174). Cf. x. 14 (Vosté, p. 145), xvi. 14 (Vosté, p. 213).

directs attention to his own attitude of obedience towards God and evinces complete trust in the divine Word. At the same time he alludes to the attitude of Word towards him, while making mention of the intimate relationship between them. Can it be alleged that this is a mere exegetical device which Theodore employs—a technique of exposition? Scarcely. Rather, it appears to draw the consequence of Theodore's comprehension of the doctrine of the 'two natures'. The Man and the Word in Christ are not only two logical subjects, of which attributes may be predicated. They are psychological subjects as well, at once distinct and intimately related as two centres of will and activity.

The same outlook is revealed, in a somewhat different way, in the fragments of Theodore's treatise on the Incarnation, where he speaks of the co-operation (συνέργεια) of the Man and God the Son.

So it is plain too that he fulfilled virtue more strictly and with greater ease than was possible for the rest of mankind, in proportion as, according to his foreknowledge of a man's character, the divine Word united him to himself in the beginning of his formation (and) supplied a greater co-operation towards the right performance of what was needful. . . . He urged him on towards greater perfection and assisted him in the greater part of his labours, whether those pertaining to the soul, or even those pertaining to the body.[1]

Theodore now refers to both the Word and the assumed Man by means of the third personal pronoun: a usage which corresponds to his employment elsewhere of the ἕτερος . . . ἕτερος formula. But the purpose of this manner of speech is not merely to indicate that God and Man in Christ are distinct subjects of attribution. Its usefulness lies in the fact that it enables Theodore, as no other mode of expression would, to express his view that the human and divine natures of Christ are the two terms of a relationship of action and response. The human nature is the subject of a voluntary obedience in which the divine Nature furnishes his closest possible co-operation. The point of Theodore's usage lies in his conception that the Man and the Word are two intimately related agents bent upon an identical project.

It appears, then, from our survey of the ways in which Theodore develops and employs his doctrine of the two natures of Christ, that it coheres perfectly with his analysis of the work of

[1] Swete, ii, p. 298.

Christ in terms of a double agency. Each of the natures, as he understands the matter, is a concrete subject, in both senses of that word: it is something of which properties may be predicated, and at the same time a centre of activity and initiative.

Theodore on the Soul of Christ

The justice of this analysis is confirmed by a consideration of Theodore's polemical treatment of the problem of Christ's human soul. Nothing, of course, is more typical of him than that insistence upon the full humanity of the Lord which underlies his doctrine of the 'two natures'. He repudiates, for example, the sort of docetism which was associated with the names of Simon Magus, Marcion, Valentinus, and the Manichees.[1] Against such, he asserts the dogma that 'ex semine natus est David Iesus Christus, homo vera ratione secundum naturam factus, qui et resurrexit a mortuis'.[2] This teaching is demanded, not only by his assent to the plain doctrine of the Apostles John and Paul, but also by his own understanding of human nature—by his rejection of that form of Platonist dualism which had made it plausible to think in terms of a purely 'spiritual' salvation.

But where the question of Christ's perfect human nature is concerned, Theodore is less troubled by docetism than he is by the teaching of Arians and Apollinarians, who had, in their different ways, called in question the reality of Christ's human soul. Against this teaching, Theodore mounts a systematic attack, in the course of which he reveals the nature of the concerns which led him to his insistence upon the full human nature of the assumed Man. In seeking to bring these motives to light, therefore, we should be able to grasp more precisely the character and functions of the 'human nature' which Theodore assigns to the Lord.

Theodore's first and most elementary argument contends simply that since 'man' means a composite of body and soul, it is impossible to speak of the divine Word's assumption of a 'man' without recognizing immediately, and as a matter of definition, that this entails his assumption of a human soul. Theodore develops this line of thought in his Commentary on John as he discusses the text 'I lay down my life (*animam meam*)'.

[1] *In I^am ad Tim.* iii. 16 (Swete, ii, pp. 135 f.); iv. 1 ff. (Swete, ii, pp. 139 ff.). And cf. *Hom. catech.* v. 8 (Tonneau, p. 111).
[2] *In II^am ad Tim.* ii. 9 (Swete, ii, p. 206).

Here we marvel at those heretics who are unwilling to concede that our Lord assumed a soul, even though our Lord speaks plainly of his soul both above and below. But they object to us in this connexion that a soul is also attributed [sc. by the Scriptures] to God. Yet they do not grasp that eyes and hands, feet and other members are attributed to God without our denying on that account that they were assumed by our Lord. So here, in the face of a similar expression, we understand that these words are said of the nature assumed by God the Word—but above, they denote merely operation and will.[1]

The attribution of a soul to God in the Scriptures must be taken metaphorically; but a similar attribution in the case of Christ is meant literally, as applying to his human nature. Such is Theodore's view, which he supports with two further observations.

They also object against us that the blessed Simon said: *I will lay down my life* (*animam meam*) *for you*. But I think this rather serves us as an argument. For just as he, a man composed of soul and body, said: *I will lay down my life*, so also our Lord (spoke). For it is not the divine Nature speaking about his soul, but the human (nature) . . . it being evident that a soul is part of a man.[2]

This last phrase states Theodore's fundamental premiss: that a soul is a natural part of the human constitution. If, therefore, the Lord speaks as man, his reference to his soul must be taken quite seriously, at the risk of truncating the human nature which he shares with Simon Peter. The implication of the argument is that to deny a human soul to Christ is simply to deny his human nature. So elsewhere Theodore writes that the divine Word took a 'perfect man', and then explains: 'He did not take a body only, but the whole man, composed of a body and of an immortal and rational soul.'[3]

Theodore's second form of argument makes implicit reference to certain of the issues in the controversy with Arianism over the full divinity of the Word. It is moved, therefore, not by an anthropological concern, but rather an interest in safeguarding the dignity of the divine Nature. This motive, which Theodore shares with all the opponents of Arianism (not excluding Apollinaris), leads him to argue for the necessity of a soul in Christ as a sort of ontological (or psychological) buffer-state. He turns to this theme in his treatise against Apollinaris.

[1] *In Ev. Jo.* x. 17 f. (Vosté, p. 148).   [2] Ibid. (Vosté, p. 149).
[3] *Hom. catech.* v. 19 (Tonneau, p. 127).

Moreover (the divine Son) furnished his co-operation in the proposed works to the one who was assumed. (Now) where does this (co-operation) entail that the Deity had replaced the (human) consciousness (*sensus*) in him who was assumed? For it was not his wont to take the place of consciousness in any, whoever they were, to whom he accorded his co-operation. And if moreover he accorded to the one who was assumed an extraordinary (*praecipuam*) co-operation, this does not mean (either) that the Deity took the place of consciousness. But suppose, as you would have it, that the Deity took the role of consciousness in him who was assumed. How was he affected with fear in his suffering? Why, in the face of immediate need, did he stand in want of vehement prayers—prayers which, as the blessed Paul says, he brought before God with a loud and clamorous voice and with many tears? How was he seized of such immense fear that he gave forth fountains of sweat by reason of his great terror?[1]

To ask these questions is to answer them. Fear and mental anguish cannot be predicated of God the Word. They belong properly to the finite human soul with its habitual weakness and susceptibility to passion. The accounts which the Scriptures give of Jesus therefore require us to recognize that he owned a human soul which could be the subject of these affections: a conclusion which of course serves to reinforce Theodore's theory of co-operation. In another place, the Interpreter states the same argument more explicitly:

Here is yet another testimony—the statement that Jesus 'grew in age and in wisdom and in favour with God and with men'—(which) the Apollinarians, who deny intellect to the soul, as well as the Eunomians, who in a similar way repudiate the assumption of a soul, are unwilling to investigate and understand. For both groups know that this testimony contradicts their own teaching. For if, as the latter hold, (the Word) did not assume a soul; or if, according to the former, he assumed a soul but not intellect . . . how did Jesus grow in wisdom? But if he wants to say that the Deity grew in wisdom—not even these men are so impudent as to maintain (this) in their wickedness. Moreover, it is obvious that the body did not grow in wisdom. So then it is manifest that he took a soul endowed with intellect.[2]

This argument is a special application of general considerations which Theodore alludes to in other connexions as well. The characteristic actions and passions of a human nature cannot be predicated of the divine Son literally: he cannot be the subject of

[1] Swete, ii, p. 315.   [2] Sachau, p. 37 f.

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physical suffering or death or local motion. All these passions must be ascribed to the man. And if the list be expanded to include affections peculiar to the soul, it becomes obvious that one must choose between compromising the Deity of the Word and recognizing that Christ possessed a human soul. Needless to say, Theodore chooses the latter alternative.

But this is not the line of debate which Theodore follows when, in the Catechetical Lectures, he turns to a systematic refutation of the Eunomian and Apollinarian views. Here he embarks on a fundamentally different course. He finds a sketch of his argument in the words of St. Paul: 'As by a man came death, so by a man came the resurrection from the dead' (1 Cor. xv. 21). On this he comments:

It was not, therefore, a body which (the Son) had to assume, but also an immortal and intelligent soul. And it was not the death of the body which it was important to abolish, but indeed (that) of the soul, which is sin; for, *since by a man sin entered the world*, according to the word of the blessed (Paul), *by sin death made its entry . . .*—it was appropriate that first the sin which was the cause of death be removed, and then death would be abolished with it.[1]

Here, obviously, we are back in the realm of anthropology and soteriology. Theodore's thought is governed by two premises: that death is the result of man's disobedience, and that the soul, not the body, is the seat of sin. We have already seen how these two principles fit into the general framework of Theodore's doctrine of man. Here he uses them to make a specifically christological point. Repeating himself, he reiterates the axiom which marks the fundamental difference in anthropological theory between himself and Apollinaris. The latter had located the seat of 'sin' ultimately in the passions of the flesh; Theodore affirms, on the contrary, 'It is plain that the inclination to sin has its beginning in the will of the soul'.[2]

Having stated his principle, Theodore draws the consequence immediately. '. . . if the soul only committed those sins which come to it from the passions of the body, perhaps it would have been enough for our Lord to take only a body in order to save (the soul) from sin; but now, the soul itself gives birth to the numerous and shameful evils of its sins. . . .'[3] He continues:

[1] *Hom. catech.* v. 10 (Tonneau, p. 115).   [2] Ibid. v. 11 (Tonneau, p. 115).
[3] Ibid. v. 12 (Tonneau, p. 117).

'Necessarily, therefore, our Lord took a soul, in order that the latter be first saved from sin and, by the grace of God, pass to immutability. . . .'[1] Here, in effect, Theodore appeals to the principle which Gregory Nazianzen had once stated: τὸ ἀπρόσληπτον ἀθεράπευτον.[2] If indeed it is man's soul, and not merely or primarily his body, which wants to be redeemed, it is necessary to suppose a priori that the divine Word assumed a human soul (and will) as well as a human body, in order to redeem them.

But again, Theodore carries his argument a step farther. He does not understand it to imply only that the soul was assumed in order that it might passively be redeemed. Rather, the argument signifies to him that the Man whom the divine Son assumed had an active, instrumental part to play in the redemption of mankind. '. . . He garbed himself in a man similar to Adam, who, after having sinned, had received a sentence of death, so that by a similar (being) sin might be rooted out of us and death abolished.'[3]

This theme is expanded in one of the fragments of the treatise on the Incarnation:

The Lord was more troubled, and struggled harder, with reference to the passions of the soul than with reference to those of the body. He mastered the pleasures by a more powerful rational process, while the Deity manifestly mediated and assisted him towards righteousness (κατόρθωσιν). So it is that the Lord is perceived to open war against these [passions of the soul] especially. Undeceived by the lust for riches and untempted by the desire for fame, he conceded nothing to the flesh. It was not for him to be overcome by such as these. However, if he had not possessed a soul, but (rather) it is the Deity which was victorious—none of the things accomplished would have been to our profit. (For what likeness is there between Deity and the human soul with respect to perfection of activity?) And the Lord's struggles would appear not to be of profit for us, but to have taken place for the sake of (empty) show. And if it is impossible to say this, it is certain that those things were done for our sakes, and (that) he instituted a greater battle against the passions of the soul, a lesser against those of the flesh. . . .[4]

Theodore insists that the victory over sin was not the work of God alone, but of the Man as well, and, moreover, that this battle was won by a struggle of Christ's human soul against the power of

[1] Hom. catech. v. 14 (Tonneau, p. 119).   [2] Ep. ci (Ad Cledonium).
[3] Ibid. v. 17 (Tonneau, p. 125).   [4] Swete, ii, p. 311.

its own characteristic temptations. It is this fact alone, the fact that sin was overcome by the agency of a human soul and will, which makes the redemption wrought in Christ relevant to ordinary men. Consequently, Theodore urges, the reality of redemption itself depends upon the divine Word's having assumed the human soul in and through which the salvation of mankind from sin was affected.

It is hard to resist the feeling that in this train of thought much of the essence of Theodore's theological outlook is epitomized. The argument derives from his anthropologically rooted conception of a double agency in the single act of man's redemption. At the same time it must issue logically in the phenomena which we have noted in his exegetical use of the two-natures doctrine. At base it is an expression of the christological consequences of that predominant strain in Theodore's doctrine of man which finds the central issue of human history in the problem of man's free, rational obedience to the commandments of God, through which fellowship with God is effected. It exhibits plainly, therefore, the way in which the characteristic note of Theodore's christology, his outspoken dualism, is the product of his general philosophical outlook on the problem of a doctrine of man.

Conclusion

It would, we have said, be misleading to speak of a single 'source' of Theodore's christological dualism. The motives which lie behind his doctrine of the two natures cannot be simplified to that degree. It should, however, be possible to arrive at some estimate of the relative importance of the different kinds of consideration which contributed to form Theodore's outlook.

Some writers have located the fundamental motive of Theodore's christological dualism in the necessities of his anti-Arian polemic: that is, in his desire to controvert any view which would reduce the Son of God to the status of a creature by subjecting him to the limitations of mutability and finitude. H. M. Diepen thus explains that Theodore's christology grows out of a double conflict, with Arianism on the one hand and Apollinarianism on the other. Because of the errors of the followers of Arius and Eunomius, Theodore felt that it was necessary to develop a theory which would make it quite clear that statements about Christ might be taken to refer to one of his two natures without applying

to the other. By this means Theodore sought to ensure that the inferiority of the Son to the Father *as man* should be maintained, while his equality with the Father as God was none the less asserted.[1] Connected with this theme, but arising more directly out of the conflict with Apollinarianism over the full human nature of Christ, was Theodore's assertion that the human 'nature' of Christ is in fact a subsistent human person, the *homo assumptus*.[2] In this way the exigencies of controversy drive Theodore to postulate, in effect, a 'duality of subjects' in Christ.[3]

Much the same analysis of Theodore's christology is offered by Fr. Sullivan, who also attaches great importance to the necessities of anti-Arian polemic in their influence on Theodore's thinking. 'Theodore . . . shows himself to be the continuator of the controversies of Eustathius and Diodorus, and, like them, an ardent champion of the divinity of the Word. Following in the Antiochene tradition, Theodore's method of safeguarding the divinity of the Word is to follow a strict distinction between what is said of the Word, and what of the Man.'[4] Consequently, as Sullivan sees it, Theodore's christological dualism consists essentially in the distinction of two 'subjects of attribution' in Christ.[5] This distinction owes something to the Interpreter's inability to see the difference between a 'nature' and a 'subject of attribution'— which issues in his effective denial of the principle of the *communicatio idiomatum*. But its ultimate positive significance is to be seen in the motive which, in the last resort, produces it: Theodore's praiseworthy desire to affirm the full divinity of the Word.

It would be foolish to deny the significance of this anti-Arian (and anti-Apollinarian) motif in Theodore's thinking about the Incarnation. Without deliberately looking for it, we have inevitably turned it up in the course of our own inquiry into Theodore's use of the two-natures doctrine. Nevertheless, it is questionable whether an appeal to these polemical necessities and interests can account for the full positive sense of Theodore's doctrine. Theodore is not merely another Eustathius or Diodore: not even a more careful, explicit, and systematic Eustathius or Diodore. Nor, for that matter, is his 'Antiochene' formula the only christological reply to Arianism which the fourth century produced. It

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[1] Diepen, 'L'*Assumptus homo* à Chalcédoine', loc. cit., p. 577.
[2] Diepen, op. cit., p. 581.   [3] Ibid., p. 582.
[4] Sullivan, op. cit., p. 201.   [5] Ibid., pp. 198, 228.

is, therefore, impossible not to wonder what factors there were in Theodore's outlook which produced the quite distinctive and characteristic form of his anti-Arian and anti-Apollinarian doctrine of the Person of Christ.

Moreover, it is scarcely to be expected that an answer to this query should be found in an analysis of Theodore's christological terminology. Galtier, in his recent defence of Theodore's essential orthodoxy, has succeeded in showing at least this much: that the peculiarities of Theodore's christological language—his use of the terms 'nature' and 'prosopon', his continual reference to the human nature of Christ as the *assumptus homo*—are not in fact as idiosyncratic as has generally been supposed.[1] His 'errors' in using this language were in fact the common habits of his time, which was quite accustomed to references to 'the Man' in Christ, as well as to a usage which made no distinction between the denotations of 'nature', 'prosopon', and 'hypostasis'.[2] If Theodore uses this language, as I think he does, to propound a definite christological dualism, the reason for his views must be sought elsewhere than in the language itself, which was at least capable of being used to other purposes.

We have attempted, in this chapter, to indicate where the ultimate positive roots of Theodore's dualism lie. His christology, if it is to be understood as something more than an *ad hoc* attempt to counter the logic of Eunomian derogations of the divinity of the Word, must be seen as the product, in part at least, of the doctrine of man which underlies it. The key to Theodore's christological position does lie in his insistence upon the active agency of Christ's humanity in the work of redemption. It is this emphasis which accounts for much of Theodore's christological dualism: for his use of the two-natures doctrine, as well as for his understanding of the necessity for the Word's assumption of a human soul. Theodore's thought requires not only that 'the Man' be a subject of attribution, logically independent of the Word: it requires also that he have a function, as a centre of voluntary activity, in the work of redemption. And just as this emphasis issues in a definite christological dualism, so it derives

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[1] 'La vraie christologie de Théodore de Mopsueste', *Rev. Sc. Rel.* xlv (1957), pp. 167 ff., 164 ff.
[2] Cf. Diepen, op. cit., p. 586: '. . . l'on sait que les mots de φύσις et d' ὑπόστασις s'équivalaient encore aux alentours de 400.'

from what we have called the biblical strain in Theodore's doctrine of man and human nature: his comprehension of the problem of sin in terms of the categories of rational freedom and rational obedience to divine Law. It is this constellation of ideas which provides the background against which Theodore's christology can be seen in perspective, and estimated for its theological significance as well as for its formal orthodoxy.

16

Theodore's Anthropology and His Doctrine of 'Henosis'

THEODORE of Mopsuestia was no less concerned with the unity of Christ than he was with the doctrine of the 'two natures'. But because his anthropology, as well as his opposition to Arianism and Apollinarianism, led him to differentiate firmly between 'the Man' and 'God the Son',[1] the dogma of the unity of Christ became, for him, the principal problem of christology. Our final task, accordingly, must be to trace out the means by which Theodore sought to resolve this problem, and at the same time to indicate how his final solution follows on the lines laid down by his anthropological preconceptions. Our interest will be, not to assess the Interpreter's orthodoxy, whether formal or material, but to show how the presuppositions which he brought to the task of christology led him to break what was perhaps new ground in the Church's perennial enterprise of explaining the significance of Jesus of Nazareth.

The Accusation: a Doctrine of 'Two Sons'

The precise nature of Theodore's problem, and the ways in which he sought to overcome it, can best be approached by observing his immediate replies to the accusation that he taught a doctrine of 'two Sons'. This concrete problem focuses the issues which he was forced to face, and can therefore serve admirably to set the stage for a discussion of his final and general answer to the question of the unity of Christ.

The charge itself was bound to be brought. In the face of Theodore's insistence that the Man and God the Son are not the same thing, that there are, in Christ, two active subjects, and not merely two abstract 'natures', it was inevitable that his opponents

[1] *Hom. catech.* vi. 4 (Tonneau, p. 137).

should reply with the charge that he was returning to the heresy of Paul of Samosata and teaching that there are, not one, but two 'Sons of God' to be counted in Christ. The fervour with which Theodore anathematizes the name of Paul of Samosata[1] may indicate at once his recognition of the force of this charge, and his perfectly sincere desire to maintain that his teaching entails no such consequence.

In his treatise *De incarnatione* he repudiates the charge emphatically, in the following terms:

> For (St. Paul) says, *leading many sons into glory*. Here, then, the apostle is seen to reckon the assumed Man together with the great mass of men in the category of sonship. He [sc. the assumed Man] does not share in sonship as they do (καθ' ὁμοίωσιν ἐκείνοις), but similarly to them inasmuch as he has received sonship by grace, since the Deity alone possesses natural sonship. So this much is obvious, that the exceptional gift of sonship is his in a way surpassing the rest of mankind, by reason of the union with him. Whence it is that he is comprehended in the signification of the word 'son'.[2]

Here Theodore, speaking explicitly of the *assumptus homo*, explains that his sonship is distinctive from two points of view. On the one hand, it must carefully be distinguished from the sonship enjoyed by other men, as deriving from his union with God the Word. The assumed Man is called 'son' in the same sense as is the Word himself. On the other hand, his possession of this sonship is 'by grace': it does not belong to him by nature, as it does to the Word, but by a gift, as it might belong to other men. Thus the assumed Man is at one and the same time the adoptive Son of God and the unique Son of God: because by the particular grace which is given him he is included in the Sonship which naturally belongs to the Word.

Much the same proposition is defended in a similar passage from the Catechetical Lectures. Here Theodore points out that to count 'two' in any connexion presupposes that the things counted are members of an identical class: that they share the same nature. But this, he insists, is not the case where the divine Word and the assumed Man are concerned: they are in no sense members of an identical class.

If each of them was by nature Son and Lord, one might say two sons and two lords, according to the number of persons . . . but since

[1] *Hom. catech.* xiii. 8 (Tonneau, p. 381).   [2] Swete, ii, p. 303.

the one is by nature Son and Lord, while the other is naturally neither Son nor Lord—but we believe that he receives these (titles) by reason of his close conjunction with the unique Son, God the Word—we confess that the Son is unique. And certainly in the first instance we consider as Son and Lord him who naturally owns these two (titles); but to him we conjoin in our thought the former also, the temple which he indwells at all times and from which he is not separated, and that by reason of the dissoluble conjunction which he has with him, and because of which we believe that he is Son and Lord.[1]

There is only one Sonship in question: the Sonship of the divine Word. But because of the συνάφεια, the union which has taken place because the divine Word assumed a Man to himself, this same Sonship can be rightly predicated of the Man. In respect of Sonship, therefore, there is both an identity and a difference in Christ. The same Sonship is possessed in two different ways. It belongs to the Word by nature, and to the Man by grace.

There are two matters here which require to be examined more closely. First, we must inevitably wonder whether there is not a difference between the Man's 'participating' in divine Sonship and his 'being' the Son. Does not Theodore's language in fact confirm the suspicion of dualism which his opponents entertained? And then, to look at the same question from the other point of view, does Theodore in fact distinguish successfully between the sonship which belongs to the assumed Man and that which belongs (or may belong) to other men?

Fr. Galtier asserts that the answer to this last question is an obvious 'Yes'. The ' "true filiation" due to union with the Word, Theodore opposes to an adoptive filiation, which, once at least, he says is common to Christ and us'.[2] To support this statement, Galtier refers at length to Theodore's comment on John xvii. 4:

> For, he says, all the grace of the Spirit is mine, because I have been conjoined to God the Word and have received the true Sonship. Of the grace, moreover, which is in me and with me, a small part will come upon you, so that you too may be called sons of God, although you be far removed from the honour which is mine as Son.[3]

Here Theodore unquestionably distinguishes between the Sonship of Christ and that which belongs to the believer: although it

[1] *Hom. catech.* viii. 15 (Tonneau, p. 209).
[2] 'La vraie Christologie de Théodore de Mopsueste', loc. cit., p. 345.
[3] *In Ev. Jo.* xvii. 4 (Vosté, p. 213).

is not by any means clear that the difference in question is more than one of degree, or that he intends to deny 'true Sonship' to the believer. These suspicions are only confirmed by Theodore's exegesis of John i. 16:

> *Of his fullness*, he says, *we have all received*—that is to say, it is of his abundance that we receive the grace of the Spirit which we are given. He says of his human nature that all grace is in it: but at the same time this reveals the glory (*dignitatem*) of the Nature which is in him. For through union with God the Word, by the mediation of the Spirit, he has become sharer in the true Sonship. We receive a part of his spiritual grace, and through this same (grace) we are made participants with him of adoptive sonship, although we are far away from this honour.[1]

No distinction is intended here between 'adoptive' and 'true' sonship. It is by adoption, through the gift of the Spirit, that the Man shares in the Sonship of the Word through union with him: and it is through sharing in the same Spirit, lavished upon them in Christ, that believers have a part in his adoptive Sonship, even though, as sinful men, they have no right of themselves to this honour. The 'true sonship' of the Lord is, in so far as it belongs to the assumed Man, an 'adoptive sonship': it is constituted by his participation, *mediante Spiritu*, in the honour of the divine Son.[2]

The very statement of this position carries with it an implicit answer to the question whether Theodore's doctrine of a unitary Sonship is intended to repudiate the christological dualism which we have seen him espouse in other connexions. Theodore himself supplies an explicit answer in his comment on Ps. ii. 7 ('The Lord said unto me, Thou art my Son, this day have I begotten thee'):

> Without doubt, this saying is to be referred to that Son for whom generation in the present time can be appropriate, and the day of whose birth the whole world straightway recognized. But that generation which is of the Father before all times—the generation of God the Word—cannot be submitted to a terminus—that is, to time—as the word 'present day' signifies.[3]

The Psalm, then, refers to the 'corporeal birth of the Lord', and consequently, to one who is 'Son' in a way radically different from that in which the divine Word is Son. Theodore is not here

[1] *In Ev. Jo.* i. 16 (Vosté, p. 26).   [2] Cf. *In Ev. Jo.* i. 34 (Vosté, p. 33).
[3] *In Ps.* ii. 7 (Devréesse, p. 13).

denying by anticipation what he was to write at a later date about the unitary Sonship. But his language makes it plain that, while the Sonship may be one, it is possessed by the Word in a way appropriate to his divinity, and by the Man in a way appropriate to his corporeal and temporal nature. Furthermore—and this is the crucial point in Theodore's argument—this Sonship does not belong to the Man naturally, but only because he 'receives an eminence of honour through the personal conjunction'.[1] By reason of his relation with the Word, the Man participates in a Sonship which he does not own of himself.[2]

Theodore applies the same principles in a converse sense when he treats of the question of the θεοτόκος. As he denies of the Man that he is the natural Son of God, so he denies unequivocally that the divine Nature was 'born' of Mary in the ordinary sense.

> It is certain that it was not the divine nature of the unique (Son) that they [sc. our fathers] thought to have been born of a woman, as if it had had its beginning in that birth; for (the divine nature)—of which they said 'who was begotten of his Father before all ages and who from all eternity exists from him and with him'—did not have its beginning from Mary.[3]

But this does not mean that Theodore denies the correctness of the epithet θεοτόκος as applied to the Virgin. On the contrary, he writes elsewhere, explaining himself at length:

> So when they ask, 'Is Mary the mother of God or the mother of man?'—let us say 'Both': the one by the nature of the thing, the other by relation (ἀναφορᾷ). For she is the mother of man by nature, since what was in the womb of Mary was a man. . . . But she is the mother of God, since God was in the man who was born, not confined within him by nature, but in him by the disposition (σχέσιν) of the will. Therefore it is right for both to be said, but not in the same respect. . . . The same answer is to be given if they ask, 'Was God crucified or Man?'—namely, 'Both, but not in the same respect.' For the latter was crucified inasmuch as he suffered and was nailed to the Tree and held by the Jews; but the former because he was with him for the reason we have given.[4]

Again it is a question of attributing to one of the two natures a property which belongs to the other. Now, however, what is

[1] *In Ps.* viii, Praef. (Devréesse, p. 43).
[2] Cf. the fragment of Leontius in Swete, ii, pp. 305 f.
[3] *Hom. catech.* vi. 3 (Tonneau, p. 135).   [4] Swete, ii, p. 310.

proposed is the attribution to the Word of a natural property of the Man. And Theodore's attitude is exactly the same as it was with regard to the question of predicating divine Sonship of the human nature. He denies, not that the Word can be called the Son of Mary, or that he may be said to have suffered, but that these properties can be predicated of him *by nature*. They are his only in a derivative sense—only by reason of his relation to the Man of whom they are predicated directly. Just as, because of the union, the Man shares in the honour of the divine Son, so, for the same reason, what belongs to the humanity may be attributed to the Word 'by relation'. The Word associates himself with the assumed Man: and therefore what happens to the man has reference also to the Word who indwells him. But it does not 'happen to' the Word. He is in no sense the natural subject of these properties, any more than the Man is naturally possessed of divine Sonship.

Theodore's dualism, then, remains. Nevertheless, it is obvious that he himself does not consider his dualism to abrogate the truth of the intimate union of God and Man in Christ. He is careful, within the limits of his first principles, to emphasize both the fact and the effects of the conjunction of the two natures. He can speak of the relation of the manhood and the Godhead in Christ as that of the external to the internal reality of a single phenomenon.[1] He avers, in the same strain, that the humanity of Christ reveals the divinity which is hidden within it,[2] because of the union in virtue of which the Man shares in the honours and prerogatives of the Word. He insists over and again that the union of the two natures is manifest in the unity of prosopon: in the fact that Christ, in some sense, is one 'person'. How then does he explain the union? What sort of 'conjunction' is it of which he speaks?

The Doctrine of Inhabitation

Theodore repudiates the language of 'mixture' as an adequate tool to account for the union of manhood and Godhead in Christ.[3]

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[1] *In Ev. Jo.* vii. 29 (Vosté, p. 114). Cf. *In Ps.* xliv. 9a (Devréesse, p. 290).
[2] *In Ev. Jo.* i. 14 (Vosté, p. 24); *Hom. catech.* vii. 15 (Tonneau, p. 185).
[3] Cf. the well-known Fragment of Book VIII of the treatise *De incarnatione*, in Swete, ii, p. 299; and Sachau, p. 44. The phrase 'Commixtio est ergo haec et Dei Verbi et hominis . . .' (*In Ev. Jo.* xvi. 28, Vosté, p. 217: cf. Galtier, art. cit., p. 352) appears to refer, not to the Person of Christ, but to the expression on which Theodore is commenting.

No doubt this reflects an anti-Apollinarian bias; but at the same time it reveals that Theodore is impatient with the whole circle of ideas associated with the analogy of physical mixture. We have seen that he fails to allude to this theme in his references to the problem of body-soul union; and consistently with this neglect of a current philosophical commonplace he ignores it also when he employs the body-soul analogy to justify his doctrine of two natures and one prosopon.[1] In this respect his christological theory differs markedly from that of Nemesius of Emesa, who explicitly employs the Neo-Platonic doctrine of body-soul 'mixture' as a model for his account of the union of Deity and humanity in Christ.[2]

Theodore seizes upon the word ἕνωσις as the correct alternative to κρᾶσις.[3] The incarnation comes about, not by a mixture of two substances, but by a 'union'. And how Theodore understands the difference between these two ways of conceiving the incarnation appears from his further definition of 'union' in terms of 'inhabitation'. It is as the divine Word indwells the assumed Man that he unites him to himself.[4] The words 'and the Word was made flesh' must therefore be interpreted in the light of the expression which immediately follows them: 'and dwelt among us'.

. . . that is, he was made flesh in so far as he dwelt in our nature. For the words καὶ ἐσκήνωσεν ἐν ἡμῖν manifestly stand for *he dwelt in us*; just as the Apostle says of us men, *We who are in this tabernacle groan*, calling our body a tabernacle—and again: *We know that if our earthly house of habitation is dissolved*. And it has been noted that it is customary for the Scripture to denote the whole man by 'the flesh'. . . . So here too when he meant (*The Word*) *came to be in a man*, he said: *became flesh*. But he does not say *became* as though (the Word) was altered, but because it was believed to be so on account of appearance.[5]

The Word did not and could not 'become man' in any sense which would involve change or alteration of his Nature. He did not 'turn into' a man, or cease in any way to be what he eternally is. ' "The Word became flesh" in appearance (κατὰ τὸ δοκεῖν): in appearance, not because he did not take real flesh, but because he did not *become*. . . . For he was not changed into flesh.'[6] And if the

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[1] See below, pp. 229 f., and Swete, ii, pp. 318 f.
[2] *PG*, xl. 601B.
[3] See the references in n. 3, p. 216.
[4] Swete, ii, p. 296, l. 3.
[5] *In Ev. Jo.* i. 14 (Vosté, p. 23).
[6] Swete, ii, p. 300.

Word did not suffer alteration in becoming man, then the only satisfactory way of understanding the incarnation is in the very terms which the Evangelist supplies to interpret his meaning: the divine Son came to dwell within a man.

Here in effect Theodore is applying the same principles by means of which he explains the θεοτόκος. Manhood cannot be predicated naturally of the Word, but only by reason of a relation: the relation of indwelling. To say of the Word that he *is* man would be to imply that he has relinquished his divine Nature —that he has become something which he was not. And since this is unthinkable, it follows that he can only improperly be said to be man or to have become man. Adequately interpreted, these expressions must be taken to denote that relation in virtue of which the Word indwells a man. Literally taken, they can only be true κατὰ τὸ δοκεῖν: 'cum haec revera opinio esset videntium eum.'[1]

In a long and well-known Fragment of Book VII of the *De incarnatione* Theodore explains more exactly what he understands by the relation of indwelling. In this passage he attempts to supply the answer to two questions. First he addresses himself to the problem of defining the general mode of divine indwelling in men and then he takes up the logically subordinate issue of the specific character of this indwelling as it is realized in Christ.[2]

The premisses of his argument are of interest for the light which they throw on Theodore's conception of the relationship of God to the created world. We have had occasion to note how seriously the Interpreter takes the differentiation between Creator and creature, both in his doctrine of man and in his christology. Here, however, he makes it plain that his is not a doctrine of unqualified divine transcendence. God, he insists, is always present and operative throughout the created world. He is immanent in the world both according to substance (οὐσία) and according to activity (ἐνέργεια). For the substance of Deity is uncircumscribed and everywhere present, and God by his providential activity governs and directs all things, working 'in all things what is fitting'.[3]

For this reason, Theodore continues, it is impossible to suppose that the indwelling of God in a man should take place either

[1] *In Ev. Jo.* i. 14 (Vosté, p. 23). For a full discussion of this point, see Sullivan, op. cit., pp. 230 ff.   [2] Swete, ii, p. 293 *ad fin.*   [3] Ibid., p. 294.

according to substance or according to activity. For such inhabitation in a man is clearly an exceptional event: something which is neither universal nor necessary. Consequently, it cannot be defined in terms which would allow it to be confused with God's general and ordinary presence to his creatures, human and non-human. And what is true in general of God's indwelling in rational creatures is *a fortiori* true in the case of the unique event of the Incarnation. The Incarnation is not the only example of the activity of God within the world, nor even of his indwelling in men; but it is a surpassing and unparalleled example of such activity. Hence the indwelling of God in Christ must be understood in terms which explicitly differentiate it from other modes of God's presence within the world without at the same time denying that there are such other forms.

To accomplish this, Theodore seizes on the notion of 'indwelling according to good pleasure' (κατ' εὐδοκίαν):

So it is not possible to say that God makes his indwelling either by substance or by activity. What then remains? . . . It is plain that one must say that the indwelling takes place by good pleasure: and by 'good pleasure' is meant the best and noblest will (θέλησις) of God which he exercises when pleased with those who have been zealous to be dedicated to him. . . .[1]

Theodore quotes Ps. cxlvii. 10 f., to establish his point: 'The Lord takes pleasure in those who fear him, in those who hope in his mercy.' He then proceeds to clarify the meaning of his conception of εὐδοκία. What the Psalm means is that God

does not approve acting together with other men, or working together with any men but with those . . . who fear him. Of these he makes great account. It seems good to him to work together with them and to assist them. Thus then it is right to speak of 'indwelling'. For since (God) is unlimited and uncircumscribed by nature, he is present to all. But by good pleasure he is far from some, and near to others. . . . For he is by inclination (διαθέσει) near to those who are worthy of this nearness, and again far from those who sin: neither being by nature separated, nor being by nature set closer, but working both by the disposition of his will (σχέσει τῆς γνώμης).[2]

'Union according to good pleasure' does not mean merely that God takes a happy view of those whom he is said to indwell. It

[1] Swete, ii, p. 294 *ad fin.*   [2] Ibid., p. 295.

means that he acts and works together with them, that he assists them, and that he indwells them 'by disposition of the will'.

In connexion with this conception we must note first that Theodore is appealing to a principle which has its roots in the Neo-Platonic view of the relation between soul and body. On this view, which Nemesius explicitly adopts, an intelligible cannot enter into relations of a spatial or material order. Its mode of presence to corporeal substance must therefore be of the order of will or of inclination. We have seen that Theodore himself does not explicitly apply this doctrine to the relation between soul and body. But he clearly does apply it to the relationship between God and the world, wherever there is question of a 'special' divine action. 'Affectionaliter . . . non localiter, Deus vel recedere vel accedere dicitur—nam qui ubique per naturam est omnibus semper praesens.'[1] Theodore gives, in effect, two reasons, both of a more or less philosophical order, for espousing this position. One we have already had presented to us. It is, simply, that since God is naturally omnipresent, cases of his special action or presence must occur in a different way from this habitual and universal presence: they must spring of the divine Will, of God's intentional activity. The second reason which is given for this conclusion is that *local* motion cannot be predicated of God: 'It was not by a removal from one place to another, but by a condescension and a providence'[2] that the Word united himself to the assumed Man.

So 'he descended': it was not by removing himself from one place to another. For we must not think that the divine nature, which is everywhere, moves itself from one place to another, since it is not even possible that the divine nature, being incorporeal, be enclosed in a place . . . what he calls 'the descent of God', is the condescension of God. . . .[3]

In this way, Theodore gives a philosophical basis for his doctrine of 'indwelling according to good pleasure'.

But what is distinctive, if not unexpected, in Theodore's case is his identification of the intentional presence of God with *grace*. The identification is made explicit in certain passages where Theodore is speaking of the Incarnation: 'hic autem in gratia ab

[1] *In Ps.* ix. 22 (Devréesse, p. 56).
[2] *Hom. catech.* vii. 14 (Tonneau, p. 183).
[3] Ibid. v. 4 (Tonneau, pp. 103 f.).

eo assumptus est et propter gratiam a tota creatione adoratur.'[1] It appears also from Theodore's use of the term διάθεσις. He repeats in his Commentary on the Psalms the principle which we have seen him espouse in the *De incarnatione*: when the Psalmist says that God is 'near' to men, τὴν διάθεσιν λέγει καὶ τὴν σχέσιν.[2] But this, as his language elsewhere clearly indicates, means essentially the same thing as 'love', or even 'desire'.[3] It is this sort of 'disposition' which Theodore has in mind when he writes that the divine Nature indwells the assumed Man 'affectu . . . eliganti'.[4] God's special nearness to men is effected by a loving disposition of the will which expresses itself in assistance, co-activity, and co-operation.

What is it, then, which defines the difference between God's indwelling in ordinary men—in, say, the prophets and apostles—and his indwelling in the assumed Man? In a crucially important passage, Theodore explains that in this unique case, the ἐνοίκησις takes place ὡς ἐν υἱῷ:

When, then, he is said to dwell in either the apostles or just men generally, he makes his indwelling as taking pleasure in men who are just. . . . But we do not say that the indwelling took place in this manner in him [Christ]—for never would we so rave—but so as in a son. For it is in this way that he took pleasure (in him) and indwelt (him). But what is meant by 'as in a son'? It means that in coming to indwell, he united the assumed (Man) as a whole to himself, and made him to share with him in all the dignity in which he who indwells, being Son by nature, participates: so as to be counted one prosopon according to the union with him, and to share with him all his dominion; and thus to work everything in him. . . .[5]

The interpretation of this passage is both difficult in itself and disputed among authorities: so it would be as well to approach it discreetly.

Galtier is clearly justified in calling attention to the fact that 'In this definition or description of the divine indwelling . . ., that which constitutes it and that which is its consequence are clearly distinguished'.[6] The indwelling is constituted by the union of the Man to the Word and by the man's sharing in the divine

[1] Sachau, p. 47. Cf. *Hom. catech.* v. 5 (Tonneau, p. 107).
[2] *In Ps.* xxxiii. 19a (Devréesse, p. 166).
[3] *In Ps.* xli. 2ab (Devréesse, p. 261); *In Ps.* li. 6 (Devréesse, p. 344).
[4] *In Ep. ad Eph.* i. 22 f. (Swete, i, p. 142).
[5] Swete, ii, pp. 295 f.   [6] Art. cit., p. 176.

glory and prerogative. The effect of the union is twofold. The Word becomes one prosopon with the Man, and accomplishes in and through him the work of salvation. We will consider these themes in turn.

First, then, Theodore simply asserts that in the case of Christ, the indwelling is a *union* of the Word and the Man. *He does not allude to the idea of 'co-operation' as in any sense constitutive of this union.* What is to the fore here is not any mutual or reciprocal action of God and the Man, but simply the action of the divine Son, who himself, by the disposition of his will, unites the human nature to himself. It is this fact which, as Theodore sees it, distinguishes the divine indwelling in Christ from other instances of his indwelling. The union is logically prior both to the prosopic unity which it effects, and to the sort of co-operation to which, as we have seen, Theodore alludes in other passages. The priority of the union is nowhere more clearly conveyed than in Theodore's insistence that the assumed Man 'was indwelt by God the Word from his very formation in the womb of his mother—and inhabited, not in the ordinary way . . ., but in a certain excellent way, according to which we say even that both natures were united and that one person was effected according to the union'.[1] This statement confirms what Theodore writes in his account of the distinctive nature of the indwelling in Christ. He is speaking of a union which consists neither in prosopic unity nor in the συνέργεια of God and man, but which is the basis of both of these as they are realized in Christ.

To explain what this union involves, Theodore speaks of the 'participation' of the assumed Man in the glory of the natural Son of God. This is a familiar theme; we are already acquainted with it from Theodore's answer to the charge that he taught a doctrine of 'two sons'. Here, however, its importance lies in the fact that Theodore employs it in conjunction with the idea of voluntary union to define one aspect of the συνάφεια of God and Man in Christ. From the point of view of the divine Word, the fact of the union may be asserted by speaking of his voluntary 'condescension'. From the point of view of the Man, however, it is discovered in his sharing in the honour of the Word. For as Theodore explains carefully, any allusion to the adoration accorded the assumed Man involves at the same time a reference to

[1] Swete, ii, pp. 307 f.

the divine Nature. Such an allusion, that is to say, can only adequately be understood as referring to the whole Christ, the union of Godhead and Manhood, because this union is directly required as the basis on which worship can be given the Man.

Since it is above human nature that all men should adore it, this must necessarily have been said as of a single individual; so that it is as a consequence of the close conjunction between the natures that one believes this word. In fact (the Apostle) makes it clearly known whence he who was assumed can receive such an honour: only from the divine nature of him who assumed him and indwelt him.[1]

The Man's sharing in the dignity of the divine Son thus directly proclaims the union as a fact. But, as Theodore's language here seems to suggest, it also helps to clarify the nature of this union as one which is realized in the subordination of the Man to the Word. The humanity enjoys divine honours 'not on account of his own nature, but on account of the indwelling Nature'.[2]

. . . we show both the difference of the natures and the unity of the person, and that, according to the natures, the one receives benefit, while the other gives it, a sure unity having been established on the basis of which worship is offered indivisibly by the whole creation.[3]

Theodore thinks that the very fact that the Man's honours are not his own, but a glory which he has received through the condescension of the Word, hints at the sort of relationship which can truly be a unity in duality. In respect of the union itself, the man is passive, while the Word is active. The Man receives; the Word gives. For just this reason, to perceive the glory of the Man is to grasp the Word himself, who, indwelling the Man, confers his own dignity upon a human nature. So the honour which is given the man reveals the union created by the voluntary indwelling of the divine Son.

This conception, as Theodore develops it, forbids any supposition that the union itself is the work of the human nature, and therefore excludes the notion that it is a gradual achievement of the human effort of the assumed Man. To be sure, Theodore recognizes, what the Scripture itself records, that the assumed Man has, so to speak, a biography. As a man, he grew and learned. He was 'perfected by sufferings'.[4] By the resurrection he was

[1] *Hom. catech.* vi. 6 (Tonneau, pp. 141 f.).   [2] Swete, ii, p. 305.
[3] Ibid., p. 302.   [4] Ibid., p. 304.

transferred to an immortal and immutable life.[1] In this new condition he will come again as the bearer of divine judgement. But, as Theodore in the following passage attempts to make clear by his carefully weighed language, this 'progress' in the life of the assumed Man, though completely real, has no bearing upon his given union with the Word.

For he had straightway from the beginning, in his formation in the womb, union with him. And when he arrived at the age at which men naturally come to a knowledge of right and wrong—rather even before that age—he exhibited a power of judgement in these matters both more direct and swifter than the rest of mankind. . . . He was immediately possessed, together with judgement, of a great hatred for evil, and both attached himself by an irrepressible affection to the good and received the co-operation of God the Word in proportion to his own designs. [So] he was kept, for the rest, free from any change in the direction of the worse—being of this mind himself, and having this design thus preserved in him by the co-operation of God the Word . . . after his resurrection and his reception into heaven he showed that he was worthy of the union even by reason of his own intent, though he received the union before this by the good pleasure of the Lord in his very formation; and so he clearly gave proof of the union, having no activity apart from God the Word or in separation from him, and having God the Word, through his union with himself, as the author of all that was done in him.[2]

Here Theodore traces out the growth of the assumed Man, from the time when, living the mortal life of a descendant of Adam, he overcame temptation through a perfect obedience. The end of this growth was his elevation to an immortal life, in which he no longer had to achieve obedience through struggle against temptation. It is only in this final state that the fact of his union with God the Word is fully revealed for all to see. Consequently, it is only in the ascended Christ that the full glory of the Word is known in the Man. But, having said so much, Theodore continues to reiterate that the union itself, which is presupposed at every stage in the biography of Christ, took place, not at the end, but at the beginning of the Lord's historical and trans-historical career. His contention is not that the union itself is progressively realized; but rather that the fact of the union is necessarily manifested in different ways and to different degrees as the assumed Man grows from childhood, to manhood, to a new and immortal life.

[1] *Hom. catech.* xii. 6 (Tonneau, p. 331).   [2] Swete, ii, pp. 296 f.

. . . God the Word came to be in him when he had been formed. For he was not only in him as he ascended into heaven, but also as he rose from the dead. . . . Nor was he in him only as he rose from the dead, but also as he was crucified and baptized, and as he was living the evangelical life after his baptism: and also even before his baptism, as he was fulfilling the requirement of the law. . . . Moreover he was in him even as he was being born, and when he was in his mother's womb, straightway from his first formation. For he imposed an order on the things which concerned him, bringing him to perfection step by step.[1]

The meaning of this passage is plain enough. Theodore wants to insist, at one and the same time, that there never was a moment in the life of the assumed Man when he was not fully united to the Word, and that, as a man, he grew to perfection, fulfilling righteousness at every stage of life in the manner appropriate to that stage, but achieving the final perfection of righteousness only in that ascended condition in which the reality of the union can be seen for what it is. It is for this reason that the resurrection marks, not merely a crucial juncture in the existence of the assumed Man, but also the turning-point in the disciples' understanding of the Lord. After the resurrection they were given the gift of the Spirit, 'ut scirent quia praecipuum ipsi praeter ceteros homines non aliquo puro honore ex Deo pervenit, sicut in ceteris hominibus, sed per unitatem ad Deum Verbum, per quam omnis honoris ei particeps est post in caelos ascensum'.[2]

It is at this point that it becomes possible to see what, in Theodore's mind, is the relation between the union itself and the fact of 'co-operation' between the Man and the Word. Nowhere does Theodore affirm that the union took place by 'co-operation'. What he says, and what has led many interpreters to suppose that he understood the union in terms of co-operation, is that the indwelling which effects the union occurs by a condescension or disposition of the divine Will, which is in itself an act of grace. As we have seen, however, this language represents Theodore's debt to the Neo-Platonic doctrine of the mode of union which is possible between intelligible and corporeal substances. In itself, therefore, such language does not connote the idea of 'moral union', as that phrase has customarily been understood when applied to Theodore's christology. In fact, as Theodore himself

[1] Swete, ii, p. 314.   [2] Swete, ii, p. 291.

uses it, the notion of unity through a 'disposition of the will' is closely connected with an emphasis on the initiative of the Word, through whose gracious disposition the union is effected under circumstances in which there can be no question of a 'co-operation' on the part of the assumed Man. For Theodore, what is constitutive of the union between God and Man in Christ is precisely the action of the Word, who *gives* what the Man *receives*.

Nevertheless, this union is effected in such a way that, at a certain period in the career of the assumed Man, it is manifested in the divine Son's assistance to the Man in his moral struggle, in his preservation of perfect obedience at every stage of his life. We have already attempted to indicate the significance of this theme. It testifies to Theodore's sense of the Man's status as a moral agent within the union. As such it is closely connected both with his soteriology and with his distinctive doctrine of man and of sin. More than any other element in his thought, this theme bears witness to the fundamental dualism which informs Theodore's christology. To speak of the human nature of Christ must, for Theodore, be to speak of a Man, who is the subject, not merely of the passions and affections which cannot be predicated of the Word, but also of a moral activity and obedience by which sin is overcome in and through the nature in which it is resident. Yet it remains true that the Interpreter does not, and sees that he cannot, define the union itself in terms of the co-operative moral activity of which the human nature is one subject.

This fact is evident from two considerations to which we have already alluded. The first is the purely negative, but nevertheless significant, fact that Theodore nowhere attempts to explain the union in terms of co-operation. When, in fact, he refers to the Word's συνέργεια with the Man, he does so in language which indicates that he regards the union as the *basis* of the extraordinary co-operation which is in question in the case of Christ. It is *because of* his union with the divine Son that the assumed Man receives the extraordinary assistance which was his; and the union itself was not, in any sense, his doing. Thus Theodore distinguishes between the union once for all effected, and the co-operation of the Word with the Man: they are two distinct phases of the relationship between the natures. 'Having united him to himself in the very beginning of his formation, God the

Word accorded him from himself a greater συνέργειαν.'[1] Again, Theodore often speaks of the co-operation of the Spirit with Christ:[2] yet he never suggests that this relationship in itself constitutes the union, even though, if a 'moral union' were all that he understood by the ἕνωσις, it would be impossible for him to distinguish, as he does, between the co-operation of the Spirit (or the Word) and the indwelling of the Word. In fact, he seems to regard the συνέργεια as constitutive, not of the union, but of that process within the human nature by which the Man himself becomes a more and more perfect vehicle, as man, for the divine Nature which indwells him. It is in the perspective supplied by these facts that one must read such a statement as the following:

> Rightly do we say this same thing even concerning the Lord—that the divine Logos, knowing his virtue, both pleased, according to his foreknowledge, to indwell him from above at the beginning of his formation and also united him to himself by the disposition of his will, [and then] accorded him a certain greater grace. . . .[3]

The tenses of the verb-forms in this passage, as well as the content of what Theodore is saying, suggest clearly that he separates the indwelling and union on the one hand, from the 'grace' given the assumed Man on the other. The reference to co-operation is not intended as an explanation of the union. If anything, the converse is the case.

The same conclusion emerges from a consideration of those passages in which Theodore alludes to his conception that one immediate effect of the union is that the divine Son 'works all things' in the Man. We have seen already that Theodore will not limit the application of this principle to any one stage in the career of the assumed Man. It was the Word who brought him to birth,[4] who led him to baptism,[5] who delivered him to death and raised him,[6] and who therefore accorded him the immortal and immutable nature in which he now exists in heaven. All of these events are works of the divine Son, which came to pass in and for the Man by reason of his union with the Word. One aspect of the divine Nature's 'working all things' in the Man is the perfect co-operation of the Man's will with the purposes of God: but this co-operation, wrought by the assistance of divine grace, is not

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[1] Swete, ii, 298. [2] Ibid., p. 316. [3] Ibid. ii, p. 308.
[4] Ibid., p. 314. [5] Ibid. [6] *Hom. catech.* viii. 5 (Tonneau, p. 193).

what Theodore *means* when he refers to the union, nor even when he speaks of the Word's 'working all things' as an immediate consequence of the union. He means, as his various statements show, a great deal more than that.

We are compelled, then, by this survey of Theodore's doctrine of union by inhabitation, to draw at least three conclusions. First, it appears that the idea of a co-operation of the Word and the Man is not Theodore's way of defining what he understands by the union. He insists upon the reality of this co-operation, but within, and as a consequence of, the union. No doubt it is this theme which, more than any other, calls attention to Theodore's christological dualism—to his emphasis on the independence of the Man as a subject of moral activity. Nevertheless, it is not in the Man's moral activity that Theodore seeks an explanation of the union. Secondly, and consistently with what we have just said, Theodore understands the union as a work of divine condescension which is prior to, and a presupposition of, what is accomplished in and through the Man. Finally, although he offers no 'explanation' of the union beyond his assertion that it is an indwelling which takes place by a disposition of the divine Will, it seems evident that Theodore attaches great significance to the relationship of subordination between the Word and the Man which, as he sees it, makes an organic unity of a 'conjunction' between two subjects. This emphasis on a relationship of subordination appears both in Theodore's doctrine that the glory of the Man *is* the natural glory of the Word, and in his reiteration of the notion that the Word 'works all things' in the human nature. His point seems to be that there is a single source (though not a single subject) of all that Christ is and does, and that this source is the divine Word who indwells the Man.

Unity of Prosopon

On the basis of these conclusions it should be possible to understand more or less what Theodore intends when he speaks of the 'one prosopon', or 'the unity of prosopon'. He sets this doctrine forth in a well-known fragment preserved by Leontius.

. . . through the union the two natures which have been brought together make up one prosopon according to the union. Just as the Lord said of a man and his wife that 'they are no longer two, but one flesh', so let us reasonably say, in accordance with the principle of the

union, 'So they are no longer two prosopa, but one', the natures being of course distinguished. For just as in the former case it does no harm for the one flesh to be called by the number two, since it is evident in what sense they are called one; so also in the latter case the union of the prosopon does not militate against the difference of the natures. For when we distinguish the natures, we say that the nature of God the Word is complete, and that [his] prosopon is complete (for it is not correct to speak of an hypostasis without its prosopon); and [we say] also that the nature of the man is complete, and likewise [his] prosopon. But when we look to the conjunction, then we say one prosopon.[1]

Here Theodore uses the analogy of husband and wife, not to emphasise the 'distinction of natures', nor to define the manner of the union, but to provide an illustration of how it is possible to find duality within unity. He uses a similar illustration to the same point in the Commentary on John. Quoting St. Paul's statement (Rom. vii. 21): 'I find it to be a law that when I want to do right, evil lies close at hand', Theodore points out that the Apostle is 'speaking of our soul and our body'.

The words *I want to do right* he said of the soul; but *evil lies close at hand* he said of the body. Although he was speaking of two natures and of two diverse things, [and] fitly according to the difference of the natures, he includes with each member of the expression the pronoun 'me' as referring to one [subject]. That is, he speaks in both cases of his person on account of the union which exists between body and soul. So also our Lord, when he was speaking of his humanity and of his divinity, refers by the pronoun 'I' to the common person.[2]

Again Theodore does not suggest that the soul-body analogy is to be taken as an attempt to explain or define the nature of the union. It is an illustrative type of the union of two different 'things' to make up a unity of person (prosopon). Because of the relationship of union which exists between body and soul, St. Paul can encompass both of these natures at once by using the first personal pronoun to denote the single reality which is his 'person'. Theodore indicates, therefore, what he explicitly says

[1] Swete, ii, p. 299. For a Greek retroversion of the Syriac parallel to Leontius' text, cf. M. Richard, 'La tradition des fragments du traité περὶ τῆς ἐνανθρωπήσεως de Théodore de Mopsueste', *Le Muséon*, lvi (1943), pp. 64 f. The Syriac suggests that Theodore taught a doctrine of 'one hypostasis'. Sullivan (op. cit., pp. 58 ff.) gives satisfactory reasons for thinking that in fact Leontius' text is to be preferred.
[2] *In Ev. Jo.* viii. 16 (Vosté, pp. 119 f.).

elsewhere, that unity of prosopon is the effect of a certain kind of relationship between two differing concrete natures.[1] '. . . when we look to the conjunction, then we say one prosopon.'

Sullivan, in his analysis of Theodore's doctrine of 'personal' union, has pointed out the connexion between his christological and exegetical uses of prosopon.

In the exegetical context, the *prosopon* was the subject of whom, or to whom, a psalm was spoken. The essential note of the term *prosopon* here was not that the subject referred to be a 'person' in the philosophical sense of the term. The *prosopon* of a psalm could be an individual, a group, or a multitude. But it constituted one *prosopon* if it was the subject of whom the psalm was spoken.

Now when Theodore found the Scriptures speaking of the Word and the man assumed 'sicut de uno quodam', or 'quasi de uno eodemque omnia dicens', it seems only natural that he would express this in terms of 'one *prosopon*'. Thus he would express the fact that there is one subject of whom the Scriptures speak, whether they refer to the Word or to the man assumed. Theodore's use of the term *prosopon* to express such an idea, as we have seen, does not necessarily imply that this 'one subject' is an individual, a 'person' in the strict, philosophical sense. It seems rather, simply to be a way of saying that the Word and the man together constitute one subject of whom one can say what pertains to either of them.[2]

This analysis serves to emphasize what we have already said. Theodore's exegetical use of prosopon combines the ideas of a grammatical subject and an interested party—where the party, like the subject, may be intrinsically either singular or plural. And Christ, in the Scriptures, is treated as one prosopon in both of these senses. He is a single subject of predication, and a single 'party' in his actions and interests, although, at the same time, he is both human and divine. As in the case of soul and body, therefore, or of man and wife, unity of prosopon is consistent with duality of 'nature'. It is the outward manifestation by which one or more concrete 'natures' are recognized as an hypostatic, historical, functional, or generic 'unit'.[3]

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[1] Cf. Swete, ii, p. 308: 'unam juxta adunationem effectam esse personam.'
[2] Op. cit., p. 263.
[3] For discussions of the general meaning of the term 'prosopon' in this period cf. Sellers, *Two Ancient Christologies*, pp. 157 f.; and Loofs, *Nestorius*, pp. 76 f. Loofs defines the meaning of *prosopon* (for Nestorius) as 'the external, undivided appearance' of a thing, 'its kind of being seen and judged'. The notion of *prosopon* is that of an existent individual in the oneness of its characteristic external

Having said so much we may conclude that an understanding of what Theodore meant when he spoke of the 'one prosopon' of Christ depends upon a comprehension of the sort of relationship which he thought to exist between the Lord's human and divine natures. Unity of prosopon is not, in itself, a *kind* of union: rather is it the outward expression of an underlying unity which might be of any one of several different kinds. When Theodore speaks of Christ as one prosopon, he means that, because of the union between the Word and the assumed Man, the Lord presents himself to the world and to the believer as a single object of knowledge and faith and a single agent of reconciliation with God. This is the fact of the *persona communis*. But the reason for the fact lies precisely in the Word's indwelling of the Man, defined as Theodore understands it.

In this connexion we may consider two of the fragments of Theodore's *De incarnatione*, which illustrate admirably how he thought of the 'one prosopon' of Christ. The first is the continuation and conclusion of the Fragment cited just above from Leontius:

In the same way . . . we say that the essence (οὐσία) of the divine Word is his own, and that that of the Man is his own. For the natures are distinguished, but the prosopon is perfected as one by the union. Whence, when we undertake to distinguish the natures, we say that the prosopon of the man is perfect, and perfect also (the prosopon) of the Deity. But when we look steadfastly at the union, then we pronounce that both natures are one prosopon, since the Manhood receives through the Deity honour beyond its constitution, and the Deity fulfils all righteousness in the Manhood.[1]

From this text, two conclusions seem to emerge fairly clearly. Theodore obviously thinks of the unity of prosopon as a *product* of the union—i.e. of the indwelling of the Word in the Man through a disposition of the will. This is the relationship which, so to speak, unites the prosopa of the two natures, so that one who knows Christ knows him as a single prosopon. Second, this unity of prosopon is by no means a mere habit of speech by which two things are fictitiously treated as one. On the contrary there is, by the fact of the union, a relationship established which creates self-presentation—a conception which, in different phases of its use, can account for both Theodore's trinitarian and his exegetical employments of the term.

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[1] Swete, ii, p. 300.

a basis in reality for the one prosopon. The Man shares an honour which is not his by nature; and the work of the Man, rightly attributed to him as its immediate subject, is nevertheless, in the last resort, the work of the divine Son. Theodore thus reverts, in explaining the unity of prosopon, to a theme which we have encountered before: the unity of Christ is not the unity of two equal partners, but one which is achieved through the subordination of humanity to the Word. If Christ is one prosopon, this is because to know him in his humanity is to know the glory and the power of the second Person of the Trinity. In yet another fragment, Theodore writes:

> The unity of person is known from the fact that he accomplishes all things through him. This unity is brought about by the indwelling according to good pleasure. So when we say that the Son of God will come as judge from the heavens, we understand the simultaneous coming of the Man and of God the Word: not because God the Word, like the Man, is naturally brought down, but because by good pleasure there will be unity with him wherever he is, because of the fact that he accomplishes everything through him.[1]

Here again Theodore explains the unity of prosopon by an appeal to two principles: first, the principle of ἐνοίκησις κατ' εὐδοκίαν, and, derivatively, that of the Word as the source of all that is done in and through the Man.

The doctrine of the one prosopon is not, therefore, to be taken as an equivalent for the later dogma of 'hypostatic union'. For Theodore, the one prosopon is indeed a *persona communis*: the outward unity of presentation which is the result of the Word's indwelling of the Man. It presupposes the distinction which Theodore habitually and deliberately makes between the two 'natures' considered both as subjects of attribution and as centres of activity. Nevertheless, what Theodore's position presupposes is by no means a doctrine of 'merely *moral* union'. His doctrine of the unity of Christ's Person does indeed presuppose the dualism which his anthropology necessitates. But he refuses to assimilate the unique case of the divine indwelling in Christ to an ordinary instance of divine co-operation with a man of good will. Rather, he seeks to overcome the obvious limitations imposed on him by his dualism by insisting upon the priority of the union even to the extraordinary co-operation which the Word accords to the Man

[1] Swete, ii, p. 297.

in Christ. The result of his effort is a christology unique in the form it takes. What he argues in effect is that the moral relationship or co-operation between the Word and the Man is itself the result of the sole initiative of the divine Son, who 'works all things' in the Man whom he assumes. And it is this fact, the dominance of the Word, who is alone the agent of the union itself, which makes it possible to speak of the 'one prosopon' of Christ.

Conclusion

It should be clear from what we have just said that Theodore's doctrine of the unity of Christ's Person is not, in itself, the direct product of anthropological considerations. He does indeed toy with the illustrative example of body-soul union. But unlike Apollinaris, for whom this analogy defines the very form of the relation between what is human and what is divine in Christ, Theodore uses it in a subsidiary way. He carefully eschews all reference to the doctrine of 'mixture' in this connexion; and his doctrine of union 'by the disposition of the will', while it clearly exhibits a debt to current philosophical speculation, is not associated in his mind with the problem of body-soul union.

If, then, Theodore's anthropology has an effect on his understanding of the *unity* of Christ, the effect is negative and indirect, though not the less important for that. Anthropological considerations, as we have seen, contribute directly to the dualism which informs his christology at every point: and this dualism in turn affects his doctrine of the union by the obvious limit which it sets to the number of possible ways in which the nature of the union can be understood. Hence in the last resort the connexion between Theodore's doctrine of man and his christology must be sought in what we have labelled the 'biblical' strain in his anthropology. Despite the ambiguities in his anthropology, and despite his genuine indebtedness to certain elements in the Platonic philosophical tradition, the determinant element in Theodore's whole system, christological and anthropological alike, is his interest in the problem of free rational obedience to divine law. It is this interest which, in part, lies at the root of his rejection of the Platonist emphasis on a quasi-divine, contemplative reason. Moreover, it is this interest which leads him to insist, as we have seen, on the necessary part which the human will of Christ must

play in the redemption of man—the conception which, more than any other, sets his teaching apart from the currents of thought to which the christology of Apollinaris of Laodicea had given expression.

In the end, however, this same interest in man's free, rational obedience to the law of God leads Theodore to a conception of the unity of Christ's Person in which primary emphasis is placed on the divine initiative and prevenience of the Word. The Word, by a condescension of will, so indwells the assumed Man from the moment of his conception that he makes himself the single source of all that is done in and through the Man and thus effects a unity of prosopon between himself and the concrete human nature which he assumes. The subordination of the Man to the Word in this relationship means that the Man comes to share in the divine prerogatives of the Word by reason of the unique nature of his 'adoption'; and at the same time it entails that whatever happens to the Man, or is performed by the man, has an immediate reference to the divine Son in virtue of the singular character of the relation between them. Whatever, then, may be said of his anthropology, Theodore's christology is anything but 'Pelagian'. The doctrine of prosopic unity as Theodore propounds it has two equally important constituents, which when taken together define what is, for him, the essential nature of the paradox of the incarnation. On the one hand, it seeks to preserve the reality of Christ's human nature as a concrete centre of human activity; on the other hand, it involves a systematic denial that the human will in and through which salvation is wrought is ultimately the agency *by* which salvation is wrought.

EPILOGUE

Now that the end of this study has been reached, there remains one inevitable question to be faced and discussed: that of the adequacy or legitimacy of Theodore of Mopsuestia's christology. But the question cannot be discussed usefully until we have defined with some care precisely what it means and what sort of answer can be given to it.

At first glance it must seem obvious that what is wanted is a clear judgement as to the *orthodoxy* of Theodore's christological formula. If the question is interpreted in this sense, then the procedure to be followed in searching for an answer is equally obvious. We must first find an acceptable standard of christological orthodoxy: one which will supply both a form of sound words and a clue as to their traditional interpretation. Then it will be possible to ascertain whether Theodore's language conforms to this standard or not; and whether, in any case, his language means or intends the same thing as that of the agreed definition.

Needless to say, there is such a standard to hand in the Chalcedonian Definition of Faith, which is certainly the most universally accepted criterion of christological orthodoxy. This Definition lays down the dogma that complete manhood and complete Deity are in Christ united in one ὑπόστασις, in such a way that the natures remain at once distinct and inseparable. Accepting the Antiochene language of 'two natures' and the Antiochene insistence upon the completeness of Christ's humanity, the Definition combines these emphases with the Alexandrian, or Cyrilline, doctrine of 'hypostatic union', according to which the human nature of Christ is 'impersonal' in the sense that it has no ὑπόστασις of its own, but subsists in an attributive relation to the Person of the divine Son.

When Theodore's christological formula is set alongside that of the conciliar decree, two facts become immediately apparent. The first is that the central affirmations of the two formulas are identical. Both are concerned to sound three fundamental themes: those of the perfect humanity of Christ, his perfect Divinity, and the unity of his Person. Furthermore, it must be evident to the

eye of the historian that the conciliar decree has adopted at least one of the postulates of Theodore's christology: that of the distinction of two complete 'natures' in Christ. Nevertheless, it is also apparent that in one crucial respect Theodore's formula diverges from that of the Council as it has traditionally been understood. Not only does Theodore not use the language of 'hypostatic union'; he clearly does not intend to say the sort of thing which Cyril of Alexandria meant when he spoke of the 'one hypostasis' of Christ. This is not to say that Theodore is indifferent to the problem of the unity of Christ's Person. But it is to say that he did not choose to deal with it in the Cyrilline manner which the Chalcedonian Definition appears to canonize.

But if this conclusion is clear, it is nevertheless not very helpful. For if left unqualified it ignores the significance of the fact that the issue of the unity of Christ did not present itself to Theodore in the same terms in which it presented itself to thinkers in the Alexandrian tradition. Theodore does not differ from the Chalcedonian Definition, or from Cyril of Alexandria, in wishing to minimize the truth that Christ, as the union of manhood and Godhead, is one. Rather he differs in his way of conceiving the *problem* of the unity of Christ. He does not set out to explain how it is possible for two contrary sets of attributes to be predicated of a single Person; for he does not understand the question of the Incarnation in these terms. To him, on the contrary, it appears essentially to be a question about the reconciliation of divine prevenience and human freedom in a single action, which is at once an action of divine grace and condescension, and an action of human obedience and self-sacrifice. But if this is so, then it becomes historically pointless to settle the question of Theodore's christology by enumerating the differences between his formula and that of Chalcedon, or that of Cyril. For this procedure inevitably suggests that Theodore is to be counted somehow blameworthy for failing to return what came to be the accepted answer to a question which he did not ask; and at the same time it ignores the issue which he raised when he posed the christological question in the particular form in which he grasped it. If some judgement is to be made on Theodore, it must take the form of an appreciation and criticism of his christology in the light of the problem with which he himself was wrestling.

What this problem was we have attempted to indicate in our

treatment of Theodore's anthropology; for it is in Theodore's doctrine of man and of sin that his way of conceiving the problem of the Incarnation has its roots. Despite his manifest debt to the Platonic philosophical tradition on which he drew, and despite the ambiguities and inconsistencies in his accounts of sin and of the Fall, Theodore propounds a view of man which in its critical essentials reiterates certain postulates of biblical religion. Theodore understands man's reason as a faculty of practical choice, which is informed and governed by moral law; and in consequence of this view he conceives the ideal relation of man to God in terms of fellowship achieved through free obedience. By the same token he retains, in spite of his Platonic heritage, a firm grasp on the voluntary nature of sin. He sees man as a creature in whom fleshly weakness and perversity of will breed and confirm each other; but he is certain that in the last resort the root of the evils which afflict man lies not in the circumstances of his mortality and his creatureliness, but in the arrogance and disobedience of the will itself. Consequently, for him, the redemption of man means primarily and essentially the redemption of the human will in its freedom, a redemption which must nevertheless be the work of God himself, who intervenes to initiate the 'Second Age' of sinlessness and immortality.

Here then is what we may call Theodore's *problématique* of the Incarnation. Christ, for Theodore, is the one in whom God the Word achieves the redemption of humanity in the free activity of a perfectly obedient Man. Theodore's christological dualism is the product, not merely of his opposition to Arian snipings at the divinity of the Word, but also of his own characteristic insistence upon the part which the Man plays in the salvation of humanity. What is done in Christ must, for him, be the work of the free human will; and therefore he must emphasize the 'personal' character of Christ's manhood, the reality of his human soul, which is the subject of the obedience by which the world is redeemed.

Yet this same human obedience is, at another level, the work of the Word himself, who is in this sense (a sense quite different from Cyril's) the ultimate 'subject' in Christ. To explain this conception, Theodore resorts to his doctrine of 'union by good pleasure', which is not a theory of 'union by co-operation', but one which sees the agent of the union in the divine Word alone,

and which thus subordinates the Man to the Word in this relationship without depriving him of his 'personal' character. This relationship of subordination effects the reality of the 'one prosopon', which is thus based on the fact that all that is done in and through the Man is in the end the work of the divine Son.

This is not the Chalcedonian formula: certainly it is not Cyril of Alexandria's formula. Nevertheless, Theodore's account of the Person of Christ has at least one virtue. Though it is incomplete and inadequately worked out, it represents a serious attempt to state the doctrine of the Incarnation in a form which explicitly, and not merely formally, recognizes the *moral* reality of Christ's manhood. Any attempt simply to dismiss Theodore's christology is at the same time a rejection of the problem which it poses, and which Theodore, however haltingly, tries to resolve within the limits set by the Church's traditional confession of Christ: the problem how the obedience of the Man to God can be at once a genuinely human obedience and the decisive act of divine grace.

APPENDIX I

Anthropology and Christology in Fifth- and Sixth-century Discussion of Theodore

THE Church's official judgement on the christology of Theodore of Mopsuestia was passed by the Council of Constantinople, meeting A.D. 553 at the behest, and under the supervision, of the Emperor Justinian. Together with the letter of Ibas of Edessa *Ad Marim Persam*, and the anti-Cyrilline writings of Theodoret of Cyrus, the doctrine of Theodore concerning the Person of Christ was found to be inconsistent with the Definition of the Council of Chalcedon. This condemnation of the 'Three Chapters' was thought to be essential because it had been widely held that the Chalcedonian Synod had in fact countenanced, even though it had not openly approved, them.[1] By anathematizing Theodore, Ibas, and Theodoret, therefore, the Council of Constantinople sought to clear the Fathers of Chalcedon from the charge that they had, at least implicitly, tolerated views of the Person of Christ which were plainly Nestorian; and it was asserted, in the case of Theodore, that he had universally been recognized as heretical by orthodox teachers—e.g. by Cyril of Alexandria, and by Proclus of Constantinople in the *Tome* which the latter had addressed to the Armenian Church.

Primarily, therefore, the deliberations at Constantinople were concerned with two sorts of questions. First, historical issues about the course of events at Chalcedon and about the reputation of Theodore among orthodox bishops and doctors even prior to Chalcedon, had to be settled. Second, the Council was interested in Theodore's christology as that was set forth in a series of excerpts from his works which were read out to the assembled bishops. In this connexion the charges levelled against Theodore centred almost exclusively around the issue of the unity of Christ's Person. Theodore and his followers, it was said, denied to the Mother of Christ the epithet θεοτόκος.[2] They taught, in

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[1] This was, for example, the view taken by Pope Vigilius in his *Constitutum*, issued in 553. Cf. *PL*, lxix. 100D: '. . . neque in sancto ac venerando Chalcedonensi concilio aliquid de saepius designati Mopsuesteni Theodori episcopi nomine invenimus statutum vel dictum esse contrarium.' Later, however, it became necessary for Vigilius to repudiate this view.

[2] This charge was levelled in particular against the Letter of Ibas: cf. Mansi, *Concilia*, ix. 181A; and Anathema VI, ibid. 380C.

effect, the doctrine of 'two Sons'.[1] In their eagerness to distinguish
the natures in Christ they failed to remember that the connotation of
'nature' is carefully to be distinguished from that of 'person': and this
failure led them to teach only an *affectualem unitatem* in Christ.[2] Finally,
in the background of this discussion lay the formula which, to the
piety of the time, was the touchstone of christological orthodoxy and
the stone of Nestorian offence. The heretics, and in particular their
teacher Theodore, denied the truth of the statement that one of the
Trinity suffered.[3]

Needless to say, then, the Council's interest was concentrated upon
what may be called formally christological problems. Its deliberations,
however, did not fully reflect the scope of the controversies and dis-
cussions which had preceded it. The public quarrel over the orthodoxy
of Theodore and his followers was, of course, one of long standing.
Reaching back at least to the period of the Formulary of Reunion,
adopted in 433, its beginnings antedate the Council of Chalcedon it-
self. The source of this contest over Theodore's orthodoxy can perhaps
be located in the determination of Rabbûla of Edessa, recently con-
verted to the views of the Alexandrian school, to extirpate Theodore's
teaching within the Syrian church.[4] From the very start, this con-
troversy was concerned primarily with the christological question. It
is, however, interesting and important to note that the question of
Theodore's doctrine of man became an issue as well, when his name
was introduced into the Pelagian quarrel in its later stages. With the
charge that he taught a Nestorian doctrine of the Person of Christ
was coupled, in certain circles, a charge that he adhered to a false
view of human sin and redemption.

The person initially responsible for this fresh allegation appears to
have been Marius Mercator, writing perhaps in the year 439.[5] In his
Commonitorium, directed against the Pelagian heresy, he traces the
origins of Pelagius' teaching to Syria, and suggests that Theodore
himself was one of its originators. He speaks of the doctrine that 'the
progenitors . . . of the human race, Adam and Eve, were created
mortal by God, and when they transgressed harmed none of their
posterity . . ., but hurt themselves alone'. This view he identifies as
'the issue formerly raised against the Catholic faith among some
Syrians, and especially in Cilicia by Theodore, former bishop of the

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[1] Whence the condemnation of the usage ἄλλος . . . ἄλλος of the natures of Christ
in Anathemas XII and XIV (Mansi, ix. 384 f.).   [2] Mansi, ix. 343B.

[3] Cf. Joh. Maxentius, *Libellus* (in Schwartz, *Acta Concil. Œc.* IV. ii, p. 6) and the
language of Anathema X (Mansi ix. 383).

[4] Cf. Ibas, *Ad Marim Persam* (in Schwartz, II. i. 392, ll. 25 ff.).

[5] For this date cf. R. Devréesse, *Essai sur Théodore de Mopsueste* (Rome, 1948),
p. 164.

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city of Mopsuestia'.[1] The opinion in question, he asserts, was brought
to Rome by a Syrian named Rufinus,[2] during the pontificate of
Anastasius, and it was by him that the British monk Pelagius was
deceived.

In yet another brief work, devoted to the translation and refutation
of the 'symbol' of Theodore of Mopsuestia,[3] Marius adopts a somewhat
different tactic. He sets out first of all to warn his readers against the
'pravum eius [sc. Theodori] de dispensatione dominica . . . sensum,
quo Nestorium . . . male decepit'.[4] Then, having lodged the charge of
christological heterodoxy, he goes on to issue a *caveat* about Theodore
on the grounds of his Pelagian associations. In this instance, Marius

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[1] Schwartz, I. v, p. 5.

[2] Ibid. On Rufinus see the discussion by Schwartz, *ACO*, I. v, 1, pp. xi f.
B. Altaner ('Der Liber de Fide, ein Werk des Pelagianers Rufin des "Syrers"',
Theologische Quartalschrift, 1950, pp. 432 ff.) identifies one of his writings: an anti-
Origenist, anti-Augustinian, and anti-Apollinarian work, which shows clear points
of similarity with the teaching of Theodore.

[3] The text of this symbol is reproduced in the Acts of the Ephesine Council of
431. Cf. Mansi, v. 696 ff.; Swete, *Epistolae Minores*, ii. 327 ff. It is also cited by
Cyril of Alexandria, *Quod Unus Sit Christus*, *PG*, lxxv. 1277D. Swete (*Dict. of
Christ. Biog*. iv. 943) attributes the Creed to Theodore as its author; more recently
this has been questioned. Cf. M. Jugie, 'Le "Liber ad Baptizandos" de Théodore
de Mopsueste' (*Echos d'Orient*, xxiv (1935), p. 258, n. 5); and E. Amann, 'La doc-
trine christologique de Théodore de Mopsueste' (*Revue des Sciences Religieuses*, xiv
(1934), p. 164, esp. n. 2). According to the Acts of the Ephesine Council, the Creed
was presented at the VIth Session with a communication from the presbyter
Charisius of Philadelphia, who reported that it had been brought there by one
James, a Constantinopolitan follower of Nestorius, who had induced certain
simple clerics to subscribe it. In the Acts of the Second Council of Constantinople
the Creed is explicitly attributed to Theodore ('Hoc symbolum Ephesina prima
synodus una cum auctore ejus anathematizavit': Mansi, ix. 229C, cf. 227 ff.), no
doubt following Marius Mercator. Justinian, in his letter read at the opening ses-
sion, asserts that it was anathematized also at Chalcedon—where, however, it was
not ascribed to Theodore. Cf. Mansi, ix. 183C and vi. 887 ff. Facundus of Hermiane
(*Pro def. trium cap*. iii. 2, in *PL*, lxvii. 588 f.) is at pains to point out that at Ephesus
the Creed was not in fact attributed to Theodore. The same assertion is made by
Pope Vigilius in his *Constitutum* (*PL*, lxix. 99CD). Facundus further notes that even
Cyril of Alexandria himself, though he mentions the attribution, does not lend it the
weight of his own authority. Facundus' reference is to Cyril's Ep. 72 (*PG*, lxxvii.
345 A.), to Proclus of Constantinople: "Ἴστω δὲ ἡ σὴ ὁσιότης, ὅτι παρενεχθείσης τῇ ἁγίᾳ
συνόδῳ ἐκθέσεως παρ᾽ αὐτοῦ [sc. Theodore] συνταχθείσης, ὡς οἱ πρόελοντες ἔφασκον,
οὐδὲν ἐχούσης ὑγιές. . . . Cyril's language suggests at least that the Council of
Ephesus must have been consciously chary of believing the statement that Theodore
was the author of this creed—if, indeed, the allegation that Theodore was its
author was ever made at the Council. Facundus is correct in pointing out the
significance of the fact that its Acts omit all reference to Theodore in this connexion.
Considering that it most certainly is not the symbol which Theodore employs as the
basis for his Catechetical Lectures, this Creed can be ascribed to him only with the
utmost hesitation. Its source is best considered doubtful.

[4] Schwartz, I. v, p. 23.

does not explicitly refer to his previous suggestion that Theodore was the originator of Pelagian teaching, although this view appears to be presupposed by the tone of his account. Rather, he calls attention to a visit paid to Theodore by Julian of Eclanum when the latter was in the East. Julian, it is suggested, regarded Theodore as a constituted and sympathetic authority on the matters which were at issue between Augustine and his Pelagian opponents, and which Julian himself expected to treat in an extended work.[1] Marius goes on to record that when his Italian visitor had left Cilicia, the Bishop of Mopsuestia consented in the decision of a local synod which anathematized Julian and his doctrine;[2] but Marius thinks that this action merely reflects the cleverness with which Theodore had learned to conceal his doctrinal aberrations from the rest of the Church.

Unfortunately, the Creed which Marius undertakes in this work to translate and refute contains little if any reference to a doctrine of man, of whatever sort. The Creed is concerned principally with trinitarian and christological matters, and, no doubt for this reason, Marius' *Refutatio* contains no expansion of the second of the two charges which he brings in his preface. He limits himself to a lengthy refutation of christological dualism; and it would appear that he was content to record the charge of Pelagianism without either developing it[3] or relating it to the christological heterodoxy which he detected in the Creed he took to be Theodore's. In one respect at least Marius' example seems to have been followed by later contributors to the controversy over Theodore's orthodoxy. John Maxentius repeats the accusation that Theodore taught a Pelagian doctrine of man,[4] but he does not bring this charge into relation with the principal accusation, that of Nestorianism.[5] The issue of Theodore's Pelagianism

[1] Schwartz, I. v, p. 23. Julian, it is said, sought out Theodore 'ut de haeresi Pelagiana . . ., quam defendendam et sequendam suscepit, ab ipso confirmaretur atque velut instructior octo . . . volumina illa . . . conderet'.   [2] Ibid.

[3] The *Collectio Palatina* contains a collection of five fragments which are obviously intended to lend substance to the charge that Theodore taught a Pelagian doctrine of man. These fragments (ed. Schwartz, I. v, pp. 173 ff.) are described as being from a work of Theodore directed against Augustine, and were long thought to have been assembled by Marius Mercator, to whose hand the whole of the *Collectio* was ascribed. Schwartz, however, gives reason (I. v, I, pp. viii f.) for supposing that the collection of these Fragments is to be assigned to the sixth century, and ascribed to the circle of monastics of which John Maxentius was a member.

[4] See his *Libellus* in Schwartz, IV. ii, p. 9.

[5] The connexion is in fact made—without specific reference to Theodore—by John Cassian in his anti-Nestorian *De incarnatione*. 'Illud sane unum praetereundum non arbitramur, quod peculiare ac proprium supradictae illius haereseos, quae ex Pelagiano errore descenderat, fuit: quod dicentes quidem solitarium hominem Jesum Christum sine ulla peccati contagione vixisse, eo progressi sunt,

appears, therefore, to have been treated, not merely as secondary to, but also as separate from, the question of his christological heterodoxy.

From another point of view altogether, however, both Theodore's critics and his defenders would have recognized a connexion between his doctrine of man and his christology. If during the fifth and sixth centuries the possible influence of a given view of sin and of redemption on the form of the doctrine of the Incarnation was not explicitly considered, much emphasis was laid on the analogy between the union of soul and body in man, and the union of the Godhead and the humanity in Christ. This analogy had been employed during the fourth century; and it is not surprising to discover that in later controversy, because the aptness of the analogy was assumed, much importance was attached to its correct formulation and interpretation. In the second of his *Dialogi contra nestorianos*, John Maxentius records the accepted view: 'exemplo . . . animae ad carnem factae unitionis . . . omnes doctores ecclesiae et inlustres viri dei verbi ad propriam carnem unitionem factam docere monstrantur.'[1] This observation occurs at the end of a passage in which the proponent of orthodoxy has been trying to explain to his Nestorian interlocutor that, just as the union of body and soul in one substance does not entail a modification of the soul's nature, so in the substantial union of Word and flesh the Divinity does not undergo change or suffer diminution.

Marius Mercator finds the analogy useful in his refutation of the Creed which he attributes to Theodore: in fact, he resorts to it twice, for slightly different purposes. In the first instance he is concerned, like John Maxentius above, to reply to the suggestion that a doctrine of substantial union entails alteration or diminution of some sort in the divine Word. In the Incarnation, he says, the 'man' became what he was not, the Word 'non deponens quod erat, sed manens deus . . . numquid enim anima . . . mixta et conexa corpori amittit vel immortalitatem naturae suae vel quod invisibilis, quod incorporea est?' To suppose that such is the case, he says, would be like supposing that the angels who visited Abraham had ceased to be angels when they assumed bodies—a notion which he dismisses as 'madness'.[2] But even

ut assererent homines, si velint, sine peccato esse posse. Consequens enim existimabant, ut si homo solitarius Jesus Christus sine peccato fuisset, omnes quoque homines sine adjutorio esse possint, quidquid ille homo solitarius sine consortio Dei esse potuisset. Ac si nullam facerent inter omnem hominem ac Dominum nostrum Jesum Christum esse distantiam; cum idem utique homo nisu atque industria sua mereri possit, quod Christus studio ac labore meruisset. Quo factum est ut in majorem quoque ac monstruosiorem insaniam prorumpentes, dicerent, Dominum nostrum Jesum Christum hunc in mundum, non ad praestandam humano generi redemptionem, sed ad praebenda bonorum actuum exempla venisse': *De incarn.* i. 3 (*PL*, l. 20A et seq.). Cf. vi. 14 and v. 1 f.

[1] Schwartz, IV. ii, p. 28.   [2] Ibid. I. v, p. 28.

though, in the union of soul with a material body, the former remains
fully itself, nevertheless it is true also that body and soul together make
up one single thing. Consequently, the same analogy which permits
the orthodox to counter the Nestorian objection that substantial union
would entail an alteration of the divine Nature enables him also to
assert the positive necessity of a doctrine of 'one nature' or 'one sub-
stance' in the case of the incarnate Word. 'Quid', Marius asks, 'sub-
stantiarum diversitas in uno domino Christo . . . nobis adfertur?' The
motive behind talk about a plurality of substances could, he thinks,
only be the desire to teach a doctrine of 'two Sons'. Yet, writes
Marius,

> homo communis ex anima et corpore constitutus, ex diversis sine dubio
> substantiis et naturis, corporali videlicet et spiritali . . . convenit in unum,
> non contra naturam, sed naturaliter . . . homo ergo . . . una natura est et
> una substantia unaque persona.[1]

And the same, *mutatis mutandis*, holds true of Christ, in whom also
immutable and invisible Spirit is united to flesh.

The use of this analogy was not, moreover, the peculiar habit of the
opponents of Antiochene christology. Marius and John Maxentius
employ it to reveal and refute the heterodoxy of Theodore and his
followers. Facundus of Hermiane, defending Theodore's reputation
against the attacks of the Acephali, finds that the analogy provides
a bulwark against the monophysitism of those who sought, as he saw it,
to pervert the sense of the Chalcedonian Definition. Theodore, he
thinks, employed the analogy in its correct sense, holding that body and
soul in man, although not in any sense 'of one nature', constitute
nevertheless 'one person'; and Theodore's calumniators have there-
fore misunderstood and misinterpreted the point of the analogy as it
was propounded by the orthodox Fathers.[2] Theodore, on the con-
trary, correctly conceiving the mode of union between soul and body,
is able to retain the essential distinction between 'person' and 'nature',
and thus, while distinguishing the properties of the Divinity and the
humanity in Christ, to adhere firmly to the doctrine of their union in
one *persona*.

To sum up, then, we may say that there were two respects in which
the anthropology of Theodore was of interest to the participants in the
controversy about his orthodoxy which led up to the Council of

[1] Schwartz, I. v, p. 27.
[2] *Pro def. trium cap.* ix. 4 (*PL*, lxvii. 756c–757A): 'Hinc autem cognoscant
Semieutychiani, qua intentione dicatur ab aliis Patribus, quos putant in duabus
Christum negasse naturis, quia sicut anima et corpus unum hominem faciunt, ita
ex divinitate et humanitate unus est Christus: quod hoc ab eis non ad naturae, sed
ad personae potius unitatem dicatur.'

Constantinople. The charge of Pelagianism was brought against him
as a second and distinct accusation, at a time when interest was
centred primarily on the question of his doctrine of the Incarnation.
In addition, his christology itself was thought to presuppose an inter-
pretation of the common analogy between the union of body and soul
in man and the unity of the Word with his humanity in Christ. In
neither case, however, was the discussion always very closely bound up
with knowledge or citation of the works of Theodore himself. Particu-
larly in the case of the body-soul analogy, both his attackers and his
defenders appear to have been relying largely on assumptions as to
what someone of Theodore's known propensities would necessarily
have thought about this classic problem; and they may, therefore,
have been attributing to him opinions which had in fact been pro-
pounded by other defenders of the diphysite tradition. The evidence
cited, however, is of interest in so far as it indicates one sense in which
it was immediately supposed that considerations derived ultimately
from a philosophical anthropology might have a clear bearing on the
form of the doctrine of the Incarnation as Theodore stated it.

APPENDIX II

Anthropology and Christology in Modern Discussion of Theodore

IN the discussion of Theodore's teaching which formed a significant part of the fifth- and sixth-century christological controversy, the issue of his doctrine of man, while taken account of, did not loom unduly large. But if his contemporaries and immediate posterity made little of the significance of his anthropology as the foundation, or even as an integral part, of the theological point of view expressed in Theodore's christology, the same cannot be said of his modern interpreters. Discussion of Theodore in the nineteenth century, as well as in the twentieth, has with remarkable consistency interested itself in the teaching about man and human redemption which underlay Theodore's doctrine of the Person of Christ; and it has shown a corresponding tendency to see in Theodore's christology the logical consequence of his understanding of man's nature and of the nature of man's salvation. The tone, if not the invariable conclusion, of modern interpretation of Theodore is aptly enough expressed in the dictum that 'The Nestorian Christ is a fit Saviour for the Pelagian man'. Whereas for a Marius Mercator or a John Maxentius Theodore's alleged Pelagianism was an aberration not directly or plainly connected with his principal heresy, more recent writers have seen an organic relationship between the two aspects of his thought.

J. A. Dorner's Interpretation

This strain in the interpretation of Theodore finds its classical expression in the great work of J. A. Dorner, *The History of the Development of the Doctrine of the Person of Christ*.[1] The Antiochene School of theologians, says Dorner, 'devoted itself with all its weight, and with whatever creative power it could boast, to anthropology'.[2] Consequently, Dorner lays it down as axiomatic that 'In endeavouring to understand the christology of the School of Antioch, we must start with its peculiar doctrine concerning the nature and constitution of man'.[3] This doctrine he proceeds to expound in terms largely drawn from Theodore himself.

At the centre of Theodore's anthropology, according to Dorner, lies

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[1] English translation by Simon: Edinburgh, 1866.
[2] Op. cit. II. i, p. 25.
[3] Ibid., p. 33.

a distinctive doctrine of man as the image of God. Man's status as image of God is constituted, on this view, by his character as a being in whose double nature the antagonism of spirit and matter is overcome and the unity and harmony of the created world guaranteed. However, man's fulfilment of this role, which is his by reason of his very constitution, is dependent upon his exercise of the free will which pertains to his nature as a rational and spiritual creature. Consequently, the unity and harmony of the created world was from the beginning a programme to be realized through a process of moral growth on the part of mankind. In this sense, existence as the image of God was, for the first man, a goal to be achieved by free moral effort, and not a status automatically, and therefore extra-morally, accorded him. 'It is, therefore', writes Dorner, '. . . a universal moral law that man cannot be perfect at the very beginning.'[1] Theodore's 'ethical tendency', and the significance which he, like Apollinaris, attached to the doctrine of the freedom of the will, led him inevitably to the position that man at his first creation was a creature imperfect and incomplete, whose perfection was contingent upon his response to the law by which God sought to guide him.

It is this insistence on man's original imperfection which accounts for the secondary role which the fall of Adam plays in Theodore's system. The result of Adam's fall was that to the work of the world's perfection was added that of overcoming the positive disharmony and antagonism which man's rebellion had introduced into the cosmos: and 'herein lies the ground of the Divine incarnation'.[2] The work of the Divine Incarnation was that of making it possible again for man to fulfil his preordained function as the bond of the creation—to overcome sin, and death which was the consequence of sin.[3]

Given such a set of presuppositions, Dorner writes,

Theodore's christology must assume a form totally different from any that had preceded it. In the *first place*, a function of fundamental importance was assigned to the humanity of Christ: the mission of Christ was to be that true and real image of God, which Adam ought to have been but failed to become. He is regarded as an indispensable part of the cosmos. . . . In the *second place*, Theodore follows that ethical tendency which claims that Christ also, so far as he is under the necessity of being truly a man, shall undergo a moral development.[4]

It is, therefore, in man's eternal cosmic function as a created, embodied spirit, and in the necessity that this function, morally conceived, be fulfilled by the creature itself as a free agent, that Dorner sees the rationale of Theodore's doctrine of redemption, and, derivatively, of

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[1] Loc. cit., p. 33.
[2] Ibid., p. 34.
[3] Ibid., p. 33.
[4] Ibid., p. 34.

his christology. In this system the manhood of Christ is accorded a significance which necessitates the christological dualism with which Theodore is reproached. Moreover, the same ethical concern which dictates the Nestorian form of Theodore's christology determines his mildly Pelagian view both of the fall and of the place of human co-operation in the work of cosmic redemption. There is a basically evolutionary cast to Theodore's conception of the *Heilsgeschichte*: and the evolution in question must, on his view, be to a significant degree the result of the moral decisions of the human will. In this distinctive anthropology lies the key to the Antiochene doctrine of the Incarnation.

Harnack and Theodore

In Harnack's *History of Dogma*,[1] Dorner's emphasis on the evolutionary facet of Theodore's doctrine of man and redemption is developed and expanded, and again set forth as the basic determinant of the Antiochene system. In Harnack's exposition the central element in Theodore's thought is the distinctive Antiochene understanding of the meaning of redemption. The notion of redemption as restoration of man to his primitive unfallen state—a notion typical of the Origenist strain in Greek theology—is foreign to the Antiochene mentality. For it, Theodore and the whole Antiochene School are seen by Harnack to have substituted the idea that redemption means primarily the elevation of mankind from its original condition to a higher state of existence. Harnack therefore seizes on Theodore's doctrine of the two καταστάσεις as fundamental for his thought. In the κατάστασις of the creation, man is naturally unstable and mortal. As a consequence, he is involved necessarily in moral failure. By the coming of Christ, however, he is assured of the immortality and immutability of the second κατάστασις, which will be realized in the resurrection from the dead. Harnack, then, differs slightly from Dorner in his account of the significance of the fall of Adam within Theodore's system. Adam's fall is seen to be simply a necessary stage in the moral growth of humanity —the natural and typical manifestation of man's present state of mortality and mutability, which, in turn, is the condition of his education as a free moral agent.

As Harnack sees it, therefore, Theodore conceived the process of redemption in moralistic terms. Redemption is precisely the process by which man learns to distinguish between ethical good and evil, and, as a free agent, to choose the one and eschew the other. Such moralism, in which there is 'an entire absence of any religious view of sin',[2] explains why the Antiochenes would naturally be hostile to the doctrine

[1] Tr. J. Millar, Williams & Norgate: London, Edinburgh, and Oxford, 1897.

[2] Op. cit., vol. iii, p. 280.

of original sin. They took it that such teaching inevitably minimized man's moral freedom, deprived him of genuine responsibility, and under-emphasized the part which he must play in his own salvation. Nevertheless, Theodore, despite this 'rationalistic and Aristotelian' view of man,[1] differs from the strict teaching of Pelagius in that he sees human effort as being a necessary, though not a sufficient, condition of redemption. The coming of Christ alone is the sufficient condition.

The christological consequences of this anthropology are clear. The Antiochenes generally, and Theodore in particular, did not cast Christ so much in the role of the supernatural Redeemer as they did in the role of the Man in whose free personality the promise of the second κατάστασις has been realized. Thus, Harnack asserts, it was the Antiochene teaching that the work of redemption which Christ wrought is to be ascribed not so much to God as its author, as to the Man Jesus. This anthropological point of view combined with an intense conviction of the immutability and impassibility of God to determine the form of Antiochene christology. Hence it becomes true to say that 'The christology of the Antiochenes was . . . not soteriologically determined'.[2] The same set of premisses, of course, accounts for the Antiochene insistence that Christ had two natures 'in the strong sense'.

Thus Harnack too sets in prominent relief the supposition that the christology of Theodore is, to a significant degree, the expression of anthropological and (in the broadest sense) soteriological presuppositions which have their roots in a general philosophical view of human nature. Dorner and Harnack together present a fairly consistent and, within the limits we have noted, a fairly unanimous account of the bases of Theodore's christology. Theodore's insistence on the personal character of Christ's manhood has two foundations: on the one hand, a strong moralism, which sees in man's freedom the essential mark of his nature; and, on the other hand, an evolutionary view of redemption which minimizes the significance of the fall of Adam. Harnack further contributes the suggestion that the philosophical associations of this outlook are to be found in the teachings of the Peripatetic school, or more particularly, perhaps, in those of Aristotle himself, the great rationalist.

In more recent years this interpretation of Theodore's system has found both supporters and opponents. Certain authors have attempted to combat the view that Theodore was essentially a Pelagian and a Nestorian, and have found in a reconsideration of his doctrine of man the key to a renewed appreciation of the fundamentally orthodox intent and structure of his christology. Others, and this with increasing

[1] Ibid., p. 283.

[2] Op. cit. iv, p. 166.

persuasiveness, have argued in effect that the classical analysis of Theodore's thought, as systematized and interpreted by Harnack and Dorner, is substantially reliable and correct.

Theodore's Philosophical Affinities

Harnack's view, that the Antiochene doctrine of man can only properly be understood as proceeding from an Aristotelian and rationalistic philosophical outlook, has received general acceptance, although the problem of Theodore's philosophical sympathies has not been investigated with systematic care. Thus Dr. Raven can speak of 'the two elements which after [Paul of Samosata] became characteristic of Antiochene theology, literal exegesis of Scripture, and Aristotelianism'.[1] According to Raven, this Aristotelianism is a matter of 'standpoint' and is revealed in an 'interest in the concrete and particular',[2] as well as in the use of themes derived from Aristotle's ethics.[3] Raven is unable to name a particular source for this Aristotelian influence: he ascribes it in the end to a 'type of culture', and suggests, partly on the basis of the evidence for later Muslim interest in Aristotle, that Aristotelian thought was widespread in Syria from an early date.[4] Sellers, in *Two Ancient Christologies*, records a somewhat similar point of view. The Antiochenes, he writes, are 'not idealists, but realists . . . theirs is not so much the metaphysical as the ethical point of view. . . . If the Church has her Christian Platonists, she has also her Christian Aristotelians.'[5] J. N. D. Kelly, in *Early Christian Doctrines*, is somewhat more specific in his analysis of what this Aristotelianism amounts to. Theodore's insistence on the completeness of Christ's humanity, as an organism 'composed of a body and an immortal soul', he traces to its

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[1] *Apollinarianism* (Cambridge, 1923), p. 54.   [2] Op. cit., p. 55.

[3] Ibid., p. 56. Cf. L. Patterson, *Theodore of Mopsuestia and Modern Thought* (London, 1926), pp. 28 f. Patterson argues that Theodore's conception of Christ's moral progress 'may have been influenced to some extent by the ethical teaching of the Peripatetic school of philosophy'. He refers to Diogenes Laertius, vii. 127: 'They (sc. the Stoics) hold that there is nothing intermediate between virtue and vice, while the Peripatetics say that the state of 'progress' (προκοπή) falls between virtue and vice'. 'This term', Patterson writes, 'was used by Paul of Samosata to express his belief in the moral progress of Christ, and was probably inherited from him by the teachers of the school of Antioch.' However, Patterson's statement of the christological bearing of the notion of 'progress' suggests that it could have had little relation with the Peripatetic opinion to which he refers. Christologically applied, he says, it does not mean 'that our Lord advanced . . . from perfection to imperfection, but rather that he was perfect at every stage of his human life.' The suggested parallel seems far-fetched.

[4] Op. cit., p. 59.

[5] Op. cit., p. 109. But cf. *The Council of Chalcedon*, p. 166, where Sellers records a change in his views. He would now see the primary characteristic of the Antiochene standpoint in its affinities with O.T. thought, rather than in its associations with a philosophical school.

presupposition in 'the Aristotelian anthropology favoured by the Antiochenes';[1] and he further defines this Aristotelianism as the view that 'body and soul constitute a composite unity, the body being as matter to the soul, and the soul, as it were, the Form of the body'.[2]

This analysis had, however, already been called in question indirectly by Arnou in an important article entitled 'Nestorianisme et Néoplatonisme',[3] which is doubly significant for our purposes. Arnou reopens the question which, as we have seen, was touched on by certain fifth- and sixth-century authors: the question of the sense in which the Antiochenes (and Theodore among them) employed the analogy of the body-soul union in man as a clue for the understanding of the union of Logos and humanity in Christ. Citing relevant passages in Nemesius of Emesa's *De hominis natura*, Arnou attempts to show that the later Antiochenes, deserting Aristotle,[4] adopted the Neo-Platonic doctrine of the mode of union between an intelligible and a material substance, applying this doctrine both to the problem of the constitution of man,[5] and to that of the Incarnation. Theodore's use of such terms as σχέσις, γνώμη, and διάθεσις is taken to show his affinity with Nemesius and the Neo-Platonists, despite his final reluctance to speak, christologically, in terms of 'natural union'. Thus, Arnou concludes, the Antiochenes, 'conceiving the union in a fashion more Platonic than Peripatetic . . . are content with a very loose bond, a bond of the moral order' between the manhood and the Godhead in Christ.[6]

Arnou may or may not be correct in the detail of his analysis[7] but his work remains important both because it calls attention again to an

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[1] Op. cit., p. 304.   [2] Ibid., p. 12.

[3] In *Gregorianum*, vol. xvii (1936), pp. 122–31.

[4] Ibid., pp. 122 f. Arnou sees in the christology of Apollinaris an expression of the Aristotelian doctrine that two complete substances cannot become one. Cf. Aristotle, *Metaph.* 1039ᵃ.

[5] It should be observed, however, that Arnou does not directly discuss Theodore's anthropological use of this idea, but only his application of it to the christological problem.

[6] Art. cit., p. 131.

[7] Arnou's thesis is criticized and, in one respect, rejected by Fr. L. Scipioni, O.P., in so far as it is taken to apply in the case of Nestorius: cf. Scipioni's work, *Ricerche sulla cristologia del 'Libro de Eraclide' di Nestorio* (Fribourg, 1956). With Arnou, Scipioni 'sottolinea la grande importanza che l'esempio dell'unione tra l'anima e il corpo nell'uomo occupa fra i Padri, nella chiarificazione del dogma cristologico' (p. 15). But Arnou errs in thinking that Nestorius' position is related to the Neo-Platonism of Nemesius. Nestorius adopts a stoic view of the union of soul and body in man, and so is forced to insist upon 'il carattere completamente diverso, anzi opposto dell'unione anima-corpo, rispetto all'unione della divinita all'umanita de Cristo' (p. 33). Nestorius' christology in fact involves a view of the union of the Logos and the humanity which is defined by way of contrast with the mode of the soul-body union in man. Cf. Wolfson, *The Philosophy of the Church Fathers* (Cambridge, Mass., 1956), pp. 445 f.

important respect in which Theodore's philosophical anthropology bears on his christology, and because it implicitly questions the tendency to a facile identification of the Antiochene 'outlook' with Aristotelianism—an identification which has in fact never been carefully examined.

Defence of Theodore's Orthodoxy

Quite independently of the discussion of Theodore's philosophical affinities, which have remained a subsidiary issue for historians of dogma, the problem of his anthropological and christological orthodoxy has been the subject of ever-renewed investigation. Because of the tendency to neglect the matter of the relation of Theodore's thought to its secular and philosophical background, these questions have been dealt with in almost purely dogmatic and theological terms. Discussion of Theodore's anthropology has centred all but exclusively around his doctrine of the Two Ages and his treatment of the Fall of Adam; in general the attempt has been to show either that his position is, or is not, susceptible of having a moderately Augustinian interpretation placed on it. Theodore's defenders have tried, in effect, to demonstrate that, despite his insistence on the freedom of the human will and his moralism, Theodore takes a serious view of the Fall of Adam and its consequences: a view which, in turn, necessitates a doctrine of redemption which emphasizes the divine initiative in the Incarnation, and thus makes it possible for the historian to take quite seriously Theodore's protestations that he did not teach a doctrine of 'two Sons'. It should be noted, however, that not all contributors to this continuing discussion have called attention to a connexion between Theodore's doctrine of man and his christology.

L. Patterson, for example, touches both on the Antiochene's anthropology and his treatment of the Person of Christ, but makes no attempt to show a clear relation between them. Discussing Theodore's doctrine of man, he follows Harnack in emphasizing the conception of the Two Ages, and attributes to Theodore the view that 'The original state of man ... was mortality'.[1] He denies, however, that Theodore was in the full sense a Pelagian.[2] 'It would', he concedes, 'be more in accordance with Theodore's conception of man to say that sin was the consequence of mortality than that it was its cause.'[3] Nevertheless, 'Theodore seems to admit that Adam's sin affected not only himself but his posterity',[4] in that it brought mortality upon them. Patterson, unhappily, does not note or explore the apparent inconsistency between these two statements, nor does he inquire into the reasons which might account for it. Rather, he goes on to call attention to the centrality of the doctrine of

[1] *Theodore of Mopsuestia and Modern Thought*, p. 14. [2] Ibid., p. 21.
[3] Ibid., p. 17. [4] Ibid., pp. 15 f.

free will for Antiochene anthropology, and to the evolutionary cast of Theodore's thought on the subject of redemption—again following Harnack: 'Theodore does not believe in the original perfection of man, and his subsequent perversion, but in his natural imperfection and the ultimate perfectibility of human nature.'[1] Patterson, however, does not draw from this doctrine the christological consequences which Harnack sees as following from it. On the contrary, while recognizing Theodore's tendency towards christological dualism, he insists that the Bishop of Mopsuestia did affirm the unity of Christ's Person, 'though the expression of his belief may sometimes be ambiguous and unsatisfactory'.[2] 'Of one thing Theodore is perfectly certain, that the distinction of natures did not destroy the unity of person.'[3] Patterson's essay, then, while in fact it presents no picture of Theodore's system as a coherent whole, represents an initial effort towards reviving his reputation for orthodoxy.

A further contribution towards the understanding of Theodore's doctrine of man was made by A. Slomgowski,[4] who, however, engages in no reflections on the christology of Theodore, or on the connexion between his christology and his anthropology. What is of primary interest in his essay is his attempt to deal, against the background of the doctrine of the Two Ages, with the apparent inconsistency which, as we have seen, Patterson registers without noting, and which bears clearly on the question of Theodore's Pelagianism. On the one hand, Slomgowski asserts, Theodore plainly teaches that, as a matter of fact, Adam existed in an immortal state after his creation, and that, consequently, death is to be conceived as the result of sin.[5] On the other hand, 'there are a number of texts where Theodore affirms that Adam and Eve were mortal by nature, and that death must not be ascribed to the fall alone'.[6] Slomgowski considers that the two kinds of statement are reconcilable, if we recognize that in the former case Theodore is 'concerned with a point of fact', while in the latter 'he is concerned, as a philosopher, with the question of right. Thus . . . he can say that Adam was immortal, the while being "mortal by nature".'[7] Slomgowski concludes that, on Theodore's view, Adam and Eve, as created, belonged to the first κατάστασις—as Harnack had insisted; but that nevertheless Theodore conformed to ecclesiastical tradition in conceding the factual immortality of the first man.

The tendency to take a more generous view of Theodore's claims to

[1] Ibid., p. 17. [2] Op. cit., p. 39.
[3] Ibid., p. 41.
[4] In his monograph, *L'État Primitif de l'homme dans la tradition de l'Église avant St. Augustin*, Paris, 1928.
[5] Op. cit., p. 121.
[6] Ibid., p. 125. [7] Op. cit., p. 125.

orthodoxy was lent a further impetus by the work of E. Amann.[1] Dealing with the question of Theodore's Pelagianism, he too notes the apparent inconsistency of certain of Theodore's statements about the relation between human sin and human death; but he presents a rather different solution from that proposed by Slomgowski. In order to account for the phenomenon, he suggests the hypothesis of a development in Theodore's views—or at least in his emphases.[2] In the Catechetical Lectures, Amann says, the reader finds ideas 'approaching Augustinianism'; but in the fragments of Theodore's final work, directed against Jerome's statement of the doctrine of Original Sin, the view taken seems to be 'Pelagianizing'.[3] Nevertheless, Amann continues,

would it not be better to think that between the two expositions, that of the Catecheses and Commentaries on the one hand, and that of the treatise against Jerome on the other, the contradiction is more apparent than real?[4]

Amann thinks, in effect, that the 'anti-Augustinian' treatise, if read not in fragments but in its integral state, would be found to contain 'an exposition of the doctrine of the double condition of humanity', that is, of the doctrine of the Two Ages in all its ramifications.

In this section Theodore could restate his favourite ideas on the transmission by Adam to his posterity first of mortality, and of the tendency to evil . . . his conception would not differ greatly from the Augustinian conception properly understood.[5]

What this conception is, and its bearing on the christological question, can be discovered from a reading of the fifth of the Catechetical Lectures. There Theodore teaches that 'The sin of Adam has introduced into all of humanity the tendency to evil, sin, and, as a consequence of sin, death . . .'.[6] This situation is remedied by the appearance of the Man-God, whose humanity necessarily includes not only a body, but also a rational and immortal soul: 'for it is not only corporeal death which must cease, but also that of the soul, which is sin'.[7] But while Theodore thus insists on the full humanity of Christ and, against Apollinaris, on the autonomy[8] of that humanity, he nevertheless propounds considerations which amount to a doctrine of *communicatio*

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[1] See the Article 'Théodore de Mopsueste' in the *Dict. Th. Cath*. vol. xv (1); and 'La doctrine christologique de Théodore de Mopsueste', in *Revue Sc. Rel*. vol. xiv (1934).

[2] Art. 'Théodore de Mopsueste', cols. 272 ff. (For a similar view cf. W. de Wries, 'Der "Nestorianismus" Theodors von Mopsuestia', *Or. Chr. Per*. vii (1941), p. 100.)

[3] Ibid., col. 275.   [4] Ibid.

[5] Art. 'Théodore de Mopsueste', cols. 275f.   [6] Ibid., col. 261.

[7] Ibid.   [8] Cf. ibid., cols. 256 f.

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idiomatum,[1] and in this way sets aside the doctrine of 'two Sons' to affirm the unity of Christ's Person.[2]

With the work of R. V. Sellers, *Two Ancient Christologies*, the Dorner–Harnack strain in the interpretation of Theodore is explicitly called in question. Sellers here undertakes to show the fundamentally orthodox intent and structure of Antiochene theology generally, with reference to christological issues. In a later work he writes:

. . . so far as fundamentals are concerned, there is no difference between the christological teaching of the Antiochenes, and that of the Alexandrians, though, when set beside that raised by the latter, the Antiochene doctrinal structure must appear crude and unfinished.[3]

This judgement, moreover, is true not only of the formal christology of the Antiochenes, but also of its soteriological motivation. Sellers is emphatic in his denial of Harnack's allegation that the Antiochenes' christology is not 'soteriologically determined'.[4] 'Their thought', he insists, 'is essentially theocentric: they see that only through an act on the part of God Himself'[5] can the second Adam in whom the creation is renewed come into existence. Redemption must indeed be worked through the obedience of the second Adam; but such obedience is possible only by reason of the intervention of God himself, who becomes man in order to effect the salvation of his creatures. Further, 'the Antiochenes . . . do indeed see that it is man's fall which has rendered the Incarnation necessary'.[6] While, therefore, Sellers can describe the Antiochenes generally as 'humanists',[7] and acknowledge 'their interest in man as a free agent',[8] he denies that they taught a merely evolutionary doctrine of redemption. Citing Theodore, he avers that 'according to the Antiochenes, death and mutability are the outcome of sin';[9] and consequently the first $\kappa\alpha\tau\acute{\alpha}\sigma\tau\alpha\sigma\iota\varsigma$—man's present state of mortality and instability—is not the order of God's creation, but the order brought about by man's disobedience. Of course, this statement must be understood in the right sense. The Antiochenes did find it difficult 'to understand why the whole of mankind should suffer on account of one man's transgression'.[10] Even granting their clear affirmation that death is the result of sin, and their serious view of the cosmic consequences of man's fall, it remains the case that they lacked

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[1] Ibid., cols. 261 f. Cf. col. 264.

[2] Cf. ibid., cols. 263 f. and 259: 'En attribuant ainsi à une seule personne ces deux attributs dissemblables . . ., le Symbole montre l'étroite union des deux natures et aussi l'unité de filiation, cette union s'étant effectuée par la bienveillance divine.' Cf. 'La christologie de Théodore de Mopsueste', loc. cit., p. 167.

[3] *The Council of Chalcedon*, p. 181.   [4] Cf. above, p. 249.

[5] *Two Ancient Christologies*, p. 117.   [6] Ibid., p. 129.

[7] Ibid., p. 117.   [8] Ibid., p. 109.

[9] Ibid., p. 116, n. 5.   [10] Ibid., p. 114.

a clear grasp of the universality of sin. This fact, however, does not, in Sellers' view, contravene the plain evidence that the aeon of redemption, the second κατάστασις, is for the Antiochenes in some sense a *restoration* of the state of Adam before his fall, when man 'did not see death, and his soul remained immutable'.[1]

Sellers further makes it clear that this revision in the estimate of the seriousness with which Theodore regarded the Fall must have direct implications for the understanding of his christology. Antiochene christology is incorrigibly dualistic: this follows from the central importance in Antiochene thought generally of the human will and its freedom. The redemption of man for Theodore and his followers meant primarily the redemption of the human will in its essential freedom; whence it is that the κατάστασις of salvation presupposes the emergence of a new Man, whose free obedience to God inaugurates the age of immutability and incorruption. But 'since man, being what he is, is unable to free himself from the chains of disobedience, God himself must intervene, and, through creating, and uniting to himself, the new Man, bring into being the "Man-God"'.[2] Thus the Incarnation, by which man's redemption is wrought, is the true work of God at the same time as it is the true work of 'the Man's' obedience. There is, therefore, no incongruity between Theodore's doctrine of man and the affirmation that in Christ the Word himself has become man for man's salvation.[3] Thus, relying heavily on the evidence of the Catechetical Lectures, Sellers attempts to point out that a fresh understanding of Theodore's doctrine of man shows the way to a revised estimate of his christology—affirming the connexion which Dorner and Harnack had seen between Theodore's anthropology and his christology, while questioning their detailed analysis.

Sellers' conclusions are in certain respects confirmed by Mgr. R. Devréesse in his more recent work, *Essai sur Théodore de Mopsueste*. Of primary interest to Devréesse is the question whether, as the result of the recovery of extensive tracts of Theodore's works, it is possible to revise in a favourable sense the judgement passed upon him in 553. To this end he simply summarizes the principal heads of Theodore's version of 'the history of the divine revelation', as that may be reconstructed from his writings. He concludes that the accusations brought against Theodore in the fifth and sixth centuries were substantially false. In large part he rests this conclusion upon his contention that the fragments of Theodore's works used at the Council of Constantinople had been falsified or interpolated by hostile hands,[4]

[1] *Two Ancient Christologies*, p. 113.
[2] *The Council of Chalcedon*, p. 167. The expression 'Man-God' is cited as from Nestorius: cf. ibid., n. 2.   [3] *Two Ancient Christologies*, pp. 125 ff.
[4] Op. cit., p. 103, and chapter ix. For a similar view cf. M. Richard, 'La

and must therefore be used only with caution, if at all, in the reconstruction of Theodore's views. Thus he affirms that, according to Theodore, Adam was created immortal, and became mortal as the result of his sin. In this way Adam 'inaugurated for his descendants the conditions of the present life'.[1] For Theodore, then, the first κατάστασις is not to be identified with man's condition as creature, but with his condition as sinner. The state of man which requires that he be redeemed is brought about by his rebellion against the order of God; and Adam's sin, furthermore, involves the whole of his posterity—if not in its guilt, then at least in its objective consequences.[2] Devréesse, of course, recognizes Theodore's profound moralism, which is the basis of his insistence upon the freedom of man's will;[3] but Devréesse is not eager to draw out the possible christological consequences of this attitude. He insists first of all—again in agreement with Sellers—that Theodore's doctrine of the Incarnation is an account of the action which God has taken in the Person of the Logos to remedy the consequences of mankind's rebellion in Adam.[4] Christ is thus truly God made man: for the results of man's sin can only be overcome by the condescension of God himself. At the same time, however, the salvation of man demands that it be the work of one who is the Pioneer of the human race. Christ 'had to be the first to travel the way of salvation and of the return of man to his immortal condition'.[5] So much will Devréesse concede to Harnack's contention that for Theodore the work of redemption is primarily the task of man himself.

More recently still, Fr. Paul Galtier, taking careful account of the work of Sullivan,[6] has risen to a spirited defence of Theodore's essential christological orthodoxy in a series of two articles in *Recherches de Science Religieuse*.[7] Galtier insists that what is basic to Theodore's thought is the idea of the unity of Christ's πρόσωπον—which is the πρόσωπον of the Word, the natural Son of God. For Theodore it is the Word who, by uniting to himself the assumed Man, has brought him to share in his own natural divine Sonship. Galtier denies that

tradition des fragments du traité περὶ τῆς ἐνανθρωπήσεως de Théodore de Mopsueste', *Le Muséon*, lvi (1943), pp. 55 ff. Richard suggests that the Conciliar Fragments, and those cited by Leontius and Vigilius, derive from the same source as that from which St. Cyril derived his knowledge of Theodore's works: a collection of extracts handed to Cyril at Jerusalem in August 438, by opponents of the Antiochene tradition. A comparison of the texts of those Conciliar Fragments to which there are independent Syriac parallels with the texts of such parallels indicates, according to Richard, that the former have been tampered with and are therefore unreliable. See further below, p. 260.

[1] *Essai*, pp. 98 f.   [2] Ibid., p. 99.
[3] Cf. ibid., p. 100.   [4] Ibid., p. 110.
[5] Ibid.   [6] See below, pp. 260 f.
[7] 'Théodore de Mopsueste: sa vraie pensée sur l'Incarnation', *Rech. Sc. Rel.*, vol. xlv, nos. 2 (pp. 161 ff.) and 3 (pp. 338 ff.).

Theodore taught a doctrine of merely 'moral' union, or that he conceived 'the πρόσωπον of the union' to be a 'collective' πρόσωπον: the effect of an external conjunction of two independent 'persons'. The perfect co-operation of human and divine wills is, on Theodore's view, the result rather than the ground of the incarnation of the Word. Galtier consequently—if somewhat startlingly—attempts throughout his articles to suggest that Theodore's position is substantially, if not by way of language or emphasis, identical with the teaching of Cyril of Alexandria. He therefore sees in Theodore's doctrine a statement of the essential belief which was, in a form different from Theodore's, canonized at Chalcedon.

An equally sympathetic, though otherwise radically differing, treatment of Theodore's position is to be found in R. A. Greer's *Theodore of Mopsuestia*[1]—which provides, incidentally, a useful general introduction to Theodore's thought as well as a careful discussion of the relation between his christological prepossessions and his exegetical method. Greer emphasizes the connexion between Theodore's doctrine of man and his christology in a manner reminiscent essentially of the classical analyses of Dorner and Harnack. He draws attention to Theodore's strong ethical interest, his insistence upon the creatureliness of man, and his espousal of 'the notion of man created imperfect and ready to be redeemed by *paideia* from imperfection to perfection'.[2] This last-mentioned theme is closely connected with Theodore's sense of man's essential freedom as a moral agent, which, in turn, is bound up with his understanding of 'the *homo assumptus* as a real being separate from the Logos'.[3] Greer does not attempt to assimilate Theodore's christology to that of the Fathers of Chalcedon, but offers instead what is at once a critique and an appreciation of his attempt to state a doctrine of the unity of God and Man in Christ in terms of 'moral harmony' and grace.[4] At the same time he insists throughout that Theodore's christology is the creation of one who was by inclination an exegete rather than a philosopher or theologian—one whose thought turned invariably to biblical concepts and images for its expression.

Replies and Objections

The growing stream of defences of Theodore's orthodoxy has not gone its way without meeting resistance. M. Jugie,[5] writing in 1935 and reconsidering Theodore's christological formula in the light of Mingana's edition of the Catechetical Lectures, concludes that the newly discovered texts confirm the traditional judgement on Theodore's

[1] London, 1961.   [2] Op. cit., p. 23. See also pp. 16 ff.
[3] Ibid., p. 53.   [4] Ibid., pp. 57 f.
[5] 'Le "Liber ad baptizandos" de Théodore de Mopsueste', *Échos d'Orient*, xxxiv (1935), pp. 257 ff.

teaching.[1] Of more direct interest for our purposes is the consideration of Theodore's dogmatic position by W. de Vries,[2] who sees in the interrelated themes of Theodore's anthropology, soteriology, and christology the outlook which determines the shape of his sacramental theology. What is of particular importance in de Vries's analysis is his reversal of the customary logical roles of the several elements in Theodore's system. For Dorner and Harnack, as well as for the majority of more recent contributors to the discussion of Theodore's teaching, it is Theodore's anthropology and his doctrine of redemption which are conceived as the basic elements in his system—the determinants of his christological position. For de Vries, on the other hand, Theodore's *Fundamentalirrtum* is his 'denial . . . that God has truly become man, that one and the same is God and man in one person'—an error which has its roots in Theodore's 'rationalistic tendency'.[3] This christological dualism, according to which Christ is a man indwelt by God,[4] accounts for the distinctive character of Theodore's soteriology. On the one hand, it serves to explain why, for Theodore, 'The mediator of our salvation is the man Christ'[5]—that is to say, a *mere* man. On the other hand, it accounts for the fact that salvation, in Theodore's view, can be defined exhaustively in terms of immortality and immutability.

If a mere man is for us the mediator of the grace of redemption, then this cannot consist in participation in the divine life. Further: our exaltation is nothing other than a sharing in the Lordship of Christ. But if this does not really mean divinization—the man Christ is indeed not really God—then neither can our sharing in the good things of Christ really confer on us the *consortium divinae naturae*.[6]

Thus Theodore's christological error leads to a misunderstanding of the very meaning of redemption: and this misunderstanding in turn suggests the reason why the conception of original sin has no significance for Theodore. Since he fails to conceive of redemption as a true participation in a genuinely supernatural life, the notion of an inherited loss of supernatural life can hardly be meaningful for him. For this reason it is not difficult to comprehend why Theodore, in the end, elected to follow in the way of the Pelagian Party.[7] De Vries, in effect, revives an interpretation of Theodore's teaching not dissimilar to that of Harnack, picturing Theodore as a thoroughgoing rationalist

[1] Cf. ibid., p. 259: 'L'évêque de Mopsueste voit en réalité en Jésus Christ deux personnalités distinctes, celle de Dieu le Verbe, et celle de Jésus.' Thus the true formula of his Christology is *alius in alio*, not *unus et idem*.
[2] 'Der "Nestorianismus" Theodors von Mopsuestia . . .', *Or. Chr. Per.* vii (1941), pp. 91 ff.   [3] Ibid., p. 92.
[4] Ibid., pp. 93 ff.   [5] Ibid., p. 102.
[6] Art. cit., p. 106.   [7] Ibid., p. 100.

who is uncomfortable to a degree before any theology which takes seriously the mysteries of a life at once genuinely human and genuinely 'supernatural' in quality.

It was, however, the effort of Mgr. Devréesse to rehabilitate Theodore as an orthodox teacher which has stimulated the most pronounced reaction. His attempt, and that of M. Richard, to call in question the reliability of the fragments of Theodore's works which were employed by his opponents in the fifth and sixth centuries, has been severely dealt with by F. A. Sullivan in a recent book, *The Christology of Theodore of Mopsuestia*.[1] This publication has settled one matter clearly. It is no longer possible to ignore the evidence supplied by these fragments in any attempt to reconstitute the outlines of Theodore's teaching. Sullivan's further examination of Theodore's christology follows along the lines suggested by the briefer comments of Parente,[2] McNamara,[3] and Diepen.[4] By a careful analysis of Theodore's christological terminology Sullivan seeks to show that despite its frequently orthodox appearance, and despite Theodore's protests against a doctrine of 'two Sons', his christology remains irrevocably dualistic and Nestorian in character. This conclusion is justified, not only by a consideration of what Theodore in fact means by the expression 'one *prosopon*', but also by his failure to formulate a doctrine of *communicatio idiomatum* and by his failure to distinguish adequately between 'person' and 'nature'. Sullivan's conclusion is basically negative in character: it is impossible either to deny that a strong dualism governs Theodore's doctrine of the incarnation, or to assert that his affirmation of the unity of Christ's Person may be understood to satisfy the terms of the Chalcedonian Definition. Sullivan, of course, makes no effort to relate Theodore's christology either with a set of philosophical presuppositions, or with other themes within his theological

[1] Sullivan's verdict on the textual question was in part anticipated by other writers. Cf. the review of Devréesse's *Essai* by I. Ortiz de Urbina, *Or. Chr. Per.* (1949), pp. 440 ff.; and K. McNamara, 'Theodore of Mopsuestia and the Nestorian Heresy', *Irish Theol. Quarterly*, xix (1952), p. 256. See also H. M. Diepen, 'L'assumptus homo à Chalcédoine', *Revue Thomiste* (1951), p. 587.

[2] 'Una Riabilitazione de Teodoro Mopsuesteno', *Doctor Communis* (1950), pp. 3–15. Parente concedes Devréesse's textual argument (p. 6), but insists that an examination of the sources Devréesse would admit as authentic reveals the dualism of Theodore's christology. Cf. esp. p. 7.

[3] Art. cit., with Part II (*Irish Theol. Quart.*, 1953, pp. 173 ff.). See esp. pp. 268 ff., where McNamara insists upon Theodore's 'failure to mark the distinction between nature and person', and his concomitant failure to grasp the principle of the *communicatio idiomatum*.

[4] 'L'assumptus homo à Chalcédoine', *Revue Thomiste*, li (1951), esp. pp. 577 ff. Theodore refuses to employ the principle of the *communicatio idiomatum* (pp. 578 f.) and teaches in effect a doctrine of 'two Sons' (p. 580): so that his use of the expression *assumptus homo* 'implique réellement la dualité des sujets' (p. 582).

system: for a positive evaluation of the historical significance and intent of Theodore's christology one must look elsewhere: possibly to Galtier, whose reply to Sullivan we have already mentioned.

Sullivan's judgement on the christology of Theodore is paralleled in the case of his doctrine of man by the verdict of Gross,[1] who has subjected Theodore's anthropology to a lengthy analysis with view to reviving in substance the classical charge of Pelagianism. Theodore, Gross insists, taught that Adam was created mortal: and this view, moreover, is substantially entailed by the doctrine of the Two Ages. Because Theodore substitutes this conception for the more traditional analysis of the course of human history into three stages, he is naturally unable to distinguish the state of Adam before the Fall from the present state of man—as the Fathers had customarily done.[2] Gross notes, as Sellers and Devréesse do not, the apparent inconsistency in Theodore's characterization of the relation between sin and death. Death, he observes, 'appears now as a punishment consequent on Adam's sin, now as the natural fate of all men, now as a punishment for personal sin'.[3] The explanation of this apparent inconsistency he finds in Theodore's tendency to use these traditional modes of expression 'without sharing the conception normally associated' with any one of them.[4] As Gross sees it, Theodore considered that death was natural to man in his first condition: and the result of Adam's Fall was not so much that Adam died, as that his death assumed the character of a punishment, and as such was transmitted to his posterity.[5] 'All in all', Gross concludes,

The Fall of Adam was, for Theodore, no descent from a higher, supernatural or praeternatural condition to a lower, perhaps merely natural condition—much less a genuine corruption of human nature. No more was it an interruption in the history of redemption, but much more a beginning, the first episode of the present world era, in which death and sin reign.[6]

From this point of view it was only natural that Theodore should oppose the Augustinian conception of inherited sin, as he did in the work excerpted in the *Collectio Palatina*. Moreover, Gross concludes, in this Theodore merely demonstrates his agreement with the *Schöpfungsoptimismus* of the whole Greek tradition, which is the root of Pelagianism.[7]

[1] Cf. 'Theodor von Mopsuestia, ein Gegner der Erbsundenlehre', in *Zeitschr. für Kirchengeschichte*, vol. lxv (1953–4), pp. 1–15.

[2] Ibid., pp. 4 f.   [3] Ibid., p. 7.

[4] Ibid. Gross relates Theodore's teaching to the position of others (e.g. Theophilus of Antioch) among the Fathers, 'die den Tod für eine Ursündenstrafe halten', but who 'annehmen, der urständliche Adem sei weder sterblich noch unsterblich, wohl aber für beides empfänglich gewesen'.

[5] Ibid.   [6] Op. cit., p. 9.   [7] Ibid., p. 15.

With the work of Gross and Sullivan, interpretation of Theodore's christology and his doctrine of man appears to have come full circle from its modern starting-point in the discussions of Dorner and Harnack. Theodore is again labelled, in effect, a Nestorian (though Galtier's work puts a question-mark behind this conclusion) and a Pelagian. There is, however, a difference between the earlier and the most recent interpretations, in that the latter have tended to be concerned almost exclusively with the problem of Theodore's position with regard to the narrowly theological questions of Pelagianism and Nestorianism—and with these, moreover, considered in isolation from each other. Apart from de Vries, with his hypothesis that Theodore's anthropological aberrations are rooted in his christological heterodoxy, and from the work of R. A. Greer, the question of a connexion between these two points of view has been, for the most part, neglected—with the result that the project of attempting a constructive interpretation of Theodore's position as a whole has also, in fact if not by intent, been set aside. Furthermore, the question of Theodore's philosophical affinities—and, in particular, that of the philosophical background of his doctrine of man—has been neglected, or dealt with summarily by repetition of the customary observations about his 'rationalism' and 'Aristotelianism'.[1]

[1] Cf., for example, K. McNamara, art. cit., in *Irish Theol. Quart.*, 1952, p. 259.

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